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Preface 
 
This eBook contains some of the first fruits of a large collaborative project funded by the EU’s 
DG Research under their FP7 Programme: an “infrastructure design study” whose ultimate goal 
is “Providing an Infrastructure for Research on Electoral Democracy in the European Union” – 
a title that gives rise to the unlovely acronym PIREDEU, referred to repeatedly in the pages that 
follow. 
 
The design study was complemented by a feasibility study conducted in the context of the 
2009 elections to the European Parliament. While somewhat restricted in breadth of coverage 
(for example the numbers of questions asked in voter and candidate surveys were limited by 
available funds) this was still a fully-fledged election study that included all the component 
parts needed to address fundamental questions regarding the quality of democracy in the 
European Union at the time of elections to the European Parliament. It included five of these 
components. 
 
- A voter study sought to interview about 1,000 respondents in each of the 27 
EU member countries. The questionnaires were identical in each country, apart from 
unavoidable differences due to party system particularities and language differences; 
- A candidate study sought to interview all candidates with any viable chance of 
actually gaining a seat in the European Parliament; 
- A media study content-analyzed newspapers, television channels and radio 
stations during a three-weed period leading up to the elections; 
- A manifesto study coded all the campaign platforms published by parties 
seeking representation in the European Parliament; 
- A contextual data study sought to collect all relevant statistical information 
regarding the outcome of the election in each of the 27 participating countries. 
 
In addition to these PIREDEU components, the design study was conducted in close 
collaboration with a study of an internet-based Voter Advice Application (the EU Profiler), 
administered under the same umbrella – the European Union Democracy Observatory (EUDO) 
– that also housed PIREDEU (see below). EU profiler data includes profiles of the policy 
positions of all parties contesting the EP elections of 2009, data that was intended to be linkable 
to PIREDEU data, providing many research opportunities. 
 
Less than a year after the elections (in April 2010), preliminary versions of the data resulting 
from these studies were released into the public domain for scholarly use. This release, apart 
from serving as a public demonstration of the viability of PIREDEU’s data collection strategy, 
was intended to serve a deeper purpose: to provide the project’s various stakeholders with the 
means to conduct actual research employing the released data. To stimulate the speedy 
completion of realistic examples of the type of research that could be conducted with 
PIREDEU data, scholars were invited to apply for funding to attend a conference in Brussels in 
November 2010. This was a widely-publicized high-profile conference that attracted the 
participation of some eighty academic researchers in addition to representatives of the media 
and political worlds. Some forty papers were presented at the conference, many of which were 
intended for later publication in peer-reviewed journals. However, some of the authors agreed 
to have their papers appear in a special-purpose publication, in very much the preliminary form 
in which they were presented at the conference. 
 
This eBook is the publication concerned. It contains 15 chapters (rather more than a third of 
the total number of papers presented at the conference) showcasing the range of variation found 
in the conference as a whole. Some of the conference papers concerned voters, some 
candidates, and some focused on media coverage, but many employed multiple data sources, 
investigating such topics as whether voters were aware of party manifesto promises or of 
i
candidate efforts to make themselves known; or the interaction between media content and 
educational attainment. The different ways in which the five PIREDEU components, together 
with EU Profiler data, could be fruitfully combined for academic research purposes is 
enormous, and our hope in organizing the conference was that scholars would employ a wide 
range of different combinations in addressing substantively important research questions. We 
were not disappointed. 
 
This eBook can be read in several ways. It provides an outlet for cutting-edge research on 
electoral democracy in Europe, and can be employed as a source from which to sample the 
nature of this research. More importantly, in terms of PIREDEU objectives, it provides a series 
of demonstrations of the nature of the research questions that can be addressed employing 
PIREDEU data – demonstrations that make it clear how vast are the research possibilities that 
could be addressed by means of the infrastructure that PIREDEU designed. And, finally, it 
provides conclusive evidence of the feasibility of an infrastructure provided according to the 
PIREDEU design. The resulting data will not lie unused in some archive. They will provide 
hundreds, perhaps thousands, of researchers with raw material for answering research questions 
of major academic and public interest. The present eBook contains only a very small sample of 
what is possible on the basis of just the data collected at a single election – a tiny foretaste of 
what will become possible on the basis of a fully-fledged infrastructure. 
 
I should not end this preface without a number of thank-yous. First I should thank all those 
who made possible the conference at which these papers were presented: the EU’s DG research 
for providing funding; the European Union Democracy Observatory at the European University 
Institute’s Robert Schumann Center for Advanced Studies, which provided administrative 
facilities (and some of the funding) for the conference’s organization as well as paying for the 
publication of this eBook; and all the scholars who took advantage of the opportunity to present 
papers at that conference. A special thank-you goes to those scholars who agreed to include 
their papers in this volume. I should not fail to also thank my co-editors, who spent many hours 
reading these fifteen papers and providing suggestions that would help their authors make the 
changes needed to bring even preliminary research results to publication standard. Finally I 
should thank those who worked so hard to proofread and correct the eBook. Conor Little and 
Catherine Mcging did an excellent job in a very short space of time. The actual typesetting I did 
myself and I am conscious that errors may have been injected at that stage for which our 
proofreaders are not responsible. 
 
Mark Franklin 
Cambridge, MA, and Florence, Italy, December 2011 
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Investigating candidate selection strategies:  
the case of 2009 European Parliament elections 
 
 
Massimiliano Andretta and Nicola Chelotti1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Candidate selection is widely recognized as a central feature in the life of every political party. 
If Gallagher (1988b: 276) defines it as “a key variable, not a peripheral factor” in the whole 
election process, Bille (2001) makes a cl ear link between the democratic credentials of a 
country and a widened participation in the candidate selection procedures. In the same vein, 
Rahat (2007) compares the candidate selection process to the devising of a menu, where 
democracy is the restaurant. Furthermore, as Cross (2008: 615) puts it, it can be argued that in 
several cases “party candidate selection processes may be equally or more determinative of 
who ends up in the legislature than are general elections”. 
 
Candidate selection is also one of the key indicators to discover where the power lies within 
parties: “he who can make the nomination is the owner of the party” (Scattschneider in 
Gallagher 1988a: 3). In particular scholars have investigated at what level (national versus 
local) and by which body (leader, selected agency, members, voters, etc.) candidates are 
chosen. In an analysis of nine countries, Gallagher and Marsh (1988) find that in a slight 
majority of the parties it is the territorial (regional and local) level which plays the major part 
and the centre has little influence. A general widening of the participation in the candidate 
selection process has been distinguished over the years: reforms undertaken by political parties 
have increased the number of people involved in the decisions. A democratization, a greater 
inclusiveness of the selectorate – that is, the body that selects the candidates – thus seem a 
reality (Hazan 2002; Pennings and Hazan 2001; Rahat and Hazan 2001; Scarrow et al. 2000): 
in Western parties in general (and in Denmark in particular), the role of the individual party 
member was greater and the process more decentralized in the 1990s than it was in the 1960s 
(Bille 2001). 
 
However, there is substantial variance in the degree of democratization of candidate selection 
procedures: parties greatly differ with regard to their selection methods, employing more or less 
inclusive strategies or involving to a greater or lesser extent the sub-national layers of the party. 
A few scope conditions have been put forward to explain these differences, among which the 
electoral system, party size, ideology and regional areas seem to play a major role (Gallagher 
and Marsh 1988; Lundell 2004). Finally, it has been observed that different candidate selection 
mechanisms have different consequences for the nature and workings of the parliament: they 
have a relevant impact on the qualities of the members of the parliament, their backgrounds and 
political experiences as well as on t heir behaviour and voting choices. As a result, party 
cohesion and the possibilities of realizing party’s and government’s political agendas can be 
highly affected (Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Rahat and Hazan 2001; Shomer 2009). 
 
This notwithstanding, the field is still relatively understudied, and – in spite of its importance 
– there is relative paucity of writings on this topic (Hazan 2002). Comparative data and 
analyses are still few (Rahat and Hazan 2001), and the state of the art of the “comparative 
research of candidate-selection methods is still in its early stages” (Rahat 2007: 165). Our 
1 Massimiliano Andretta was mainly responsible for the preparation of the second part (on the 
consequences of nomination strategies), while Nicola Chelotti focussed more on the first part (candidate 
selection strategies). The introduction and conclusion are the work of both authors. 
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knowledge of the candidates in European Parliament (EP) elections is even more limited: large-
scale, cross-national analyses on the determinants and consequences of EP candidate selection 
procedures are rare (Meserve et al. 2010). Faas (2003) has shown that Members of the 
European Parliaments (MEPs) selected through centralized methods tend to defect more from 
EP party group lines, while Hix (2004) reveals that more decentralized strategies lead MEPs to 
act more independently and follow the preferences of the voters rather than the party leaders. 
Meserve et al. (2010) – employing the biographies of the candidates for the 2009 EP elections – 
explore how patterns of EP candidate selection covary with political parties’ ideological 
positions, internal selection mechanisms, and electoral contexts. They find that parties with 
different attitudes toward European integration pursue differing strategies when selecting 
candidates for European office; and that candidates with more political experience follow 
specific patterns of selection procedures; and conclude that “the character of an EP national 
delegation is not formed in a vacuum, but rather is the end result of the domestic environment 
political parties operate within” (p. 25).   
 
This chapter contributes to this literature and uses the data generated by the PIREDEU 
project to increase our knowledge on the candidate selection process in the EP. The PIREDEU 
data2 are a welcome and useful addition to this literature for a number of reasons. In spite of 
some limitations (low response rate, and consequent doubts on how representative the data can 
be [see Meserve et al. 2010]), they offer a standard set of answers from all the candidates which 
allow a more precise investigation of candidate selection dynamics. Second, these data can be 
used to statistically explore candidate selection processes. Gallagher and Marsh (1988), 
employing qualitative case studies in their collective research, argued in favour of a 
quantitative strategy in order to have a clearer picture of the determinants and consequences of 
the candidate selection process (Gallagher 1988b). 
 
Third, in most of the literature, the unit of analysis is the individual party (Rahat and Hazan 
2001; Hazan 2002; Hazan and Rahat 2006; Meserve et al. 2010). However, as Gallagher 
(1988a) has aptly underlined, the selection of the candidates (in both dimensions, centralization 
and inclusiveness) may vary not only between parties but also within them; some actors within 
the parties may have more influence and leverage over some candidates than over others. This 
complicates the task of the researcher and makes the choice of the party (rather than the single 
candidate) as unit of analysis potentially problematic. Furthermore, in several cases the primary 
selecting agency may be difficult to locate, because several selectorates and levels may be 
involved in the process, as happens in mixed and in multi-stage candidate selection methods 
(Rahat and Hazan 2002). As a result, the single candidate is, empirically, in a very good 
position to know where her candidacy comes from. 
 
The chapter is organized as follows. Consistent with the research design and objectives of the 
literature mentioned above, we first give evidence of the degree of inclusiveness/exclusiveness, 
and of centralization/decentralization in EP parties’ strategies. Next, we identify different 
strategies parties use to nominate candidates. The challenge is to find patterns which go beyond 
the indicator of the party territorial level. Using several indicators that consider also the 
importance of actors external and/or internal to the party structure in the nomination strategies, 
three strategies are proposed (Euro-societal; inclusive; co-optation). Moreover, we advance a 
few explanatory variables to explain the determinants of candidate selection. In the second part 
of the chapter, we focus on the consequences of different selection mechanisms on the qualities 
and voting behaviours of 2009 EP elections candidates: do different patterns of selection select 
different types of candidates? Do they have an impact on their (likely) voting behaviour? A 
concluding section summarizes our findings and briefly discusses further avenues of research. 
 
2 European Election Study, (2009), European Parliament  E lection Study 2009, [Voter Study and 
Candidate Study, and Contextual Data],  [Advance Release], 24/10/2010, (www.piredeu.eu). 
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Candidate Selection Strategies 
 
Inclusiveness/Exclusiveness and Centralization/Decentralization 
The first aim of this chapter is to describe and map the different party strategies in the 
nomination of the EP election candidates. The 2003/2004 Regulation in clarifying the 
respective competences of EP groups and political parties at the European level assigned to the 
latter the responsibility to conduct elections for the EP. National parties are the instruments 
through which the political parties at the European level campaign. As mentioned in the 
introduction, national parties adopt very different strategies when selecting their candidates 
(Cross 2008). These variations occur along two principal dimensions: centralization and 
inclusiveness of these selection procedures (Lundell 2004; Hazen 2002; Bille 2001). In other 
words, they refer to, and ask, the following questions: “who selects the candidates?” and 
“where are the candidates selected?” (Rahat and Hazan 2001). 
 
First of all, the selectorate is the key feature of the selection process (Hazan and Rahat 
2006). On a continuum of inclusiveness to exclusiveness, at one extreme, it is when the entire 
electorate has the right to participate in the process (American open primaries which can be 
more – for instance, Hawaii, Wisconsin, Michigan – or less open). At the other extreme, it is the 
case of a si ngle party leader (in Mexico’s long-ruling Revolutionary party until 2000); or a 
special nomination committee composed of a few party leaders, or of the party founders (ultra-
Orthodox Israeli religious parties), who select the candidates and ratify en bloc (Rahat 2007). 
Between these two extremes, it is possible to locate most of the parties: in some cases t he 
selectors are dues-paying party members’ primaries (closer to the inclusive end of the 
continuum). In other cases, selected party agencies (closer to the exclusive extreme), where the 
selector is an agency of the party or an ad hoc convention of delegates, play the major role in 
the candidate selection process. 
 
The second issue refers to the location of this selectorate: this can be highly centralized, 
when candidates are selected exclusively by a national party body. Or, vice versa, procedures 
are envisaged to allow for territorial (regional, local) and/or functional representation (trade 
unions, minorities, women, etc.). Significant numbers of cases fall between central party 
control and complete independence of the local levels (Cross 2008). Some parties in Israel fully 
centralize the selection procedures, whereas the US system represents full decentralization 
(Rahat 2007). In many parts of Europe (in Norway, for instance), the selectorate at the local 
level plays the major role in candidate selection strategies (Rahat and Hazan 2001). 
 
However, as several scholars argue (Penning and Hazan 2001; Rahat 2007), local processes 
can equally be highly exclusive: potentially more voters might participate in a centralized 
rather than in a local selection. For instance, national primaries, despite their centralization, are 
extremely inclusive, whereas a few individual local leaders each choosing their favourite 
candidate/s represents a highly exclusive process. 
 
The PIREDEU dataset3 allows us to describe these strategies on a large scale. If we exclude 
the missing values, it emerges that 59 percent of our respondents declared they were nominated 
for the EP elections at the national level, while 34 and 7 percent respectively, at the regional 
3 For all the analyses of this chapter, we weighted the dataset by comparing our data based on 
respondents with the actual number of candidates for each party in each country. “Description: This 
weight corrects for the number of candidates of a party which were contacted in relation the number of 
candidates of the respective party in the dataset over all countries. Hence, the weight is calculated for 
each party in relation to the overall sample of all countries. For example, the candidates of Party A 
represent 1% of the candidates contacted in all countries. The proportion of the candidates of Party A in 
the dataset is .9%. For those candidates, this would result in a weight of 1/.9=1.111” (Giebler, Haus and 
Weßels, 2010: 205). 
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and local level. More than 45 percent of them were selected by their party executive board, 14 
percent by appointed party members, 22 percent by elected party members, 15 percent by all 
party members and only 2 percent were directly elected by voters.  
 
Voting versus appointment is another dimension usually employed to classify candidate 
selection methods (Rahat and Hazel 2001; Hazel 2002). When the list is appointed, its 
composition can be more easily controlled. On the other side, with a voting system, it is much 
more difficult for the party bodies to command the selection process. For 35 percent of the 
interviewees the selection procedures did not require a vote, while for about 18 percent a 
certain share of votes, for 21 percent a relative majority and for 26 percent an absolute majority, 
respectively, were necessary in order to get nominated. Members of the EP have been important 
(or very important)4 for 35 percent of the respondents, national party officials for 67 percent, 
regional or local party officials for 59 percent. Individual party members were considered 
important by 47 pe rcent of the interviewees, while non-party, minority organizations’ and 
interest groups’ members were relevant for only 12 percent of them. About 50 percent of 
respondents were encouraged to stand as a EP candidate by a national party official, about 46 
percent by a regional/local official; 17 percent by a sitting MEP, 6 percent by a retired MEP, 24 
percent by other community leaders, 13 p ercent by a representative of an interest group, 27 
percent by their spouse/partner and 23 percent by other family members. 
 
Advancing a Few Explanatory Variables 
In order to reduce the complexity of these answers and better interpret this information, we 
factored the data relative to nomination strategies by using a Varimax method of rotation. All 
the items that have been mentioned and briefly described in the previous section are used, with 
the exclusion of the people who had encouraged respondents to stand as EP candidates. The 
factor analysis has isolated three main components which explain more than 60 percent of the 
variance. As we can see in table 15, the first component isolates respondents for whom both the 
EU level and the societal level were more important than the national party organization 
(“Eurosocietal strategy”); the second component isolates candidates who have been appointed 
through decentralized and democratic procedures (“Inclusive party strategy”); finally, the third  
 
Table 1.  Nomination strategies. Rotated Component Matrix (Varimax method – only variable 
scores loading more than ± .4 in each component are shown). 
Strategies of nomination Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 
Territorial (from local to national) ---- -.66 --- 
Degree of centralization (from voters to 
national party bodies) 
--- -.66 --- 
EP members: important .59 --- --- 
National party officials: important --- -.58 .62 
Local party officials: important --- --- .87 
Individual party members: important --- .56 --- 
Non party members: important .81 --- --- 
Minority organizations: important .89 --- --- 
Interest groups: important .82 --- -- 
Type of strategy identified Euro-societal Inclusive party Co-optation 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4 The importance of different actors for the EP elections candidature are measured on a 5  points scale, 
ranging from 0 (not at all important) to 5 (very important). Here we report the percentage of those 
respondents who attached particularly high value to this variable (4 or 5). 
5 For a more detailed explanation of these variables and their coding, see the Appendix – see the 
Appendix also for tables 3, 4, 5 and 7. 
4
component isolates those interviewees who have been co-opted by both national and regional 
party’s leaders (“co-optation strategy”).   
 
It thus emerges that political parties use different strategies to nominate their EP candidates: 
some are more centralized, others are more inclusive, or involve the participation of actors 
external to the party organization. In the rest of this section we test a few, preliminary, variables 
to explain the variance in selection strategies adopted by European parties for the 2009 EP 
elections. A first element is a) ideology. Lundell (2004) hypothesizes that more extreme parties 
employ more centralized selection mechanisms than other parties; and Gallagher and Marsh 
(1988) use the nature of the party (Rational-Efficient Party versus and Democratic Type) as one 
of their (five) independent variables. A second factor that can have an impact is b) region. 
Lundell (2004), for instance, makes a distinction between Northern, Central and Southern 
Europe, and – although recognizing some problems in studying regions as a separate variable 
because “they consist of several separate values that together explain more than single and 
separate variables” (Ivi: 40) – he finds that region is the most important determinant of 
candidate selection. In particular, he reveals that parties in Northern Europe apply decentralized 
selection procedures, while in South Europe centralization is the favourite strategy. 
 
The last independent variable that can explain nomination strategy is c) the degree of 
proportionality of the EP electoral systems, measured by the Gallagher index. The electoral system 
is indeed said to affect the candidate selection procedures in several ways. Lundell (2004) tests both 
district magnitude and preferential voting. Decentralization occurs when the electoral system 
provides for small constituencies, and centralization in case of large multi-member constituencies, 
as, among other things, there is need for coordination in compiling party lists. Furthermore, 
preferential voting is assumed to have a decentralizing effect on candidate selection.  
 
Table 2. Nomination strategies: EU geographical areas and countries’ type of EU  
 Eurosocietal Inclusive party strategy Cooptation 
 Mean Mean Mean 
 
North EU countries 
 
.45 
 
.56 
 
.48 
Continental EU  .45 .51 .51 
South EU  .45 .36 .50 
Central-East EU  .54 .39 .53 
Total .47 .50 .50 
Eta .09* .26*** N.s. 
Old EU (15) countries .46 .52 .49 
New EU countries .53 .39 .52 
Total .47 .49 .50 
Eta .10** .18*** N.s. 
 
We saved the components of the factor analysis as variables and rescaled them from “0” to 
“1”. It emerges that there are differences in the strategies adopted to select EP candidates, 
among EU geographical areas and type of country membership6 as well as among candidates’, 
parties' and party voters’ political positions (in terms of left and right). As table 2 shows, in fact, 
Eurosocietal strategies seem to be more associated with respondents coming from Central-East 
6 We classified the 27 countries as follows: North EU (Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, the 
UK); Continental EU (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg), South EU (Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain) and Central-East EU (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia). Malta and Cyprus are excluded from this classification because their 
inclusion in South EU would be problematic. Finally we distinguish between the old (the 15 countries 
members of the EU before the 2004 enlargement) and the new EU countries.   
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EU countries, and from countries whose EU membership is new; while Inclusive party 
strategies are more widespread among candidates from North and Continental EU countries. 
Co-optation is instead equally used among all EU member states. Table 3 shows that the more 
candidates, parties and voters are leftist the more nomination strategy is inclusive, while the 
more they are rightist the more the strategy adopted is co-optation from party leaders. 
Regarding the degree of proportionality, PIREDEU data reveal (table 3) that, somewhat 
surprisingly, the more the electoral system is proportional the more the nomination strategy is 
inclusive and the less it is based on a ctors external to the national party organization 
(Eurosocietal strategy). 
 
Table 3. Bivariate correlations between nomination strategies, political positions (left-right) 
and proportionality (Gallagher Index) of the national EP electoral systems (Pearson 
coefficients) 
 
Political position of Eurosocietal Inclusive Cooptation 
 
Candidates  
 
   n.s. 
 
-.90** 
 
.11*** 
Candidates’ party    n.s. -.11*** .10** 
Party’ voters    n.s. -.07* .12*** 
Gallagher Index -.10**   .17**    n.s. 
 
In this first section of the chapter we have traced different nomination strategies and 
underlined three possible patterns. The first is external to national party organization, and 
implies that potential candidates find strong allies at the European level (for instance MEPs) 
and/or at the societal level (i.e. interest groups); the second is internal to party organization, but 
candidates are chosen by both local levels and party members (or directly by voters); finally, 
the third is the classic co-optation model in which party leaders decide the candidatures. We 
have revealed that inclusive strategies are less developed in Southern and Central-Eastern EU 
countries and in the new EU members; while they are associated with leftist political positions 
and more proportional electoral systems.  
 
 
Consequences of Nomination Strategies 
 
Different candidate selection methods are said to have relevant consequences for the functioning 
of a parliament. They produce different candidates and lead to different political consequences, 
determining “much of how the party looks and what it does”, “more than its organisation or even 
its manifesto … In short, candidate selection affects the essence of modern democratic 
governance” (Hazan and Rahat 2006: 367-368). Gallagher and Marsh (1988) and Hazan and 
Rahat (2006) focus, in particular, on the consequences of candidate selection for the composition 
of the legislature, the behaviour of the MPs, and party cohesion. Only for the latter outcome does 
Gallagher (1988b) find evidence that candidate selection played an important role. 
 
What are, therefore, the implications for the selection of candidates of the three different 
nomination strategies? Are there any mechanisms of candidate selection which assure a better 
quality of candidate? What are the consequences on the voting behaviour of (once elected) 
MEPs? We attempt to give an answer to these questions, and explore the consequences of 
selection strategies, by looking at: 1) the candidates’ political experience, 2) their attitude 
toward the EU and the EP, and 3) their degree of independence in their (potential) legislative 
behaviour in the Parliament.  
MEPs Political Experience 
Meserve et al. (2010) reveal that parties with centralized selection mechanisms tend to choose 
candidates for the EP elections with national and party executive backgrounds, whereas more 
6
decentralized parties are more likely to send people with more local experience. Parties’ 
internal methods seem thus to have an influence on the type of MPs they select. In this part of 
the chapter we investigate similar dynamics and phenomena. As far as political experience is 
concerned, we look at three main dimensions: the experience in party organizations, in 
representative institutions and in the executive branch. The PIREDEU data show that 
(excluding missing values) about 50 percent, 23 percent and 20 percent of respondents have 
been (or currently are) members of parliaments/councils at local, regional and national level, 
respectively; 8 percent have direct experience of EP membership; and 27 percent, 9 percent and 
5 percent have experience in executives at local, regional and national level, respectively. As far 
as party organization is concerned, as many as 85 percent and 80 percent of the interviewees 
report to have been, or to be members and/or to hold, or to have held in the past, an office in the 
local/regional and national party structure. We, then, built three indicators of political 
experience: a representative, an executive and a  party  experience  index  which  range  from  0 
(no experience) to 1 (great experience). Table 4 r eports, respectively, the means of these 
indexes by countries, classified according to the four EU geographical areas and the type of EU 
membership. 
 
 
Table 4. Indexes of political experience: EU geographical areas and countries’ type of EU 
membership (means) 
 
 
 
Representative 
experience index 
Executive 
experience index 
Party 
experience index 
    
North EU .22 .12 .84 
Continental EU .19 .09 .91 
South EU .35 .15 .64 
Central-East EU .20 .15 .71 
Total .22 .12 .81 
Eta .17*** .11** .27*** 
Old EU (15) .22 .11 .84 
New EU .20 .15 .71 
Total  .22 .12 .81 
Eta n.s.  .07* .15*** 
 
As we can see, experience in representative institutions is more widespread among 
respondents of Southern EU countries, experience in executive institutions comparatively lower 
in continental Europe, and party experience is greater among candidates of the North and 
Continental EU and of the old EU countries. 
 
Attitudes Towards the EU Integration Process 
Attitudes toward the EU and the EP are measured by using several indicators. Some are related 
to the respondents’ opinions on the power of the EP7: about 80 percent of them agree that the 
EP should have the right to initiate legislation, 73 percent that the EP should have equal power 
with the Council in all areas of EU legislation, 76 percent that the EP should have equal power 
with the Council to amend the budget, 75 pe rcent that the Commission President should be 
nominated by the EP rather than the Council, and 84 percent that the EP should be able to 
remove individual Commissioners from office. Others are indicators of opinion toward the 
process of a European integration8: 57 percent sustain that integration should be pushed further, 
7 All the items concerning the EP range from 1 (strongly agree with the statement) to 7 (strongly 
disagree). In our analysis we report the percentage of respondents which answered from 1 to 3. 
8 These items vary between 0 (integration has already gone too far) to 10 (it should be pushed further): 
we report the percentage of respondents giving a high value (from 6 to 10). 
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but only 49 percent recognise that their party position – and 38 percent that their party voters’ 
opinion – are the same. Regarding the views on the EU as a w hole, 56 percent of the 
interviewees have a great or a fair amount of confidence that decisions made by the EU will be 
in the interest of their country; 22 percent claim that European unity threatens their country’s 
identity; 53 percent believe that the EU has strengthened democracy, while about 50 percent 
affirm that the EU is over regulating in several sectors, and 20 percent state that the EU has 
greatly harmed their country’s economy. Finally, 49 percent trust EU institutions (strongly or 
enough), and 71 percent feel proud of being European. In order to make sense of, and to reduce 
the complexity of, all the information we get from these indicators, we run a factor analysis 
(Varimax rotation method) once again. We then identified two components which explain 63 
percent of the variance of the 15 indicators used (see  table 5).  The  first  component  identifies 
those respondents who strongly support the EU as  a  whole,  while  the  second  includes those 
interviewees who strongly oppose any further increase of the EP's power. We rescaled the two 
variables so that they now range from 0 (low value for that component) to 1 (high value for that 
component). 
 
 
Table 5. Attitudes toward the EU and EP. Rotated Component Matrix (Varimax method – only 
the scores loading higher than ± .4 in each component are showed). 
   
 Component 1 Component 2 
   
The EP: initiate legislation -.42 .66 
The EP: equal power in legislation   -- .84 
The EP: equal power in budget   -- .85 
The EP: nominate the President   -- .81 
The EP: remove Commissioners   -- .71 
European integration.: candidate  .84 -- 
European integration.: party  .10 -- 
European integration.: voters  .75 -- 
EU decisions in the country interest -.83 -- 
EU threatens country’s identity  .71 -- 
EU strengthened democracy -.75 -- 
EU subjects to too much regulation . 66 -- 
EU harmed country’s economy  .79 -- 
Trust in EU institutions -.82 -- 
Feel proud of being European -.63 -- 
EU attitude identified Strongly pro EU Strongly against 
EP power 
 
 
 
Table 6 s hows that candidates from Southern, Central-Eastern and new EU countries are 
more likely to support the EU but, at the same time, also oppose more strongly any increase of 
EP powers. 
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Table 6. Attitudes toward EU and EP: EU geographical areas and countries’ type of 
EU membership (means) 
   ______________________________________________________________ 
 Strongly Pro EU Against EP powers 
   
North EU .38 .56 
Continental EU .51 .40 
South EU .58 .48 
Central-East EU .60 .59 
Total .48 .51 
Eta .31*** .25*** 
Old EU (15) .45 .49 
New EU .60 .58 
Total  .48 .51 
Eta .20*** .12*** 
  
 
 
What Legislative Behaviour? 
The last dimension we take into consideration in this section concerns the potential legislative 
behaviour of the candidates once they are elected to the EP. It is a common assumption in the 
literature that more decentralized and inclusive selection methods can lead more easily to 
instability in legislative behaviour (Pennings and Hazan 2001). The MPs are exposed to various 
and sometimes conflicting pressures; and will respond mainly to non-party mediators, or to the 
demands of their (more local, more inclusive) selectorates. As a result, they have more 
incentives to deviate from the party programme; and party cohesion is threatened as a 
consequence of low levels of party discipline. This lack of cohesiveness can lead to a decline in 
the ability of the parties to operate effectively in the parliamentary arena. On the other side, 
with more exclusive candidate selection strategies the MPs will be more likely to respond to 
party actors, as they owe their position to the party leadership. When lists and nominations are 
controlled at the central level, legislators are more inclined to follow party lines in parliament.  
 
Consequently, some authors argue that there is a trade-off between inclusiveness and party 
discipline (Hazan 2002). The narrow personal interests of a MP chosen by a more inclusive 
selectorate may overcome the more general party (or even voters’) interests. After a 
democratization of the selection process in three Israeli leading parties (Labour, Likud and 
Meretz), what has been witnessed was a breakdown of party discipline, and a decrease of the 
effective government control of the parliamentary agenda. In two legislatures (1992-96; 1996-
99) the majority of the bills passed were private members' bills. Finally, a reverse process of 
democratization occurred: both Meretz and Likud adopted less inclusive selection procedures, 
“receding from the precipice” (Rahat and Hazan 2001: 316), and the behaviour of the MPs 
returned to being more disciplined and less independent. 
 
In the case of the EP these views are confirmed: candidate selection mechanisms influence 
party cohesion: more exclusive strategies induce MEPs to vote closer to national party lines, 
while inclusive and decentralized selection procedures create greater incentives for legislators 
to raise their personal profile (Faas 2003; Hix 2004). 
 
Using a different data set (with data at the individual rather than aggregate level), Shomer 
(2009) reveals that Israeli MPs selected through inclusive procedures do not act so as to 
enhance their personal reputations more than those chosen by less democratized methods. 
Instead, he advances an alternative explanation, arguing that it is the MPs’ seniority which can 
explain legislators’ vote-seeking behaviour both at the individual as well as the aggregate level. 
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In this case, therefore, Parliamentary efficiency seemed not so much affected (decreased) by 
candidate selection strategies. 
 
Analysing the PIREDEU data, it emerges that 53 percent think that, in case of opinion 
divergence, MEPs should vote according to their voters’ opinion rather than their party’s one; 
about 63 percent according to their own opinion, and finally 68 percent think that MEPs should 
vote according to their country’s interests rather than their party’s. Next, we built an index of 
independent legislative behaviour which scores from 0 ( no independence) to 3 ( maximum 
independence; if they would vote according to their opinion even if in contrast to their party’s, 
their voters’ positions). 
 
Table 7 examines, again, whether there are any country differences and reveals that 
candidates are potentially more independent in North and Continental Europe, while no 
difference can be observed as far as the type of EU membership is considered. 
 
 
        Table 7. Independent EP legislative behaviour: EU geographical  
areas and countries’ type of EU membership (means) 
 
 
Independence of 
legislative behaviour 
  
North EU 1.1 
Continental EU 1.2 
South EU 0.9 
Central-East EU 0.9 
Total 0.9 
Eta 0.17*** 
Old EU (15) 1.1 
New EU 0.9 
Total  1.0 
Eta 1.06* 
   
 
 
Advancing Some Explanations 
Once we have explored the variables related to respondents’ attitudes, the objective of the 
chapter is to investigate whether the nomination strategies are relevant in selecting candidates 
with particular views and potential behaviour. We test this hypothesis by using bivariate 
correlations between the three nomination strategies and the three groups of variables 
considered in this section: political experience; attitude toward EU and the EP; and the 
potential independence of legislative behaviour in the EP. 
 
 
Table 8 indicates that Eurosocietal strategies are more associated with a pro-EU attitude, but 
with a less (potentially) independent legislative behaviour; moreover, inclusive strategies often 
imply both more party experience and more independent candidates, while co-optation tends to 
‘produce’ candidates with extensive party experience but with more negative attitudes towards 
any further increase of EP powers. 
  
10
Table 8. Implications of nomination strategies: Pearson’s coefficients 
 
 Representative 
Experience 
Executive 
Experience 
Party 
Experience 
Pro-EU 
attitude 
Against 
increasing 
EP powers 
Independent 
Behaviour 
       
Eurosocietal -- --  -- .11***  -- -.07* 
Inclusive -- -- .11***  --  --  .08** 
Cooptation -- -- .07*  -- .09**   n.s. 
 
 
 
To draw more accurate and sound conclusions, these effects must be controlled for other 
variables; as a result, a linear regression analysis is performed using the “potential independent 
legislative behaviour” as dependent variable (table 9). We used an “enter” method to estimate 
different models in which, first, only control variables are tested; next, other relevant attitudes  
 
 
Table 9. Linear Regression: the implications of nomination strategies for candidate selection 
(independent legislative behaviour).Standard errors and significance within parentheses. 
 
Dep. Variable:  Independence of legislative behaviour 
 Beta (b)        Beta (b)             Beta (b) 
Independ. Variables:     
Control   
Gender (dummy) n.s. n.s n.s. 
Education (categorical) n.s n.s n.s 
Under 45 (dummy) n.s n.s n.s 
Lower class (dummy) n.s n.s n.s 
Attitudes   
Exp. In re. inst.  n.s. n.s 
Exp. In Excut.  n.s n.s 
Exp. In party org.  .10 (.06**) .09 (.06*) 
Strong pro EU att.    .18 (.04***)    .18 (.04***) 
Against EP att.  n.s n.s 
Left-right posit.  -.08 (.02*) n.s. 
Nomination strategies   
Eurosocietal    -.10 (.04**) 
Inclusive   .09 (.04*) 
Cooptation   n.s. 
Gallagher index   n.s. 
R 0.11 0.25 0.29 
Sig. F change 0.09 0.00 0.00 
N. of cases (dep. Var.)     1,220    1,220   1,220 
 
and political views are added, and, finally, the three nomination strategies (obtained and 
discussed in the first section) are entered in the model controlled for the proportionality of the 
EP national electoral system. It can be noticed that the nomination strategy remains relevant 
even when other independent variables are controlled for: a potential independent legislative 
behaviour is associated with a good party organization experience, and a strong pro-EU 
attitude, but it also prevails when nomination strategies are less Eurosocietal and more 
inclusive.  
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Our analysis thus confirms that more democratized parties may bring about more 
independent MEPs; and that independence does not affect candidates’ chances of being elected, 
as no correlation has been observed between our dependent variable, the candidates' position 
(safe, uncertain, implausible) in the lists and their actual election as MEPs. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Candidate selection is an essential feature of modern politics: those who are elected will form 
the new parliament and shape its activities, policies and objectives. In this chapter we have 
analysed the 2009 EP candidates’ responses to a set of questions on how, where and by whom 
their candidacy was decided. In this way, the objective is to contribute to a better understanding 
of an important, but somehow neglected, topic. Furthermore, PIREDEU data allow us to offer a 
large-scale, cross-national analysis of the candidates to the 2009 EP elections. In this 
concluding section we summarize our main findings and briefly indicate how to improve our 
analysis. 
 
First, we have shown that 59 percent of the interviewees declared they were nominated at 
the national level; and that EP candidate selection procedures were, to a good extent, exclusive: 
more than 45 percent of them have been selected by their party’s executive board, 14 percent 
by appointed party members, 22 p ercent by elected party members, 15 percent by all party 
members and only 2 percent directly by voters.  
 
Second, we have run a factor analysis and distinguished three possible patterns: a “Eurosocietal”; 
an “inclusive party ”; and a “co-optation” strategy, each representing a distinct selection method and 
logic: respectively, the influence of the EU and the societal level; decentralized and democratic 
procedures; appointment by both national and regional party’s leaders. 
 
Third, we have proposed a few, preliminary, explanatory variables, and underlined that 
inclusive strategies are less developed in Southern and Central-Eastern Europe and in the new 
EU member states. Moreover, they are associated with leftist political positions and more 
widespread in more proportional electoral contexts.  
 
Fourth, we analysed whether different candidate selection methods have relevant 
consequences on the composition and functioning of the legislature. Experience in 
representative institutions is more widespread among respondents of Southern EU countries, 
while candidates from continental Europe spent a lower number of years in executive bodies, 
and those from North and Continental Europe and from old EU countries had more 
responsibilities and positions within the party. Eurosocietal strategies are more associated with 
a pro-EU attitude; and candidates are potentially more independent in Northern and Continental 
EU countries. Moreover, a potential independent legislative behaviour is associated with a 
strong party organization experience and a strong pro-EU attitude. Our analysis finally 
confirms that more democratized parties may bring about more independent MEPs. In order to 
further corroborate this finding, a useful strategy would be to cross-check the behaviour of the 
MEPs in the European Parliament, by looking at the number of private members’ bills each MP 
proposed and enacted; the number of questions they introduced; and the number of speeches 
they gave in the plenum (Shomer 2009). Further variables can be employed to make our 
analysis more complete and meticulous. Although Lundell (2004) finds no correlation between 
the political structure of a country and candidate selection methods, in Gallagher and Marsh’s 
(1988) study, the only strong association found is between federalism and decentralization: in 
national polities, the national party bodies often play a marginal role in the choice of 
candidates. Another factor that can be tested is the party size: large parties are said to adopt 
more centralized selection procedures, whereas small parties, relying often on the power of 
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well-known figures at the local level, are more open, more flexible and employ a decentralized 
approach. Finally, it can be argued that more pro-European parties tend to nominate candidates 
with deeper political experiences, as they place a greater value on EU politics (Meserve et al. 
2010). 
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Appendix: List of variables used in this chapter. 
 
Table 1 
 
Strategies of nomination 
Territorial: from local to national 
recoded from var. Were you Nominated as an Official Candidate for the EP election? 
1.On the local level 
2.On the regional level 
3.On the national level 
 
Degree of centralization 
Recoded var. Who Officially Nominated You to run for the EP election? 
1.Voters 
2.All party members 
3.Elected party members 
4.Appointed party members 
5.Party’s executive board 
 
EP members: important 
Var.  Importance for EP candidate selection: European Parliamentarians of your party 
Likert  ranging from 1 (not important) to 5 (very important) 
 
National party Officials: important 
Var. Importance for EP candidate selection:  National party officials 
Likert  ranging from 1 (not important) to 5 (very important) 
 
Local party officials: important 
Var. Importance for EP candidate selection:  Local party officials 
Likert  ranging from 1 (not important) to 5 (very important) 
 
Individual party members: important 
Var. Importance for EP candidate selection:  Individual party members 
Likert  ranging from 1 (not important) to 5 (very important) 
 
Non party members:  important 
Var. Importance for EP candidate selection:  Non  party members  
Likert  ranging from 1 (not important) to 5 (very important) 
 
Minority organizations: important 
Var. Importance for EP candidate selection: Minority organizations 
Likert  ranging from 1 (not important) to 5 (very important) 
 
Interest Groups: important 
Var. Importance for EP candidate selection:  Interest groups 
Likert  ranging from 1 (not important) to 5 (very important) 
 
 
Table 3 
 
All variables related with political position: 
In terms of left and right what is (your, your party, your party’ voters) position? 
Likert ranging from 1 (left) to 10 (right) 
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Gallagher index: we attributed to each candidate the Gallagher degree of proportionality of 
their national electoral system for the EP elections 
 
 
Table 4 
 
Representative experience  index: 
Original variables: 
Are you/have you ever be member of a local representative body? 
Are you/have you ever be member of a regional  representative body? 
Are you/have you ever be member of a national representative body? 
Are you/have you ever be member of the EP? 
 
All variables: 1. Yes, at the moment, 2. Yes, in the past, 3. Never 
All recoded as: 0. Never; 1. Yes, at the moment or in the past 
Construction of the Index: normalized addition of the 4 recoded variables ranging from 0 to 1 
 
Executive experience index 
Original variables: 
Are you/have you ever been a member of local government? 
Are you/have you ever been a member of regional government? 
Are you/have you ever been a member of national government? 
 
All variables: 1. Yes, at the moment, 2. Yes, in the past, 3. Never 
All recoded as: 0. Never; 1. Yes, at the moment or in the  past 
Construction of the Index: normalized addition of the 3 recoded variables ranging from 0 to 1 
 
Party experience index: 
Original variables: 
Are you/were you member/held an office in local/regional party organization? 
Are you/were you member/held an office in local/regional party organization? 
 
Both variables: 1. Yes, at the moment, 2. Yes, in the past, 3. Never 
Both recoded as: 0. Never; 1. Yes, at the moment or in the past 
Construction of the Index: normalized addition of the 2 recoded variables ranging from 0 to 1 
 
 
Table 5 
 
All variables related to the EP: agreement with the statement, ranging from 1 (strongly agree 
with the statement) to 7 (strongly disagree) 
 
All variables related to the positions on the European integration process: agreement with the 
statement, ranging from 0 (has already gone too far) to 10 (should be pushed further) 
 
Confidence that decisions made by the EU will be  in the country interest  
Likert ranging from 1 (great deal of confidence) to 4 (no confidence at all) 
 
All other variables related to the EU: agreement with the statement, ranging from 1 (strongly 
agree with the statement) to 7 (strongly disagree) 
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Table 7 
 
Independent Variable: Independence of legislative behavior 
Original variables: 
How should a MEP vote if his opinion doesn’t correspond with his party’s voters position? 
1.According to own opinion 
2.According to voters’ opinion 
 
How should a MEP vote if his opinion doesn’t correspond with his party’s voters position? 
1.According to own opinion 
2.According to his party’s opinion 
 
Index assigns 0 if respondents answer in both “2”; 1 if in one of them answer 1;  and 2 if in 
both answers 2 
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Misconstruing the European Project?  
How Welfare Issues Colour Attitudes Towards Europe. 
 
 
Laurie Beaudonnet1 
 
 
Abstract 
This chapter analyzes the impact of the welfare state on public opinion towards European 
integration at the time of the 2009 European elections. It has been established that citizens 
are increasingly aware of the social and political implications of European integration but 
the role of the welfare regime has been regarded mostly as contextual. Yet, the integration 
process challenges the social boundaries of nation states and the double relationship that 
binds citizens to their welfare state (economic dependence) and to the community (a sense 
of belonging). This phenomenon is not without consequences for individual attitudes. This 
study provides an empirical test of the relationship between support for Europe and the 
welfare state in a b road sense, using a multilevel approach and linking data from the 
Eurobarometer 71.3 (2009) and the 2009 E uropean Election Media Study. I first 
investigate the importance of dependence on the welfare regime and welfare attitudes for 
individual support for Europe, and second the influence of the welfare regime and the 
salience of welfare issues in the media on these attitudes. This approach adds explanatory 
value to the customary models by accounting for the political dimension of support for 
Europe and by showing that attitudes regarding the welfare state have an independent 
significant effect in explaining public support for Europe.  
 
 
Introduction  
 
It has been shown that economic concerns have been playing a role in support for European 
integration for a long time. Citizens are sensitive to whether integration benefits them (the main 
issue here being mobility and employment opportunity) and their country (especially in terms 
of economic conditions and trade). In a context of economic crisis and ongoing challenges to 
and reforms of welfare regimes in many European countries, social concerns are likely to affect 
support for Europe. The 2009 European Parliament elections offer a good opportunity to test 
whether the European project is a viewed as a threat to social protection by its citizens. 
 
Connecting attitudes to the welfare state on t he one hand and support for European 
integration on the other can appear counter-intuitive as welfare provision is first and foremost a 
prerogative of the nation-state, a field in which the European Union (EU) has no di rect 
authority. Yet, recent debates showed, first, that social protection appears to be a concern for 
elites as w ell as for citizens. The meaning of the European project is more frequently 
questioned, as f ears concerning social protection arise among citizens. Social concerns have 
motivated to some extent the rejection of the European Constitutional Treaty in France and the 
troubles of the Bolkestein directive (Cautrès 2005; Sauger and Grossman 2007; Binzer Hobolt 
2009). Second, various tendencies have been challenging national welfare states for two 
decades now, and the rise of a supra-national entity, as w ell as t he increase in cross-border 
movements that are caused by the integration process, are definitely part of this phenomenon. 
Globalization, de-industrialization, ageing, migration and economic and monetary integration 
destabilize “this assumed unity of people, place and political institutions”, which is the basis of 
European welfare states (Oorschot, Opielka, Pfau-Effinger 2008:241). Scholars have long been 
claiming that European integration has an impact on national welfare states, an impact that is 
becoming more and more visible in public discourse and, even more importantly, in citizens’ 
everyday life (Dalton and Eichenberg 2007).  
1 Laurie Beaudonnet, European University Institute. Email: Laurie.beaudonnet@eui.eu 
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This phenomenon has been extensively studied from a p ublic policy perspective (Pierson 
2001; Bartolini 2005; Ferrera 2005; Pierson and Castle 2005), but not so much from a public 
opinion perspective, and definitely not sufficiently from the perspective of public opinion 
regarding Europe. And yet, after a decade of using the integration process as, an incentive, a 
justification, and a scapegoat for economic modernization, labour market restructuring and 
welfare state reforms (Martin and Ross 2004), it seems justified to assess whether welfare 
regimes and individual attitudes towards welfare state have any impact on support for Europe. 
My argument is that the redistribution issue has been playing an ever growing role in European 
integration since the Maastricht treaty and thus the welfare state, understood both as a structural 
context and as an issue, plays a role in the way that individuals perceive Europe. In fact, large 
segments of the European population perceive the integration process as potentially threatening 
the material benefits they receive from their national welfare regimes2, but the mechanisms 
behind these opinions have not yet been extensively studied (Ray 2002). 
 
Aside from the traditional theories of utilitarian support for Europe and identity issues, some 
hypotheses have been developed concerning the effect that the welfare state has on ideological 
positioning regarding European integration, a possibility that has been operationalized in 
particular by interacting individual ideology with the type of welfare state. Results are quite 
encouraging for this research path and various models show, without a doubt, an impact of the 
welfare state on support for Europe. In some studies, the welfare state dimension even explains 
more individual variance than individual-level predictors (Gabel 1998; Brinegar and Jolly 
2004; Brinegar and Jolly 2005; Ray 2004; McLaren 2004). However, welfare issues as such 
have hardly been considered yet, and the contextual dimension of welfare itself could benefit 
from further operationalization and empirical verification.  
 
This chapter complements existing work on contextual effects of the welfare state on 
support for Europe by investigating the cross-level and cross-national patterns that underlie this 
new explanation. This relationship between the welfare state (understood in the broadest 
sense)3, and individual opinions on Europe can be apprehended at two levels, first by focusing 
on the different welfare regimes, second by analyzing individual attitudes on both topics. The 
macro-level set of hypotheses assumes that nations constitute clusters depending on welfare 
regime characteristics, and that the members of a cl uster share some similar opinions on 
Europe. From this perspective, individuals are considered first of all according to their 
nationalities and to the welfare features attached to national regimes. At the same time, a 
micro-level set of hypotheses underlines the differences regarding welfare that exist among 
individuals from the same country. Therefore, the analysis accounts for both individual 
situations in the welfare regime and attitudes towards the welfare state. It also includes media 
context data, in order to test for the salience of welfare issues in national public spheres and 
their impact on the above mentioned relationships.  
 
The chapter is structured as follows. I first review existing theories of attitudes towards 
Europe and explain the rationale for considering welfare issues and welfare regimes to be part 
of the picture. I then present the research design and results of the analysis, which I discuss in 
the final part. 
  
2 Eurobarometer studies have been monitoring anxiety about social benefits for some years. Figure A1 in 
the Appendix displays the most recent results, from 2005 (Eurobarometer 64.2). As one can see, fears are 
the strongest among old member states, especially those that experience the strongest influence of the EU 
in economic and public finance domain, i.e. members of the Economic and Monetary Union. 
3 The general concept of “welfare state” stands in fact for two different explanatory dimensions:  
− As context: the welfare regime. I identify two features in particular, the role of the state in welfare 
provision (i.e. the degree of involvement in welfare production and allocation) and the degree of 
social protection it provides.  
− As political issue: the welfare issue is made of the individual attitudes towards the welfare state.  
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Theorizing Attitudes Towards Europe 
 
The focus on pub lic opinion in European studies is not new. Since the early seventies, the 
“peoples of Europe” have been closely monitored by the European Commission through twice-
yearly surveys; and early quantitative analysis characterized their attitudes towards Europe as 
passively positive. According to the permissive consensus hypothesis and employing a 
generational logic, support for Europe was predicted to increase as the general level of 
education went up and generational replacement reinforced the presence of post-materialist 
values among European publics (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970; Inglehart 1970; Inglehart 
1990; Inglehart and Reif 1991). Forty years on, the prognosis is not that clear. If one cannot 
speak of a drastic decrease of positive attitudes towards Europe, the contrary is not true either. 
More specifically, what has changed is the degree of homogeneity of individual attitudes in 
national public opinion. People have not stopped being supportive of Europe, they have simply 
started to care about it and be critical of it (Down and Wilson 2008).  
 
Prior to 1992, the main logic for supporting Europe was purely sociological and based on two 
predictors: social group and age. The more educated, the wealthier and the younger you were, the 
more you would support European integration (Inglehart 1990; Inglehart and Rabier 1991). This 
dynamic is still visible in post-1992 empirical studies, but the most powerful explanations now 
combine economic issues and identity concerns. Indeed, the budgetary constraints, which came 
along with the EMU, made the EU more visible to individuals in their everyday life. In response 
to this, the rational theory of utilitarian support was developed in the early 1990s (Dalton and 
Eichenberg 1993; Gabel and Palmer 1995). It grounds support for European integration, at the 
aggregated level, on a cost/benefit assessment of membership for the country. This calculation 
varies according to two dimensions. First, public opinion on Europe fluctuates according to the 
perceived national economic situation (Gabel 1995). Second, it varies according to national trade 
balance and public budget. Dalton and Eichenberg showed that the more positive the national EU 
intra-communal trade balance is, the more national public opinion will support integration. 
Financial transfers through regional funds have a si milar effect: net beneficiaries have a more 
positive perception of Europe than countries that are net contributors (Dalton and Eichenberg 
1993). In spite of the fact that it is difficult for individuals to assess the added value of European 
integration, for themselves and for their countries (van der Eijk, Franklin, Demant and van der 
Brug 2007), this calculation migrated more recently from the national to the individual level, or at 
least to the group level (McLaren 2006). Individual attitudes towards Europe are positively 
correlated with the ability to personally benefit from the single market. Socio-economic 
conditions (in particular education level, professional skills and mobility capacity) now separate 
losers and winners from European integration (Tucker, Pacek, and Berinski 2002; Kriesi et al, 
2008; Down and Wilson 2008). 
 
At the same time, the Maastricht Treaty intensified the process of authority delegation to a 
supranational entity. The delocalization of some state prerogatives raises the question of 
individual loyalty and individual identification to this new polity. Multilevel governance thus 
brought identity issues in individual attitudes towards Europe (Marks et al 1996; Scharpf 1999; 
Hooghe and Marks 2004). The reallocation of loyalty and identification between local, national 
and European level depends primarily on h ow individuals consider their attachment to their 
country and how they define others: “for European proper, a key question is whether identity is 
always an identity ‘against’, i.e., whether it always serves to create a d ifference between 
members and non-members, and thus a boundary between who is included and who is 
excluded. (...) Social identity is interactional, and in collective identification the typified other 
is the defining point.” (Kohli 2000: 127). Therefore, the more inclusive the national identity, 
the stronger the support for Europe (Marks 1999).   
 
National referendums on the Maastricht Treaty gave an indication of these shifts in public 
opinion, which has become more concerned about European integration in the post-Maastricht 
period, a change that did not remain unnoticed (Gabel 1998; Christin 2008; Binzer Hobolt 
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2009). The consequence of this evolution, from an academic perspective, has been a change in 
focus, from national opinions to individual support, as a response to this loss of permissiveness 
(Dalton and Eichenberg 2007; Hooghe & Marks 2007; Down and Wilson 2008). In particular, 
some studies point to a new category of European citizens, the “critical” ones, who are in 
favour of European integration but are concerned about which Europe is being built by their 
elites (Wessels 2005). Especially in the old member states, membership to the European Union 
is not an issue anymore. What is at stake now is the direction of the European project, with its 
policies and consequences. The values on which integration was grounded are now being put 
into question, and whereas the principle of democratic accountability, liberty and peace are 
taken for granted by European public opinions, economic and social values are much more 
controversial. Recent difficulties over the popular approval of the Constitutional Treaty and the 
Lisbon Treaty have reinforced this new path. Gaining public support on European questions has 
become, more and more, a high cost political action for elites (Hix 2005; McLaren 2006; 
Hooghe and Marks 2008).  
 
In this regard, the French referendum on the Constitutional Treaty is archetypical. First, one 
third of those who rejected the Treaty were supportive of European integration. Second, the 
central axis of the campaign, and the main factor in rejection, was the social question: whether 
Europe was too liberal, not “social-minded” enough, and threatening the welfare state (Dalem 
2005; Perrineau 2005; Perraudeau 2006; Sauger, Brouard, Grossman 2007; Binzer Hobolt 
2009). These studies have underlined that social fears were the trigger for the French ‘no’. The 
European Union is perceived by large segments of the population as a constraining 
environment that challenges the French social model. Of course, the national context at that 
time partially explains the importance of this issue in the debate. Several reforms directly 
linked to social protection had been undertaken (the reform of health insurance system, of 
labour contracts and of employment policy), and the left was in opposition, both facts fostering 
the idea that social protection could no longer be taken for granted and was in fact diminishing. 
It appears that, in this context, the European Union is perceived by a growing number of 
individuals as potentially dangerous for social protection. The opposition against the Bolkestein 
directive, which was far from being exclusively French, is another example. The country of 
origin principle was the symbol of this supranational influence on a very national issue: social 
protection. Among governments, this policy domain has been at the centre of negotiations ever 
since the beginning of integration, because free movement of workers, already in 1957, was 
predicted to have huge effects on social protection, raising the issue of pensions, health 
insurance, work conditions, and the portability of social rights and benefits. However, in this 
domain the relevance of European integration relates mainly to the negative type of integration 
(Scharpf 1999) and the tools that benefit social cohesion and employment, such as the Open 
Method of Coordination and other instruments of normative soft integration, are little known to 
Europeans. There is no such thing as European social benefits or a common social policy; the 
sharing of social risks and protection is done, as it has always been, at the national level. The 
dynamic that led to the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in France seems thus rather 
counter-intuitive and even irrational: of course the European Union is not social, because it was 
never meant to be so. Citizens still do link social protection and the European Union, helped by 
all too-frequent attempts by politicians to blame “Europe” for unpalatable policy developments, 
and the issue at stake here is not whether it makes sense or not, but whether this relationship 
will be found to exist in other countries and at other times than in France during the campaign 
for the Constitutional Treaty referendum, in May 2005. T his question arises again in the 
context of the 2009 economic crisis, which might increase salience of the question for at least 
two reasons. First, social concerns arise much more during an acute scarcity of resources. It is 
especially the case when the economic situation increases pressure on the welfare system, by 
simultaneously reducing financial capacity for social protection and increasing the share of 
population that rely heavily on social protection. Second, public debates have been dominated 
in Europe by the supposed need for a common response of the EU members to this crisis, so 
that debate has focused on whether such a common response was feasible or even desirable.  
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Between Interests, Identity, and Ideology: How Does The Welfare State Fit In? 
 
The integration process is seen as threatening social protection, and more specifically social 
benefits, for a majority of European citizens, in a majority of member states (cf. Figure A1 in 
the Appendix). These concerns are not totally surprising given both the international context of 
retrenchment in European welfare states and the strategy of blame avoidance of the political 
elite (Scharpf and Schmidt 2000; Pierson 2001; Pierson and Castle 2005). Beyond the 
rhetorical argument, from a factual perspective, economic integration has been proven to have a 
constraining effect on na tional welfare state, through the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) (Leibfried and Pierson 1995; Leibfried and Pierson 2000; Saari and Kvist 2007).  
 
More than that, from a theoretical perspective, connecting European integration and social 
protection makes sense in more than one respect. First and foremost, it is relevant because 
social protection is a central prerogative of the nation state and because social rights are one of 
the pillars of citizenship (Marshall 1949). From the cradle to the grave, social protection is the 
most present and direct link between the citizen and the national authority: health insurance, 
health care, pensions and unemployment benefits are the vectors of public regulation and 
redistribution in a citizen’s everyday life (Rothstein 2008). Rokkan has shown the central role 
of social rights in the double dynamic of differentiation/consolidation during the process of 
nation building (Rokkan 1999). The institutionalized form of social sharing is vital for the 
building of a community, and is therefore of major importance for the state-citizen relationship. 
By formalizing the sharing of social risks and protection, the state creates a double bond, with 
individuals (an economic dependence) but also among them (a shared feeling of collective 
belonging) (Bartolini 2005; Ferrera 2005). Through direct and indirect pressures, the building 
of a European common market challenges national social boundaries, redistribution processes 
and state authority in a domain that is central for national identity and cohesion.  
 
From an institutional point of view, European integration reduces the political options of 
national welfare states, but, even more important, it establishes a new level of decision-making 
to be held responsible for of the reconfiguration and retrenchment of welfare states. “What 
European integration challenges is not only a purely economic redistribution process, but 
something at the core of national identity, loyalty to the state and political attitudes” (Derks 
2005:8). Second, following Rokann’s definition of welfare states as societal systems (Rokkan 
1999; Lewis 2004; Bartolini 2004; Clarke 2004), the welfare state is a structuring agent, which 
influences individual interests and attitudes through redistribution. The position each individual 
occupies in the system (the personal costs and benefits of the welfare regime) structures 
individual opinion and in particular opinion about state and politics (Rothstein and Steinmo 
2002; Kumlin 2002). It is thus likely that the welfare state structures attitudes towards 
European integration to some extent, as it structures other political attitudes. Finally, social 
protection appears entirely relevant when it comes to specific support for Europe. Indeed, the 
role of the state in protecting its citizens, national solidarity and redistribution are core values 
of the modern system of political values and cleavages (Rokkan 1999). Therefore, it is not 
surprising that individuals take this dimension into account when they evaluate the actions of 
the European Union and the values on w hich it is grounded. For these reasons, the socio-
economic cleavage might be the most promising possibility for a politicization of the European 
issue (Bartolini 2006; Hix 2006; Ray 2004; Brinegar and Jolly, 2004). 
 
This structuring role has been understudied in the research field of public opinion about 
Europe. The importance of education, occupation and income in attitudes towards Europe has 
been underlined as well as the influence of social expenditure on national public opinion (Gabel 
1998; Belot 2002; Dalton and Eichenberg 2007; Hooghe, Huo and Marks 2007) but the gap 
between the two levels of analysis has not yet been fully bridged. Likewise, the challenging, 
and even threatening, dimension of integration for European welfare states and national 
provision of social protection has been investigated exclusively from an institutional 
perspective (Bartolini 2005; Ferrera 2005), and the implications of such phenomena for 
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individual support has been generally left aside, with the exception of a few studies (Brinegar et 
al. 2004; Brinegar and Jolly 2005; Ray 2004; McLaren 2006). From a slightly different 
perspective, the political allegiance mechanism, from de Vries and Kersbergen, provides a 
bridge between utilitarian and identity theories and a framework in which the welfare state 
problematic fits very well. Support for Europe is low when citizens see the EU as preventing 
their national elites from providing them with the security and well-being they are entitled to 
expect (de Vries and Kersbergen 2007: 313). More specifically, this analysis shows the 
negative impact of both constraining membership (EMU) and feelings of economic anxiety on 
support for Europe. I however argue that this logic might not exclusively rely on e conomic 
considerations, but that welfare issues are key in understanding this mechanism. The EMU has 
a clear impact on national social protection in terms of public deficit restrictions, labour wages 
and common good practices. It goes beyond mechanical financial logic, and deals with the 
organization of national solidarity and what this concept means EU-wide. The logic has to be 
taken one step further to empirically test if the EU is seen as endangering the national social 
model (and thus altering a fundamental bond between citizens and their national state). We can 
do so by slightly reformulating the argument as follows: support for Europe is expected to be 
low when individuals perceive the EU as threatening/reducing the ability of their governments 
to provide social security though the operation of their welfare states.  
 
Two limits from past studies have to be overcome (Ray 2005; Brinegar, Jolly, and Kitschelt 
2004; Brinegar and Jolly 2005). First, the operationalization of the welfare state relies on a 
rigid categorization that is not precise enough to account for the complexity of welfare regimes. 
A single categorical variable or the only share of social protection in GDP does not account for 
the complexity and the variety of the object itself. Moreover, this kind of three-position index 
(universalist, corporatist, and residual welfare states) does not deal at all with the specificities 
of familialist welfare regimes and is not adapted to an analysis of the whole EU either, as the 
post-communist countries are excluded. The welfare state, as a st ructural variable, deserves 
further investigation. The ranking of welfare regimes, from the most redistributive to the least 
is not that straightforward and needs to take into account other indicators, such as private-
public arrangements, the degree of de-commodification of the care function and the efficacy of 
the regime.  
 
With regards to the individual level, the role that individual attitudes toward the welfare 
state might have on support for Europe has not yet been extensively studied (Brinegar et al 
2004). The common strategy of including the type of welfare state or varieties of capitalism 
acknowledges a well-known link between public opinion and the welfare state. Nevertheless, it 
seems quite reductive to implicitly assume that citizens are not able to have, first, a general 
opinion on social protection, and second, a specific opinion on their national regime, the way it 
works and its political and social consequences. If the question, with which people are 
concerned, is now “what Europe are we building?”, then social protection and redistributive 
issues have to be considered when we investigate support for Europe. Although the welfare 
state was acknowledged to have an impact on the way European matters are politicized (Ray 
2004), it has not been assessed yet to what extent the role of the state and the degree of 
redistribution matters when it comes to defining a common European project in citizens’ minds. 
Numerous works have shown that welfare state influences individual positions by creating 
individual dependence on the state and such a politically sensitive topic should be investigated 
at the individual level, as well as at the societal level, to take into account all possible effects, 
whether they are aggregated or depend on one’s professional situation, financial situation or 
ideology. The next step is thus to provide a relevant theoretical framework to test the influence 
of specific opinions towards the welfare state on s upport for European integration and to 
empirically test this relationship. 
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Hypotheses  
 
My first set of hypotheses investigates the relationship between welfare and European 
integration at the individual level. I state that, in addition to the traditional explanatory 
variables of support for Europe, welfare issues play a role in the equation. Starting from a 
rational perspective, I expect first that the individuals who are the most vulnerable and 
dependent on w elfare provision (i.e. people who do not  get their main income from current 
employment, so who are retired, unemployed or not working because of illness) will have more 
fears regarding European integration and its influence on the national welfare regime 
(hypothesis 1a). Indeed, the more dependent on national redistribution one is, the more risky 
supranational convergence and delegation of power might seem; in other words, the higher the 
reluctance to see any change regarding the welfare regime. Second, I expect specific attitudes 
toward the welfare state to have an effect on individual support for Europe. When citizens are 
not satisfied with their own welfare state, supporting Europe could be an exit strategy 
(Hirschmann 1970; Rokkan 1977) and might represent a hope for improvement. Therefore, the 
less satisfied with national regime one is, the higher one’s level of support (hypothesis 1b). At 
the same time, the stronger the faith in the national social model, especially when it has a 
strong identity dimension, the lower the support for any European action in this domain, and 
the lower the support for European integration in general, if the process is perceived as 
endangering this national model. Finally, I expect individuals to vary their support according to 
their ideological preferences on g eneral welfare issues. I hold that social protection is a 
dimension that people take into account when assessing their position on European issues, and 
that these attitudes are based on a comparison between what the European Union might be 
thought to represent regarding social protection, and what the individuals’ values are on that 
question. Therefore, the bigger the misfit between what the European Union represents for 
citizens on welfare issues and what they want, the lower the support (hypothesis 1c). 
 
My second set of hypotheses deals with the welfare state as a contextual variable. Brinegar 
et al. (2004) ask the question in terms of convergence: if one lives in a regime which is close to 
the European mean (regarding redistribution), integration and its influence on national welfare 
regime is not seen as a threat. On the contrary, the further one’s country is from this mean, the 
bigger the threat, whether it is for more or for less redistribution. What is central here is the 
reluctance to change. This approach in terms of mean can be fruitful, but it requires us to first 
assess which regime stands as t he European mean, and more importantly, when do citizens 
from a given country consider themselves as b eing at the EU average regarding social 
protection. Furthermore, the assumption that the corporatist regime stands at the European 
average might have been correct before the two last enlargements, but it is not the case 
anymore: the twelve new member states introduced far more heterogeneity regarding social 
protection. My hypothesis is built on the notion of convergence as well, but instead of using the 
notion of convergence on the mean, I rely on the hypothesis of welfare values universality, 
which states that social protection is generally seen as positive by citizens (Oorschot, Opielka, 
Pfau-Effinger 2008). I hold first that the more extensive and the more efficient the national 
welfare regime is, the less supportive of European integration individuals are. Monetary 
integration and the liberalization of capital markets would lead to a lowering of taxation levels 
and potentially to a race-to-the-bottom regarding social protection standards. Then, the higher 
the protection offered by the national welfare state, the stronger the fears and the greater the 
reluctance regarding European integration. On the contrary, normative integration in terms of 
sustainability of public expenditures and bureaucracy, together with substantial financial help 
through accession and structural funds could be seen as a chance to improve the welfare regime 
and to raise social protection standards. So, the lower the protection offered at the national 
level, the more public opinion will support European integration. According to this hypothesis, 
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I expect the support for Europe to be negatively correlated to the efficacy of the welfare regime 
in reducing poverty risk by social transfer (hypothesis 2).4  
 
My third set of hypotheses relates to the salience of welfare and economic issues in national 
public spheres. Here, salience is understood as a strong focus in public debate, indicated, for 
instance, by coverage in media and political discourse of issues related to social protection, such 
as welfare regime reform, the vulnerability of the pensions system due to population ageing, as 
well as when bad economic conditions increase pressure on the system. In these cases, it is 
expected that such high salience will increase the impact of welfare issues on support for 
Europe, and even alter the relationship, depending on how the question is framed by political 
elites and media. The 2009 economic crisis, with the debate about common EU response, 
provides a very good opportunity to measure this effect. Furthermore, the European Parliament 
elections guarantee some coverage of EU issues across countries, thus providing for more 
possibilities to document possible links between social protection and European integration. I 
hold that, at the time of the 2009 European Parliament elections, the more salient were social 
protection and economic issues, the stronger the relationship between welfare issues and features 
on one hand, and support for European integration, on the other (hypothesis 3). 
 
Table 1: Hypotheses 
 
 
MICRO 
1a 
 
1b 
 
1c 
The higher the dependence on the welfare system, the lower the support for 
Europe; 
The better the opinion regarding the national welfare state, the lower the support 
for Europe; 
The larger the misfit between what the EU represents for citizens (on welfare 
issue), and their ideological preferences, the lower the support for Europe; 
MACRO 2 
 
3 
The higher the efficacy of a welfare regime in protecting its citizens, the lower the 
support for Europe; 
The higher the salience of welfare issues, the stronger the effect of dependence 
(H1a), welfare attitudes (H1b and H1c), and welfare regime on support for 
Europe. 
 
 
Design of the Study: Data, Method, Variables 
 
In order to test the micro-level hypotheses on welfare attitudes, I use the Eurobarometer 71.3, 
from Spring 2009.5 It is the most recent dataset with extensive questions on bot h attitudes 
towards Europe and welfare issues. It includes several variables on attitudes towards the 
national welfare regime in general, and the pensions system in particular.6 Macro-level 
hypotheses related to welfare features are tested with data from the Eurostat database. The 
macro-level hypothesis related to issue salience is tested using data from the 2009 European 
Election Media Study that provides information about health care and economy related media 
4 In future research, the strength of this hypothesis will have to be tested depending on the actual level of 
social protection. One would expect that, in welfare regime with a high level of efficacy, very dependent 
individuals would be less likely to support European integration than their counterparts in less efficient 
regimes, as they have less to gain (and therefore would be expected to be more reluctant to change).  
5 Eurobarometer 71.3: Globalization, Personal Values and Priorities, European Identity, Future of the 
European Union, Social Problems and Welfare, and European Elections, June-July, 2009, Gesis archive 
#ZA4973. 
6 Though the question on feeling anxious about the pension system has been asked in a couple of other 
Eurobarometer, it is not the case for the other welfare-related questions. Thus, the scarcity of such 
measures of attitudes towards social protection does not allow for an over-time analysis. 
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content in the twenty-seven EU countries during the European election campaign.7 The 
fieldwork of the Eurobarometer was conducted immediately after that of the media study (the 
former ran from the 12th or the 15th of June, depending on countries, to the end of June or the 
beginning of July; the latter ran from the 14th or the 17th of May to the 4th or the 7th of June), so 
the two datasets are compatible with one another. Not using the pre-linked individual data from 
the EES raises only one big issue: it is not possible to control for individual media consumption 
(for instance how often the respondents watch or read news), as this variable is not included in 
the Eurobarometer. However, the aim of this chapter is not to analyze a direct effect of media 
content on support for Europe, or to explain the framing mechanism as such. Media data here 
are used as a p roxy to account for the salience of economic and welfare issues in national 
public spheres.8 
 
In order to account for the hierarchical nature of my hypotheses (individuals are assumed to be 
nested in national welfare regimes and more generally in a n ational context, while potentially 
showing heterogeneity in their personal attitudes towards the welfare regime), I use multilevel 
modelling with random intercepts and random slopes (Steenbergen and Jones 2002).9 
 
The Dependent Variable: An Index Of Support For Europe 
The Eurobarometer provides numerous questions on various aspects of individual attitudes 
towards Europe but no variable has been directly used as a general indicator on a regular basis 
in the literature. Some efforts have already been devoted to this issue and strategies vary 
between data reduction and the use of variables as they are given in datasets (Kopecky and 
Mudde 2002; Ray 2004; Brinegar and Jolly 2004; Scheuer 2005; McLaren 2006; Krouwel and 
Abts 2007). The present study does not intend to contribute specifically to this debate but rather 
seeks a measure of general support that enables comparison across studies and across time (i.e., 
that does not focus only on one aspect of attitudes towards Europe, such as the image of the 
EU, or the benefit from membership). It was not possible to compute the current evaluation of 
European integration index (Ray 2004) or the “overall European integration view” (Brinegar 
and Jolly 2004) as the question on efforts made towards unification and the ones on speed of 
unification were not included in the Eurobarometer 71.3. I thus relied on item-response theory 
to assess the best dependent variable to use based on the more widely spread variables on EU 
support. Most of the variables are ordinal or dichotomous, for this reason Mokken scaling 
appears to be the most appropriate method, as it accounts for the difference of items in 
popularity (van Schuur 2003; van der Eijk 2007). The four more general measures of support 
are included, together with the four available measures of trust in the EU.10 Five of them form a 
very homogeneous scale (H coefficient = 0,64), meaning that they capture the same latent trait, 
7 It was not possible to use the 2009 European Election Voter study because it does not permit a full 
operationalization of my micro-level hypotheses. The set of questions on responsibility allocation and 
evaluation of health care and economic conditions may be very useful in this context but they are not 
available in the pre-release dataset.  
8 As a precaution, the effect of news consumption on the relationship between salience issues and support 
for Europe was tested, using the 2009 voter and media studies. The interaction term was significant in 
none of the models (results available on request) (in these analyses, the dependent variable was the 
unification index available in the 2009 EES study). 
9 Refusal and “don’t know” values were originally coded as missing in order to be imputed, using 
multiple imputation, to have a final dataset of 26805 cases (King 2001, Raghunathan 2004). Only the 25 
observations that were missing on the multinomial occupation variable were definitely excluded, as the 
variable had too many values and prevented the imputation process. However, due to a technical 
problem, the imputed dataset was not ready in time for the present version. For this reason the average 
sample is here 14000 cases and results should be considered with caution. The analysis will be replicated 
in near future to benefit from the total sample. 
10 Opinion on membership, opinion on benefit from membership, image of the EU, opinion on how 
things are going at the EU level, trust in the European Union, trust in the European Commission, in the 
Council of the EU and in the European Central Bank. Wording details are in table 1A in appendix. 
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which can be labelled “general support for Europe”. Out of this single dimension an index is 
created and used, hereafter as dependent variable.11  
 
Independent Variables 
To test the hypothesis 1a on dependence, I rely on occupation retired and unemployed status to 
test for a specific lack of support from the ones that are the most dependent on welfare 
provision.12 As an alternative for individual and family income indicator (not available in the 
dataset), I specified an indicator of vulnerability, for those who declare not being able to plan 
their household’s financial future, as financial insecurity increases the likelihood of having to 
rely on social protection. To test hypothesis H1b, I used three measures of specific opinion on 
national welfare regime: whether one thinks that national social welfare system provides 
enough coverage (positive evaluation about the amount of protection), whether one thinks that 
the system is too expensive (evaluation of its cost), and a measure of anxiety about pensions’ 
future, as a proxy for the evaluation of system sustainability. The hypothesis 1c about value 
misfit between citizens and the European project is operationalized with five variables. As there 
is no direct measure of whether a respondent is in favour or against social protection and 
extensive welfare state, I used proxies to measures their positions on the topic. Two questions 
capture two main values of the left-right dimension: state interventionism (in all domains), and 
free economic competition. I assume that respondents who are strongly attached to social 
protection tend to be more in favour of state interventionism and against free economic 
competition. To operationalize a p ossible misfit between these individual values and what 
individuals anticipate from the European project, I use two measures: whether they associate 
the European Union and the concept of social protection, and their evaluation of the EU in the 
domain of social rights. 13  
 
Regarding higher-level variables, hypothesis 2 (welfare regime) is operationalized with a 
measure of protection efficacy. It measures whether the welfare regime (understood as a whole, 
from a structural and financial point of view) is efficient at protecting its citizens from poverty. 
It is calculated as a ratio between the percentage of the population at risk of poverty before and 
after social transfer. Pressures on public deficit and therefore indirect pressures on social 
expenditures are strongly related to economic and monetary integration. Therefore I included as 
well a h igher-level control variable for eurozone (coded 1 w hen respondent’s country is a 
member of the eurozone). Finally, issue salience (hypothesis 3) is measured by media content 
variables, from the 2009 EES media study. From the original (country-level) dataset, three 
variables are created, counting 1 for each topic related to social protection, economic 
conditions, and unemployment, respectively (whether it was the first, second, or third topic of 
the story); therefore, the higher the value, the more visible the issue was in national media. 
(Details about variables in tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix) 
 
 
11 This index of support was created out of the following variables: opinion on membership, the opinion 
on benefit from membership, the image of the EU, trust in European Parliament and in the European 
Commission. For technical reason, the index was created using factor analysis, all five items score on a 
same factor with an eigenvalue of 3.42, that capture 69% of the variance in average (pooled dataset), 
with only two border cases (Slovenia and Luxembourg for which the first factor only capture 45 and 50% 
of the variance) (results available on request).   
12 I distinguished “being retired or not able to work because of illness” and “being unemployed”. As 
control variables, I added occupation categories for the rest of the sample, with the following 
dichotomous variables: self-employed, professional/manager, employed, manual worker, house person, 
student (details of all variables are displayed in table A2 in appendix). 
13 Individual control variables are: age (continuous measure, in years), gender (dichotomous variable, 
1=male, 0=female), ideology (10-point self-positioning scale, used as a continuous variable), education 
(age when education was completed, continuous measure, in years). 
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Results 
 
The three individual-level hypotheses are tested in a single model, together with the higher-
level one about welfare regime, as they are not exclusive. The implications of these results are 
discussed in more details in the next session, but Table 2 already shows that welfare attitudes 
and dependence on welfare regime have a significant impact on support for Europe that holds 
when controlling for traditional socio-demographic characteristics and country. This model 
explains more than a third of the variance (out of these 32%, about two thirds are due to the 
variables of interest here, the remaining third being due to controls and country clustering).14  
 
Table 2: The impact of welfare (dependence, attitudes, regime) on support for 
European integration. 
MODEL 1 – The impact of welfare on support for European integration 
Micro level predictors  
 *H1a: Dependence on welfare regime   
Unemployed -0.086(0.028)*** 
Retired or illness -0.071(0.023)*** 
Insecurity  (household financial situation) -0.138(0.017)*** 
  
*H1b: specific welfare attitudes  
Welfare system provides enough coverage  0.184(0.027)*** 
Welfare system is too expensive -0.015(0.017) 
Is anxious about pensions’ future -0.202(0.017)*** 
  
*H1c: general welfare attitudes  
Values: State intervenes too much -0.181(0.015)*** 
Values: In favour of free economic competition  0.211(0.017)*** 
EU performance on social rights  0.154(0.004)*** 
Evaluation: The EU means social protection  0.297(0.022)*** 
  
Macro-level predictors  
*H2: Welfare regime   
Welfare regime efficacy -0.290(0.131)** 
  
*Controls  
Ideology  0.012(0.003)*** 
Education  0.017(0.002)*** 
Male  0.028(0.014)* 
Age -0.002(0.001)*** 
Euro zone   0.028(0.083) 
Constant  -0.838(0.117)*** 
  
N         13002 
Number of groups 27 
Log-Likelihood    -15812.49 
AIC     31658.98 
BIC     31786.02 
R² (lower and higher level together)             0,32 
Standard errors in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
14 I thank Lorenzo De Sio very much for his help and very useful Stata command (mlrsq) used here in the 
calculation of R² for multilevel models.  
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First of all, at the macro level, this first model provides significant evidence in favour of 
hypothesis 2 (the negative effect of welfare regime efficacy). Respondents from regimes with a 
high level of poverty reduction are much less supportive of European integration (the effect of 
welfare efficacy is -0.290, and the dependent variable ranges from -2.08 to +1.17) than 
respondents from less protective regimes. 
 
Table 3: The impact of issue salience in national public spheres on support for European 
integration. 
 
 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 
Issue salience Social protection Unemployment 
Micro level predictors 
*H1a: Dependence on welfare regime 
Unemployed -0.138(0.054)** -0.079(0.045)* 
Retired or illness -0.070(0.023)*** -0.071(0.023)*** 
Insecurity  (household financial situation) -0.138(0.017)*** -0.137(0.017)*** 
   
*H1b: specific welfare attitudes 
Welfare system provides enough coverage  0.183(0.028)***  0.179(0.028)*** 
Welfare system is too expensive -0.013(0.017) -0.013(0.018) 
Anxiety about pensions’ future -0.201(0.022)*** -0.201(0.022)*** 
   
*H1c: general welfare attitudes 
Values: State intervenes too much -0.181(0.015)*** -0.181(0.015)*** 
Values: In favour of free economic 
competition  0.211(0.017)***  0.211(0.017)*** 
The EU means social protection  0.154(0.004)***  0.154(0.004)*** 
Evaluation : EU performance on social 
rights  0.297(0.022)***  0.298(0.022)*** 
   
Macro-level predictors 
*H3: issue salience 
Social protection  0.299(0.189)  
   Social protection*unemployed  0.158(0.141)  
Unemployment   0.423(0.196)** 
    Unemployment*unemployed  -0.024(0.114) 
   
Controls 
Ideology 0.012(0.003)***  0.012(0.003)*** 
Education 0.017(0.002)***  0.017(0.002)*** 
Male 0.027(0.014)*  0.0270(0.014)* 
Age -0.002(0.001)*** -0.002(0.001)*** 
Euro zone 0.059(0.085) -0.022(0.091) 
Constant -1.103(0.109)*** -1.082(0.010)*** 
 
N         13002         13002 
Number of groups             27 27 
Log-Likelihood -15813.34         -15813.19 
AIC   31684.69           31684.38 
BIC    31901.4           31901.09 
R² (lower and higher level together)            0,32            0,32 
Standard errors in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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The first hypothesis is confirmed: individuals that are directly dependent on welfare regime 
(either because they are unemployed, retired, or not able to work because of illness) are less  
supportive of European integration than the rest of the population. If this difference is 
significant, the effect is very weak compared to welfare attitudes and values (being unemployed 
or retired decreases support for Europe by 0.089 and 0.071, respectively). Besides, in the case 
of unemployed people, the lack of support could be due to resentment for the EU regarding 
changes in labour market and economic conditions, more than fears about social benefits. On 
the contrary, in the case of the “retired/illness” variable, the effect here is likely to be directly 
linked to social protection, more than just to age, as age is controlled for. This is also the reason 
for having included a measure of financial insecurity (which is correlated to being unemployed, 
but not exclusively): the effect of this variable is twice as great and consolidates evidence in 
favour of hypothesis 1a. Insecurity decreases support for Europe.  
 
Aside from this interest-based logic, I consider now the evaluation of the welfare regime. I 
hold, in hypothesis H1b, that if one is satisfied with this regime, one will not seek an exit and 
thus will be less likely to support European integration. First, satisfaction with the welfare 
regime (operationalized here in terms of coverage) does have an effect, but not the expected 
one. Positive evaluation of welfare regime increases support for Europe. In line with that, 
negative evaluation (regime costs too much) does not have any positive impact on support. In 
fact, anxiety about regime sustainability (in the specific case of pensions) has a strong, 
significant, negative impact. People who are satisfied with the protection they receive at home, 
and who are not particularly anxious about the future of the system, are more supportive of 
European integration. In light of these results, the exit hypothesis (H1b) is not confirmed. 
When people are dissatisfied with, or at least worried for, their welfare regime, they are less 
supportive of Europe. We cannot exclude the possibility that this effect hides a more simple 
“support for government” effect: people feel insecure and dissatisfied with their national 
government and therefore project this negative opinion on any other authority, in that case the 
European level. Settling this question is easy: controlling for support for government would be 
enough. Unfortunately, this variable is not included in the Eurobarometer dataset.  
 
Another way is to test the effect of general welfare attitudes independently of national 
regimes evaluation. The question here is: do i ndividuals take into account values of social 
solidarity when they form their opinion on Europe, and, when these values are core values, do 
individuals evaluate the EU on this issue? Hypothesis H1c conditions support for Europe to a 
value-fit. The dependence and satisfaction hypotheses might appear too mechanical to some 
extent. Hypothesis 1c brings in political values. The two first variables (opinion on s tate 
interventionism and on f ree economic competition) indirectly show that integration is first of 
all visible through its economic dimension (the single market): individuals who are in favour of 
free economic competition are more strongly supportive of Europe. But the de-regulative 
dimension of the EU is not captured here, as individuals against state interventionism express 
lower support. To narrow down these logics, I included two direct references to both social 
protection and the EU (evaluation of the EU performance on s ocial rights, and does the EU 
mean social protection). This permits a test for potential direct exit logic (when one associates 
the EU with social protection or considers its action in this domain). Individuals do associate 
the EU and social protection in some cases, and doing so has a strong positive effect on support 
(+0.297). Similarly, the better one perceives EU performance on social rights, the higher one’s 
support for European integration.  
 
Finally, Table 3 d isplays the models testing the salience hypothesis (H3). The salience 
measures have been rescaled to be comparable: they range from 0 to 1, 0 b eing the minimum 
value found, 1 being the maximum. I assumed that high salience in media of, respectively, 
social protection and unemployment, might increase the negative effect of welfare dependence 
on support for Europe. Figures 1 and 2 g raphically display the marginal effect of being 
unemployed on support for Europe, as salience changes. The main conclusion here is that the 
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salience of social protection issues and unemployment have a v ery limited effects on the 
relationship between dependence and support for Europe. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Marginal Effect of Being Unemployed on Support for Europe as Salience of Social 
Protection Changes. 
 
 
There is a significant effect on the marginal effect of being unemployed only when salience 
ranges from 0 to .45 (so the first half of the scale) in the case of social protection issues, and 
from 0.07 to 0.64 in the case of unemployment (these areas are in grey on the  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Marginal Effect of Being Unemployed on Support for Europe as Salience of 
Unemployment Changes. 
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graphs).15 The effect of unemployment salience in media is as expected: when salience 
increases, the negative effect of being unemployed for support for Europe increases. However, 
this increase is very limited (the marginal effect increases from -0.07 to -0.09), one could say 
almost nonexistent. The effect of social protection salience is stronger (although still very weak 
as regard to the scale of the dependent variable): in that case, the marginal effect of being 
unemployed decreases from -0.14 to -0.04. This effect is the contrary of what was expected: a 
higher salience of social protection issues decreases the negative effect of being unemployed. 
The reason could be that the measure does not control for the tone of news stories and positive 
coverage of social protection which might affect individual anxiety regarding unemployment.  
 
 
Discussion 
 
First of all, analysis showed an aggregate effect of welfare regimes on support for Europe. The 
greater the regime’s efficacy in reducing poverty risks for its citizens, the lower the support for 
European integration. When the national regime works well at reducing the risk of poverty, 
there is no space for improvement through European integration. This process might even be 
seen as threatening the national welfare state, through delegation of competences and indirect 
pressures on social benefits and status quo. By contrast, when the welfare regime performs 
poorly, integration might be seen as a path of improvement, either towards higher standards of 
social protection or towards more efficiency and sustainability.  
 
The European Union was never thought to be a substitute for national (or local) social 
protection, but the strong economic inter-dependence that the Single market and monetary 
union had induced opens the door to a full range of potential social consequences. The aim of 
the present study was neither to investigate what these consequences are, whether they are 
positive or negative for welfare state, nor to ask if they are even likely. The question was 
whether social protection played a role in support for Europe, whether integration was 
perceived as beneficial or threatening for social protection, and whether individuals even 
framed the question in these terms. It appears that national context (the type of welfare regime 
citizens are in) indeed shapes individual attitudes towards Europe to some extent. The efficacy 
in reducing poverty risk is not the only and exclusive way to describe welfare regimes and it 
surely has to be complemented with more detailed indicators, such as the coverage rate and the 
share between private and public provision. These measures will have to be detailed by type of 
social risks (unemployment, illness and ageing are the main ones), as s ituations drastically 
differ from one program to another. Nevertheless, this first measure enables me to point at a 
strong contextual effect on support for Europe. This effect is particularly strong for two 
categories of persons. First, citizens who are strongly dependent on social provision (whether 
they are unemployed, unable to work or retired) are less supportive of Europe than working 
individuals across countries. From a contextual point of view, no important effect of issue 
salience was found. There is an effect of social protection and unemployment salience in the 
media, but extremely weak. The operationalization of public debate on social protection and 
economic situation has to be improved, to better capture potential framing effects. Two 
additional measures could be included in further analysis: a macro-level variable on the tone of 
news stories and a micro-level measure of individual media exposure. 
 
Having said that, one should not assume that neither the aggregate performance in social 
protection nor public debate on social protection are enough to explain individuals relation to 
their welfare regime, and it is essential to introduce in the equation three parameters: individual 
evaluation of national welfare regimes, political values (especially the ones related to social 
protection and solidarity), and evaluation/perception of the European Union on these issues. 
15 The marginal effect of being unemployed on support for Europe is statistically significant when both 
confidence intervals (here displayed as dashed lines) are below or above the zero line (Brambor, Clark, 
Golder 2006). 
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The exit logic is not confirmed by the analysis: dissatisfaction with the national regime does 
not increase support for Europe, nor does satisfaction decrease it. On the contrary, anxiety 
about national systems strongly decreases support. In this specific case, the higher the anxiety 
for pensions in the future, the lower the support for Europe, and this is regardless of the 
objective efficiency of the welfare regime (there is no positive interaction effect with low 
efficiency regimes)16. There is a link between regime evaluation and support for Europe, but it 
is not the one that was first thought. The question has to be reformulated in terms of a 
threatening environment: it seems that when citizens are confident in their own welfare state, 
attitudes towards integration are independent from social protection issues, whereas the same 
integration process appears negative and threatening when the regime is considered to be 
failing. That is not to say that individuals rely exclusively on the European Union to deal with 
this issue, or that they understand the full implications of integration for the restructuring of 
welfare states. But it proves that welfare issues and European issues are not thought of as being 
independent. The anxiety for pensions' future might also have an influence on support only 
because anxiety produces negative opinion on numerous objects, from government to European 
Union. However, when measures of this general level of pessimism and dissatisfaction are 
added (expectations for national and personal situation), anxiety for pensions’ future is still 
significant.17 Keeping these cautions in mind, and without inferring any direction in this causal 
relationship, this effect indicates nevertheless that individuals are likely to link their anxiety 
regarding the welfare system to their opinion on integration.  
 
Finally, the analysis points out an ideological logic: to associate the European Union with 
social protection and to positively evaluate its action on social rights strongly increases support. 
In that case, the EU is likely to appear as an extra layer of social protection and/or as an 
opportunity to strengthen national social protection standards. It is not clear yet if citizens 
associate the European Union with social protection on the basis of its action, or on the basis of 
their beliefs about European project. Further investigation is thus needed on how they allocate 
responsibility for changes in social protection (between local, national and European levels), 
what orientation they want for the integration process, and whether this logic could lead to 
further politicization of the European issue - in particular, whether it was translated into an 
identifiable electoral behaviour during the last European elections. 
 
To conclude, further operationalization of contextual effects is needed, but it is already possible 
to state, from the present results, that welfare regimes and welfare issues do have an impact on 
individual support for Europe. Concerns about the welfare state as a national resource exist and 
have a significant negative effect on individual support for Europe. This study was not intended 
to investigate whether individuals are fully aware of the implications and consequences of 
integration for their national welfare states. However, it shows that even negative opinion 
towards national welfare regimes (or at least anxiety) negatively influences individual support 
for Europe. Two ideas of Europe are in competition here. On the one hand, the EU can be seen 
as an economic environment that threatens an already challenged welfare state. The European 
Union is then perceived as an external condition that increases the difficulties of national 
welfare regimes, or as responsible for these very difficulties. On the other hand, some segments 
of the European population do positively associate the European Union with social protection. 
In this case, individuals seem to go beyond the traditional utilitarian and identity logics to 
condition their support for integration to a value fit, thus providing us with evidence of a 
politicization of the European issue. 
16 Results not shown here; available on request.  
17 Results not shown here. Adding the support for government might have been a complementary test, 
but the question was not available. 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A1: Fear for social benefits by country (Eurobarometer 64.2).18 
18 Eurobarometer 64.2: The European Constitution, Globalization, Energy Resources, and Agricultural 
Policy, October-November 2005, ICPSR dataset #4580. 
Exact wording is “Some people may have fears about the building of Europe, the European Union. Here 
is a list of things which some people say they are afraid of. For each one, please tell me if you, 
personally, are currently afraid of it, or not? The loss of social benefits” (Question QA18_8) 
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Table A1: Summary of variables. 
Variable Description 
Support Factor score "General support for European integration" created 
out of variable QA6A, QA7A, QA10, QA14_1 and QA14_2, 
centred. The higher the score, the higher respondent's support for 
European integration 
Opinion on the EU membership  “Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)'s 
membership of the European Union is...? A good thing (1), a bad 
thing (2), neither good nor bad (3).” Recoded as : A good thing 
(1), a bad thing (-1), neither good nor bad (0) 
Benefit from EU membership  “Taking everything into account, would you say that (OUR 
COUNTRY) has on balance benefited or not from being a 
member of the European Union? Benefited (1), not benefited 
(2).” Recoded as: Benefited (1), not benefited (0) 
Image of the EU “In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very 
positive (1), fairly positive (2), neutral (3), fairly negative (4) or 
very negative image (5), don’t know?” Recoded as: very positive 
(2), fairly positive (1), neutral(0), fairly negative(-1) or very 
negative image (-2) 
General trust in the EU " For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend 
to trust it (1) or tend not to trust it (0)." The European Union 
Trust in the European 
Parliament 
"For each of the following European bodies, please tell me if you 
tend to trust it or tend not to trust it."  The European Parliament 
Trust in the European 
Commission 
The European Commission 
Unemployed 1= being unemployed 
Retired or illness 1= being retired or not working because of illness 
Insecurity  (household financial 
situation) 
1="your current situation does not allow you to plan" 
(Household situation for planning for the future) 
Welfare system provides enough 
coverage 
1= "our social welfare system provides enough coverage" applies 
fairly well  
Welfare system is too expensive 1=the statement "our social welfare system is too expensive" 
applies fairly well 
Anxiety about pensions’ future 1=is not very or not at all confident about pensions' future 
Values: State intervenes too much 1=agrees with the statement  "state intervenes too much" 
Values: In favour of free 
economic competition 
1=agrees with the statement  "free economic competition is a 
good thing" 
The EU means social protection the EU meaning: 1= mentioned "social protection" 
EU performance on social rights Opinion on EU performance on social rights, from 1"not at all 
satisfactory" to 9 
Ideology Self positioning on the left-right scale (from 1 to "left” to 10 
"right”) 
Education Age when finished education (in years) 
Male Gender: 1=male 
Age Age (in years) 
Eurozone Member of the Eurozone 
Topic : social protection Number of topics related to social protection in general (this 
category includes topic about health care, national health care 
policy, welfare state, pensions, child care, nursing care, and 
social housing) (in media: news paper or television)  
Topic : economic conditions Number of topics related to economic conditions (in media: news 
paper or television)  
Topic: unemployment Number of topics related to unemployment (in media: news 
paper or television)  
36
Table A2: Summary of variables (Table A1 continued). 
 
Variable Type Original variable Source N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Support Continuous   19373 0 1 -2.08 1.17 
Opinion on the EU 
membership Ordinal QA6A EB 71.3 25861 - - -1 1 
Benefit from EU 
membership Dichotomous QA7A EB 71.3 23819 - - 0 1 
Image of the EU Continuous QA10 EB 71.3 26208 .33 .89 -2 2 
General trust in the 
EU Dichotomous QA9_5 EB 71.3 23909 - - 0 1 
Trust in the European 
Parliament Dichotomous QA14_1 EB 71.3 23005 - - 0 1 
Trust in the European 
Commission Dichotomous QA14_2 EB 71.3 21608  - 0 1 
Unemployed Dichotomous C14 EB 71.3 26805 - - 0 1 
Retired or illness Dichotomous C14 EB 71.3 26805 - - 0 1 
Insecurity  (household 
financial situation) Dichotomous QJ6 EB 71.3 25953 - - 0 1 
Welfare system 
provides enough 
coverage 
Dichotomous QJA1_1 EB 71.3 25319 - - 0 1 
Welfare system is too 
expensive Dichotomous QJA1_3 EB 71.3 23967 - - 0 1 
Anxiety about 
pensions’ future Dichotomous QJ3 EB 71.3 25699 - - 0 1 
Values: State 
intervenes too much Dichotomous QC1A_1 EB 71.3 25717 - - 0 1 
Values: In favour of 
free economic 
competition 
Dichotomous QC1A_2 EB 71.3 24061 - - 0 1 
The EU means social 
protection Dichotomous QA11_4 EB 71.3 26805 - - 0 1 
EU performance on 
social rights Continuous QA17_2 EB 71.3 24183 4.75 2.04 1 9 
Ideology Continuous D1 EB 71.3 20943 5.41 2.25 1 10 
Education Continuous VD8 EB 71.3 26264 18.48 4.70 1 63 
Male Dichotomous D10 EB 71.3 26805 - - 0 1 
Age Continuous VD11 EB 71.3 26805 48.14 18.18 15 98 
Welfare efficacy Continuous 
Poverty risk 
ratio, net of 
transfers 
Eurostat 
(2008) 
26805 .52 .31 0 1 
Euro zone Dichotomous  Eurostat 26805 - - 0 1 
Topic : social 
protection Continuous 
V5a, V5b, 
V5c 
 EES’09 
Media 
Study 
26805 0.31 0.21 0 1 
Topic : economic 
conditions Continuous 
V5a, V5b, 
V5c 
ditto 26805 0.20 0.20 0 1 
Topic: unemployment Continuous V5a, V5b,V5c ditto 26805 0.29 0.22 0 1 
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Abstract  
This chapter assesses the validity of different interpretative models of voting behavior in 
European elections in the light of the June 2009 results. We focus, on the one hand, on 
models linking the European vote to national political concerns (second order model) and 
the domestic electoral cycle (electoral cycle model); on the other hand, we assess the 
ability of a model based on the role of party positions and campaigning (Europe matters 
model) to explain those occurrences at odds with traditional interpretations. A composite 
model is advanced, with the aim of providing an account for the 2009 European election 
results.  
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
European elections are at odds with traditional notions of representation and democratic 
accountability. At the national level, elections connect representation with democratic 
governance (Manin, Przeworski and Stokes 1999). Through them citizens elect their 
representatives and (directly or indirectly) a government. The peculiarity of European elections 
lies in the fact that these are not followed by the formation of a government. As a consequence, 
voters’ choices are less likely to be guided by EU-related accountability concerns, and less 
likely to be expressed based on either prospective or retrospective evaluations of parties’ 
performance in the EU arena. Moreover, the European party system is based on national 
parties, and electoral campaigns have traditionally been dominated by national issues (de 
Vreese et al. 2006). This has led political scientists to hold what can be qualified as the classical 
view of European elections, that is second order contests (Reif and Schmitt 1980). This 
perspective highlights the importance of domestic factors driving the European vote. 
Elaborating upon this consolidated view, some scholars have recently attempted to show the 
growing importance of an independent impact on electoral outcomes exerted by the specific 
supranational characteristics of these contests (Hix and Marsh 2007). The relevance of these 
rival interpretations lies in the different nature of the link between citizens, political actors and 
the supranational European arena they subsume – a mainly country-based one, as opposed to a 
more supranational European one.  
 
In this study we compare the two perspectives in order to present a composite model based 
on the more relevant aspects of both. Our analysis focuses on the most recent elections for the 
European Parliament held in June 2009. These elections have been the widest ever, in terms of 
eligible voters and participating countries and, particularly interesting given our purpose, have 
recorded an unprecedented role played by ‘Europe’ within the parties’ campaigns (Shuck et al. 
2011). At the same time, a number of pan-European developments – such as the poor 
performance of socialist parties across the continent – have led some to the hypothesize the 
emergence of a n ew European element in the contest (Hix and Marsh 2011). Therefore, if 
1 Università di Siena, Dipartimento di scienze storiche, giuridiche, politiche e sociali. Email: Paolo 
Bellucci paolo.bellucci@unisi.it; Diego Garzia garzia3@unisi.it; Martiño Rubal Maseda 
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supranational concerns are to be found as independent explanations of the vote, it is likely that 
these will show up in the 2009 European elections. The results of our analysis will be discussed 
after a b rief review of the literature dealing with the major interpretative models of voting 
behavior in European elections. 
 
 
Alternative Explanations of the Vote in European Elections 
 
The ‘Second Order’ Model 
So far no ‘responsible’ party system at the European level has emerged (Kousser 2004). The 
lack of stable supranational cues means that European voters can only rely on cognitive 
heuristics usually employed in national elections. In this sense, it can be argued that European 
elections are held first and foremost on the basis of national political concerns (de Vreese et al. 
2006). As Reif and Schmitt (1980) argue, the national arena is the most important in the eyes of 
both the parties and the public. Therefore, other elections, such as the European ones, are less 
important. These are second-order national elections, insofar “there is less at stake as compared 
to first-order elections” (ibid.: 8).  
 
Turnout in second-order elections is lower than in national contests, because parties dedicate 
comparatively less time and resources to the former (Franklin, van der Eijk and Oppenhuis 
1996; Franklin 2001; Schmitt 2005). Without sufficient information on the position of parties 
about European issues, voters can only evaluate the competing parties on the basis of their 
performance and policy appeals at the national level. However, because governing parties are 
more visible than those in opposition, European elections usually become a referendum on 
incumbent governments’ performance (Lord 2001) – a referendum where governments get 
usually defeated. Furthermore, voters are thought to use their hearts instead of their heads in 
European elections, voting for the parties closer to their ‘real’ preferences and ideological 
outlook (Oppenhuis, van der Eijk and Franklin 1996). In turn, this makes larger parties lose and 
smaller parties gain votes with respect to national parliamentary elections.  
 
Summing up, s econd order theory affirms that: (1) there is a lower turnout in European 
elections than in national parliamentary elections; (2) voters behave differently between types 
of election: some of them switch their vote in order to punish parties that are in government or 
to vote sincerely for the parties they like the most, instead of strategically choosing parties that 
can gain power at national level; as a result (3) larger and ruling parties lose votes to smaller 
and opposition parties. 
 
The ‘Electoral Cycle’ Model 
As a corollary to second order theory, it has been argued that parties’ fortunes in European 
elections depend on the national electoral cycle. Depending on when they take place within the 
national electoral cycle, citizens will show different patterns of voting behavior (Reif 1984; 
Marsh 1998). Governments facing European elections during the honeymoon with their 
electorate (e.g., within their first year of tenure) are most likely to register minor losses or even 
none at all (Hix and Marsh 2007). The switch is much more consistent when European 
elections occur at the mid-term of the national cycle, that is, when government parties’ 
popularity is at its lowest (on domestic electoral cycles, see: Miller and Mackie 1973), and 
when opposition parties make greater efforts to present the European vote as a test of governing 
parties’ performance. When European elections are held shortly before national elections, 
citizens have stronger incentives to act strategically, in order to influence upcoming national 
elections. Although there is always the opportunity to punish governing parties, these tend to 
lose less than they would if the elections were held at the middle of the electoral cycle. In other 
words, governing parties lose votes anyway (as postulated by second order theory), but they 
lose less if the European election is held at the beginning, or at the end, of the national electoral 
cycle.  
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Moreover, empirical evidence shows that the popularity of the government affects the 
electoral switch independently of the location of a European election in the national electoral 
cycle (Heath et al. 1999). Popular governments lose fewer votes than do less popular ones. By 
the same token, retrospective judgments of a government’s macroeconomic performance help 
explain the magnitude of ruling parties’ loss in European elections (Kousser 2004). 
 
The ‘Europe Matters’ Model 
Despite this classical view on European elections, a growing body of literature contends that 
Europe matters, and that its influence on voting has increased over time due to the 
strengthening of the Parliament’s powers over the Commission (Schmitt 2005) and a somewhat 
greater visibility of European issues among the citizens (de Vreese et al. 2006). The political 
salience of Europe is exerted, first of all, through the position of the parties with respect to the 
issue of European integration. According to Ferrara and Weishaupt (2004), anti-Europeanist 
parties tend to perform better than those with more favorable orientations. The second 
dimension through which parties’ policy positions affect voters is related to the ideological left-
right continuum. According to Hooghe and Marks (2001), this dimension overlays that relating 
to a major/minor regulative role for the European Union. This entails that (a) centre-right 
parties perform better than centre-left parties and (b) extreme parties of both left and right, 
which are also supposed to be more anti-Europeanist (Taggart 1998; Hooghe, Marks and 
Wilson 2002), are the most likely to gain votes at the expense of governing parties, which are 
generally located at more moderate positions (Ray 1999).  
 
Campaigning on E urope may have been relevant in the 2009 elections, which were 
characterized by the unprecedented attention devoted to supranational concerns in parties’ 
communication strategies (Shuck et al. 2011). Previous research has highlighted the impact of 
campaigning on bo th citizens’ turnout and vote choice. Those parties and governments that 
campaign intensively for EU elections can raise citizens’ interest in these elections (and 
influence turnout as a consequence). Also the tone of the campaign has an impact: an analysis 
of media coverage during the 1999 and 2004 electoral campaigns demonstrates that a negative 
presentation of Europe by television and newspapers has a mobilizing effect (Banducci and 
Semetko 2004). The relationship with turnout is, however, curvilinear: negative evaluations of 
the EU mobilize voters, but only up to a threshold above which turnout is depressed by more 
negative evaluations (ibid).  
 
Recent works hypothesized that giving salience to Europe (either in a positive or a negative 
way) could also have a p ositive effect on a p arty’s vote share in EP elections (Ferrara and 
Weishaupt 2004; Hix and Marsh 2007). Classic salience theory suggests that parties’ choices to 
emphasize certain issues at the expense of others is based on strategic considerations 
(Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge 1994). Large parties or incumbent parties in particular can 
be thought to adopt this strategy in relation to European issues as a way to deflect attention 
from poor performance evaluations (Shuck et al. 2011). As to anti-European parties, a greater 
emphasis on Europe is related to their attempt to politicize European issues to attract those 
segments of the electorate that are discontent with the Union (Hooghe and Marks 2009), thus 
pairing saliency with a predominantly negative tone. Bellucci, Garzia and Rubal (2010) found 
that the electoral performance of government parties in the EU 2009 elections is negatively 
associated with voters’ increasing interest in the electoral campaign, where citizens’ interest in 
the campaign is used as a proxy for parties’ communication strategies. They conclude that 
ruling parties’ losses are due to the opposition’s mobilization of voters, although this inference 
is only speculative in the absence of a clear link between parties’ actions and campaign content. 
Actually, research connecting campaigning and media effects to voting at the European level is 
rather scant, and comparative structured data on media coverage is emerging slowly (de Vreese 
et al. 2006: 146). Therefore the 2009 PIREDEU database fills this important gap, and allows 
parties’ campaign efforts to be studied, as we will discuss in the next section. 
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Data and Hypotheses 
 
We contend that each of the three models discussed above (e.g., second order, electoral cycle 
and Europe matters) is singularly valid and useful for understanding different aspects of voting 
behavior in European elections. We believe that both political concerns (second order) and the 
electoral cycle (mid-term) at national level are a necessary explicans of European citizens’ 
choices. But we also believe that the parties’ location on a pro/anti-Europe dimension matters, 
as well as their campaign strategies in relation to European Union issues. In our analysis we 
will test these expectations against the results from 2009 elections.  
 
181 cases have been included in the analysis, corresponding to the parties from 27 states of 
the Union which have gained at least 1% of the vote at both 2009 EP election (source: 
www.europarl.europa.eu) and the previous national one (source: www.parties-and-
elections.de).2 Parties that contested the EP election as part of an electoral coalition while they 
ran separately in the previous national election have been treated as electoral coalitions in both 
instances. Similarly, parties in coalition in the previous national election have been considered 
as if they ran together also for the 2009 EP election (but in this case, we include only those 
national alliances whose partners jointly received at least 1 percent of the vote-share in 2009). 
Our dependent variable – which we term Eurogap – is for each party the difference between the 
percentage of valid votes polled at the 2009 European elections and that obtained at the most 
recent previous national parliamentary elections held in the country. 
 
We follow Hix and Marsh (2007) and rely on a ggregate-level data to resolve conflicting 
hypotheses about European elections and investigate why citizens switch votes from national to 
European elections. In fact, aggregate parties’ outcomes are not marred by the problem of 
individual-level data that “must rely on each respondent’s recall of past [voting] behavior, 
which is likely to understate change, particularly that from unpopular parties” (ibid., 499). 
Therefore, the analyses include the following aggregate-level variables, organized according to 
the model they operationalize: 
 
‘Second order’ Model 
Size is the percentage of votes for each party in the last national election. This variable serves 
as baseline to calculate the vote-share gap between national and the European elections. As we 
expect large parties to lose votes in the latter, we hypothesize therefore a negative relationship 
(b < 0). 
 
Government is a dummy variable scoring ‘1’ for all parties included in the national 
government at the time of 2009 E uropean elections (source: www.parties-and-elections.de), 
and ‘0’ for all others. Since second order theory postulates governing parties to lose votes, the 
hypothesis is of a negative impact (b < 0). 
 
‘Electoral cycle’ Model 
Early is intended to capture the relationship between sitting in government and the national 
electoral cycle. The Government variable is thus multiplied by a dummy variable scoring ‘1’ for 
all parties that are in the executive since a year or less. Since governing parties are assumed not 
to lose votes during their honeymoon, we expect that Early*Government leads to a p ositive 
impact (b > 0). 
 
2 This operational choice follows that employed by Hix and Marsh (2007; 2011) in a s imilar exercise, 
and it is meant to exclude primarily those flash parties whose electoral results can hardly be accounted 
for by general interpretations of European elections. 
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GDP is the percentage change in the gross domestic product in the quarter preceding the 
European election (source: Eurostat), with its value shared by all parties in a country. We 
expect that a positive state of the economy increases the votes of governmental parties, and thus 
that the interaction GDP*Government be positive (b > 0). 
 
‘Europe Matters’ Model 
Anti/Pro-EU is an indicator that taps the position of the parties in relation to the European 
Union as derived from expert surveys: each party is assigned a score from 0 (completely 
against the EU) to 7 (completely in favor) (source: Benoit and Laver 2006; Hooghe et al. 
2010). Based on the available literature, we hypothesize that Euro-skeptical parties poll better 
than Europhile ones (b < 0). 
 
Left-Right is the score assigned to each party on the continuum ranging between 0 (left) and 
10 (right) as derived from expert surveys (source: Benoit and Laver 2006; Hooghe et al. 2010). 
Based on Hooghe and Marks (2001) we expect that centrist and right parties gain votes at the 
expense of more leftist ones (b > 0). 
 
Extremism measures the distance of each party’s left-right position from the midpoint of the 
scale. Based on the argument that extreme parties are also more Euro-skeptical, we expect 
extreme parties to be favored in EU elections (b > 0). 
 
Saliency represents the volume of news in national media mentioning the European Union 
during the 2009 campaign and in which the party is the main actor, divided by the total number 
of EU-related news in a country featuring any national party as main actor (the value for each 
party can range from 0 t o 1; source: PIREDEU Media Study). This coding strategy aims to 
capture the relative extent to which each party campaigns on EU-related matters. If Ferrara and 
Weishaupt (2004) are correct in claiming that talking more about Europe has a positive impact 
on a party’s electoral outcome, we expect Saliency to be positively associated to parties’ vote 
shares (b > 0). 
 
Tone measures the content of a party’s campaign on Europe as deduced from media contents 
(source: PIREDEU Media Study). Explicit evaluations of Europe in the news are coded on a 
scale ranging from -2 (totally negative) to +2 (totally positive). The value assigned to each 
party is computed as follows. We first sum the scores for each message in which the party is 
coded as main actor and which contains an explicit evaluation; then, we subtract from each 
party score the mean value of all parties in a country on the same score. In this way, we express 
the tone of a party’s campaign as a contrast to the average tone across all parties in a nation (a 
party campaigning neutrally on the EU can therefore get a positive value if the average tone of 
the campaign in the nation is negative, and vice versa). We expect Tone to be positively related 
with Eurogap – that is, a positive tone should correspond to a better electoral performance (b > 
0) for governing parties, since both strategic considerations (as earlier argued) and a g reater 
involvement of incumbent parties with EU should suggest a pro-EU campaign for ruling 
parties. We then include a Government interaction with Tone (and also Saliency) to assess a 
differential impact between ruling and opposition parties. 
 
 
A Preliminary Assessment of the Models: Bivariate Analysis 
 
As our analysis is concerned with vote shares, we will not dwell at length on the aspects of 
second order theory that relate to turnout. We limit ourselves to the observation that in each and 
every European country turnout was lower in June 2009 than in the most recent previous 
national election. 
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Figure 1: Vote-share in 2009 European Parliament elections as a function of party size 
 
 
The expectation of second order theory that larger parties lose more votes than smaller ones 
is confirmed by the results of the 2009 European elections. Figure 1 plots the parties in our 
analysis in terms of its vote share in the EP election (vertical axis) and previous national 
election (horizontal axis). The regression line (solid) clearly shows the inverse relationship 
between previous size and vote-share in European elections, with bigger parties as the most 
penalized in the latter. The slope of the regression line is less steep than that of the 45 degree 
line (dashed) which describes equal vote shares in both elections, thus signaling a worse 
electoral performance at EP elections for larger parties. 
 
A third expectation from second-order theory is that losses are greater for parties in 
government. We find that this was indeed the case in 2009 (see Table 1). However, we deem of 
particular interest the fact that contrary to 2004 (Schmitt, 2005) there is not much difference in 
this respect between old and new member states. Governing parties lose a bit less in old 
member states (3.5 percentage points vs. 4.4 percent in new member states) while the reverse is 
true for opposition parties which in older member states gain slightly more (.75 of a percentage 
point) than in new ones (.31). Overall, in 2009 structural differences between Western and 
Eastern Europe appear to have somewhat leveled off, at least with respect to aggregate patterns 
of electoral behavior. 
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Table 1: Average gain for governing/opposition parties (old vs. new member states) 
    Old Members    New Members     
    Average gain  N   Average Gain  N   
  Government -3.50  (35)   -4.38  (29)   
  Opposition  0.75  (67)    0.31  (50)   
 
 
What does not seem to have worked as expected is the electoral cycle at the national level. 
By itself, the electoral cycle was a rather poor predictor of governing parties’ gains or losses in 
2009 compared to the previous national election. A visual inspection of the data plotted in 
Figure 2 shows a significant number of occurrences for which the theory cannot possibly 
account. Strong divergences are to be found, in particular, in the cases of Latvia (-14.7 percent 
for governing parties altogether after only three months from the national election), Sweden 
(+10.6 percent right in the middle of the electoral cycle), Portugal and Great Britain (losses of 
between 18.5 and 19.5 percent with new national election approaching). A second-order 
polynomial regression explains only 6 percent of variance in the relative performance of 
governing parties on the timing of EP election within the national cycle. Interestingly, 
excluding new member states from the analysis does not lead to better results – while it did so 
in 2004 (Schmitt 2005: 659). 
 
Figure 2: Results for governing parties according to the national electoral cycle 
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A further description of governing parties’ losses in 2009 may be provided by less contingent 
factors, and in particular by the parties’ political positions and campaign strategies. As to the 
first point, we observe that Eurogap is, although weakly, correlated with both Extremism on the 
left-right scale and parties’ position in relation to the Union (Anti/Pro-EU) (Fig. 3). 
 
 
Figure 3: Eurogap according to parties’ political positions 
 
The data in Table 2 shows that more extreme parties are likely to gain votes compared to those 
at more moderate positions on the left-right continuum. At the same time, we observe that our 
dependent variable is negatively correlated with the parties’ position towards the EU – that is, 
Euro-skeptic parties are those more likely to obtain better results. Furthermore, the strong 
relationship between Extremism and Anti/Pro-EU (r = .60) seems to reinforce the association 
between extremism on the left-right scale and a negative attitude towards the EU – and hence 
with electoral gains/losses. The implications of these results for governing parties are clear, as 
they are generally located on more moderate left-right positions (Taggart 1998; Ray 1999).  
 
Table 2: Linear correlation between Eurogap and parties’ political positions and non-linear 
(quadratic) R-squared regressing Eurogap on parties’ political position 
 Eurogap Extremism 
Extremism 
Correlation 
Quadratic R2 
.17* 
.03 
1 
 
 
Left-Right 
Correlation 
Quadratic R2 
.01 
.03 
.10 
 
rrelation 
Quadratic R2 
-.18* 
.04 
-.60** 
 
    Note: Correlations are Pearson’s r coefficients (two-tailed), ** p < .01, * p < .05 
 
They tend to lose votes to those parties whose Euro-skepticism is not constrained by 
governmental responsibilities. We must observe, however, that each of these factors is by itself 
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a poor predictor of electoral gains/losses, as is shown by the limited amount of variance 
explained by (polynomial) regressions of Eurogap on parties’ political positions. 
 
A second factor that may have affected the performance of governing parties in the last 
European election is their campaign strategies with respect to EU-related matters. Figure 4 
shows that government and opposition parties campaigned quite differently, as indicated by the 
salience assigned to Europe in the news in which parties were actors. The salience of Europe in 
the electoral campaigns of government parties (average value: 19%) was twice as large as that 
of opposition parties (average: 9%). On the other hand, the tone of the campaign – that is the 
evaluative content of the news concerning Europe – does not show a significant difference 
between government and opposition, with the government parties being just slightly more 
positive than opposition parties (Figure 5).  
 
 
Figure 4: Salience of EU campaign according to government/opposition role 
 
Unexpectedly, both campaign variables are inversely related with our dependent variable. The 
bivariate correlations between Saliency and Tone with Eurogap in Table 3 show an inverse 
relationship. This implies that, on average, talking more about Europe during the campaign, as 
well as talking more positively about Europe, is moderately associated with electoral losses. 
However, if we concentrate on opposition and governing parties separately, the conclusions to 
be drawn would appear rather different. The relationships are in fact extremely weak in the case  
of oppositions parties [Pearson’s rEurogap-Saliency = .00 and rEurogap-Tone = -.03].  
 
  Table 3: Eurogap and campaign strategies 
 Eurogap Saliency 
Saliency -0.15** 1.00 
Tone -0.14*    0.01 
 
Note: Cell entries are Pearson’s r coefficients (two-tailed), ** p < .05, * p < .10 
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Figure 5: Tone of EU campaign according to government/opposition role 
 
Conversely, governing parties’ electoral results are more strongly related to both the saliency 
given to European matters within their campaign and the tone used. But, surprisingly, the 
relationship is still weakly negative: the more that government parties emphasize Europe the 
more they lose compared to the previous national election [r = -.15]. With respect to the tone of 
the campaign on Europe, the relationship is once again negative: talking positively about the EU 
is moderately associated with worse results [r = -.20]. These findings suggest that if campaigns 
matter, they do s o first and foremost for parties in government which, contrary to our 
expectations, do not appear to benefit from engaging in positive campaigns on Europe. However, 
we must remember that all of the previous associations, albeit weak, are bivariate and therefore 
potentially spurious. Their actual impact needs thus to be assessed in a multivariate analysis. 
 
The Determinants of Vote Choice in European Elections: a Multivariate Analysis 
 
In this section we discuss a multivariate model that is aimed at understanding the determinants 
of parties’ electoral outcomes in the 2009 European election using all potentially relevant 
explanations. We estimate four OLS regression models with cluster correction and robust 
standard errors. The first includes only the variables relative to the classic second order theory 
(Size, Government); the second adds those from the electoral cycle specification of the former 
model (Early, Early*Government, GDP, GDP*Government); in the third model we also take 
into account the role played by a party’s position on the left-right and anti/pro-Europe scales 
(Left-Right, Extremism, Anti/Pro-EU); finally, the Saliency and the Tone of the campaign are 
included, along with their effect in interaction with the government variable 
(Saliency*Government and Tone*Government). The regression estimates are presented in Table 4. 
 
Model 1 confirms the core prediction of second order theory also for the case at hand. 
Larger parties, as well as those in government, lose votes to smaller and opposition parties 
(although the Government coefficient is not statistically significant here). Model 2 shows that 
being in an early phase of the domestic electoral cycle (e.g., the first year) restricts to a 
considerable extent the losses for governing parties. At the same time, the state of the economy 
provides us with a further specification of the conditions that affect ruling parties’ electoral 
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performance: a p ositive macroeconomic performance is related to Eurogap regardless of the 
location of the European election in the national electoral cycle. In our opinion, this represents 
a valid explanation for those countries (see above) where the electoral performance of the 
government did not conform to the Mid-Term model predictions. More generally, these 
findings suggest that ruling is not in itself associated to electoral losses, which are contingent of 
the phase of national electoral cycle and the condition of the economy, which affects 
government popularity.  
 
Table 4: The determinants of party performance in 2009 EP elections (OLS estimates) 
 
(1) 
 
Second Order 
(2) 
Electoral 
Cycle 
(3) 
Europe 
Matters 
(4) 
Europe + 
Campaign 
Size    -0.22    -0.24    -0.31    -0.43 
 (.06)*** (.06)*** (.07)*** (.08)*** 
Government    -1.96      1.12      2.73      3.99 
    (1.22)     (1.47)     (1.56)* (1.29)*** 
Early -     -0.42      -1.41     -0.99 
      (1.28)      (1.64)     (1.75) 
Early*Government -       4.74        6.46       5.63 
       (1.88)**     (2.12)***  (2.37)** 
GDP -      -0.05       -0.10       -0.05 
       (0.12) (0 .13)       (0.15) 
GDP*Government -        0.62         0.90         0.85 
        (0.19)***       (0.23)***       (0.23)*** 
Left-Right - - 0.40 0.22 
     (0.22)* (0.17) 
Extremism - - 0.79  0.90 
     (0.44)*     (0.42)** 
Anti/Pro-EU - - 0.43 0.53 
   (0.41)        (0.43) 
Saliency - - -        18.15 
           (6.75)** 
Tone - - -     0.04 
        (0.04) 
Saliency*Government - - - -    6.13 
         (8.81) 
Tone*Government - - -    -0.23 
        (0.15) 
     
Observations 181 181      149        149 
R-squared           0.26           0.30 0.38         0.44 
SEE           5.64            5.52 5.55         5.32 
Note: Dependent variable: Eurogap. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by country 
   *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10 
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In Model 3 we add parties’ positions on the Left-Right and Anti/Pro-EU scales.3 We also add  
Extremism – which emerges as the strongest coefficient in this block of predictors. Our expec-
tations are thus confirmed, showing that mainstream parties are penalized at European elections. 
However, the insignificant contribution of the Anti/Pro-EU variable, although in the expected 
direction, leads us to think that a party’s position in relation to the EU does not matter per se; 
rather, we believe that what matters is how this position is communicated to voters during the 
campaign. For this reason, we include in Model 4 the variables related to the saliency and tone of 
each party’s campaign on Europe. Their direct effects are, in accordance with our expectations 
(and contrary to the earlier bivariate associations) positively related to electoral results (although 
Tone falls short of statistical significance). So, net of the other covariates, focusing heavily on 
European matters in the campaign does help a party’s electoral fortunes. To ascertain whether the 
distinction between government and opposition makes a difference we also added two 
interactions with the Government variable. Although both their signs confirm the earlier bivariate 
associations - e.g., emphasizing European issues would appear to represent a liability for 
government parties, as increasing communication appears related to a poorer electoral 
performance as Tone also does, albeit with a co nsiderably lesser magnitude – the lack of 
statistical significance means that the impact of government status remains uncertain, within the 
proposed model. Our conclusion is therefore that emphasizing Europe enhances the electoral 
prospects of all parties, both in government and in opposition. Giving salience to European issues 
in waging European Parliament electoral campaigns is therefore a positive asset. Contrary to our 
expectations, such enhancement would appear somewhat smaller for ruling parties. However, the 
size of the interaction coefficient for Salience*Government – besides its lack of statistical 
significance – is far smaller than that of the main effect of Salience. Thus ruling parties are still 
greatly favored by assigning high salience to European issues. As to the tone of the campaign, its 
effects are not statistically significant in the model estimated. Further research will explore why 
this is so, and also explore different measures to tap this important dimension. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The 2009 European elections represent a further confirmation of the Second Order Model. We 
documented how the key aspects of the SOM found application in the 2009 European elections, 
and focused on the factors that drive the traditional tendency of large and ruling parties to lose 
votes compared to the preceding national elections. In particular, we ascertained how the 
impact of the timing of the EP elections within the national electoral cycle on the ruling parties’ 
results is supplemented by the state of the national economy, with ruling parties presiding over 
positive economic conditions being electorally rewarded.  
 
We also found confirming evidence that parties’ ideological outlook impacts upon European 
election outcomes. However, and for the first time, we were also able to observe a s izable 
impact of parties’ electoral campaigning on voting results, thanks to the research design of the 
PIREDEU Media Study. This adds to the explanation already provided by the Europe Matters 
model, whose preliminary findings from the modified model discussed in this chapter show that 
large parties’ tendency to lose at European elections is also mildly counterbalanced by strong 
Europe-focused campaigning. Saliency of Europe in parties’ campaign does therefore support 
positively parties’ electoral fortunes. Although only indicative due to the lack of statistical 
significance, we observe hints that European salience may slightly favor the opposition more 
than government parties which, nevertheless, are in any case electorally advantaged by waging 
campaigns for the European Parliament elections focusing on Europe. 
3 The number of cases included in this model (n=149) is slightly lower as compared to Model 1 and 2 
(n=181), the reason being that parties founded after 2006 – as well as those from Cyprus, Luxembourg 
and Malta – are not included in the Chapel Hill expert survey (2006) from which we derive parties’ 
placement on the left-right and anti/pro-EU scales. 
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Explaining the Second Order Effect: the Role of Issues and 
Institutions in Elections to the European Parliament1 
 
 
Nick Clark2 
 
 
Abstract 
Elections to the European Parliament have been unable to capture the public’s interest 
– turnout remains far lower than most national elections and many who do vote appear 
more concerned with sending messages of approval to national political parties than 
electing representatives at the EU level. This chapter seeks to explain why the public 
does not take these elections seriously. The second order elections theory (Reif and 
Schmitt 1980) posits that the public simply does not care about EU politics. Disputing 
this ‘issue-based’ explanation, we argue that the public instead doubts the 
representativeness and influence of the European Parliament. Negative perceptions of 
the Parliament induce many individuals to abstain or to vote differently than they 
would in national elections. We expect this ‘institution-induced’ effect to be stronger in 
countries with empowered national parliaments, where the public is accustomed to and 
expects a r epresentative body to have substantial influence over decision-making. 
Using data from the 2009 European Election Study and Eurobarometer 69.2, we find 
that negative perceptions of the EP lead many individuals to abstain from EP elections 
and prompt EP voters to focus more on national politics when casting their vote.    
 
 
 
Elections to the European Parliament (EP) do not appear to be working as instruments of 
democratic accountability at the EU level. Turnout remains low by the standards of most 
national elections, and has declined in every EP election since 1979. EP campaigns receive 
little attention from the media (de Vreese, et al 2006), and largely focus on national-level 
politics (Franklin 2001, Weber 2007). Several scholars argue that EP elections serve as “second 
order” contests – voters do not perceive EP elections as important and use their vote to send 
messages of displeasure to national political parties (Reif and Schmitt 1980, Reif 1984, Marsh 
1998, Ferrara and Weishaupt 2004, van der Brug, et al 2007, Hix and Marsh 2007). However, 
few studies seek to explain why the public holds such disregard for EP elections. The second 
order literature often suggests that Europeans simply do not care that much about the European 
Union, but more recent contributions find that EP voters are actually swayed by preferences on 
EU political issues (Hobolt, et al 2009, Clark and Rohrschneider 2009). Moreover, the higher 
turnout in referenda on EU questions indicates that the public takes an interest in EU affairs. 
Given that EP voters appear to hold preferences on European integration, why do t hey 
subordinate the EU to national-level politics in EP elections or choose not to participate at all? 
This chapter argues that many EP voters have a negative perception of the European Parliament 
and thus do not view EP elections as genuine opportunities to address EU politics.  
 
To explain the public’s behavior in EP elections, we distinguish between ‘issue-based’ and 
‘institution-induced’ motivations for voting. According to the former, individuals choose 
whether and how to vote based on the salience of the political issues at the center of an election. 
Public apathy toward the EU constitutes an issue-based explanation for the second order effect 
in EP elections. Institution-induced citizens focus more on the perceived importance of the 
1 Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at the 2010 Annual Meeting and Exhibition of the 
American Political Science Association and the PIREDEU Conference “Auditing Electoral Democracy 
in the European Union”. The author wishes to thank Nicholas D’Amico, Mark Franklin, Tim Hellwig, 
Jae-Jae Spoon, and Robert Rohrschneider for feedback on earlier versions. 
2 Department of Political Science, Indiana University. Email: nijclark@indiana.edu  
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political actors at the center of an election. Individuals who doubt the influence or 
representativeness of a political body are not likely to take elections to that body seriously. We 
believe that this motivation offers a more plausible explanation for voting behavior in EP 
elections.   
 
The public has been given ample reason to doubt the influence of the European Parliament. 
The Parliament did not have any decision-making power through the late 1980s – the 
Commission and Council were only required to consult with the Parliament on proposals for 
new EU legislation. The EU Treaties have since been revised to provide the Parliament with the 
right to approve proposals for new EU laws, but the EP does not have any power of legislative 
initiative and lacks some of the oversight powers held by most national parliaments – critics of 
EU democracy thus often call attention to the Parliament’s lack of power vis-à-vis the 
Commission and Council of Ministers (Schmitter 2000, Siedentop 2000, Mauer 2007). Given 
the limitations on the EP’s power, many Europeans may not view the Parliament as a viable 
arena for addressing EU political issues. This institution-induced motivation would explain 
why many individuals hold preferences on E uropean integration and yet abstain from EP 
elections or only use these elections as opinion barometers on the performance of national 
parties. We expect that such institution-induced voting is more prevalent in countries with 
empowered parliamentary bodies, as individuals from these political systems are accustomed to 
a legislative chamber able to exert substantial influence over the decision-making process.   
 
This chapter proceeds by first reviewing what we already know about the political 
conditions that shape EP voting behavior. We then develop our theory of institution-induced 
voting, explaining how perceptions of the European Parliament and national parliamentary 
bodies might influence the public’s attitudes toward EP elections. Using survey data from 
Eurobarometer 69.2 and the 2009 European Election Study, we next examine how the public’s 
views of the European Parliament affect both voter turnout and voting behavior in EP elections. 
To investigate whether more powerful national parliaments enhance the institution-induced 
effect, we incorporate Fish and Kroenig’s measure of parliamentary strength into our model of 
EP voting behavior. The concluding section discusses the implications of our results for the 
research on EP elections.  
 
 
Issue-based Voting in the Second Order Research 
 
Much of the research on EP elections assumes that EP voting behavior is issue-based. Reif and 
Schmitt (1980) argue that EP elections are second order contests because the most important 
and visible policy areas are governed at the national level. As EP elections do not affect who 
holds power over the more important issues, there is not any risk of ‘wasting a vote’ in these 
elections. Some voters cast a ‘sincere vote’ in the EP elections, defecting from the large, 
centrist party that they supported in the last national election to a sm aller, less-competitive 
party with which they more closely identify. Other ‘strategic’ voters defect in order to send a 
message of disapproval to the party they normally support in national elections. The small, 
niche parties thus perform much better in EP elections than in national contests, while large, 
centrist parties and governing parties tend to suffer disproportionately larger losses. A large 
body of subsequent research has confirmed Reif and Schmitt’s initial conclusions, suggesting 
that the perceived irrelevance of EU issues leads voters to behave differently in national and 
European-level elections (Reif 1984, Anderson and Ward 1996, Marsh 1998, Carrubba and 
Timpone 2005, Schmitt 2005, Koepke and Ringe 2006, Hix and Marsh 2007, Marsh 2007). 
 
Despite the micro-level foundations of the second order argument, much of this research 
utilizes macro-level data. For instance, theorizing that strategic voting is more likely the longer it 
has been since the last national election, some scholars point to the greater losses of governing 
parties at the midpoint in national election cycles as evidence for the second order effect (Reif 
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and Schmitt 1980, Marsh 1998, Hix and Marsh 2007). Using survey data to identify the issue 
preferences of EP voters, more recent studies demonstrate that both national and EU-level issues 
prompt individuals to switch their votes across national and EP elections. Government 
supporters are more likely to support an opposition party in the EP elections if they perceive 
themselves as more Eurosceptic than the government (Hobolt, et al 2009) or if they do not 
approve of the government’s performance on EU issues (Clark and Rohrschneider 2009).  
 
Further research demonstrates that the availability of information about EU politics has a 
clear effect on the public’s voting behavior. Examining the 1994 Norwegian referendum on EU 
accession, Hobolt (2007) finds that greater levels of EU knowledge improve voter competence 
– better-informed Norwegians were more likely to vote according to preferences about EU 
accession rather than support for the government. Political information has a similar effect in 
EP elections. EU preferences exert greater influence over EP voters as the EU achieves greater 
visibility in EP campaigns (Weber 2007, Hobolt, et al 2009) and media coverage of EP 
elections (de Vries, et al forthcoming), and as EP voters acquire more information about the 
positions of EP candidates on EU issues (Hobolt and Wittrock 2010). Greater media coverage 
of EU politics also increases voter turnout in EP elections (Banducci and Semetko 2003). This 
research identifies the political conditions that influence the salience of EU issues, but has yet 
to consider the potential effect of institutional trust on EP voting behavior.  
 
This chapter contributes to the second order research by investigating how perceptions of 
the European Parliament shape participation in EP elections. Carrubba and Timpone (2005) 
offer the only study that includes a measure for attitudes toward the Parliament in a model of 
EP voting. Their findings support the institution-induced theory, but with a sample limited to 
individuals who switch their vote to a Green party in European elections. Given the evidence 
that trust in political institutions affects voter turnout (Nie et al 1976, Shaffer 1981, Powell 
1986) and political engagement (Putnam 1994, Mishler and Rose 1997, Bernhard and Karakoc 
2007), it is worthwhile to consider how negative perceptions of the European Parliament 
influence the wider European electorate.  
 
Additionally, to better test the assumptions behind the second order model, this chapter 
investigates both voter turnout and vote switching in EP elections. While the second order 
argument assumes public apathy toward EP elections, much of the micro-level research focuses 
solely on individuals who switch their vote in EP elections – less than 13% of actual EP voters 
in the 1994 elections (Carrubba and Timpone 2005) and less than 12% in the 2009 elections. 
Taking reported EP voters together with abstainers, vote-switchers are a small proportion of the 
European public. By examining both why and how people vote in EP elections, we hope to 
better identify the attitudes shaping political behavior at the EU level.   
 
 
The Public’s Perceptions of the European Parliament  
 
EU critics argue that the Parliament lacks the powers to ensure democratic accountability in the 
EU (Schmitter 2000, Siedentop 2000). Of course, there was a stronger basis for this critique 
thirty years ago than today. The Parliament was only a consultative body with minimal 
influence over EU decision-making through the late 1980s. In 1992, the Parliament gained the 
right to approve Commission proposals for new EU laws in a limited number of policy areas. 
Successive treaties have widened the scope of the Parliament’s jurisdiction, so that it currently 
shares decision-making authority with the Council over most EU policy areas. In that same 
period of time, the Parliament has used its limited oversight powers over the European 
Commission to full effect, including widely-covered rebukes of the Santer Commission in 1999 
and the Barossa Commission in 2004. However, the public may still have reason to doubt the 
importance of EP elections.  
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The Parliament remains junior partner to the Council of Ministers in the EU decision-
making framework, excluded from EU decision-making in a few important and visible policy 
areas (such as taxation and international trade) and the open method of coordination over 
economic, employment, and social policy. The EU treaties grant the EP significant oversight 
powers over the College of Commissioners, but the Parliament does not have a seat  in the 
Council’s ‘comitology’ system of committees that approve Commission proposals for new rules 
and policies (Mauer 2007). Most notably, the Parliament does not have the same legislative 
initiative granted to most national parliaments – it can only request that the Commission draft a 
proposal for a new EU law.  
 
Perhaps more important for public perception, the Parliament has not effectively depicted 
itself as a capable representative body. National media outlets devote minimal coverage to EU 
politics (Anderson and Weymouth 1999, Meyer 2005, Peter, et al 2003, Peter and de Vreese 
2004). When the media does take an interest in EU politics, it often frames European 
integration as having negative consequences for the public well-being (Norris 2000, de Vreese 
2002, Anderson 2004, Maier and Rittberger 2008). The Parliament appears to receive the worst 
treatment – the media focuses more on national-level issues and actors even within stories on 
EP elections (de Vreese, et al 2006). As Peter, et al (2004) note, it is unclear if recent advances 
in the Parliament’s power have actually been communicated to the public.  
 
For their part, the EU institutions have not dedicated sufficient resources to overcoming 
media resistance to covering EU politics (Meyer 1999). Reviewing the Parliament’s media 
communications, Anderson and McLeod (2004) find that the press units and national 
information offices are under-funded, under-staffed and lack any sort of coordinated media 
strategy. Additionally, the connection between the public and members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs) appears to have weakened in recent years. As the EP has assumed a greater 
role in EU decision-making, MEPs have had to devote more time to learning about policy and 
less to constituency work and public outreach (EPRG 2006, Mauer 2007). Given the remaining 
limitations on the Parliament’s power and the weak communications between the EP and the 
public, many individuals may not perceive the Parliament as capable of influencing EU 
decision-making or as representative of the public’s interests.   
 
 
The Relationship between National Parliaments and Perceptions of the European 
Parliament   
 
We suspect that institution-induced voting is more prevalent in countries with empowered 
national parliaments. Executives have acquired much of the policy-making authority once 
delegated to parliaments (Laver & Shepsle 1996, Bergman, et al 2000). Parliaments, in turn, 
have increasingly assumed responsibility for monitoring and holding accountable national 
governments (Bagehot 1990, Lijphart 1992, Shugart and Carey 1992). The ex-ante and ex-post 
controls at a parliament’s disposal determine its capability for influencing the government 
(Andweg 2007). In assessing parliamentary strength, Fish and Kroenig (2009) thus consider 
whether parliamentary approval is required to declare war, ratify treaties, or appoint members 
of the judiciary and whether parliaments can summon, investigate, or compel testimony from 
executive officials. As there are a number of institutional arrangements structuring 
executive/legislative relations (Lijphart 1999), parliamentary power varies across different 
European political systems (Auel and Benz 2007). 
 
The extent of a parliament’s power has an effect on its constituents’ views on the role of a 
parliamentary body. Stronger parliaments are more likely to exert power and have an active role 
in decision-making, ensuring greater visibility in the public sphere. Their constituents may thus 
come to expect a parliamentary body to effectively influence decision-making and check the 
power of the executive. As weaker parliaments may have a far less prominent role in national 
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politics, their constituents may not attribute a parliamentary body with the same importance in 
the political process. Europe’s variation in parliamentary strength may thus lead to each EU 
members’ voters having different expectations for the European Parliament. As voters 
accustomed to strong national parliaments have higher expectations for their representative 
institutions, negative perceptions of the EP may have a larger effect on turnout and vote 
switching in EP elections. In countries with weak national parliaments, the voters do not place 
as much emphasis on the strength of representative institutions and are thus less likely to be 
swayed by negative perceptions of the EP.  
 
Previous research demonstrates that national-level institutions have an effect on the public’s 
attitudes toward European integration. Many individuals evaluate the quality of political 
representation in their country based on the openness of national bureaucracies and judiciaries – 
the extent to which these institutions allow citizens to express their preferences and demands 
(Rohrschneider 2002). These procedural-based assessments are detrimental to public support 
for the entire political system. “The procedural aspect is particularly important given that 
individuals rarely obtain everything they value: what counts, to a considerable degree, is the 
belief that institutions provide a fair articulation of one’s interests” (Rohrschneider 2005: 464). 
Better-performing institutions have the inverse effect on support for the EU: open and 
responsive political institutions at the national level only underscore perceived deficiencies in 
representational quality at the EU level. In these countries, the public is not only more likely to 
find fault with the EU institutions, but to develop EU positions based on these perceived 
deficiencies rather than the financial costs and benefits of European integration.  
 
National-level actors influence EU-level behavior by structuring the public’s expectations 
from their political institutions. Rohrschneider (2002) focuses on bureaucracies and judiciaries, 
but we expect that other national actors serve a similar function when individuals consider and 
appraise the different EU institutions. National parliaments offer a far more relevant benchmark 
for individuals evaluating the European Parliament. Moreover, parliamentary bodies are useful 
tools for assessing the representational quality of a political system. Parliamentarians are the 
voters’ delegates within the political system (Strom 2000, Maurer 2007), articulating the views 
and preferences of different groups (Polsby 1975) and ensuring compromise between opposing 
interests (Gerring and Thacker 2008) in a democratic society. Parliaments offer an important 
point of access for the public to provide input and feedback to their decision-makers. Most 
individuals will thus look to their experiences with national parliaments when judging the 
quality of EP elections.   
 
To summarize our argument thus far: the public behaves much differently in national and 
European-level elections. Voter turnout is substantially lower at the EU level, and many EP 
voters appear more concerned with sending messages of disapproval to national political parties 
rather than electing representatives at the European level. The second order literature often 
interprets this behavior as evidence of public apathy toward EU issues. We contend that the 
public, when considering whether and how to participate in EP elections, are motivated more 
by doubts about the European Parliament than a lack of interest in EU issues. Given the 
perceived weaknesses of the European Parliament, many individuals do not believe they can 
effectively address EU issues through EP elections.  
 
 
Turnout in European Parliament Elections 
 
Most of the survey data in this study is taken from the 2009 European Election Study (EES), a 
part of the project on "Providing an Infrastructure for Research on Electoral Democracy in the 
European Union" (European Election Study 2010). EES analyses are supplemented with data 
from Eurobarometer 69.2 (Papacostas 2009) and the Parliamentary Powers Index (Fish and 
Kroenig 1999). We investigate two potential explanations for low voter turnout in EP elections:  
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Issue-based Hypothesis: The low salience of EU political issues prompts many 
individuals to abstain from EP elections 
 
Institution-induced Hypothesis: Negative perceptions of the European Parliament 
prompt many individuals to abstain from EP elections  
 
Conducted prior to the 2009 EP elections, Eurobarometer 69.2 asks those who report having 
abstained from the 2004 EP elections why they chose not to participate. Figure 1 presents the 
responses to this question. Around 43% reply that they are not interested in EU politics, and 
over 57% agree that the EP does not deal with problems that matter.   
 
 
 
Figure 1: Considerations shaping likely vote in 2009 EP elections. 
 
While only about a third of abstainers raise concerns about the EP’s influence, nearly 55% 
respond that the Parliament does not represent their views. Over 60% of respondents reply that 
they do not have sufficient information about the Parliament’s role. After removing abstainers 
who express no interest in politics in general, those who indicate that they are not interested in 
EU issues drops to less than 25% – this is by far the largest effect of political interest across all 
of the responses. There are not significant regional differences in the data, other than 
individuals from Eastern Europe are far less likely to abstain because of opposition to the 
European Union3. Altogether, these responses indicate that some individuals choose to abstain 
due to low EU issue salience, but that negative perceptions of the EP are more responsible for 
low voter turnout.  
EB respondents were also asked how likely it is that they will vote in the 2009 elections. 
Table 1 presents the results of an ordinary least squares regression of trust in national and EU 
institutions and perceptions of the EP’s importance within the European Union on the intention 
to vote in the 2009 EP elections4. Neither of the measures for satisfaction with national and 
EU-level affairs is significant – we expected one or both to matter if issue-based concerns 
influence turnout. Moreover, contrary to the second order argument that EP elections are largely 
defined by national political concerns, these results suggest that an individual’s trust in their 
national government does not influence their decision to participate in EP elections. Instead, 
3 15% identify this reason in the East compared with nearly 28% in the West.  
4 These measures are described more fully in Appendix A.  
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perceptions of the European Parliament are the best predictors of an individual’s intention to 
participate in EP elections. As predicted by the institution-induced hypothesis, trust in the EP 
and the belief that the EP can influence EU decision-making increases the likelihood that 
someone will vote in EP elections. Additionally, our measure for trust in national parliaments 
achieves significance, suggesting that experiences with national parliaments have an effect on 
perceptions of EP elections. 
 
 
Table 1: Predicting likely vote in European Parliament elections. 
 Likelihood of voting 
EU membership bad -0.77 
(0.03)** 
Country moving in wrong direction -0.08 
(0.03) 
EU moving in wrong direction 
 
-0.08 
(0.03) 
Tend not to trust national parliament 
 
-0.18 
(0.03)** 
Tend not to trust national government 0.03 
(0.03) 
Tend not to trust European Parliament 0.39 
(0.03)** 
European Parliament not important in EU decision-making -0.48 
(0.03)** 
Education 0.001 
(0.002) 
Sex 
 
-0.11 
(0.04) 
Age 0.02** 
(0.001) 
Note: Entries are coefficients from an ordinary least squares analysis.  
This model includes dummies for each of the EU’s 27 members. These coefficients are not presented in 
order to conserve space. 
* and ** denotes significance at the .05 and .01 level. There are 24,510 observations tested in this model.  
Source: Eurobarometer 69.2. 
 
Next, we turn to the European Election Study to further examine the factors shaping turnout 
in EP elections. The EES includes the question: “A lot of people abstained in the European 
Parliament elections of June 4, while others voted. Did you cast your vote?” We first note that 
there are significant discrepancies between likely, reported, and actual turnout in the 2009 EP 
elections. In 2008, over 65% of respondents in Eurobarometer 69.2 indicated there was a better 
than even chance that they would vote in the 2009 elections. Over a y ear later, the actual 
turnout, averaged across the EU-27, was 43%5. In the 2009 E ES, over 70% of respondents 
replied that they had voted in the elections. While the Eurobarometer and EES may have 
unintentionally over-sampled likely and actual EP voters, it seems more likely that these 
surveys have the same problem with voter over-reporting as found in other election studies 
(Granberg and Holmberg 1991, Karp and Brockington 2005). Fortunately, over-reporting does 
not appear to bias survey results toward any demographic (Traugott and Katosh 1979, Katosh 
and Traugott 1981, Hill and Hurley 1984, Silver, Anderson and Abramson 1986).  
Using the EES data, we estimate a maximum likelihood model to investigate the 
considerations leading individuals to abstain from EP elections. The results of this analysis, as 
5 As reported by the EP at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/archive/elections2009/en/turnout_en.html  
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depicted in Table 2, offer further support for the institution-induced hypothesis. The 
relationship between turnout and EU issue salience is in the direction predicted by the issue-
based hypothesis – those who do not think that the EU deals with the most important problem 
facing their country are more likely to abstain – but is not significant. However, both measures 
of EP perceptions are statistically significant. Individuals who doubt the representativeness of 
the Parliament and the importance of EP elections are more likely to abstain from EP 
elections.6  
 
 
Table 2: Predicting abstentions in European Parliament elections. 
 
 
Abstain (1) 
Vote (0)  
EU Salience 
 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
EP Representational Quality 
 
 0.08 
(0.02)** 
EP Elections Importance 
 
 0.49 
(0.01)** 
EU Knowledge -0.20 
(0.01)** 
Education -0.02 
(0.003)** 
Sex -0.08 
(0.03)* 
Age -0.03 
(0.001)** 
Socio-Economic Class -0.12 
(0.01)** 
Note: Entries are coefficients from a logistic regression.  
This model includes dummies for each of the EU’s 27 members. These coefficients are not 
presented in order to conserve space.  
* and ** denotes significance at the .05 and .01 level. There are25,900 observations tested 
in this model.  
Source: The 2009 European Election Survey.  
 
 
To better assess the substantive effects of issue salience and EP perceptions, we estimate the 
different predicted probabilities of abstaining from EP elections for those individuals who 
attribute low and high importance to EU issues and those with negative and positive 
perceptions of the Parliament. Table 3 presents the results. In line with the institution-induced 
hypothesis, perceptions of the EP have a greater effect on turnout than the salience of EU 
issues. Those who believe the EP represents the public interest are nearly 7% more likely to 
vote, whereas those who identify the EU as dealing with the most important issue in their 
country are less than 1% more likely to vote. Our measure for the perceived importance of EP 
elections has the largest effect – those individuals who believe that it matters who wins seats in 
the EP are nearly 40% more likely to vote.   
 
 
6 Abstainers tend to be younger, less-educated females, with less information about the EU, and from 
lower socio-economic cohorts. 
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Table 3: Predicted probabilities of abstaining from European Parliament elections. 
 
 Probability of Abstaining  
  
Who deals with the most important issue today?  
National/Regional Authorities  0.31 
EU Authorities  0.301 
Difference 0.009 
 
The Parliament represents citizens.  
Strongly Disagree  0.345 
Strongly Agree  0.276 
Difference 0.069 
  
It matters which candidate wins the most seats in EP 
elections.   
Strongly Disagree  0.543 
Strongly Agree  0.145 
Difference 0.398 
Notes: Probabilities based on a middle-class, 50-year old female with some knowledge about the EU 
(able to answer 2 out of 4 true/false questions correctly) and around 14 years of education.   
Source: The 2009 European Election Study 
 
Vote Switching in European Parliament Elections 
 
The second order argument presumes that the public perceives EP elections as inconsequential. 
This perception removes any anxiety over wasting a vote and allows EP voters to either support 
smaller parties that are not as competitive in more important national elections or to send a 
message of disapproval to the government. While a number of second order studies 
demonstrate that performance evaluations of the government are related to vote switching in EP 
elections, there have been few efforts to verify if or explain why the public actually views EP 
elections as unimportant. In addition to confirming that dismissive attitudes toward EP 
elections do influence vote choices, we investigate two conditional hypotheses for vote 
switching:  
 
Issue-based Hypothesis: EP voters are more likely to switch their vote from a 
government party to an opposition party in EP elections when EP elections are 
perceived as unimportant due to the low salience of EU issues    
 
Institution-induced Hypothesis: EP voters are more likely to switch their vote from a 
government party to an opposition party in EP elections when EP elections are 
perceived as unimportant due to negative perceptions of the European Parliament    
 
To measure vote switching across national and European elections, we use the standard four-
part matrix (Carruba and Timpone 2005, Clark and Rohrschneider 2009) based on respondents’ 
recalled votes in the last national and EP elections: (1) the voter supported a government party 
in both elections; (2) supported an opposition party in both elections; (3) moved from a 
government party in the national election to an opposition party in the EP election; or (4) 
defected from an opposition party in the national election to a government party in the EP 
election. As with past EP elections, there are very few defections – roughly 89% consistently 
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support the government or the opposition across elections. Amongst defectors, far more switch 
their vote from a government party to an opposition party – 11.5% compared with 3.38% who 
switch in favor of the government.  
 
Table 4 summarizes the results of a m ultinomial logistic (MNL) regression on the 
probability of defecting from a government party in EP elections, as opposed to supporting the 
government in both national and EP elections. We do not present results for the other two 
categories in the four-part vote switching matrix, as the second order argument primarily 
focuses on defectors from the government and the number of voters defecting from an 
opposition party is a fraction of the total population. Our model of vote switching includes the 
measures of government performance used in most of the second order research, as w ell as 
demographic controls and indicators for perceptions of the importance of EP elections, the 
salience of EU issues, and perceptions of the EP’s representativeness. Additionally, as w e 
theorize that EU issue salience and the EP’s representativeness may condition views on the 
importance of EP elections, our model includes terms for the interaction of the perceived 
importance of EP elections with both EU issue salience and EP representativeness.  
 
The MNL results corroborate previous research on the second order effect: individuals who 
perceive themselves as diverging from the government on left/right issues or who disapprove of 
the government’s performance are more likely to defect from a g overnment party to the 
opposition in EP elections. In other words, national politics influences vote choices in EP 
elections. Consistent with more recent second order research, perceived differences with the 
government on the pace of European integration also increases the chances of defecting from 
the government in EP elections. 
 
Seeking to explain why EP voters focus on national issues and actors at the EU level, we next 
examine how voter’s perceptions of EP elections, EU political issues, and the European 
Parliament affect the likelihood of defecting from the government. The results in Table 4  
suggest  t hat doubts about the importance of EP elections are indeed associated with vote 
switching in EP elections, as is widely assumed in the second order literature. Additionally, in 
line with the institution-induced hypothesis, negative perceptions of the EP appear to induce 
vote switching – EP voters are more likely to defect from a government party if they harbor 
doubts about the Parliament. Moreover, the second interaction term is significant, suggesting 
that perceptions of the EP’s representativeness condition the effect of views on the importance 
of EP elections. The MNL results do not offer as much support for the issue-based hypothesis. 
Neither the measure for EU issue salience nor the first interaction term (EU 
salience*importance of EP elections) appear to be related to vote switching. 
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Table 4:  Predicting defections from government parties in European Parliament elections. 
 
 Pr(Vote Gov. in Nat. Election 
Opp. in EP Election) 
Left-Right Distance  0.09 
(0.02)** 
EU Distance -0.03 
(0.02)* 
Government Approval  1.13 
(0.08)** 
EP Elections Importance  0.22 
(0.09)** 
EU Salience  0.05 
(0.17) 
EP Representational Quality  0.24 
(0.07)** 
Interaction 1 (EP Importance*EU Salience) -0.01 
(0.08) 
Interaction 2 (EP Importance*EP Represent.) -0.06 
(0.03)* 
EU Knowledge  0.03 
(0.03) 
Education  0.01 
(0.01) 
Sex -0.03 
(0.07) 
Age -0.01 
(0.002)** 
Socio-Economic Class -0.04 
(0.04) 
             Notes: Entries are coefficients from a multi-nominal logistic regression.  
This model tests the probability of voting for a government party in the last national election and 
an opposition party in the 2009 EP election as opposed to supporting a government party 
in both elections.  
This model includes dummies for each of the EU’s 27 members, but these coefficients are not 
presented above to conserve space. 
* and ** denotes significance at the .05 and .01 level. There are 9,466 observations tested in this 
model.   
Source: The 2009 European Election Survey.  
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To better interpret these results, Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the substantive effects of the issue-
based and institution-induced measures on t he probability of government defections in EP 
elections. While neither measure exerts much influence over government defections,  EP  
representativeness has a s lightly larger effect than EU issue salience. Of particular note, EU 
issue salience has the opposite effect than predicted by the issue-based hypothesis – voters who 
attribute higher importance to EU issues are more likely to defect from a government party in 
EP elections.  
 
 
Figure 2: Probability of defecting with different perceptions of the European Parliament. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Probability of defecting when EU issues are salient. 
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Figures 4 and 5 depict the conditional effects of these two measures on the relationship between 
perceptions of EP elections and defections from the government. Assessments of the EP’s 
representativeness clearly mediate the effect of perceptions of EP elections on vote switching.  
 
 
Figure 4: Conditional effects of EP representativeness on perceptions of EP elections. 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Conditional effects of EU issue salience on perceptions of EP elections. 
 
The difference in the probability of defection (between those who strongly agree and strongly 
disagree that EP elections matter) increases along with faith in the EP’s representational quality. 
EU issue salience not only has a weaker effect on perceptions of EP elections, but again appears 
to actually increase the odds of government defections. However, we are cautious in weighting 
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the results for EU issue salience, as a continuous measure of EU issue salience might reveal a 
greater effect.  
 
Consistent with previous second order research, we find that the government’s positions on 
left/right issues and European integration and evaluations of government performance lead to 
vote switching in EP elections. Additionally, we confirm that this voting behavior is related to 
the perception that EP elections do not matter, and that public doubts about the European 
Parliament underlie such perceptions. These results indicate that negative perceptions of the 
Parliament may lead voters to doubt the value of EP elections as instruments of accountability 
at the EU level and to thus use these elections to address national politics. 
 
 
The Role of National Parliaments 
 
The public may look to their national parliament as a point of reference when evaluating the 
value of elections to the European Parliament. Theorizing that individuals accustomed to a 
powerful national parliament will expect the European Parliament to have a prominent role in 
EU decision-making, we use the Parliamentary Powers Index (PPI) to investigate the following 
hypothesis:  
 
National Filter Hypothesis: Negative perceptions of the EP will have the strongest 
effect in countries with empowered parliamentary bodies.    
 
The PPI scores every national parliament in the world on an index of 32 measures of 
parliamentary power, including ‘influence over the executive’, ‘institutional autonomy’, 
‘specified powers’, and ‘institutional capacity’. To estimate each parliament’s score, the 
principle investigators take the confirmed number of powers out of the 32 possible in the index 
– a parliament receiving a score of .75 h olds 24 of  the 32 p owers. Scores are based on the 
survey responses of country experts who participated in the Legislative Powers Survey and 
verified by checking national constitutions and secondary sources. The PPI includes all EU 
countries except Luxembourg and Malta. The mean score for these 25 countries is .73, with 
Cyprus (.41) and France (.56) receiving the two lowest scores and Germany (.84) and Italy 
(.84) receiving the two highest scores. 
 
To assess the effect of national parliaments on EP voters, we expand the model of turnout 
from Table 2 to include PPI scores for 25 EU countries and interaction terms that signify the 
relationship between the PPI scores and EES respondents’ perceptions of the Parliament.7 Table 
5 presents the results of a multi-level mixed-effects logistic regression on turnout in EP 
elections. The results reflect our earlier analysis of turnout – doubts about the Parliament and 
the importance of EP elections are associated with abstentions, but the salience of EU issues 
does not appear to influence whether individuals decide to vote in EP elections.  
 
The coefficient for the PPI measure suggests that individuals from countries with weaker 
parliaments are more likely to abstain, but this measure does not achieve statistical significance. 
This is not a surprising result, as we do not theorize that national parliaments directly influence 
turnout so much as mediate the effects of EP perceptions. Indeed, the interaction term for the 
PPI and EP representational quality is significant at the .06 level, suggesting that negative 
perceptions of the Parliament are more likely to prompt abstentions in countries with stronger 
national parliaments. The perceived importance of EP elections does not appear to interact with 
the PPI scores, indicating that the public does not relate their experiences with national 
parliaments to EP elections as much as the EP itself.  
 
7 The PPI variable is mean-centered prior to generating the interaction terms and running the model. 
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Table 5:  Influence of national parliaments on European Parliament election turnout. 
 
 
 
Abstain (1) 
Vote (0)  
EU Salience 
 
 0.01 
(0.04) 
EP Representational Quality 
 
 0.09 
(0.02)** 
EP Elections Importance  
 
 0.49 
(0.01)** 
EU Knowledge -0.21 
(0.01)** 
Education -0.02 
(0.003)** 
Sex -0.08 
(0.03)* 
Age -0.03 
(0.001)** 
Socio-Economic Class 
 
-0.12 
(0.01)** 
Influence of National Parliament (PPI) 
 
-0.64 
(1.75) 
Interaction of PPI score with perceptions of EP 
elections importance 
-0.07 
(0.17) 
Interaction of PPI score with perceptions of EP 
representational quality 
 0.34 
(0.18)*** 
Note: Entries are coefficients from a multi-level mixed-effects logit analysis.  
This model is weighted for each of the EU’s 27 members. 
* and ** denotes significance at the .05 and .01 level. *** denotes significance at the .06 level. 
There are 23,504 tested in this model. Country weights were used in this analysis.  
Source: The 2009 European Election Survey.  
 
Finally, we estimate the differences in the probability of abstaining between negative and 
positive perceptions of the EP’s representational quality, in countries with low, average, and 
high PPI scores. At the lowest level (.41), moving from negative to positive perceptions of the 
EP actually increases the odds of abstention by 1.5%. Positive perceptions of the EP have the 
opposite effect in the middle-scoring EU countries – decreasing the odds of abstention by 
around 7%. Continuing this trend, individuals with positive EP perceptions are 10% less likely 
to abstain in the highest-scoring EU countries (.84). The influence of negative EP perceptions is 
clearly enhanced by strong national parliaments. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Our findings suggest that perceptions of the European Parliament influence the public’s voting 
behavior in EP elections. The analysis of data from Eurobarometer 69.2 indicates that trust in 
the European Parliament and perceptions of the EP’s influence within the larger EU decision-
making process are the strongest predictors that someone plans to participate in the EP 
elections. Data from the 2009 European Election Study further supports this finding: attitudes 
toward the European Parliament and EP elections are strongly correlated with reported 
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abstentions from the 2009 EP election. Furthermore, as anticipated, negative attitudes toward 
the EP have a stronger effect on turnout in countries with empowered national parliaments. 
While the effects of institution-based perceptions on vote switching are not as strong, there is 
still evidence that negative perceptions of the Parliament undermine the public’s faith in EP 
elections and lead EP voters to base their decisions on national politics.  
 
These results address an important division in the second order literature. The macro-level 
research indicates that national politics dominate EP elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980, Hix and 
Marsh 2007), while the micro-level evidence demonstrates that EP voters have an interest in 
EU politics (Hobolt, et al 2008, Clark and Rohrschneider 2009). Perceptions of the EP may 
well explain this discrepancy. Some EP voters may have an interest in EU affairs, but do not 
trust that the Parliament can or will address their concerns. These individuals (presumably) use 
EP elections as opportunities to signal preferences to national political parties, rather than select 
EU-level representatives. To the extent that such voters act on EU politics, it is to evaluate the 
performance of national parties on EU issues and not to hold accountable members of the 
European Parliament.  
 
Additionally, our findings may apply to research on electoral behavior in other multi-level 
political systems. Local and regional elections often generate lower levels of turnout than 
national elections. Given that many individuals have a vested interest in local issues such as 
education and policing, it is clearly possible that differences in voting behavior are due more to 
perceptions of local and regional bodies than the salience of local and regional issues. 
Moreover, the power of national parliaments may have similar effects on the public’s 
perceptions of local, regional, and European political bodies. If political and legislative power 
rests within a national parliament, then some voters may not attribute relevance to elections at 
any other level of governance.      
 
Finally, this study has implications for discussions about democracy at the EU level. 
Critiques of EU democracy often focus on the accountability of EU institutions or the public’s 
engagement with EU politics. To the extent that low turnout and national-centric voting is due 
to perceived weaknesses of the European Parliament, the EU should consider educating the 
public on the expanded powers of the Parliament or consider further institutional reforms to 
enhance the legitimacy of the Parliament. The public may simply require additional reasons to 
have faith in their elected representatives at the EU level.   
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Appendix A: Construction of Measures 
 
2009 European Election Study  
 
Dependent Variables:  
Participation in EP elections: Respondents were coded as reported voting in the last EP 
elections (0) and reported not voting in the last EP elections (1).    
Government Support across National/EP elections: Respondents were coded as (1) voted for a 
party in a governing coalition in both the last EP election and the last national election, (2) 
voted for a party not in a governing coalition in both the last EP election and the last national 
election, (3) voted for a party in a governing coalition in the last national election and a party 
not in a governing coalition in the last EP election and (4) voted for a party not in a governing 
coalition in the last national election and a party in a governing coalition in the last EP election.  
 
Independent Variables:   
Left/Right Distance: EES respondents were asked to place themselves and each of the largest 
political parties in their country on a 0-10 scale of left/right ideology, with 0 as the most left 
and 10 as the most right. For each respondent, we subtracted the left/right score they assigned 
to the largest coalition partner in the government from their own left/right self-placement score 
and took the absolute value of the resulting number. The resulting measure ranges from (0) no 
ideological distance between the respondent and the government to (10) the widest ideological 
distance.   
EU Distance: EES respondents were asked to place themselves and each of the largest political 
parties in their country on a 0-10 scale of support for European integration, with 0 denoting the 
view that “unification has already gone too far” and 10 denoting that “unification should be 
pushed further”. For each respondent, we subtracted the pro/anti-EU score they assigned to the 
largest coalition partner in the government from their own pro/anti-EU self-placement score 
and took the absolute value of the resulting number. The resulting measure ranges from (0) no 
ideological distance between the respondent and the government to (10) the widest ideological 
distance.   
Government Approval: “Let us now come back to Britain. Do you (0) approve or (1) 
disapprove of the government’s record to date?”  
EP Importance: “It is very important for you which particular candidates win seats and become 
MEPs in the European Parliament elections: (1) strongly agree, (2) agree, (4) neither agree nor 
disagree, (4) disagree, or (5) strongly disagree”. We select the EES question about candidates 
rather than political parties, with the hope of controlling for respondents who might agree with 
this statement due to party loyalty.  
EU Salience: Respondents were asked “what do you think is the most important problem facing 
<your country> today?” and then “as of today, is <the most important problem> mainly dealt 
with by the regional, national, or European level political authorities?” Respondents who 
indicated the European authorities were coded 1, and all others were coded 0. Nearly 25% 
replied that European authorities dealt with the most important problem.  
EP Representational Quality: “The European Parliament takes into consideration the concerns 
of European citizens: (1) strongly agree, (2) agree, (4) neither agree nor disagree, (4) disagree, 
or (5) strongly disagree”.  
EU Knowledge: Each respondent was asked to answer four true/false questions about the 
history and institutions of the EU. The number of correct responses was tallied for each 
respondent producing a r ange from (0) no correct answers to (4) correctly answered all four 
questions.   
Education: “How old were you when you stopped full-time education?” We substituted the 
respondent’s age for those who replied “still studying”.  
Sex: (0) female, (1) male. 
Age: “What year were you born?” Each respondent’s answer was subtracted from 2009 to 
estimate their actual age.  
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Socio-Economic Class: “If you were asked to choose one of these five names for your social 
class, which would you say you belong to: (1) the working class, (2) the lower middle class, (3) 
the middle class, (4) the upper middle class, or (5) the upper class?” I grouped “other”, “don’t 
know” and refusals into an (6) other category. 
Parliamentary Powers Index: The PPI scores each national parliament as “yes” or “no” on 32 
different measures of the legislature’s influence over the executive, institutional autonomy, 
specified powers, and institutional capacity. To estimate each parliament’s score, the PPI’s 
principle investigators take the confirmed number of powers out of the 32 possible in the index 
 
Eurobarometer 69.2 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Likely vote in EP elections: “Can you tell me on a  scale of 1 to 10 how likely it is that you 
would vote in the next Europeans elections in June 2009?” The scale ranges from respondents 
who definitely do not  plan to vote (1) to respondents who definitely plan to vote (10), with 
“don’t know” responses coded in the middle (5).  
 
Independent Variables:  
EU Membership Bad: “Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR COUNTRY)'s membership 
of the European Union is...?” Responses were coded as a good thing (1), neither good nor bad 
(2), or a bad thing (3), with “don’t know” responses coded in the middle (2).   
Country and EU Direction: “At the present time, would you say that, in general, things are 
going in the right direction or in the wrong direction, in…?” Responses were coded as the right 
direction (1), neither the right nor the wrong direction (2), or the wrong direction (3), with 
“don’t know” responses coded in the middle (2).    
Trust in European Parliament and National Political Bodies: Respondents were asked “please 
tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?” for their national government, their national 
parliament, and the European Parliament. Responses were coded as tend to trust (1), don’t 
know (2), or tend not to trust (3).  
Importance of European Parliament: Respondents were asked if the European Parliament 
“plays an important role or not in the life of the European Union?” Responses were coded as 
important (1); don’t know (2), or not important (3).  
Education: “How old were you when you stopped full-time education?” I substituted 
respondent’s age for those who replied “still studying”. 
Age: “How old are you?” 
Sex: (1) male, (2) female  
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Abstract  
What kinds of messages do political parties put out on the eve of European Parliament 
(EP) elections? Anecdotal evidence portrays EP election campaigns as either nationally-
oriented (featuring domestic political actors and issues), European or Eurosceptic 
(critiquing the Members of the European Parliament and their records), or so lackluster as 
to have almost no content at all. To date there has been no attempt to systematically 
document campaign appeals across parties and countries to determine when and where 
these sorts of appeals are used. Nor have scholars attempted to predict when party 
campaign frames will be nationally or European oriented. Here we argue that parties 
competitive in first-order (national) elections face incentives to stress domestic political 
issues in their EP campaigns while political parties that flourish in second-order 
(European) elections possess motives for running more substantive, European-focused 
campaigns. We then examine the print advertising campaigns of 53 pa rties in 12 E U 
member states in the run up to the 2009 European Parliament elections and find evidence 
supportive of these expectations. 
 
 
Political Parties and 2009 European Parliament Election Campaign Content 
 
European Parliament (EP) elections are frequently classified by students of voting behavior as 
second-order elections (e.g., Reif and Schmitt 1980, Marsh 1998, Ferra and Weishaupt 2004, 
Schmitt 2005, Brug and Eijk 2007). In contrast to first order elections, which determine who is 
in power and what policies are pursued, second-order elections are perceived by voters as being 
less important because there is less directly at stake. As a result, citizens often vote very 
differently in EP elections than in national ones because the former are not perceived as 
“counting” for much: voter turnout is lower in European elections than in national polls, 
political parties holding power in the national government tend to perform poorly while the 
opposition’s vote share increases, and large political parties lose vote share while smaller ones 
gain. These latter two effects are more pronounced in the European Union’s (EU) old member 
states than in the new member states (Koepke and Ringe 2006, Carrubba and Timpone 2005).   
 
In addition to these studies of voting behavior in EP elections, extensive systematic research 
has been conducted into the content of parties’ EP election manifestos (Gabel and Hix 2002) 
and on media coverage of the campaigns (e,g, Vreese et al 2006). Content analysis of party 
manifestos reveals that political parties have real differences of opinion over the policies under 
the European Parliament’s purview; in contrast, media studies indicate that national political 
issues dominate the news in the run up to EP contests.  
 
While EP election voting behavior is relatively well understood, parties’ European platforms 
1 The authors would like to thank the PIREDEU team for including us in both their Brussels conference 
and this eBook. Chris Mann and other University of Miami Political Science Faculty Workshop 
participants, Mark Franklin, and two anonymous reviewers provided very helpful feedback that 
improved this project considerably. We are grateful to Maria Stampino, Paul Vladescu, and Kevin 
Krause for their observations of the campaign and for their translation help. Any remaining errors are 
ours alone. 
2 Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Miami. Email: davidson@miami.edu 
3 PhD Candidate in International Studies, University of Miami. 
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well documented, and media coverage of Euro-elections well analyzed, political scientists have 
not systematically recorded political party campaign appeals in European Parliament elections. 
What messages do parties give voters on the eve of European elections? How do they frame 
what is at stake in these contests? Although some authors have methodically focused on the 
intensity of efforts and the methods used in EP campaigns (e.g., the contributions to this 
volume; Bowler and Farrell 2011), to date there have been no systematic cross-national studies 
comparing the substantive content of political parties’ EP campaigns. 
 
Anecdotal accounts of campaigns abound, but they are conflicting and consistent both with 
the facts that political parties can take clear partisan stances on issues under the Parliament’s 
control and that EP campaign coverage seems nonetheless to focus on national politics (e.g., 
Lodge 1986, 1990, 1996, 2001, 2005; Eijk and Franklin 1996; Perrineau, Grunberg, and Ysmal 
2002, Maier and Tenscher 2006). Some authors observe that parties exploit EP election 
campaigns to actively build support for their national agendas (e.g., Hix and Marsh 2007, 
Lodge 2005), while other observers notice that parties use EP elections as an opportunity to 
launch Eurosceptic campaigns (e.g., Hoboldt, Spoon, and Tilley 2008; Vreese et al 2006), 
while still other researchers note that parties do little if anything to mobilize voters in EP 
elections (e.g., Weber 2007, Maier and Tenscher 2006).  
 
The current lack of systematic knowledge about EP campaign content has spillover effects. 
Tellingly, one recent work which purported to be a “top down” account showing how political 
parties fail to mobilize their voters in EP elections did not have direct evidence of party 
activities, and instead was forced to rely on indirect media accounts of party actions (Weber 
2007). Depending on a given scholar’s preferred perspective, the “fact” that EP campaigns are 
nationally-oriented/ Eurosceptic/ or boring is in turn used to explain voting behavior and 
election outcomes in EP contests. Given that empirical evidence of each of the above three 
campaign strategies exists, however, it is clear that each of these approaches to campaigning for 
the EP is used by some parties in some instances. There is no single approach to framing EP 
elections. 
 
The goal of this chapter is to provide a framework to reconcile these disparate observations 
about European Parliament election campaign content by delineating which specific types of 
political parties can be expected to put forth which types of campaign appeals under which 
particular circumstances. We argue that campaign content will vary with the type of party 
creating it; parties successful in first order elections are likely to stress national issues in EP 
contests whereas parties more successful in second-order elections are likely to focus on 
Europe and to do so in a substantive manner. Thus large or incumbent parties are likely to 
pursue nationally-oriented EP election campaigns or European-oriented campaigns without 
much policy substance. In contrast, small or opposition parties, especially in old member states, 
are more likely to create Europe-oriented campaigns richer in policy substance. Here we 
systematically examine 170 print advertisements created for the 2009 EP elections by over 50 
political parties in member states containing 74% of the EU’s population and find evidence 
consistent with our expectations.  
 
We proceed as follows. First we highlight the contradictions in the literature on EP 
campaigns and then put forth a framework which can be used to reconcile these competing 
visions of European contests; second we discuss our data collection methods; third we present 
our empirical results; fourth, we discuss our contributions to the study of European elections. 
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How Parties Frame European Parliament Elections 
 
Observers of EP election campaigns to date have painted three contradictory portraits of 
parties’ strategies in these contests. Below, we describe each viewpoint in turn and then provide 
a framework that can help reconcile these conflicting accounts.  
 
First, many accounts of EP election campaigns find that they lack European content; 
attention is said to be paid to the domestic political arena of each member state rather than to 
the policy positions and records of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) (e.g., 
Franklin, van der Eijk, and Marsh 1996: 367; Gabel and Anderson 2002: 911; the 2009 EPERN 
reports). After editing volumes describing all direct European elections, Juliet Lodge concluded 
“every EP election so far has largely been hijacked by national parties peddling a na tional 
agenda that deprives the electorate of the opportunity to consider EU issues” (2005: 4, 
emphasis added). Authors in this school present an institutional explanation for nationally-
oriented content: EP election campaigns are organized not by the Brussels-based transnational 
party federations, but by individual national parties. The latter’s primary mission is to compete 
for national government office and this goal is said to overshadow EP elections, turning them in 
to “second order” national contests (Hix and Marsh 2007: 495). Thus for national parties, it is 
thought to be more important to campaign on domestic issues than on European ones.4  
 
A second group of observers of European Parliament election campaigns, in contrast, has 
found EP campaign appeals to be much more European in orientation than the above scholars 
would expect. Some have noted “high profile campaigning of Eurosceptic parties” (Hoboldt, 
Spoon, and Tilley, 2008, 97) in EP elections; indeed over half of the EU member states have 
party systems characterized by some form of contestation over Europe (Szczerbiak and Taggart 
2008: 350). Studies of media coverage in EP elections find that, while for the most part 
campaign coverage is neutral in tone, the media reports which do normatively evaluate the EU 
are very negative, possibly reflecting such campaign frames (Vreese et al 2006). Eurosceptic 
campaigns and their media echo have been argued to “activate” voters’ perceptions that EP 
elections are indeed about Europe (Hoboldt, Spoon, and Tilley 2008: 96). These scholars 
therefore claim it is particularly important for parties to show that they have “gotten their act 
together” on European issues and demonstrate a coherent stance on European issues. Parties 
failing to communicate their European positions to voters are argued to suffer EP electoral 
defeats (Ferrara and Weishaupt 2004). Many researchers observe considerable overlap between 
the national and European political spaces, suggesting that parties should indeed be able to 
articulate clear positions on EU issues in campaign advertising as they do in their written 
manifestos (Gabel and Hix 2002; Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002). Thus, this school of 
thought would imply that it is both rational and feasible for most national political parties to use 
their EP election campaign materials to establish their European credentials by showcasing 
both their MEP candidates and their positions on issues relevant to the European Parliament. 
 
Yet a third view of EP election campaigns observes that political parties only devote limited 
resources to EP campaigns, failing to stress much of anything prior to the EP elections, 
especially if they are held at midterm in the national electoral cycle (e.g., Knudsen 2009; 
Krašovec and Lajh 2009). One scholar in this camp argues “whereas in the run-up to national 
elections parties mobilize their voters by means of information and persuasion, [there is a] 
mobilization deficit at the midterm” (Weber 2007: 510). Because European elections are seen 
as less relevant than national ones, and because parties have only limited resources, they will 
not expend much money, time, or energy on E P campaigns, reserving resources for more 
4 National political party leaders have also been hypothesized to stress national themes because their 
party is internally divided on Europe (Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996), because Europe is a valence 
issue making it difficult for parties to distinguish themselves from each other (Lange and Davidson-
Schmich 1995), or because they are too Europhile for the general public’s taste (Hobolt, Spoon, and 
Tilley 2008). 
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important national contests (Negrine 2006: 38, 40; Maier and Tenscher 2006: 9).5 Such authors 
expect that parties would not invest in media professionals to create (m)any new or unique 
posters for the EP campaign and/or they could decline to print up or  distribute many such 
advertisements. While the latter observable implication is beyond the scope of this chapter6, the 
former could manifest itself in campaign advertising that can be used in either a national or a 
European election – for example hanging posters showing only the party’s logo – or a generic 
slogan equally applicable to the domestic and European arenas.  
 
Clearly, then, there is no consensus in the literature as to what type of content can be 
expected in EP campaigns; moreover, authors in all three camps can cite empirical examples to 
support their claims. These divergent findings likely stem from the anecdotal nature of single-
country case studies, as most empirical evidence about EP campaign content comes from edited 
volumes featuring different authors’ qualitative accounts of each country’s campaign (e.g., 
2009 EPERN reports7; Lodge 1986, 1990, 1996, 2001, 2005; Eijk and Franklin 1996; Maier 
and Tenscher 2006). These authors have a tendency to draw conclusions about party campaigns 
based on electoral results (which occurred after not during the campaigns), media reports 
(which may or may not cover the appeals put forth by political parties), or on a particular 
(usually Eurosceptic) party’s advertising campaign which attracted a lot of attention in the run 
up to the election, rather than to systematically discuss the EP campaigns of all national parties. 
Problems of selection bias and measurement error thus plague this research design. For 
example, voters may vote against an unpopular national incumbent party and the media may 
discuss national political issues because parties campaign on these grounds or these results may 
occur because parties do not campaign much at all, so that European issues never filter into the 
national discourse. Only by systematically examining campaign framing by all parties prior to 
the election can conclusions about national party campaign appeals be drawn. 
 
In contrast to the implications of the literature above, we do not expect that such analysis 
will uncover that all political parties take the same approach to European campaigns; instead 
we believe that different types of political parties across Europe have different incentives in 
terms of how to campaign for the Parliament and will thus pursue a variety of campaign 
strategies. Our approach assumes that national political parties are rational actors and desire to 
perform as well as they can in both national and European Parliament elections. However, we 
also recognize that parties have limited resources8 and, as a result, argue that they will need to 
prioritize which electoral arena is more important and/or find ways in which campaign content 
can serve them in both realms. Because not all parties are created equal, they will make 
different decisions when faced with choices as to how to allocate resources to particular 
campaigns. In other words, we expect that whether EP campaign materials will be national, 
European, or neutral in content depends on the party making the appeal. Party campaign 
strategies should vary predictably depending on, among other factors, whether a party is located 
in a new or old member state, whether the party is a large or small one, whether it is a member 
of the domestic government or the opposition, when in the national electoral cycle a party finds 
itself, and what the party’s ideology is.9 Here we elaborate on each of these points in turn.  
 
  
5 Additional scholars argue that because some parties are internally divided over Europe they prefer to 
remain silent (e.g., van der Eijk and Franklin 1997, Negrine 2006; Ferrara and Weishaupt 2004; but see  
Gabel and Anderson 2002, Hooghe and Marks 2002). 
6 See instead work on EP campaign activities by Vreese 2009, Giebler and Wüst, 2010; Bowler and 
Farrell 2011. 
7 Available at 
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/research/europeanpartieselectionsreferendumsnetwork/europeparliamentelections  
8 By “resources” we mean assets such as finances, creativity, members’ willingness to volunteer, etc. 
9 This list may not be exclusive; other variables such as the internal cohesion of a party or the strategies 
of other parties in in the party system may also influence campaign content. Our main point here, 
however, is that there is no single one-size-fits-all way of campaigning for the EP.   
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Old vs. New Member States  
Second-order election effects, that is voters feeling free to vote for small, extreme, or 
opposition parties in an election that doesn’t “count”, have not been as consistently found in 
new member states as in older EU members (Carrubba and Timpone 2005, Koepke and Ringe 
2006). Thus in long-time EU members, smaller, ideologically extreme, and/or opposition 
parties have a st rong incentive to stress European issues in EP campaigns in order to remind 
voters that these are second-order and not national elections; in contrast, large, moderate and/or 
governing parties there would benefit by diverting voters’ attention from the second-order 
nature of EP elections by stressing national themes where they enjoy an advantage. Because 
second-order election effects are not apparent in new member states, the differences among 
such parties’ party campaign strategies are expected to be less pronounced. Smaller, 
ideologically extreme, and/or opposition parties in the new member states do not have as much 
reason to stress the European nature of EP contests and thus may choose to focus their scarce 
resources on the primary location of party competition – the domestic arena. Thus we would 
expect more nationally-oriented campaign content in new member states than in long-term EU 
members, and more thoroughly-developed European appeals in the older member states. 
 
Party Size  
Large political parties – those likely to lead a d omestic government – are primarily in the 
business of winning national elections and possess strong incentives to use their limited 
resources either to remind voters of their domestic prowess by stressing national issues in EP 
contests or, if they include European content, not to heavily invest in creating elaborate 
campaigns, conserving resources for the next national election. Smaller parties are not 
consistently contenders for national office and thus may not always be as strongly focused on 
national issues. These differences across party size may be especially observable where large 
parties have suffered defeats in second-order elections. Voting research has determined that 
“size matters” in EP elections in old member states, with small parties performing better than 
larger one in these second-order contests (Ferra and Weishaupt 2004, Schmitt 2005, Hix and 
Marsh 2007). In this context, reminding voters that the EP election is a second-order one will 
likely worsen large parties’ electoral results. Small parties, in contrast, can improve their 
chance by reminding voters that elections are about Europe. As a result, small parties may be 
better served than large ones by expending time and money developing European Parliament 
election campaigns rich in EP-related substance.   
 
Governing Status  
Domestic incumbents, whether they are large or small parties, have by definition been 
successful in the national arena and will rationally want to continue in office. To this end, it is 
unlikely that they would expend scarce resources developing elaborate European-oriented 
campaigns. Voting research has determined that opposition parties perform better than 
governing ones in second-order elections (Ferra and Weishaupt 2004, Schmitt 2005, Hix and 
Marsh 2007). Thus where ruling parties have experienced second-order election effects, 
reminding voters that the vote is about the European Parliament, its Members’, and their 
records would only seem to further depress their electoral support. Moreover, governing parties 
enjoy high profile Ministers whose images and foreign-policy competency can cheaply be 
played up i n a campaign. In contrast, opposition parties – especially those who are likely to 
enjoy a second-order election boost – have fared less well in the domestic arena and might 
benefit from turning voters’ attention to the European realm. To the extent that the domestic 
government is unresponsive to their positions, such parties may choose to develop substantive 
European-oriented campaigns in the hope that they can find support to get their policy 
preferences implemented at the European level. Thus we would expect opposition parties to 
have more campaigns more focused on the EP and European issues than governing parties. 
 
Timing in the National Electoral Cycle  
When European elections are held at mid-term in the national electoral cycle, political parties 
may be willing to spend the time, money, and energy needed to develop campaigns that 
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substantively discuss European issues, as they have fewer competing demands for these 
resources. Alternatively, parties may fail to develop many campaign appeals at all at mid-term, 
relying on all-purpose materials usable in any election. Regardless of what they do mid-term, 
however, as the national election approaches it is likely that limited resources will be diverted 
to contesting the more important domestic election and EP election campaigns will become 
more nationally-focused, producing less European or neutral content.     
 
Party Ideology  
Political parties with very distinct ideological appeals – such as single-issue anti-EU parties, 
far-left, far-right, or Green parties – tend to be small and often in the opposition. As such, like 
other small or opposition parties, especially where second-order election effects are present, 
their electoral fortunes are enhanced by stressing European rather than domestic issues. 
Moreover, because of their distinct stances, the European-oriented campaigns they develop are 
likely to delve into policy substance which highlights the party’s particular ideological 
approach. In addition, single issue anti-EU parties, given the nature of their ideology, should be 
especially prone to stressing Europe in their election campaigns. 
 
Finally, to conserve resources, virtually all10 parties have an incentive to create campaign 
content that can be used in both domestic and European contests. Such “neutral” campaign 
content may, for example, take the form of a poster featuring the group’s logo and saying 
“Vote!”; such a poster could be hung in any election and reused time and again.11 Thus we 
would expect to see all types of political parties making such campaign materials, but they may 
be particularly attractive for political parties with distinct ideologies as their anti-immigrant, 
anti-capitalist, pro-environmental stances are likely to dominate their campaign in election after 
election.   
 
Before moving on to see if empirical evidence supports these hypotheses, a few caveats are 
in order. We recognize that the above-mentioned incentives are not the only considerations 
national party leaders have when developing election campaigns. Voters’ issue concerns, their 
knowledge of and attitudes toward the EP, the party’s internal cohesion, national traditions, and 
the actions of other parties all influence the campaign appeals put forth by political party 
leaders. Our goal is not to explain the exact content of party campaigns or to argue that party 
unity, national traditions, public opinion, party systems, and unique country-specific events do 
not matter. Instead, we seek to explain in the broadest terms how a p arty presents to voters 
what is at stake in an EP contest. National party leaders enjoy great leeway in selecting the 
images and phrases in their campaign materials. For example, a Green party under pressure to 
respond to a period of economic crisis in a Europhile country could, for example, frame the 
campaign as a f ight for a Europe that encourages Green jobs, a struggle to unseat a domestic 
government that has failed to create new employment in the renewable energy sector, or as an 
opportunity to remind voters that “the future of work is Green”. It is this choice of frame that 
we seek to explain. 
 
 
  
10 Here single-issue anti-EU parties are the exception as most do not (seriously) contest national 
elections. 
11 Another observable implication of this argument would be national parties showing a propensity to use 
posters provided at no cost to them by a transnational party federation. Indeed we find this to be the case 
for members of the socialist and Green party families who were offered such materials in 2009. The 
socialists’ “People First” cube (Figure 9) and the greens’ “Green New Deal” themes were observable 
across the continent. For example, the cube is featured in Figure 7 from Slovakia and was found, among 
other places, on the Romanian PSD/PC and French PS’s websites; it is also echoed in the German SPD’s 
design in Figure 8. 
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Research Design and Data Collection 
 
While studies of media coverage and of parties’ European manifestos provide invaluable 
information about European Parliament elections, manifestos and news articles may not reflect 
how parties attempt to frame the election to voters. Parties are very likely aware that most 
citizens do not read their manifestoes and do not view them as the primary means of 
communicating with voters. Journalists may focus on national issues because parties are 
stressing such issues in their EP campaigns or because parties are relatively inactive in 
campaigning for the EP, leaving reporters to write about the national events to fill a news 
vacuum. Moreover, while media studies rightly claim that newspapers and evening news 
broadcasts are an important source of information for citizens about EP elections, newspaper 
reading and nightly news viewing are declining across Europe (Lauf 2001; for a more nuanced 
account see Norris 2000). In addition, citizens must actively choose to opt into obtaining the 
information provided by these sources. Print and television news are only one source of 
information about parties’ EP campaigns and they reach ever fewer citizens.  
 
In contrast, political party posters, campaign information stands, and radio/television 
commercials are placed in European public spaces where it is harder for citizens – even 
politically uninterested ones – to opt out of exposure to them. Over 80% of European voters 
saw campaign advertising before the 2004 EP elections – compared to only 65% of Europeans 
who read about the contest in a newspaper (Tenscher 2006: 131). Moreover, the more exposure 
an individual has to party EP campaigns, the more likely that person is to turn out to vote in the 
elections (Steinbrecher and Huber, 2006: 24) and there is experimental evidence to suggest that 
campaign advertising influences voters’ perceptions of MEP candidates (Raudsaar and 
Tigasson 2006). Thus political party campaign appeals are key sources of information for 
citizens as to what EP elections are all about. Indeed, the content of campaign advertising and 
its effects on voters is routinely studied in domestic electoral settings (e.g., Freedman, Franz 
and Goldstein 2004; Sides and Karch 2008) and we follow this approach here. 
 
While radio and television ads are a very important platform from which political parties can 
disseminate campaign appeals, the rules governing European elections make it difficult to 
systematically compare television or radio campaigns cross-nationally. EP elections are 
regulated by national electoral laws and very different rules are in place regarding whether 
radio and television ads are permitted, whether parties may purchase such ads to be shown at 
any time or only during designated times, and whether (and how much) public funding is 
available for such advertising (Norris 2000, Farrell 2002). Political parties and/or their 
supporters are permitted to display posters and distribute fliers in all EU member states, 
however, and the 2009 E uropean Election Candidate Study found the use of posters and 
brochures in all 27 countries.12 Moreover, in many of these states, hanging posters in public 
places is the dominant form of electioneering: almost 70% of Europeans received party fliers in 
the mail prior to the 2004 EP elections (Tenscher 2006: 31). These materials are also handed 
out at pre-election events, copied onto websites, and incorporated into television and radio 
commercials, making them highly representative of a party’s appeals as a whole. 
 
Thus, for the analysis below we examine printed campaign materials including posters and 
brochures. We obtained these in several ways. First, we examined each political party’s website 
in the three months prior to the June 2009 European Elections. Most websites included a press 
release announcing the launch of the party’s EP election campaign, often specifically detailing 
the posters that were unveiled at the launch and/or showing photos or videos of candidates 
standing near such posters so that their content could be discerned. Many websites also 
included downloadable print materials. A second source of information came from media 
accounts of political party poster campaigns prior to the election. Often the press covered the 
launch of a party’s election campaign, ran articles comparing (and critiquing) party poster 
12 Personal correspondence with Heiko Giebler, 30 April 2010.  
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campaigns, or used photographs of party posters to illustrate articles about the EP elections. A 
third source of information came from personal contacts in the countries collecting hard copies 
of party campaign posters. Importantly, we did not rely on any retrospective accounts of the 
parties’ campaigns written following the election; thus the data presented here reflects political 
parties’ actual pre-election campaign strategies and avoids the tendency to characterize 
campaigns based on voting results. 
 
While we would have ideally studied each political party that campaigned for the European 
Parliament in every member state in 2009, resource constraints prohibited this approach. 
Instead we selected fifty-four parties to obtain variance on our independent variables of interest 
(date of EU accession, party size, governing status, proximity to national election, and party 
ideology); all parties and their values on the independent variables are listed in the Appendix. 
Parties studied were from EU founding states, such as Italy and Germany, as well as in new 
members such as Latvia and Slovenia. In order to assure adequate variation in party size and 
ideology in our sample, we did not study every party in each country, however. Parties ranged 
in size from entities such as the British Labour and Conservative parties, both of which have 
enjoyed single party governments, to small ones such as the Austrian List Hans Peter Martin 
and German NPD that have never been elected to a national parliament. Parties in government 
at the time, such as the Irish Fianna Fail and the Romanian PSD + PC, were included in the 
study as were opposition members, such as the Spanish People’s Party and the Czech ČSSD. 
Some parties, such as those in the UK and the Czech Republic were about to contest a national 
election; other parties such as those in Italy and Slovenia found themselves at mid-term in the 
national electoral cycle. Ideologically distinct parties including single-issue anti-EU parties 
such as the Danish People’s Movement Against the EU, Green parties like the Czech Strana 
zelenych, far-left parties including the Italian Rifondazione Comunisti Italiani, and far-right 
parties such as the German DVU were studied alongside more mainstream center-left and 
center-right parties such as the Austrian SPÖ and the French UMP.  
 
After selecting parties and collecting campaign materials, we coded each poster as e ither 
national, European, dual, or neutral in content, depending on bo th the visual image and the 
headline text. Images coded as “national” included pictures of politicians holding national level 
office and not running for the European Parliament (e.g., a Czech poster featuring Prime 
Minister Jiri Paroubek), whereas “European” images included MEP candidates or other 
symbols of the European Union such as the Euro, the EU flag, or a transnational party group 
logo (e.g., the Austrian SPÖ’s poster featuring all its MEP candidates). Visuals where national 
and European images were equally weighted (e.g., the German SPD’s poster featuring their 
national party leader / Chancellor candidate walking in park with their lead MEP candidate) 
were classified as “dual” images. Finally, “neutral” images included pictures of ordinary 
citizens rather than politicians, plants, animals, inanimate objects and national party logos (e.g., 
the Spanish PP’s cartoon of a moped). 
 
Headline text was coded according to the locus of action voters were urged to take; if the 
poster called for measures in the domestic arena (e.g., the Slovenian Social Democrats’ slogan 
“Slovenia Can No Longer [endure the current national government]”) it was coded as national 
in content, whereas large font mentioning activities in the European realm (e.g. the Danish 
People’s Movement Against the EU’s slogan “No to the EU’s Development Policy”) was 
coded as European. Statements articulating no concrete forum for action (e.g., the Austrian 
Communist Party’s “People Instead of Profits”) were coded as neutral. Smaller print was also 
examined, but when there was a conflict between the message in headline font and fine print, 
we used the headline classification because that was more likely to have caught a viewer’s eye.  
 
Generally a poster’s text and images were equally national or European in tone; where there 
was a discrepancy between a national or European code for one element, and a neutral 
classification for the other element, we categorized the poster in the non-neutral group. If 
parties included national symbols on posters or brochures whose texts extensively critiqued the 
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EU, we coded the materials as European in tone because the national symbols were used not to 
make a statement about the domestic government but rather to critique EU policy. Conversely, 
some posters featured images of a domestic political actor and statements about his/her 
relationship with the EU; we coded such posters as national in tone because the European 
Union was being instrumentalized for domestic political purposes. See Figures 1 – 4 for 
examples of each poster type.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: “National” Campaign Appeal 
Partito Democratico, Italy: “EU! The EU is dealing 
with those who become unemployed; Berlusconi isn’t.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: “European” Campaign Appeal 
Social Democratic Party, Austria: “June 7th: 
The A Team for Europe” (Depicts only EP 
candidates.) 
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Figure 3: “Dual” Campaign Appeal 
PSD/PC Romania: “Choose Wisely”  
(Depicts head of national party organization in center, flanked by EP candidtes.) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Neutral Campaign Appeal 
Greens, Spain: “Rebel in Green” 
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To assess the nature of European appeals, we took all “European” materials and further 
classified them as:  
 
• Substantive: Takes a specific stance on a particular European issue (e.g., the Austrian 
FPÖ’s poster calling for an immediate end to Turkey’s accession talks with the EU)  
 
• Non-specific: Contains Europe-related slogans that do not address a particular policy 
issue (e.g., the French UMP’s “If Europe wants, Europe can” (no details specified as to 
what exactly Europe could do if it wanted)) 
 
• Personality-based: Depicts MEP candidates (e.g., the Czech KDU-ČSL’s “Vote for the 
European Stars” campaign featuring portraits of its candidates for the European 
Parliament) 
 
• Get out the vote: Features the date of the election or other procedural information 
about voting (e.g., a Spanish PSOE poster encouraging young voters to vote by mail in 
the EP election) 
 
See Figures 5 – 8 for examples of each type of European appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: “Substantive European” Appeal 
People’s Movement Against the EU, Denmark:  
Poster critiques the Lisbon Treaty and questions whether the EU really is a peace project. 
 
When analyzing data, rather than counting every individual poster or brochure a particular party 
developed, we grouped similar posters together and recorded them once. For example, if a party 
created posters for each of its MEP candidates, each using the same slogan and visual format, we 
coded that as one European, personality-based appeal rather than recording each poster separately. 
We did so because the message sent to the voters would be no different than that made  by  a  party  
creating  a  single  poster portraying all of its MEPs. Our goal was to avoid biasing the sample by 
over-reporting parties that created many variations of the same poster. Thus our unit of analysis is a 
campaign poster/brochure or series of similar posters/brochures; parties can and did utilize multiple 
posters. To increase the validity of our data, content was coded by both authors. We agreed on the 
classification of each poster 88.8% of the time. In cases w here we disagreed on a 
categorization, we deliberated and came to a consensus on how an appeal should be coded. 
 
87
 
 
Figure 6: “Non-Specific” European Appeal 
People’s Party, Spain: “Europe goes with you” 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Personality-Based Appeal 
Social Democrats, Slovenia: “We put People First: A New Direction for Europe”  
(Posters depict individual EP candidates and their names.) 
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Figure 8: “Get out the vote” European Appeal 
Social Democrats, Germany: “Vote By Mail on June 7th for the European Parliament Election.” 
(The picture is a visual pun; the German word for “election” and “whale” are homophones.) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Transnational Party Federation Campaign Material 
Cut-out cube developed by the Party of European Socialists 
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Results 
 
The 2009 elections to elect the 736 Members of the European Parliament were held between 
June 4th and 7th. It was the first election in which Romania and Bulgaria voted at the same time 
as the other 25 member states and the first held under the Treaty of Nice, which adjusted the 
number of mandates each member state received, ranging from 5 ( Malta) to 99 (Germany). 
Turnout was typically low, averaging only 43%. Some form of proportional representation was 
used in every country. The election results favored the national parties who are members of the 
transnational European People’s Party group in the EP (i.e., conservative and Christian 
Democratic parties); members of this bloc won 264 seats compared with only 161 for members 
of the other large transnational party federation, the Party of European Socialists. The Green 
bloc increased its seat total to 53, as did non-affiliated members of the EP (110 seats). Members 
of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (83 seats), the European United Left (33 
seats) and the various Eurosceptic/nationalist party groups (32 seats) all lost mandates.  
 
While the intensity and duration of EP election campaigns varied across the 27 member 
states, content was surprisingly consistent cross-nationally. In some countries such as the Czech 
Republic the EP contest monopolized the headlines for months; parties there held high profile 
events across the country beginning early in the year and developed elaborate campaign 
materials. In contrast, references to the EP campaign in the British media or on British parties’ 
websites were virtually non-existent. Everywhere, however, the economic crisis dominated the 
campaign. Parties across the continent put forth proposals for fixing the economy, or at least 
implied they could do so better than their opponents; the specifics of their plans varied along 
ideological lines from reining in bankers, to creating Green jobs, to cutting red tape. Of interest 
here, however, was the fact that the same economic appeal could be framed quite differently. 
Some socialist parties framed the issue as one for the domestic government - for example the 
leftist Italian Partito Democratico criticized Berlusconi’s handling of unemployment. Some 
socialists framed their campaign in European terms; the Romanian Social Democratic Party ran 
a campaign using the transnational Party of European Socialists’ slogan “A New Direction for 
Europe: People First.” Still other socialists took a neutral approach; the German Social 
Democrats created a poster suitable for both the June 2009 E uropean and September 2009 
national election showing a housekeeper making a bed with the slogan “Fair Wages for Good 
Work: So that she too can live from her job.”   
 
Table 1 summarizes the results of our analysis. Of the 107 distinct campaign posters 
analyzed, only 26% were overtly national or dual national/European. The majority of materials 
analyzed (55%) were European in content; a final 19% of posters and brochures were 
categorized as neutral.  Thus  contrary  to the widespread perception that national parties 
actively exploit European elections as an opportunity to highlight domestic issues and 
personalities, only a m inority of the campaign materials studied made explicitly national 
appeals. Instead, the most common type of European Parliamentary electoral appeal observed 
had some European content. 
 
However, there was considerable variation among these European appeals, as depicted in 
Table 2. O nly 34% of all European appeals focused on s ubstantive policy questions; for 
example, the German Republikaner’s campaign brochure was headlined “Get out of This EU” 
and listed the party’s objections to the Lisbon Treaty, the Euro, the EU’s accession negotiations 
with Turkey, and certain EU regulations. These substantive posters were a minority of those 
studied, however; instead, political parties most frequently created European-oriented posters 
featuring their MEP candidates (41% of all European appeals studied). These types of 
billboards were the single most common type of poster found, used in 8 of the 12 countries 
studied, created by political parties of all sizes, governing statuses, and ideological persuasions; 
starkly similar images of MEP candidates walking toward the camera appeared across the 
continent (see Figures 2 and 3). An additional 18% of European-focused posters included non-
specific slogans; for example, in Germany the Christian Democratic Union ran a ser ies of 
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posters showing ordinary citizens next to the slogan “WE in Europe.” A final 7% of the 
European appeals studied featured neutral or get-out-the-vote related information; for example, 
the Italian communists crafted a poster showing a woman’s head bumping against a soccer-
ball-shaped party logo and the words “Head’s Up: Election Coming!” Thus, although over half 
of the EP election campaign materials studied focused on Europe, they did so without much 
substance, featuring instead pictures of candidates, slogans with little policy substance, and 
factual information about the day of the election.  
 
Table 1: Content of 2009 European Parliament Campaign Appeals 
 
 National / Dual 
Appeal 
European 
Appeal 
Neutral 
Appeal 
All Appeals Studied13 (N=107) 26% 55% 19% 
Old Member State Appeals (N =74) 20% 56% 24% 
New Member State Appeals14 (N = 33) 39% 55% 6% 
Large Party Appeals (N=47) 43% 42% 15% 
Small Party Appeals15 (N=60) 13% 65% 22% 
Governing Party Appeals (N=39) 38% 49% 13% 
Opposition Party Appeals16 (N=68) 19% 59% 22% 
Mid-term Election Year Appeals (N = 80) 22% 58% 20% 
National Election Year Appeals17 (N = 27) 37% 48% 15% 
Eurosceptic Party Appeals (N =6) -- 100% -- 
Far Left Party Appeals (N= 10) 20% 70% 10% 
Far Right Party Appeals (N=19) 5% 58% 37% 
Green Party Appeals (N = 10) -- 60% 40% 
Other Parties’ Appeals18 (N=61) 39% 48% 13% 
 
 
In keeping with the framework presented earlier in the chapter, the nature of campaign 
content varied predictably with the type of party creating it. The following sections explore this 
systematic variation. As expected, there were statistically significant differences between the 
campaign content in the old and new member states; new member states had almost twice as 
many national appeals (39%) than the old member states (20%) (see Table 1). When Europe 
was discussed, the campaign content observed was most often substantive in nature in the old 
member states whereas the most common type of appeal in the new member states focused on 
personalities rather than issues (see Table 2).  
 
Party size also exerted a significant impact on campaign content. As expected, the biggest 
parties holding a chance at serving in national governments were particularly prone to national 
appeals. Forty-three percent of large party appeals featured national or dual European/national 
content compared to only 13% for small parties (see Table 1). The differences in party size 
were starker in the old member states – where 40% of large party appeals fit these categories in 
contrast to only 7% of small parties’ campaign materials – than in new member states – where 
47% of large party and 31% of small party posters made national or dual appeals.19 As small 
13 The unit of analysis here (“appeal”) is a campaign poster or a series of campaign posters with similar 
content. 
14 Old vs. New Member States, Chi2 pr = .026.  
15 Large vs. Small Parties, Chi2 pr = .003.  
16 Governing vs. Opposition Parties, Chi2 pr = .077.  
17 Mid-term vs. National Election Year, Chi2 test not significant. 
18 Chi2 test not reliable for party ideology; cells contain too few observations. 
19 Difference in old member states significant (Chi2 pr = .002); Chi2 not reliable for new member states 
due to cells containing too few observations. 
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Eastern European parties do not enjoy an advantage in EP elections, they seem more inclined 
than their Western European counterparts to frame the European contests as domestic ones.  
 
Table 2: Types of European Appeals in the 2009 European Parliament Election 
Campaigns20 
 
  
 
Substantive Personality Non-
Specific 
GOTV/ 
Neutral 
All European Appeals (N= 59) 34% 41% 18% 7% 
Old Member State Appeals (N = 41) 37% 34% 24% 5% 
New Member State Appeals (N = 18) 28% 56% 5% 11% 
Large Party European Appeals (N = 20) 10% 45% 35% 10% 
Small Party European Appeals (N = 39) 46% 39% 10% 5% 
Governing Party European Appeals (N = 19) 21% 42% 26% 11% 
Opposition Party European Appeals (N = 40) 40% 40% 15% 5% 
Mid-Term Election Year European Appeals (N = 46) 30% 41% 22% 7% 
National Election Year European Appeals (N = 13) 46% 38% 8% 8% 
Eurosceptic Party European Appeals (N = 6) 83% 17% -- -- 
Far Left Party European Appeals (N = 7) 43% 43% -- 14% 
Far Right Party European Appeals (N = 11) 55% 27% 18% -- 
Green Party European Appeals (N = 6) 34% 34% 16% 16% 
Other Parties’ European Appeals (N = 29) 17% 52% 24% 7% 
 
When political parties did frame EP elections as a contest over Europe, however, the nature 
of their European appeals differed with party size; as expected, small parties were more prone 
to developing issue-based campaign posters than their larger counterparts were (see Table 2.) 
Almost half (46%) of the small party European appeals observed were substantive in nature 
compared to only 10% of the large parties’ European appeals. Large parties created non-
specific European posters at three times the rate of small parties (35% vs. 10%); a s imilar 
pattern was observed with neutral or get-out-the-vote type posters (10% of large parties’ 
European appeals vs. 5% of small parties’). 
 
Whether a party was a member of the domestic government or opposition made a significant 
difference in the content of its 2009 EP election campaign posters. Parties serving in the 
national government were more prone to framing the EP election in national terms; across the 
EU, while 38% of incumbent party campaign messages featured domestic personalities or 
issues, only 19% of opposition electoral materials did so. (see Table 1). Many governing parties 
sought to capitalize on the visibility of their members of the national government. For example, 
the German CDU and the French UMP created posters featuring Merkel and Sarkozy, even 
though these individuals were not MEP candidates.  
 
In the old member states, 40% of governing party appeals were national in tone, compared 
to 13% of opposition party campaign materials.21 In the new member states, however, there 
were no significant differences between governing and opposition parties’ use of national/dual 
appeals (37% vs. 43% respectively). In old member states 61% of opposition party appeals 
were European compared to only 40% of governing parties’.22 The gap was much closer in the 
new member states, however, with 50% of opposition and 58% of governing party appeals 
being European in nature, reflecting East European opposition parties’ tendency to frame EP 
contests as national ones. The lack of second-order election effects in Eastern Europe appears 
to discourage opposition parties from framing the EP elections as a European contest. 
20 The unit of analysis here (“appeal”) is a campaign poster or a series of campaign posters with similar 
content. Chi2 test not reliable due to cells containing too few observations. 
21 Chi2 pr = .03. 
22 Chi2 pr = .04.  
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Also as expected, opposition parties created substantive European appeals more often than 
members of national governments did (see Table 2.) Forty percent of opposition parties’ 
European appeals were substantive compared to only 21% for governing parties. In our sample, 
the latter utilized neutral or non-specific appeals twice as frequently as opposition parties. 
 
The timing in the national electoral cycle did not achieve statistical significance (see Table 
1.) Nationally-oriented appeals were more frequent in both old and new EU member states with 
a domestic election approaching - but not significantly so. Across Europe, 37% of the observed 
election-eve appeals were nationally-oriented, compared to only 22% of the appeals developed 
midpoint in a national election cycle; 58% of mid-term election year posters were European 
compared to only 48% for national election years. As expected above, non-specific European 
appeals were observed more frequently in posters created at mid-term in the national electoral 
cycle (22%) than in national election year posters (8%). However, in contrast to expectations, 
substantive European appeals were more frequent in a national election year (46%) than in a 
mid-term election year (30%). This may be because parties devote altogether more resources 
toward developing campaigns in a national election year with the spillover effect that they can 
more substantively discuss European issues in such years.  
 
Party ideology did perform as expected. Anti-EU, far-left, far-right, and Green parties 
rarely, if ever, produced nationally-focused materials (see Table 1). None of the single-issue 
Eurosceptic and Green parties studied used national or dual appeals in their 2009 EP 
campaigns. Far-left parties took swipes at the economic records of domestic political actors 
20% of the time, and far-right parties capitalized on the visibility of national politicians 
presenting dual appeals in only 5% of the cases studied. In contrast, 39% of the mainstream 
parties’ appeals focused on national issues or personalities. Instead, ideologically-distinct 
parties more commonly developed European and neutral campaign materials. Unsurprisingly, 
100% of single-issue anti-EU party campaign posters featured European-oriented appeals; over 
half of the Green, far-left, and far-right campaign materials collected discussed Europe 
compared to less than half for other parties. Far-right and Green parties produced posters usable 
in either a domestic or European election in 37% and 40% of the materials studied, 
respectively, compared to only 13% of other parties’ materials. 
 
The European-focused posters and brochures developed by these ideologically-distinct 
parties were generally substantive in their approach (see Table 2). Eighty-three percent of 
single issue anti-EU parties’ campaign materials focused on policy substance as did 55% of the 
far-right’s, 43% of the far-left’s, and 34% of Green party appeals; of the other parties’ 
European appeals studied a mere 17% were substantive in nature. Eurosceptic parties very 
often used the EP election campaign as an  opportunity to detail the specific aspects of the 
European Union they objected to; the Eurosceptic Danish People’s Movement Against the EU 
ran a series of ads, each opposing a particular aspect of the EU including the Euro, the Lisbon 
Treaty, certain ECJ decisions, and EU welfare, environmental, foreign aid, and military 
policies. Far-right parties used the election to call for an EU hostile to immigration and cultural 
diversity; the German People’s Union created a p oster portraying Berlin’s famous Winged 
Victory statue wearing a h eadscarf with red crescents on it and the slogan “Europe Defend 
Yourself on June 7th: Islamification No Thank You!” Far-left parties decried what they saw as 
an EU dominated by the interests of capital; the Austrian Freedom Party called for “Social 
Warmth rather than an EU for Big Business”. Green parties demanded an ecologically-friendly 
Europe; the Scottish Greens called for a “Green New Deal” in which EU policies could 
promote job creation in the clean energy sector.  
 
Our analysis also found evidence to support our expectation that rational parties with 
resource constraints have incentives to create materials featuring slogans equally applicable in 
the domestic and European arenas; these low-budget neutral appeals constituted 19% of all 
campaign materials studied (see Table 1). For example, the Spanish People’s Party hung 
posters with their party logo and the word “Vote” above it. As expected, single-issue anti-EU 
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parties were the exception here and no e vidence of their using this tactic was found in our 
sample. Also as expected, such appeals were particularly popular among far-right and Green 
parties (see Table 2). For example the far-right German NPD ran posters of Muslim women 
carrying tote bags under the headline “Have a Good Trip Home” and the French Europe-
Ecologie exhorted “You can’t imagine the power of ecology!”23 In contrast to expectations, far-
left parties rarely created neutral appeals, preferring either to attack the domestic government’s 
record or call for a more left-wing EU. 
  
Summary 
Systematic analysis of over fifty political parties’ 2009 European Parliament election appeals 
thus finds evidence consistent with the three prevailing accounts of EP campaign content: 
national, European, and neutral appeals were all utilized. The types of appeals posited varied 
significantly with political party type. National appeals were favored by large, governing 
parties in old member states and by many parties in the new member states; European appeals 
were more commonly put forth by small or opposition parties in the old member states; and 
neutral appeals found particular resonance with far-right and Green parties. Of the European 
appeals, substantive ones were created most frequently by single-issue Eurosceptic, small or 
opposition political parties.  
 
 
Contributions 
 
This chapter has made two primary contributions to our understanding of EP election campaign 
content. First, in contrast to the prevailing qualitative, single-country studies of such campaigns 
written with an eye to election results, we have taken a m ore systematic multi-country 
approach, documenting the campaign materials developed by a wide range of political parties 
in advance of the 2009 EP election. This approach reveals that, contrary to many retrospective 
accounts of EP campaigns, most of the posters and brochures put out at election time are not 
about national issues and personalities, although as others have observed such campaign 
materials do exist. Instead, a majority of the printed matter put out by the parties under study 
did indeed have something to do with Europe, as expected by other observers of EP campaigns. 
In contrast to widespread characterizations of EP campaigns as Eurosceptic in tone, however, 
we found that most of the materials we classified as “European” simply depicted MEP 
candidates, provided information about the date of the election, or contained a non-specific 
Europe-related slogan. Finally, in keeping with still other qualitative accounts, almost 20% of 
the campaign material could be classified neither as European nor national in focus, making 
such materials usable in both arenas. Our study provides other scholars with a detailed and 
nuanced snapshot of 2009 EP election campaign activities. Our approach to documenting EP 
campaign content can be replicated in future EP elections, creating an even larger dataset with 
which to test our – and others’ – hypotheses about EP campaign content. 
 
The second main contribution of this chapter has been to provide a theoretical framework 
with which to reconcile the many competing claims about EP election campaign content. We 
argue that, depending on t heir position in the first-order (national) arena, different political 
parties will have different incentives when preparing campaign appeals for European 
Parliament elections. Political parties which successfully contest national elections – that is, the 
largest two political parties in a given country and other members of national governments in 
the old member states – have the greatest incentive to frame EP contests as being about national 
issues and personalities, for those first order concerns are of most importance to them. Under 
pressure from smaller or opposition parties to show their European credentials, these parties do 
23 Clearly these slogans are not “neutral” in the policy sense – they obviously represent distinct 
ideological positions. For our purposes, however, they do not convey to the voters whether these policies 
should be passed at the European or national level. As a result, these posters could easily be reused in a 
national election. 
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create European-oriented campaign materials, but such print matter usually only includes 
pictures of MEP candidates or slogans devoid of policy substance, rather than a substantive 
discussion of the EP’s record.  
 
The incentives facing smaller political parties with distinctive ideologies (including anti-EU, 
far-left, far-right, and Green parties), and members of the domestic opposition in the old 
member states, are quite different. Because such parties tend to perform better in second-order 
than first-order contests, these parties possess a motive to frame EP elections as being about 
Europe (the second-order arena) rather than about domestic politics. As a result, these parties 
are more likely to create campaign materials that not only focus on Europe, but also do so in a 
substantive matter, discussing their stances on particular European policies. They are much less 
prone to crafting nationally-oriented content than are the parties discussed above. This means 
the information voters receive during election campaigns about the European Parliament and 
issues in its purview is quite slanted in its orientation. Green and far-right parties also 
developed neutral appeals stressing a Green or far-right agenda applicable in both European 
and national elections. In sum, the varying qualitative accounts of EP election content can be 
reconciled by examining the incentives various political parties have to frame EP elections as 
national, European, or generic contests. 
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Appendix I: Cases 
Party Country Date Joined 
EU24 
Midterm 
Election?25 
Party 
Size26 
In 
Government?
27 
Single-Issue 
Eurosceptic 
Party28 
Far 
Left 
Party29 
Far 
Right 
Party30 
Green 
Party31 
Buendins 90/Gruenen Germany Founding 
member 
No Small Opposition No No No Yes 
BZOe Austria 1995 Yes Small Opposition No No Yes No 
CDU Germany Founding 
member 
No Large Government  No No No No 
Conservatives UK 1973 No Large Opposition No No No No 
CSSD Czech 2004 No Large Opposition No No No No 
DeSUS Slovenia 2004 Yes Small Government  No No No No 
DVU Germany Founding 
member 
No Small Opposition No No Yes No 
Europe-Ecologie France Founding 
member 
Yes Small Opposition No No No Yes 
FDP Germany Founding 
member 
No Small Opposition No No No No 
Fianna Fail Ireland 1973 Yes Large Government  No No No No 
FPOe Austria 1995 Yes Small Opposition No No Yes No 
Front de Gauche France Founding 
member 
Yes Small Opposition No Yes No No 
24 In our analysis “old member states” are defined as those joining the EU in the 20th Century; “new member states” joined in the 21st century.  
25 Countries which in spring 2009 anticipated holding a national election before June 2010 were not considered to be at mid-term; all other cases were considered at mid-term. 
26 “Large” parties were the top two vote getters in the previous national election; all other parties were coded as “small”. 
27 Parties holding seats in the national cabinet were classified as “government” parties; all others were classified as “opposition” parties.  
28 Parties coded “yes” were parties whose raison d’etre is to oppose the EU, rather than political parties that take a wide range of stances including Eurosceptic positions; all 
others were coded “no.”   
29 Parties coded “yes” were members or aspiring members of the transnational European United Left parliamentary group in the EP; all others were coded “no.”   
30 Parties coded “yes” were members or aspiring members of the Non-Inscrits in the EP whose platforms went beyond opposition to the EU to include overt hostility to 
immigration and multiculturalism.  
31 Parties coded “yes” were members or aspiring members of the transnational European Greens parliamentary party group in the EP; all others were coded “no.” 
Appendix II: Cases, cont. 
Party Country Date Joined 
EU 
Midterm 
Election? 
Party 
Size 
In 
Government? 
Single-Issue 
Euro-sceptic 
Party 
Far 
Left 
Party 
Far 
Right 
Party 
Green 
Party 
Front National France Founding 
member 
Yes Small Opposition No No Yes No 
Il Popolo della Liberta Italy Founding 
member 
Yes Large Government  No No No No 
Izquierda-unida Spain 1986 Yes Small Opposition No Yes No No 
June Movement Denmark 1973 Yes Small Opposition Yes No No No 
KDU/CSL Czech 2004 No Small Government  No No No No 
KPOe Austria 1995 Yes Small Opposition No Yes No No 
KSCM Czech 2004 No Small Opposition No Yes No No 
Labour UK 1973 No Large Government  No No No No 
L'AutoNomia Italy Founding 
member 
Yes Small Opposition Yes No No No 
LDS Slovenia 2004 Yes Small Opposition No No No No 
Liberal Democrats UK 1973 No Small Opposition No No No No 
List H.P. Martin Austria 1995 Yes Small Opposition Yes No No No 
LNNK Latvia 2004 Yes Large Government  No No No No 
MSR Spain 1986 Yes Small Opposition No No Yes No 
N.S.i.  Slovenia 2004 Yes Small Opposition No No No No 
NPD Germany Founding 
member 
No Small Opposition No No Yes No 
ODS Czech 2004 No Large Government  No No No No 
OeVP Austria 1995 Yes Large Government  No No No No 
Partito Democratico Italy Founding 
member 
Yes Large Opposition No No No No 
PD/PD-L Romania 2007 Yes large Government  No No No No 
People's Movement 
against the EU 
Denmark 1973 Yes Small Opposition Yes No No No 
Appendix III: Cases, cont. 
Party Country Date Joined EU Midterm 
Election? 
Party 
Size 
In 
Government 
Single Issue 
Eurosceptic 
Party 
Far 
Left 
Party 
Far 
Right 
Party 
Green 
Party 
PS France Founding 
member 
Yes Large Opposition No No No No 
PNL Romania 2007 Yes Large Opposition No No No No 
PP Spain 1986 Yes Large Opposition No No No No 
PSD + PC Romania 2007 Yes Large Government  No No No No 
PSOE Spain 1986 Yes Large Government  No No No No 
Republikaner Germany Founding 
member 
No Small Opposition No No Yes No 
Rifondazione 
Comunisti Italiani 
Italy Founding 
member 
Yes Small Opposition No Yes No No 
SD Slovenia 2004 Yes Large Government  No No No No 
SDS Slovenia 2004 Yes Large Opposition No No No No 
Sinistra e Liberta 
(Green list) 
Italy Founding 
member 
Yes Small Opposition No No No Yes 
Slovenian Greens Slovenia 2004 Yes Small Opposition No No No Yes 
SLS Slovenia 2004 Yes Small Opposition No No No No 
SPD Germany Founding 
member 
No Large Government  No No No No 
SPOe Austria 1995 Yes Large Government  No No No No 
Strana zelenych Czech 2004 No Small Government  No No No Yes 
Tautas Partija Latvia 2004 Yes Large Government  No No No No 
UDMR  Romania 2007 Yes Small Opposition No No No No 
UKIP UK 1973 No Small Opposition Yes No No No 
UMP France Founding 
member 
Yes Large Government  No No No No 
Verde (Spanish 
greens) 
Spain 1986 Yes Small Opposition No No No Yes 
Appendix IV: Cases, cont. 
Party Country Date Joined EU Midterm 
Election? 
Party 
Size 
In 
Government 
Single Issue 
Eurosceptic 
Party 
Far 
Left 
Party 
Far 
Right 
Party 
Green 
Party 
 
N = 53 parties 
 
N = 12 
countries 
 
Old Member 
States = 35 
parties 
 
New Member 
States = 18 
parties 
 
Mid-term 
= 37 
parties 
 
National 
Election = 
16 parties 
 
Large =  
22 
parties 
 
Small = 
31 
parties  
 
Government = 
18 parties 
 
Opposition = 
35 parties 
 
N =5 parties  
 
N = 5 
parties 
 
N = 7 
parties 
 
N = 6 
parties 
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Punishing Incumbents by Voting Independent? Cleavages as 
Constraints on Vote-Switching in the 2009 European 
Elections in Estonia1 
 
 
Piret Ehin and Mihkel Solvak2  
 
 
Abstract 
While independent candidates rarely perform well in party-centered systems, a genuinely 
independent candidate attracted a q uarter of the nationwide vote in the 2009 E uropean 
Parliament elections in Estonia. This study uses data from the Estonian case to address the 
question of why voters vote for independents. It develops and tests two explanations: the 
first construes mass vote for an independent candidate as a manifestation of anti-party 
sentiment, while the second argues that voting independent constitutes a variation on the 
familiar theme of punishing the incumbents in second-order elections. The results lend 
strong support to the latter explanation, suggesting that voting independent constituted a 
low-cost strategy for punishing the incumbents in a context where strong socio-political 
cleavages inhibited vote-switching to the opposition.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
The results of the 2009 European Parliament (EP) elections in Estonia were truly out of the 
ordinary. To the surprise of observers, the six independent candidates included on the ballot 
took 30.4 percent of the nationwide vote. A vast majority of these votes went to Indrek Tarand, 
a former high-ranking civil servant who had run a campaign marked by strong anti-party 
rhetoric. Tarand won 25.8 percent of the vote, a mere 1046 votes less than the best-performing 
party. Having spent less than 2000 euros on his campaign (and having borrowed money from 
his mother to pay his registration deposit), Tarand secured one of Estonia’s six seats in the 
European Parliament. 
 
This result is unprecedented on many levels. To be elected to the European Parliament as an 
independent candidate is a rare accomplishment. Of the 736 members elected to the EP for the 
2009-2014 term, only three were elected as independents (one from Romania, one from Ireland, 
and one from Estonia). Between 1999 and 2007, five individuals entered the EP as independent 
candidates (four from Ireland, one from Romania). While the success of independents in 
Ireland can be attributed to the country’s candidate-centered electoral system,3 the seat 
allocation procedure used in the 2009 EP elections in Estonia was closed-list proportional 
representation (PR) – the type of electoral system considered to be least conducive to the 
electoral strength of independents (Brancati 2008). While Romania also uses closed-list PR, the 
independents elected in 2007 and 2009 won less than 5 percent of the nationwide vote – an 
outcome much more consistent with the expected effects of the electoral system. Both also had 
1 This research was supported by the Estonian Science Foundation (grant no. 7903) and Estonian 
Targeted Financing (grant no. 0180128). The authors thank Kristjan Vassil, Allan Sikk, Ben Stanley, the 
participants of the PIREDEU Final User Community Conference (18-19 November 2010, Brussels) and 
of the 9th Conference on Baltic Studies in Europe (12-15 June 2011, Södertorn) for their comments on 
this and earlier versions of this text. 
2 Institute of Government and Politics, University of Tartu. Email: Piret Ehin piret.ehin@ut.ee; Mihkel 
Solvak mihkel.solvak@ut.ee 
3 Ireland and Malta are the only countries in the EU that use the single transferable vote system.  
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close ties to certain political parties.4 Tarand, in contrast, was a genuinely independent 
candidate, not backed by any political party, significant interest group or civil society 
organization.  
 
Tarand’s case is also unique in the context of Estonia’s electoral history. Since 1992, 
independent candidates have won, on average, 1.3 percent of the vote in general elections. In 
the 2007 elections to the Riigikogu, independent candidates received only 0.1 pe rcent of the 
vote. In the country’s first-ever EP elections, held in May 2004, the combined vote share of 
four independent candidates was 5.7 pe rcent. Thus, Tarand’s triumph in the 2009 c ontest 
constitutes a rare example of strong independent performance in a party-centered system that 
cannot be explained away by reference to electoral system effects, the peculiarities of national 
political traditions, overt or covert backing by political parties or other influential 
organizations, or the candidate’s own material resources.  
 
This chapter examines voting behavior in the 2009 EP elections in Estonia in an attempt to 
understand the logic that led over a quarter of the voters to cast a ballot for an independent 
candidate. The starting point for our analysis is the recognition that EP elections constitute 
second-order national elections, where less is at stake for both parties and the voters, and which 
the voters use not to express preferences about European integration but to send signals to the 
national parties, and in particular, the political incumbents (e.g. Reif and Schmitt 1980, Marsh 
1998, Koepke and Ringe 2006, Hix and Marsh 2007). Within this framework, we develop two 
explanations for the voting behavior observed in the Estonian case. The first explanation builds 
on the strand of research that links the electoral performance of independent candidates to the 
robustness of the voter-party linkage, and more specifically, to the prevalence of anti-party 
sentiment among the electorate. This explanation coincides with the dominant domestic 
interpretation of the results of the 2009 vote in Estonia, and is in line with the anti-party 
message that dominated Tarand’s campaign. A rival explanation, which combines the 
predictions of the second-order national elections thesis with the influence of strong socio-
political cleavages, construes the success of Tarand as a v ariation on the familiar theme of 
punishing the political incumbents. According to this explanation, Tarand constituted a 
convenient instrumental choice for habitual government party supporters who wished to punish 
the incumbents in a context where strong social cleavages and ideological differences inhibited 
vote-switching to the opposition. Both explanations yield a number of empirical predictions 
about patterns of vote-switching and voter characteristics that we test with individual-level data 
from a post-election survey conducted in the framework of the European Elections Study (EES 
2009, van Egmond et al. 2009). The main empirical question addressed in this chapter is: what 
kind of voters voted for Indrek Tarand and how did they differ from party voters and non-
voters? The results of the empirical analysis enable us to answer the question of whether the 
vote for Tarand should be interpreted as a vote against political parties or as a vote against 
political incumbents.  
 
While the immediate objective of this study is to understand the logic of the vote in the 
intriguing Estonian case, the study also contributes to the study of voting behavior more 
generally. Although interest in independent candidates is on the rise (e.g. Brancati 2008), we 
still know relatively little about why people vote for independent candidates, and under what 
circumstances they might do so en masse. The Estonian case is particularly well suited for 
examining the question of how voters who vote for independent candidates differ from party-
voters and non-voters: due to the extraordinarily large number of votes for an independent 
candidate, the analysis does not suffer from the problem of ‘small n’ that has plagued studies 
on small party and independent votes (van der Eijk et al 2006, 438). Second, an analysis of the 
Estonian case helps cast light on the question of why people vote differently in EP elections 
4 László Tőkés, elected to the EP as an independent candidate in 2007, was backed by Fidesz, the main 
opposition party in Hungary. Elena Băsescu, daughter of the incumbent president of Romania, had close 
ties with the Democratic Liberal Party, which she rejoined immediately after the election.   
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and first-order elections. While ‘voting differently’ has been generally understood as voting for 
a different party, the Estonian case suggests that the second-order setting has characteristics 
that may lead voters (and candidates) to circumvent parties altogether.  
 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. The second section explains how voting in 
second-order elections (SOE) differs from voting in first-order elections, and shows how 
certain structural conditions associated with the SOE setting strengthen the position of 
independent candidates. The third section outlines two versions of protest-voting compatible 
with the relevant literature as well as the facts on the ground, and identifies a number of 
empirical propositions about voting behavior consistent with each account. The fourth section 
presents a brief overview of the 2009 EP election in Estonia, assessing the degree to which the 
electoral context and aggregate results lend plausibility to the competing explanations. The fifth 
section uses individual-level data to empirically test the propositions derived from the two rival 
explanations. The conclusion summarizes the main results and discusses the implications of our 
findings.  
 
 
Why Voters Vote Differently in European Parliament Elections 
 
People vote differently in EP elections: compared to general elections, there is a lower turn out, 
and those who do vote are more inclined to support opposition parties than government parties 
(Flickinger & Studlar 2007, Mattila 2003). They are also more prone to vote for small parties - 
including protest parties and ideologically extreme parties - than for the mainstream parties 
they would support in a general election (Carruba & Timpone 2005). A powerful explanation 
for these trends is offered by the second-order national elections thesis, a dominant approach to 
EP elections that has generated a wealth of theoretical and empirical research (Reif and Schmitt 
1980, Reif 1984, Marsh 1998, Koepke and Ringe 2006, Hix and Marsh 2007, Schmitt 2009). 
According to this model, EP elections are ‘national’ because voters choose among national 
parties who run campaigns focusing predominantly on national issues. They are ‘second-order’ 
because in contrast to first-order elections, they have almost no implications for the allocation 
and exercise of executive power. Because government formation is not an issue, less is at stake 
in EP elections for both parties and voters.  
 
The prevalent understanding is that in EP elections, voters are much more likely to ‘vote 
with the heart’ or ‘with the boot’ than in first-order elections (van der Eijk and Franklin 1996). 
Because government formation is not at stake, voters are freed from the need to consider the 
strategic implications of their vote. The second-order setting thus encourages sincere voting – 
i.e., voting based on ideological proximity, group identities, or issue-positions. Voting with the 
boot, however, may involve ‘insincere’ or ‘instrumental’ voting (Marsh 1998). This mode 
refers to protest voting in which ‘voters cast their ballot for a party they would not vote for in a 
real election in order to send a message of distaste for the programs or candidates of the party 
they would normally vote for’ (Franklin 2005: 5). The second-order setting allows the voters to 
safely engage in such punitive vote-switching because it does not alter the status quo in terms 
of the exercise of executive power.  
 
The second-order setting offers distinct advantages to small and peripheral political actors – 
including independent candidates. The propensity of voters to vote strategically by abandoning 
those with limited potential to participate in government formation constitutes a major obstacle 
for small parties and independent candidates in general elections. Limited or non-existent 
government potential, however, is not an impediment in second-order elections which ‘involve 
the selection of a representative rather than a government’ (Marsh 1998: 593). Independents are 
also potential beneficiaries of the anti-incumbent trend, which makes a large share of the voters 
reconsider the choice they made in general elections, and increases their susceptibility to the 
electoral appeal of alternative actors. Finally, the SOE context also reduces the tremendous 
financial and organizational disadvantages that independent candidates face when competing 
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with political parties for political office. Because less is at stake at EP elections, parties spend 
significantly less on EP election campaigns than they do in general elections. To the extent that 
party campaigns are low-cost and low-intensity, compared to the first-order arena, 
independents have a better chance of gaining visibility and getting their message across to the 
voters. 
 
 
Two Versions of ‘Voting with the Boot’ 
 
A mass vote for an independent candidate running on a protest platform seems to fit well within 
the broader rubrique of ‘voting with the boot’ in second-order elections. However, it is not 
clear who or what the Estonian voters protested against. The sections below outline two rival 
versions of protest-voting. The first, derived from the literature on independent candidate 
performance, links independent success to anti-party sentiment among the electorate. The 
second explanation argues that voting independent constitutes a peculiar punishment for the 
incumbents.  
 
Anti-Party Sentiment as a Source of Support for Independents  
A dominant strand of research on independent candidates links the electoral strength of 
independents to the robustness of the voter-party linkage. The propositions associated with this 
approach are straightforward. On the individual level, voters who do not feel close to any party 
are considered to be more likely to vote for independents than voters with a stronger sense of 
party attachment (Rosenstone et al 1984, 176-177; Donovan et al 2000, 60). On the aggregate 
level, independents can be expected to perform comparatively well in contexts characterized by 
weak or undeveloped political parties, low levels of partisan identification or party attachment, 
and high levels of electoral volatility (Gerring 2005). Thus, independents have been shown to 
perform better in first democratic elections than in subsequent ones (Brancati 2008), and in new 
democracies compared to established ones (Birch 2003). 
 
A stronger version of this logic links independent success to the prevalence of anti-party 
sentiment and anti-system attitudes among the electorate. Discontent with political parties has 
been recognized as one of the elements of the political malaise observed in advanced industrial 
democracies (Dalton 2004; Norris 1999), along with growing political cynicism, low levels of 
political trust, and declining levels of political participation. According to Poguntke (1996), 
anti-party sentiment can be specific, reflecting voter dislike of major party alternatives, or 
generalized, implying a rejection of party politics per se. Anti-partyism has been associated 
with the tendency to vote for independent candidates (Owen and Dennis, 1996) as well as 
minor parties, especially if these parties adopt anti-party rhetoric or mobilize popular 
disenchantment by offering ‘new ways’ of doing politics (Belanger 2004). Specific events that 
increase popular resentment towards party politicians (such as the MPs’ expenses scandal in the 
UK) may increase support for independents. Thus, it has been argued that independent 
candidates and anti-party parties perform important functions in a democratic political system. 
They serve as v ehicles channeling political discontent in a ‘pacific and democratic way’ 
(Belanger 2004) and may even unlock voter apathy by providing disenchanted voters more 
choice and alternative means of representation. However, an anti-systemic protest agenda can 
also be associated with ideological extremism, as exemplified by radical right parties, which 
profit from popular dissatisfaction and anti-systemic attitudes by appealing especially to a less 
educated and lower income voter segment (Lubbers & Scheepers 2000). In short, the scholarly 
literature linking the electoral performance of independent candidates to anti-party sentiment 
resonates well with the prevalent domestic interpretation of the 2009 vote, according to which 
Tarand’s triumph signified widespread popular frustration with the Estonian political parties. 
 
Voting Independent to Punish the Incumbents? 
The literature on European Parliament elections suggests a d ifferent interpretation of the 
protest-vote observed in the Estonian case. One of the central claims of the SOE model is that 
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voters use EP elections to punish political incumbents. The fact that government parties suffer 
losses in EP elections has been widely corroborated (e.g. Hobolt et al 2008; Kousser 2004). 
This happens because EP elections take place in the middle of the national election cycle: as 
governments tend to disappoint voters, support for incumbents is expected to decline as a 
function of time since the last general election, with the anti-incumbent trend being most 
pronounced if the EP elections are held in the middle of the national election cycle (Marsh 
1998, Reif 1984). Due to the detachment of election results from government formation, voters 
can safely signal discontent with the incumbents without having to ‘live with the 
consequences.’  
 
The question whether – and under what conditions - the wish to punish incumbents could 
lead voters to cast a ballot for an independent candidate leads us to consider the choices that 
habitual government party voters face in EP elections. Basically, this choice can be 
characterized in terms of the classic trilemma of loyalty, exit, or voice (Hirschman 1970). A 
disenchanted government party voter who wishes to send a signal of discontent to the 
incumbents thus faces a choice between abstention and vote-switching. The strategy they 
choose is likely to be strongly influenced by the supply side – i.e., the extent to which the 
electoral choice set includes parties or candidates perceived as suitable for the intended 
purposes. However, the fact that a voter wishes to punish the incumbents does not imply that 
the considerations related to identity and utility (Campbell et al. 1960, Downs 1957) that 
usually influence his or her vote choice are ‘turned off.’ Because the electoral choice set is 
limited (and is shaped by party competition on t he first-order arena), instrumental vote-
switching involves potentially significant costs, as v oters may have to negotiate ideological 
distances and cross deeply-embedded social and political cleavages. If the costs associated with 
vote-switching are perceived to be high, disenchanted government voters are likely to abstain in 
EP elections. Conversely, if the choice set includes convenient, low-cost options that allow the 
voters to ‘vote with the boot’ without ‘betraying the heart’, many more voters are likely to 
choose the strategy of ‘voice’ as opposed to ‘exit’. In sum, this line of reasoning leads to the 
conjecture that in the Estonian EP elections, voting for an independent candidate constituted a 
low-cost strategy for punishing the political incumbents in a context where strong socio-
political cleavages and significant ideological differences inhibited vote-switching to the 
opposition.  
 
Testable Propositions  
These two rival accounts yield a n umber of empirically testable propositions. The key to 
decoding the signal the voters were sending in the Estonian EP elections is finding out which 
voters abandoned their parties to vote for an independent candidate. The explanation derived 
from the SOE model yields the following empirical predictions:  
 
H1. Voters who voted for the independent candidate in EP elections had, in the 
preceding general elections, voted for the winners (parties that subsequently formed the 
government).  
 
H2. Vote-switching from government parties to an independent candidate was more 
prevalent than vote-switching from government to opposition parties. 
 
H3. Voters who voted for an independent candidate in EP elections evaluated 
government performance more negatively than voters who voted for government 
parties. 
 
H4. Voters who voted for an independent candidate were similar to government party 
voters and different from opposition party voters in terms of ideological positions and 
cleavage-constituting socio-demographic characteristics.  
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H5. Independent-voters, opposition party voters and government party voters did not 
differ from one another in terms of attitudes towards European integration or 
assessments of the country’s EU membership. 
 
The explanation that interprets the success of Tarand as a manifestation of anti-party 
sentiment, in contrast, yields the following hypotheses:  
 
H6. Vote-switching to an independent candidate was equally prevalent among those 
voters who, in the preceding general elections, had voted for the winners and those who 
had voted for the losers.  
 
H7. Compared to the parties appearing on the ballot, the independent candidate was 
highly successful in attracting the votes of habitual abstainers.     
H8. Voters who voted for an independent candidate had a weaker sense of partisan 
attachment than party voters.  
 
H9. Voters who voted for an independent candidate were less satisfied with the 
functioning of democracy than party voters.  
 
H10. Voters who voted for an independent candidate were less educated and had lower 
socio-economic status than party voters, and were ideologically more extreme than 
party voters.  
 
The main expectations derived from the two competing explanations are summarized in 
Table 1. Before testing these propositions with data from a post-election survey, we will offer a 
brief overview of the context, contestants, and results of the Estonian 2009 EP elections.  
 
Table 1: Summary of expectations associated with the two forms of protest-voting 
 
Areas concerned Anti-incumbent vote Anti-party/anti-system vote 
Pattern of vote-switching from government party to 
independent 
from all major parties to 
independent 
Mobilization of non-voters by 
independent 
 
no yes 
Socio-demographic profile 
associated with voting independent 
similar to government 
party voters, different 
from opposition voters 
possibly less educated, 
lower-socio-economic 
status 
Ideological profile associated with 
voting independent 
similar to government 
party voters, different 
from opposition voters 
possibly more extreme 
compared to party-voters 
Expected predictors of vote for 
independent 
  
Dissatisfaction with government 
performance  
yes yes 
Weaker partisan attachment no yes 
Dissatisfaction with the functioning 
of democracy  
no yes 
Negative evaluation of country’s 
EU membership 
no possibly yes 
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2009 European Elections in Estonia: Context and Results 
 
Estonia’s second elections to the EP were held on June 7, 2009, with advance voting taking 
place from June 1 to June 3. Estonia has 6 seats in the EP which are allocated in a single 
nationwide constituency. The electoral system was closed-list PR. Importantly, this was the 
first time Estonian voters were expected to vote for party lists. In all previous national, local 
and European elections, Estonian voters had been asked to cast votes for a specific candidate on 
the party list. In both 2004 and 2009, the electoral law allowed independent candidates to run 
on the same terms as political parties, treating them essentially as one-person party lists. There 
were no notable ballot access restrictions aside from a moderate monetary deposit (1390 euros).  
 
Three observations about the context of the 2009 EP elections are in order. First, the 
elections were genuine mid-term elections, taking place two years and three months after the 
national parliament elections won by the pro-market Reform Party which had formed a 
coalition with the centre-right Pro Patria and Res Publica Union (IRL) and the small Social 
Democratic Party (SDE). Second, the EP elections took place in the midst of a major economic 
crisis. Following a decade of high growth, the economy contracted by 15.8 percent in the first 
half of 2009, and unemployment reached 14 percent in the second quarter of 2009, up from 4.6 
percent in June 2008. Aspiring for inclusion in the eurozone, the government had pushed 
through massive budget cuts to comply with the Maastricht criteria. Conflicts over the budget 
cuts culminated in the SDE leaving the three-member governing coalition in May 2009. Third, 
despite the economic crisis, public support for the EU remained very high, and the parties had 
few incentives to politicize Estonia’s membership in the EU.  
 
Altogether, 101 individuals were registered as candidates for the European Parliament. Eleven 
parties presented their electoral lists; six independent candidates also ran. The intensity of 
campaigns was low, and overall campaign spending constituted a little more than a fifth of the 
amount the parties had spent on na tional parliament election campaigns two years earlier. The 
campaign messages, to the extent that they had anything to do with the EU, were rather general. 
Although party manifestos touched on a range of EU-related issues (e.g. Estonia’s prospective 
accession to the eurozone, energy security, EU policy towards Russia), almost no clearly 
identifiable focal points for political debate emerged. Promises focusing on purely domestic matters 
received more air time and media space than the parties’ visions of European integration. 
Predictably, opposition parties used the elections as an opportunity to blame the government for the 
economic crisis and social problems, zooming in on the hardships brought by the budget cuts. 
 
About a month before the election day, polls began to predict that Indrek Tarand would take 
an EP seat. Tarand is a former high-ranking civil servant, a talk-show host, and the Director of 
the Estonian War Museum who had never held elected political office. He ran on an anti-party 
platform, ridiculing the prevailing culture of party politics and criticizing the self-serving ways 
of Estonia’s political elites. In particular, Tarand attacked the switchover from open to closed 
party lists that the major parties had engineered specifically for the 2009 EP elections, arguing 
that this change of electoral rules deprived voters of a real choice and made the selection of 
Estonia’s MEPs a matter of party backroom politics. Although Tarand had very limited 
campaign resources, bold and occasionally scandalous confrontations with the major political 
parties helped him secure a strong media presence. 
 
The seed sown by Tarand fell onto well-prepared soil. Popular frustration with the political 
parties has been a major theme in the Estonian political discourse for well over a decade, and 
the diagnosis of ‘growing popular alienation from politics’ has been widely shared by the 
media, politicians and opinion leaders, as well as social scientists (e.g. Arter 1996, Lagerspetz 
and Vogt 2004). Surveys have recorded very low levels of popular trust in political parties 
since the early 1990s (Ehin 2007); in June 2009, only 16 percent of the respondents in a 
Eurobarometer survey said they trusted the parties (TNS Opinion & Social 2009). In terms of 
electoral behavior, systemic dissatisfaction with the established parties has translated into high 
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levels of electoral volatility (the Pedersen volatility index for the 1990-2003 period was 17.7 
percent (Wessels & Klingemann 2006)) and the remarkable success of new parties promising 
new politics (Sikk 2006). For instance, genuinely new parties gained 24.6 percent of the vote in 
the 2003 national election and 7.1 percent in 2007. 
 
While Tarand sent few signals about his ideological leanings during the campaign, his 
record as a public figure offers ample information about his political convictions. In contrast to 
established Western democracies, political contestation in Estonia is not dominated by the left-
right dimension. A second cleavage combining ethnicity, geopolitics and political memory 
plays an equally (if not more) important role in Estonian politics. In combination, the two 
cleavages produce an increasingly polarized pattern of political competition in which the 
governing Reform Party and IRL represent a centre-right ideological position, Estonian ethno-
nationalism, a strong Western orientation and an unconditional condemnation of Soviet 
occupation. In contrast, the leading opposition force, the Centre Party, is distinguished by a 
greater emphasis on solidarity and equality, a softer position on Russia, a de-emphasis on 
historical conflicts and a highly successful strategy of appealing to the country’s Russian-
speaking population. Although Tarand has never been a member of any political party, his track 
record places him squarely in the first camp. He has had particularly strong ties to the 
conservative pro-market IRL and its chairman, Mart Laar. In the 1990s, Tarand worked for the 
Laar government, first as a special representative to the city of Narva, then as a political adviser 
to the Prime Minister. From 1994 to 2002, he served as Secretary General of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs – a position from which he was fired following an ugly, widely publicized 
personal conflict with Foreign Minister Kristiina Ojuland (who topped the Reform Party’s 
electoral list in the 2009 EP elections). In 2005, Tarand became the Director of the Estonian 
War Museum - an institution with a strong nationalist-conservative imprint. In 2005, he caused 
a scandal by appearing in public in a T-shirt that called for ‘burning the commies,’ followed by 
a list of the names of active politicians who had been members of the Communist Party in the 
Soviet era. The scandal culminated in the resignation of the Minister of Defense. In 2007, 
Tarand joined Laar in contributing to state-building efforts in Georgia, advising President 
Saakashvili on administrative reform. After the outbreak of the Russian-Georgian war in 
August 2008, Tarand organized a peculiar volunteer mission to assist the government of 
Georgia, enlisting men with military training, despite the declared humanitarian objectives of 
the mission. In sum, Tarand’s public record adds up to a political profile characterized by 
centre-right ideology, strong ethno-nationalist loyalties and over-the-top behavior that has, on 
several occasions, led him into conflict with the political establishment but has not generally 
been regarded as extremist. 
 
Even though Estonia registered the greatest increase in voter turnout compared to the 2004 
EP elections among all EU countries (from 26.8 pe rcent in 2004 to 43.9 percent in 2009), 
turnout in the EP contest was much lower than in the previous national parliament elections 
(61.9 percent) and subsequent local elections (60.6 percent). The six mandates were allocated 
between four parties and one independent candidate (see Table 2). The main opposition party, 
the Centre Party, gained the largest share of the vote (26.1 percent) and secured two seats in the 
EP. Tarand came in second, having won only 1,046 votes less than the Centre Party. Indeed, 
Tarand gained the largest share of the vote in all 17 regions (15 counties and two major cities) 
except for Tallinn and Ida-Viru County which have a high percentage of Russian-speakers. The 
leading government force, the Reform Party, was the main loser, as its vote share dropped from 
27.8 percent in the 2007 general elections to 15.3 percent in EP elections. The two smaller 
parties represented in the Riigikogu, the Greens and the People’s Union, remained without a 
mandate, receiving 2.7 pe rcent and 2.2 p ercent of the vote respectively. In sum, the above 
account provides considerable support for both the anti-party and anti-incumbent  interpretation 
of the mass vote for an independent candidate in the 2009 EP elections in Estonia. 
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Table 2: Results of the 2009 European Parliament elections in Estonia 
 EP party 
group 
affiliation (at 
time of 
election) 
Number 
of votes 
% of votes (change 
compared to 2007 general 
elections) 
EP seats  
Keskerakond  
(Centre Party)  
ALDE 103,506 26.1 (0) 2 
Indrek Tarand  
(independent candidate) 
- 102,460 25.8 (NA) 1  
Reformierakond (Reform 
Party) 
ALDE 60,877 15.3 (-12.5) 1  
Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit 
(ProPatria and Res Publica 
Union) 
EPP 48,492 12.2 (-5.7) 1  
Sotsiaaldemokraatlik erakond 
(Social Democratic Party) 
PES 34,508 8.7 (-1.9) 1   
Erakond Eestimaa Rohelised 
(Greens) 
Greens-EFA 10,851 2.7 (-4.4) 0  
Martin Helme (independent 
candidate) 
- 9,832 
 
2.5 (NA) 0 
Eestimaa Rahvaliit (Peoples’ 
Union) 
UEN 8,860 2.2 (-4.9) 0 
Dimitri Klenski (independent 
candidate) 
- 7,137 1.8 (NA) 0  
Note: The table lists parties and independent candidates that received over 1% of the vote. Source: 
Estonian National Electoral Committee, www.vvk 
 
 
Individual-Level Analysis 
 
Data, Method and Variables 
To test the hypotheses derived from the anti-party and anti-incumbent versions of protest-
voting, we use data from the voter survey of the European Elections Study (EES 2009; van 
Egmond et al. 2009). A total of 1007 interviews (707 face-to-face and 300 phone interviews) 
were carried out in Estonia in June 2009, a few weeks after the EP election. The nationally 
representative sample was weighted for non-response.   
 
The empirical analysis consists of two parts. First, we examine patterns of vote-switching by 
cross-tabulating vote choice in the EP election against vote choice in the 2007 general 
elections. Second, to test the individual-level hypotheses derived from the anti-incumbent and 
anti-party explanations, we run multinomial logistic regression with a four-category measure of 
vote choice in the 2009 EP elections as the dependent variable. Thus, our dependent variable 
classifies respondents into four groups: those who voted for the Reform Party, IRL or SDE in 
the 2009 EP election are classified as coalition voters, those who voted for any other party are 
labeled opposition voters, those who cast a ballot for Tarand are grouped as independent voters, 
while those who did not vote in 2009 constitute non-voters.5 For the purposes of multinomial 
5In the analysis that follows, we only include those independent voters who voted for Tarand, while 
excluding the voters who voted for one of the other five independent candidates on the ballot (who 
111
logistic regression, we assign independent voters to the reference category against which 
coalition voters, opposition voters and non-voters are compared. Due to list-wise deletion of 
missing data, the number of cases included in the multivariate analysis was 658. Of these, 105 
(16.0 percent) were coalition party voters, 215 (32.7 percent) opposition party voters, 128 (19.5 
percent) independent voters, and 210 (31.9 percent) non-voters.  
 
The choice of variables included in the model is determined by the two versions of protest-
voting outlined above, while also being informed by pr evious studies on v ote choice in EP 
elections (e.g. van der Eijk & Franklin 1996, Oppenhuis 1995, Schmitt et al 2007). Below, we 
offer a brief summary of the variables included in the model, while a detailed description of 
survey questions and coding choices is included in Appendix 1.  
 
To measure satisfaction with government performance, we use a dichotomously coded 
variable expressing the respondent’s approval of the government’s record to date (23.8 percent 
approve). Our measure for party attachment distinguishes among those feeling close to any 
political party (41.8 percent of respondents included in the analysis) and all others. Satisfaction 
with the functioning of democracy in the country is also a binary variable, coded 1 for those 
who report being very or fairly satisfied with the way democracy works in Estonia (48.8 
percent of the respondents) and 0 for all others. To measure attitudes towards European 
integration, we employ two variables: a f requently used interval measure capturing attitudes 
towards further European integration (0 – gone too far; 10 – should be pushed further) and a 
binary evaluation of country’s membership in the EU, coded 1 f or those who regard EU 
membership as a good thing (69.1 percent of the respondents) and 0 for all others. We use two 
indicators to capture ideology: one is the traditional left-right self-placement, while the other 
captures the ‘new values’ dimension. The latter measure is an index of social liberalism 
combining attitudes towards same sex marriages, right of abortion for women, support of harsh 
punishment for criminals and teaching children obedience in school. Finally, we also include a 
binary variables measuring electoral participation in the 2007 general election (coded 1 for 
those who voted, and 0 for all others).  
 
We employ three measures to capture the respondent’s location in the cleavage structure of 
the Estonian society. These include a dichotomous measure of self-reported social class (coded 
1 for upper and middle class, 54.6 percent of respondents) and a dummy variable for the rural-
urban divide, coded 1 f or respondents who reside in big cities or suburbs (47.7 percent of 
respondents), and 0 for all others. While religion is widely used in Western European studies 
on vote choice, it does not constitute an important cleavage in the non-religious Estonian 
society and is thus excluded. Instead, our third measure of cleavages is ethnicity. In Estonia, the 
status of Soviet-era settlers (who constitute about a third of the population) has been politically 
controversial, and their integration into the mainstream society only partially successful. There 
are significant and persistent differences between the titular nationality and the Russian-
speakers in terms of political values and attitudes (Ehin 2007; Vihalemm & Kalmus 2009). 
Although there are no significant ethnic parties in Estonia, the Russian minority has become 
increasingly uniform in its support for one of the mainstream parties (the Centre Party). The 
ethnic divide is hence politicized and, to an extent, institutionalized.  
 
We also include socio-demographic variables such as gender, age, education and family 
living standards as these have been demonstrated to influence electoral participation as well as 
vote choice (Blais et al 2009; Aarts & Wessels 2005; Blais et al 2004; Caballero 2005; Franklin 
2003; Matsusaka & Palda 1999). The latter two also act as proxies for personal efficacy, as a 
higher socio-economic status together with education combine into higher cognitive ability to 
understand politics.  
collectively received 4.3 percent of the vote). Because the independent candidates in question differed 
greatly in terms of ideology, personal profile, and campaign messages, we do not expect their voters to 
constitute a uniform group 
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Results 
Patterns of Vote-Switching. 
A cross-tabulation of vote in EP elections by vote in the 2007 g eneral elections (Table 3) 
aggregated according to the grouping rule of our dependent variable, shows that significant  
 
 
Table 3: Vote in 2009 European Parliament elections by vote in 2007 general elections N, ( %) 
 
  European Parliament election 2009 
National election 2007 Coalition 
 
Opposition Tarand Didn't vote Total 
Coalition  150 (43.1) 
(77.3) 
 
22(6.3)    
(9.7) 
97(27.9) 
(52.4) 
79(22.7)  
(24.2) 
348 (100.0) 
(37.2) 
Opposition  19(7.5)   
(9.8) 
 
146(57.3) 
(64.3) 
32(12.5) 
(17.3) 
58(22.7)  
(17.7) 
255 (100.0) 
(27.3) 
Didn't vote   5(2.6)     
(2.6) 
 
36(18.5) 
(15.9) 
23(11.8) 
(12.4) 
131(67.2)  
(40.1) 
195(100.0) 
(20.9) 
DK (don't know, refused, not 
eligible, blank vote, other) 
 
20(14.8) 
(10.3) 
23(17.0) 
(10.1) 
33(24.3) 
(17.8) 
59(43.4)  
(18.0) 
136(100.0) 
(14.6) 
Total 194(20.8) 
(100.0) 
227(24.3) 
(100.0) 
185(19.8) 
(100.0) 
327(35.0) 
(100.0) 
933 (100.0) 
(100.0) 
 
 
vote-switching took place and offers substantial evidence that Tarand succeeded in attracting 
the votes of habitual government party voters. Over one half of the voters (52.4 percent) who 
voted for Tarand in 2009 had, in the 2007 general election, voted for the three parties that 
subsequently formed the government (Reform Party, IRL and SDE). In contrast, only 17.7 
percent of the Tarand-voters had voted for any of the opposition parties in 2007. Although there 
is some evidence of the mobilization of non-voters, the opposition parties were, overall, more 
successful in attracting habitual abstainers or new voters than Tarand (see Table 3). Thus, these 
initial results offer relatively robust support to the expectations about patterns of vote-switching 
associated with the anti-incumbent explanation (H1, H2) while generally disconfirming the 
hypotheses derived from the anti-party interpretation (H6, H7).  
 
Why did voters who were dissatisfied with the government not switch vote to one of the 
opposition parties, such as the Centre Party that ran a campaign accusing the government of 
incompetent and socially insensitive handling of the economic crisis? The mean ideological 
distances between self and party, reported in Table 4, suggest that Tarand-voters perceived 
opposition parties (with the exception of the small Green Party) to be ideologically much more 
distant from their own position than the coalition parties. In particular, the perceived 
ideological remoteness of the Centre Party from the self-reported position of coalition and 
Tarand-voters, suggests that for most habitual government party voters, switching their vote to 
the main opposition force to punish the incumbents would entail significant ideological costs. 
However, it should be noted that the groups were not uniform in their evaluations, as suggested 
by the large standard deviations.  
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Table 4: Mean ideological distances between voters and parties 
 
 Coalition parties  Opposition parties 
Vote in 2009 
Reform  
Party IRL SDE 
 Centre 
party Greens 
Peoples’ 
Union 
Coalition -.42 (2.50) -.46 (2.41) 2.35 (2.60)  4.17 (3.88) 1.74 (2.85) 2.81 (2.94) 
Opposition -2.75 (4.03) -2.30 (3.75) -.40 (3.24)  -.07 (2.91) -.25 (3.02) .18 (3.48) 
Tarand -.90 (3.74) -.68 (3.03) .52 (2.67)  2.75 (3.49) .39 (2.72) 1.56 (3.10) 
Non-voter -.77 (3.80) -.50 (3.41) 1.02 (3.12)  1.38 (3.59) .34 (2.82) 1.18 (3.24) 
Note: The figures are mean distances between the placement of self and party on the left-right scale ranging from 0 
to 10, with standard deviations in parenthesis. 
 
 
Results of Multivariate Analysis 
 
The results of multinomial logistic regression show that our model is significant (p<0.001) and 
overall, performs quite well. Nagelkerke R2 for the model is 0.435. The model classifies 50.5 
percent of the cases correctly. This figure is substantially higher than the benchmark level of 
one-fourth improvement over by chance accuracy, which, given the distribution of cases on our 
dependent variable, is 27.2 percent.  
 
The likelihood ratio tests show that the following independent variables have an overall 
relationship to the dependent variable at the 99 percent confidence level: self-placement on the 
left-right scale, education, electoral participation in 2007, ethnicity, the rural-urban divide, and 
evaluation of the country’s EU membership. In addition, evaluation of government 
performance has a relationship to the dependent variable that is significant at the 95 percent 
confidence level. 
 
Table 5 contrasts government party voters, opposition voters and non-voters with Tarand-
voters (reference category). It reports the odds ratios (eb) for the independent variables included 
in our model. Because the interpretation of odds ratios is not intuitive, we also calculate and 
report (in the text below) the marginal effects for the key predictors of vote choice.  
 
The results reported in the first column suggest that Tarand-voters differed from government 
party voters in six aspects. They were more educated, less satisfied with government 
performance and less likely to have voted in the 2007 general elections than government party 
voters (effects significant at the 99 percent confidence level). They were also more to the left 
on the left-right scale, less satisfied with the country’s EU membership, and more likely to live 
outside of the major urban centers than government party voters (effects significant at the 95 
percent confidence level). The other variables included in the model were not statistically 
significant predictors of the vote for Tarand, as opposed to a government party. The marginal 
effect for government performance evaluation (.102) suggests that a change in government 
performance evaluation (from satisfied to not satisfied) increases the probability of voting for 
Tarand, as opposed to a government party, by 10.2 percent, holding other variables constant at 
their mean values. Moving from the maximum value (10) to the minimum value (0) on the left-
right scale is associated with a change of 21 percent in the same probability.  
 
The results reported in the second column of Table 5 s how that four variables have 
statistically significant effects in distinguishing Tarand-voters from opposition party voters. 
While higher levels of education and residence outside of the  large  cities  is  again  associated  
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Table 5: Individual-level predictors of vote for independent candidate 
 
 Vote decision (reference category: Tarand voters) 
Independent variables Coalition party  
Voters 
Opposition party  
voters 
Non-voters 
Cleavages    
Class: upper or middle 1.600           0.765          0.690 
Ethnicity: Estonian 0.839    0.146***    0.335** 
Rural-urban divide:  urban  2.006*   2.276** 0.967 
Ideology    
Left-right self-placement 1.169*    0.797** 0.971 
Social liberalism            1.089 0.779 1.092 
European issues    
EU unification 1.024 1.067 1.035 
EU membership: good   2.703* 0.586     0.445** 
Political  performance    
Government record: good      2.501** 0.910 0.939 
Satisfaction with democracy: 
satisfied 
  1.059 1.127  0.915 
Partisanship    
Party attachment: close or 
sympathizer 
    1.668 1.515 1.137 
Voted in 2007 election       3.738** 1.552      0.442** 
Controls    
Age    0.999 1.001     0.983* 
Education        0.877**      0.891**         0.850*** 
Living standard    1.050 0.997   1.068 
Gender: male    1.050 1.263   1.158 
    
Nagelkerke Pseudo-R2        0.435   
N              658   
Percent correctly predicted                 50.5   
Notes: The figures shown are odds ratios. *** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05 (two-tailed). Group sizes are 
the following: Tarand-voters: 128, coalition party voters: 105, opposition party voters: 215, non-voters: 
210. 
 
with a vote for Tarand (effects significant at the 99 percent confidence level), a major charac-
teristic that distinguishes Tarand-voters from opposition-voters is ethnicity (eb =.146, p<0.001). 
Ethnic Estonians were much more likely to vote for Tarand, while Russian-speakers were 
significantly more likely to vote for opposition parties. Substantively, the effect of being an 
ethnic Estonian corresponds to a 28.1 percent increase in the predicted probability of voting for 
Tarand, as opposed to an opposition party, when other independent variables are held constant 
at their means. The effect of residing outside of the large cities corresponds to a 16.7 percent 
change in the same probability. The effect of left-right self-placement (eb =.797, p<0.01) in the 
second column suggests that Tarand-voters placed themselves more to the right on the 
ideological scale, relative to opposition party voters. Moving from the minimum value (0) to 
the maximum value (10) on the left-right scale is associated with an increase of 52 percent in 
the predicted probability of voting for Tarand, as opposed to an opposition party.  
 
Finally, the results reported in the third column of Table 5 suggest that Tarand-voters differ 
from non-voters in five respects. They were older and more educated than non-voters and were 
more likely to be ethnic Estonians. Tarand-voters were more likely to have participated in the 
2007 general elections and were, overall, more satisfied with Estonia’s membership in the EU 
than non-voters.  
 
115
Although the multivariate results do not confirm all of the expectations associated with the 
proposition that the mass vote for Tarand was driven by the voter’s desire to punish political 
incumbents, they do, on  balance, lend substantially stronger support to the anti-incumbent 
explanation than to the anti-party explanation. Thus, our findings are in line with hypothesis 3: 
voters who voted for an independent candidate evaluated government performance more 
negatively than voters who voted for government parties. Although Tarand-voters were 
distinguished both from government voters and opposition voters in terms of ideology and 
cleavages, the comparison of substantive effects of left-right self-placement and of the rural-
urban divide suggest that these differences were more pronounced in the latter case. In addition, 
ethnicity appeared as a m ajor factor discriminating between Tarand-voters and opposition 
voters, while it did not contribute to explaining the vote for an independent candidate as 
opposed to a government party. These results offer some support to H4. The hypothesis (H5) 
that attitudes towards European integration or assessments of the country’s EU membership are 
not correlated with vote choice in EP elections, however, has to be partially rejected. While 
general attitudes towards EU unification did not play any role in group separation, evaluations 
of Estonia’s EU-membership did. Tarand-voters assessed Estonia’s membership in the EU 
more negatively than government party voters but more positively than non-voters.  
 
The main hypotheses associated with the anti-party explanation can be confidently rejected. 
The results of our analysis provide no support to the claim that independent voters had weaker 
partisan ties (H8) or were less satisfied with the functioning of democracy (H9). Hypothesis 10 
which expected Tarand-voters to have the socio-demographic and ideological profile of an anti-
system protest voter (less educated, with lower socio-economic status, and more extreme 
ideological views) found no support. Class belonging and living standards did not play any role 
in discriminating among the four groups of voters, and Tarand-voters were found to be more 
educated than either party-voters or non-voters.  
 
 
Conclusions  
 
This chapter sets out to explain an anomaly: the spectacular electoral performance of an 
independent candidate in a party-centered system. The explanation developed in this chapter 
links the electoral triumph of an independent candidate to the structural conditions 
characteristic of the second-order setting which free the voters from the need to consider the 
strategic implications of their vote, while increasing the prevalence of sincere voting and 
protest voting. Against this backdrop, the chapter developed two explanations for the triumph 
of Tarand in the Estonian 2009 EP elections, suggesting that mass support of an independent 
candidate could be interpreted either as anti-party vote or as anti-incumbent vote. It developed 
a number of empirical propositions about voting behavior consistent with each account, and 
assessed the empirical validity of these, using data from a post-election survey. 
 
Our empirical results suggest the following account of the observed mass vote for an 
independent candidate. Voters who voted for Indrek Tarand in the 2009 election were more 
educated than either party voters or non-voters, and were more likely to live in small towns and 
rural areas. They were ethnic Estonians most of whom broadly shared the centre-right 
ideological orientations of government party voters. A typical Tarand-voter had participated in 
the 2007 general elections, casting a vote for one of the three parties that subsequently formed 
the government. By mid-2009, this voter had grown dissatisfied with the performance of the 
national government – an evaluation to be expected amidst a severe economic recession. Mid-
term elections with no consequences for the allocation of executive power constituted a 
convenient opportunity to signal dissatisfaction with the political incumbents. However, the 
party alternatives on the electoral list were a poor match to the electoral criteria employed by 
disenchanted government party loyalists wishing to cast an anti-incumbent protest-vote. Due to 
the growing polarization of the Estonian party system along ethnic and ideological lines, 
switching their vote to one of the main opposition parties constituted a high-cost (or an outright 
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unacceptable) option for most of the dissatisfied government party voters. In this context, an 
independent candidate, whose socio-demographic profile and ideological views were a close 
match to the preferences of habitual government party voters, constituted a low-cost alternative. 
This, combined with the fact that Tarand ran on a protest-agenda, made him a convenient 
instrumental choice for punishing the incumbents. In the absence of such a convenient option, 
many more disenchanted government voters would presumably have stayed at home. Thus, the 
higher-than-expected turnout in these elections can indeed be linked to Tarand’s candidacy. 
However, according to our results, Tarand contributed to turnout not by mobilizing significant 
numbers of habitual non-voters, as t he anti-party explanation suggested, but by enabling 
dissatisfied government party voters to choose the strategy of ‘voice’ rather than ‘exit’. 
  
The results of the individual-level analysis lend almost no support to the rival interpretation 
which links Tarand’s triumph to the allegedly widespread anti-party sentiment in Estonian 
society. Tarand-voters did not differ from party-voters in terms of the strength of party 
attachment. They were no less likely to be satisfied with ‘how democracy works’ in Estonia 
than party voters. They certainly did not have the profile of a typical anti-system protest voter, 
nor did they represent an alienated or marginalized minority.  
 
Overall, this study testifies to the ability of the SOE model to explain highly deviant 
electoral outcomes. Although the explanation of the strong electoral performance of an 
independent candidate advanced in this study is context-specific, our findings have broader 
implications. Contradicting a dominant strand of theorizing, they suggest that mass support for 
independents does not necessarily imply a weakness of the voter-party linkage and may, in fact, 
attest to the consolidation of party support along cleavage lines. They also suggest that studies 
seeking to explain voting behavior in EP elections may benefit from a cl oser analysis of 
cleavage structures and electoral choice sets. In particular, the question of how the structure of 
the choice set influences the choice between loyalty, abstention and vote-switching that 
disappointed government party voters face in EP elections merits careful consideration by 
future studies. 
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Appendix 1: Variables included in logistic regression 
EES question wording Coding 
Cleavages 
If you were asked to choose one of these five 
names for your social class, which would you say 
you belong to? 
1 – upper and middle class; 0 – all others 
Do you consider yourself Estonian, or do you feel 
you belong to another group? 
1 - Estonian; 0 – all others 
Would you say you live in a...? 1 - large town or suburbs; 0 – all others 
Ideology 
In political matters people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the 
right’. What is your position? Please indicate your 
views using any number on a scale from 0 to 10, 
where 0 means ‘left’ and 10 means ‘right’. 
0 - left; 10 – right 
For each of the following statements, please tell 
me to what degree you agree or disagree with each 
statement: 
- Same-sex marriages should be prohibited by law 
- Women should be free to decide on matters of 
abortion 
- People who break the law should be given much 
harsher sentences than they are these days 
- Schools must teach children to obey authority 
Four separate  items measured on a 5-point scale 
combined into a social liberalism index 
Issues 
Some say European unification should be pushed 
further. Others say it already has gone too far. 
What is your opinion? 
0 – gone too far; 10 – should be pushed further 
Generally speaking, do you think that Estonia’s 
membership of the European Union is a good 
thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad? 
1 - good thing; 0 – all others 
Government performance 
Do you approve or disapprove the government’s 
record to date? 
1 - approve; 0 – all others 
On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way 
democracy works in Estonia? 
1 – very and fairly satisfied; 0 – all others 
Party attachment 
Combination of the following items: 
-Do you consider yourself to be close to any 
particular party? 
-Do you feel yourself to be very close to this party, 
fairly close, or merely a sympathizer? 
1 – very, fairly close or sympathizer; 0 – all 
others 
Participation in the 2007 national elections 
Which party did you vote for at the general 
election of 2007? 
1-voted; 0-all others  
Controls 
Age In years 
How old were you when you stopped full-time 
education? 
In years 
What is your family living standard? 1 - poor family; 7 - rich family 
Gender 1-male; 0-female 
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Abstract 
Explanatory models on European Parliament (EP) electoral behavior in Western Europe 
focus on 'the second order election model', the major assertion of which is that EP elections 
are 'not real' European contests but mainly national contests. Yet, it has been established in 
the literature that 'the second order election model' does not yield accurate predictions for 
the post-communist context. This chapter builds on previous research on EP elections and 
EU referendums and posits that there is more room for Europe to matter in the context of 
the post-communist party system. In recent member states, the notion of Europe has a 
stronger impact on the decision to participate at EP elections than second order 
considerations. Several European dimensions are theorized and tested in the chapter as 
substantially impacting on voters’ decisions. Specifically, these are: 'Europhile attitudes' 
towards the EU institutions and the EU as a political system; 'egocentric Europeanness', 
reflecting satisfaction with democracy in the EU; and especially 'national Europeanness', 
referring to voters' perceptions with regard to a co untry's benefits accruing from EU 
membership.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Yes, I am a regular voter, I came to vote at European Parliament (EP) elections because 
voting is my civic duty, but, at the same time, I believe in European institutions. I am 
positive that things will be better for us, now, that we are finally in Europe (…) and 
Romania will have a lot to gain from the European Union (EU) membership. Hence, I 
came today to make sure that the right people are going to Brussels to represent us. 
 
This represents the dominant sentiment in Romania in 2009,  during an exit poll I administered 
on election day with the goal of discerning voters' motivations for political participation at the 
first European Parliament (EP) elections. 
 
Do these positive views on the EU and the utilitarian perspectives attached to the act of 
voting in EP elections have any effect on the decision to participate in the first place? Or is this 
Euro-optimism as dominant among the eligible electorate who decided to stay home on election 
day as it is among the active participants? And, if positive European attitudes do in fact matter 
during the first EP elections organized in newly democratized states, where inexperienced 
voters with EU policy-making processes believe that the new EU membership will alleviate 
some of the difficulties the states are experiencing, does this change over time? In other words, 
do EP elections transform, after five years of membership, from possible 'European affairs' into 
'national affairs'?  
 
The answers to these questions have important implications for understanding arguments 
concerning voter apathy and the dynamics of electoral behavior in states that have only recently 
1 The author would like to thank Bryon Moraski, Amie Kreppel, Wouter van der Brug, and the 
PIREDEU Final User Conference participants for useful comments and suggestions. Fieldwork related to 
this chapter was conducted with generous funding from the Center for European Studies at the University 
of Florida (UF), the Department of Political Science (UF), and the Ernst Haas Fellowship from the 
European Union Studies Association (EUSA). 
2 PhD Candidate, University of Florida. Email: magiur@ufl.edu  
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 become part of Europe. If Europe matters for political participation, this implies that there is a 
connection between citizens' attitudes towards Europe and EU governance that is 
overwhelmingly absent in the existing literature on previous EP electoral waves. Previous work 
argues that such attitudes do not exist or only make a difference in affecting voting behavior 
related to switching and defecting from governmental parties. Explanatory models on E P 
electoral behavior in Western Europe focus on the 'second order national election thesis', the 
core of which holds that EP elections are not real European contests but mainly second order 
national contests (Reif and Schmitt 1980). In this sense, voters have the opportunity to behave 
differently than in national contests, yielding overall lower turnout rates and systematically 
large governmental party losses complemented with small, new, radical party victories (Hix 
and Marsh 2007). Yet, behavior in post-communist states does not follow these nicely ordered 
patterns. EP turnout is much lower in new member states overall than in older members, large 
governmental parties' losses do not follow the cyclical argument, and voters do not cast protest 
votes against their incumbent governments (Schmitt 2005, Koepke and Ringe 2006). The lack 
of party institutionalization in the region, the high volatility of the post-communist 
democracies, and the weak party attachments when compared to Western Europe were 
considered to be the main culprits for why behavior that the second order theory expects failed 
to emerge in Eastern Europe as it did in Western Europe (Schmitt 2005). 
 
In addition, previous research on E uropean attitudes and support for EU integration 
underscores particular dynamics in new member states that only recently transitioned to 
democracy and market reforms (Cichowski 2000, Tucker et al. 2002). As such, for post-
communist EU citizens, EU membership represents the fulfillment of a long-term, sinuous, 
historic goal of 'returning to Europe' that began at least as early as 1994 and complemented 
expectations for a better life. In this region, the EU is the guarantor of market reform 
commitments and of new supra-national forms of democratic accountabilities.  
 
This chapter builds on the existing arguments that different party systems and East 
European attitudes towards the EU affect behavior at EP elections. I posit that because of the 
absence of long-term partisanship commitments or of other strong membership ties that might 
substitute the need for party identification, there is more room for attitudes towards Europe to 
matter and to affect behavior in the post-communist context. In a nutshell, given the weakness 
of the structural element of party institutionalization in the region (essential for keeping turnout 
high, see Franklin 2004), the high vote volatility, and the relevance of European attitudes for 
post-communist citizens, EP electoral participation depends more on European attitudes than 
on national ones. Specifically, I operationalize and test the argument that Europe matters using 
two pooled cross-sectional data sets from 7 EU member states for the 2004 and 2009 EP 
elections. The analyses, controlling for background variables and national, second order, 
dimensions, support the hypotheses. 
 
 
Theoretical Approach for Explaining Political Participation 
 
Second Order Approaches and their Alternatives 
The second order literature has paid surprisingly little attention to the arguments of why people 
participate in EP elections. For instance, country analyses that seek to disentangle 
interdependencies between national and European arenas affecting voting behavior have a 
rather minimal focus on low turnout, mostly because it is expected. Such analyses are 
concerned with campaigns, mainstream parties' positions with regard to European issues, 
parties' aggregate winnings and losses, and voter switching at the individual level (see for 
instance the country chapters in the edited volume by Eijk and Franklin 1996).  
 
The cross-national studies concerned specifically with why people vote at EP elections use 
either aggregate level data for explaining decreasing overall trends in EP turnout from the first 
1979 EP election to recent waves (Franklin 2001, 2007), or use individual level data for 
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 understanding the 'hidden messages' of abstentions (Schmitt and van der Eijk 1996). The major 
conclusion of such studies, however, is that 'Europe hardly matters' (Schmitt and Mannheimer 
1991, Franklin 2007).  ‘EC- related attitudes (…) play no significant role in the explanation of 
electoral participation in European elections’ was the major finding of a comprehensive study 
that considered electoral participation data for all European Community member states in the 
1989 and 1994 E P elections (Franklin, Van der Eijk, and Openhuius 1996: 322). In a more 
recent study on electoral participation at the 1999 EP elections, covering all EU member states 
of that time, the point that 'Europe hardly matters' is reinforced: abstention from EP elections 
does not carry an anti-EU sentiment. The decision to abstain is allegedly based on 'other 
grounds' than one's own evaluations of the EU (Schmitt and Van der Eijk 2007). Moreover, it is 
not only that 'Europe hardly matters' but also that national evaluations seem to have no impact 
on turnout since EP electoral participation can be explained with only two aggregate level 
variables: compulsory voting and the position of the EP election in the national electoral cycle 
(Franklin 2001, Wessels and Franklin 2010). As such, the major implication is that for both 
European politicians and citizens, EP elections are 'elections that serve no purpose' (Wessels 
and Franklin 2010). EP electoral participation becomes, in a sense, superfluous.  
 
Since it seemed to be established that Europe does not matter for political participation, an 
alternative approach for considering whether Europe matters entailed the investigation of 
individual behavior with regards to their support of - or better yet, defection from - government 
parties (Marsh 2008, Carrubba and Timpone 2005). Yet, in an aggregate level study, using data 
from 6 elections, Hix and Marsh (2007) demonstrate that large parties lose votes regardless of 
their position on either left-right ideological or European dimensions. The results differ when 
examined at the individual level, however. Europe matters more in the referendum literature, 
though first order European attitudes still decisively trumped the effects of second order 
considerations (Glencross and Trechsel 2011). 
 
Still, much of the research on micro-level dynamics of EP electoral behavior advances the 
argument that European attitudes and EU-based performance indicators affect EP voting 
behavior (Hobolt et al. 2008, Clark and Rohrschneider 2009, Hobolt and Witrock 2010, d e 
Vries et al. 2010). Given the increased relevance of the European Parliament in the policy 
decision-making process and the overall prominence of EU institutions, voters evaluate the EU 
on 'its own terms' with respect to party choices at EP elections (Clark and Rohrschneider 2009). 
Moreover, voters who voted for government parties at previous national elections are more 
likely to turn out at European elections, the closer they are on European issues to the party they 
voted for (Hobolt et al. 2008). And yet, in an experimental setting that develops a spatial model 
of vote choice in European elections, voters base their party choices primarily on domestic 
preferences, with the qualification that EU related information makes EU preferences play a 
greater role in vote calculus (Hobolt and Wittrock 2010), for more sophisticated voters in 
particular (de Vries et al. 2010). Unfortunately, such analyses, only indirectly focused on EP 
electoral turnout. In addition, they are built upon the assumption that habitual voters' party 
preferences are stable from one legislative election to another, when, in fact, in the post-
communist states this is more likely not to be the case, given the high volatility registered at 
both voter and party levels. Hence, considering preferences of more or less EU integration for 
both voters and parties and calculating  distances on the EU dimension between a voter and 
his/hers assumed to be the same preferred party at the EP election becomes very problematic 
since we cannot automatically assume that a preferred party at the legislative election is still the 
preferred party at the EP election. Focusing on the post-communist states in the EU, then, 
permits the opportunity to build upon these previous studies. 
 
The Characteristics of Post-Communist Party Systems 
The environment of former communist states that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 i s 
substantially different from the one that developed over the last 40 years in Western Europe. 
Post-communist states are characterized by highly unstable electoral markets from both parties' 
and voters' perspectives. At the party level, these organizations frequently split, dissolve, 
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 become completely extinct, do not stand for clear identifiable values or programs, and do not 
permit clear choices. As such, the mean party extinction in the region is 14.3 and it ranges from 
0 (in a number of cases) to 58 (Poland in 2001) (Bernhard and Karakoc 2010). In addition to 
party extinction, about 5.6 new parties emerge on average in the region since regime change at 
each legislative election, with an average vote share of 19 percent (Tavits 2007). In Estonia and 
Latvia, for instance, new parties have formed the government or participated in governmental 
coalitions shortly after, while in Western Europe only one new party emerged on average for 
the period of 1945-1991, winning only 2 percent of the vote (Hug 2001).  
 
No study has yet considered the effect of new party entry during EP elections, but one could 
assume that given the 'low stakes' of these elections and probably the low incentive for 
mainstream parties to invest resources in such second order contests, the costs of new party 
entry is lower for EP elections than national elections. This possibility might indicate that more 
new parties could use EP elections as a 'window of opportunity' for testing the electoral 
markets. Anecdotic evidence certainly points in this direction. At the 2009 EP election in 
Estonia, Indrek Tarand, a high-ranking civil servant, managed to run a successful anti-party 
campaign, securing an EP seat as an independent candidate (Ehin and Solvak 2010). Given the 
relative ease with which he succeeded, politicians seem to consider EP elections as ' testable 
electoral waters' for higher level, national politics.  
 
On the voters' side, a h igh percentage of the electorate has not developed loyalty towards 
any of the existing parties, so that high proportions of .40 o r .70 constantly acknowledge in 
surveys that they have no party attachment whatsoever. Around EP elections which take place 
within a national electoral cycle, only 10-20 percent of the voters feel close to the parties that 
are governing at the time. In some instances, coalitions formed after national elections have 
already broken up by the time the EP elections take place.3 Yet, despite the parties' adaptability 
of changing governmental coalition structures without organizing new elections, the proportion 
of the electorate identifying with the coalitions' parties is rather minimal.  
 
In this context of high partisan seat volatility and vote volatility, maybe the highest among 
democratizing regions if we exclude Russia and Ukraine (Bernhard and Karakoc 2010, Tavits 
2005, Bielasiak 2002), it seems erroneous to assume stable preferences for voters. On the 
voters' side, preferences are far from settled. On the parties' side, the supply has varied 
significantly from one legislative election to another. Therefore, studies focused primarily on 
differences in party preferences from one type of election to another in the context of the post-
communist EU region must consider weak party institutionalization and high vote volatility as 
potentially important intervening variables affecting EP voting behavior. 
 
Table 1: Party Attachment Distribution across East Central Europe 
 
 2004 2009 
 No party % 
Governing 
coalition % 
No party 
% 
Governing 
coalition % 
Czech 
Republic 32 16 65 30 
Estonia 57 13 57 13 
Hungary 60 16 35 13 
Latvia 57 10 68 16 
Poland 44 5 40 31 
Slovenia 55 17 46 30 
Slovakia 40 20 42 32 
Source: 2004 EES; 2009 EES 
3 This is the case for Poland 2004, Latvia in 2009, and Czech Republic in 2009. 
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 Essentially, the lack of strong linkages between voters and parties in post-communist 
Europe has two distinct effects on ov erall participation and party choices in national and 
European elections. First, as opposed to older European democracies, where parties play a 
distinct role in guiding their electorates on when and how to vote, in post-communist Europe, 
given the lack of such incentives, there appears to be room for other short-term incentives to 
affect electoral behavior. These short-term incentives have been identified in national elections 
as charismatic politics (which dominate the region), policies and candidates' images; in 
European elections one could add attitudes towards Europe. Second, given the short democratic 
experience with free and fair elections that post-communist countries have, these European 
citizens have not developed habits of 'entrenched voting' that may explain EP electoral 
participation in older democracies (Franklin 2004). From this perspective, then, one could 
expect European attitudes to play a larger part in determining turnout and party choices at EP 
elections in post-communist countries than in other EU member states. Or, as Wessels and 
Franklin (2010) argue 'the utility of voting should play a larger part in determining overall 
turnout in post-communist countries'. However, I understand the 'utility of voting' more broadly 
than Wessels and Franklin. For me, it captures voters' European affective and evaluative 
assessments of the EU rather than strict linkages between votes and policy outputs of the EU. 
 
Finally, since previous research on electoral behavior underscores the role of information as 
essential for electoral participation and vote choices, I focus on the impact of EP campaigns in 
particular, because campaigns serve as major opportunities for informing and mobilizing 
citizens (see Craig 2006). Information communicated via campaigns matter to non-committed 
non-voters, especially in the sense that campaigns trump the lack of partisan allegiances and 
mobilize electorates to cast their ballot (Hillygus 2005). To the extent that the EU political 
system, its institutions and governance are mentioned in a campaign, the idea of Europe 
galvanizes voters for political participation (Hobolt 2008, Hobolt and Wittrock 2010, de Vries 
et al. 2010). This is more the case in the post-communist countries where voters are among the 
least partisan, the least knowledgeable about Europe, and yet, probably the most optimistic 
about 'returning to Europe'. But do c ampaigns activate this optimism, and is that what is 
reflected in voters' decisions to participate in the EP elections organized in the new member 
states? 
 
This chapter addresses the question of whether European attitudes matter for political 
participation in new members states (i.e. states that joined the EU in 2004). In contrast to other 
studies that focused on turnout, this chapter is neither concerned with explaining decreasing 
turnout trends in EP elections, nor with explaining variations in turnout across countries. 
Building on work which suggests that Europe matters for political participation, mostly in an 
EU referendum context, the chapter's primary goal is to theorize and measure possible 
European dimensions impacting on v oters' decisions during the most recent EP elections of 
2004 and 2009. The European dimension is considered against the second order characteristics, 
understood as national/ domestic influences affecting political participation.  
 
Thus, the theoretical model incorporates EU related dimensions of Europhile attitudes 
towards the EU institutions and EU democracy, in addition to 'national Europeanness' with 
regard to voters' perceptions of national benefits accruing from their country's membership to 
the EU. The second order model includes variables for four sub-dimensions: economic 
evaluations, attitudes towards the national democratic system, approval of government's record, 
and attachment to governmental parties. 
 
In sum, the hypotheses to be tested in this study are formally stated as follows: 
  
 H1a. Attitudes towards Europe have a strong effect on turnout in post-communist states.  
  
 H1b. Positive attitudes toward Europe will increase political participation. 
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  H2. There are no differences between the elections of 2004 and 2009 in the effects of 
 attitudes towards Europe on turnout.  
 
Since I do not exclude the second order effects and I only assume that they may be second in 
terms of relevance for political participation, the third hypothesis states that: 
 
H3. National evaluations of economy and politics will add to the explanation of 
political participation, but their overall effect is less important than attitudes towards 
the EU.  
  
 H4. In post-communist societies, European campaigns have a strong effect on turnout. 
 
 
Data and Methodological Approach 
 
The data sets used for the analyses come from the European Election Studies surveys carried 
out in the aftermath of the 20044 and 20095 elections for the European Parliament in seven 
post-communist countries: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Slovenia, 
and Slovakia6. From the two pooled data sets, which contain responses to a core set of 
questions from representative samples of twenty-four (or twenty-seven in 2009) member states, 
two pooled data sets were constructed for the seven post-communist states, one for each EP 
electoral wave.7 I selected only interviews of respondents eligible for voting in EP elections 
(see Appendix 1 for the questions selected). 
 
The dependent variable for all analyses is a measure of voters' participation in EP elections, 
i.e. the binomial answers to the question 'did you cast your vote'. Voters who could not 
remember or did not answer the question were excluded from the analyses.  
 
Operationalising the 'Second Order' Aspects in Turnout 
The 'second order election' theory holds that voters base their voting behavior in second order 
elections on party preferences in the first order arena. In all countries concerned, the national 
arena is considered to be first order. Therefore, four sub-dimensions were created at the 
individual level, which capture the impact of national/domestic concerns on the decision to 
participate at EP elections. These sub-dimensions refer to subjective political and economic 
evaluations of national democracies, governments, national economies, and partisanship (see 
Appendix for survey questions). 
 
• One sub-dimension related to the political system, which relates to the electorates' approval 
of democratic practices undergoing in the specific country: "how satisfied one is with how 
democracy works in [c]"; (1) 'very satisfied', (4) 'not at all'; 'don't know’ answers were 
dropped from the analyses.  
 
4 The data are available from the homepage of the European Election Study 
(www.europeanelectionstudies.net) and from the Archive Department of GESIS (the former Central 
Archive for Empirical Social Research (ZA) at the University of Cologne – www.gesis.org), Germany. 
5 EES (2009), European Parliament Election Study 2009, Voter Study, Advance Release, 7/4/2010, 
(www.piredeu.eu).  
6 Lithuania is missing from the analysis mostly due to the limitations on the survey — only a short 
survey was administered and most of the questions selected for measuring first and second order 
dimensions were missing.  
7 Schmitt H., Loveless M., Adam S., Braun D. 2009. European Election Study 2004. Design, Data 
Description and Documentation, 2nd Edition; van Egmond, M., Sapir, E. V., van der Brug, W.,  Hobolt, 
S. B.,. Franklin, M. N. 2010. EES 2009 Voter Study Advance Release Notes. Amsterdam: University of 
Amsterdam. 
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 • One decision-making sub-dimension which captures the support for government: "do you 
approve or disapprove the government's record to date"; coded as dummy variable (1) 
'approve', (0) 'disprove'; 'don't know' answers were dropped from the analyses.  
 
• One economic sub-dimension, which captures self-retrospective evaluations of the 
economy: "on the whole, what do you think about the economy"; (1) 'a lot better', (5) 'a lot 
worse'; 'don't know' answers were dropped from the analyses.  
 
• Finally, a partisanship sub-dimension was created to capture attachment for government 
parties: "do you consider yourself close to any particular party? If so, which one?" Coded 
as dummy variable, (1) for parties that are members of the governmental coalition at the 
moment of EP elections; attachment to other parties was coded as (0). 'No party' answers 
were coded as (0), to avoid losing too many observations. 
 
The correlations among these 4 sub-dimensions do not exceed .34 for both 2004 and 2009 
pooled data sets. Moreover, partisanship and governmental evaluations are positively correlated 
in both pooled data sets, while these two sub-dimensions are moderately negatively correlated 
with economic and democratic evaluations. For individual countries, however, in Slovakia and 
Hungary only, economic evaluations are negatively moderately correlated (coefficient .46 and 
.48) with approval of government's record in 2004. Approval of government's record and 
attachment to governmental parties are positively moderately correlated in Poland, in 2009 
(coefficient .41). These low to moderate correlations provide confidence that the second order 
dimension is well captured from different angles — attitudes towards the political system, the 
decision-making process, economic evaluations, and partisanship. 
 
Operationalising the European, 'First Order', Dimension 
To measure the European attitudes, four sub-dimensions were included in the analyses that 
include both political and economic assessments of EU membership. These dimensions refer to 
individuals' normative assessments of the EU as a p olitical system, captured by 'trust' in EU 
institutions and EU membership perceived as a 'good thing'. In addition, I add a sub-dimension 
that refers to individuals' perceived economic benefits accruing from EU membership. Based 
on previous research on e conomic voting and European integration, it has been shown that 
direct and indirect economic benefits associated with the EU affect support for EU integration. 
As such, individuals who benefit personally from EU membership support the integration 
project. Moreover, individuals living in countries that benefit more from EU membership 
display higher levels of support for their country's membership (Anderson and Reichert 1995). 
However, as all the countries considered in this analysis are new members, I did not consider it 
necessary to control for EU benefits at the country level. Finally, I add a sub-dimension that 
captures subjective perceptions of how EU democracy works, which might be problematic for 
citizens of new member states. Since these countries joined the EU in 2004, their citizens might 
not have had the time to form an opinion with respect to how the EU works for the 2004 EP 
election. In a nutshell, considering that 'returning to Europe' has been a recurrent theme in the 
foreign policy of the post-communist countries since the early 1990s, I expect European 
attitudes to have a strong effect on electoral participation, stronger than national evaluations. 
The four European sub-dimensions8 are: 
 
• National Europeanness, which represents a national, rationalized interest in the EU, 
captured by answers to the question: "decisions made by the EU will be in the interest of 
my country". The answers have an ordinal scale, with lower values indicating more support 
(1) 'a great deal of confidence' and higher values indicating less support (4) 'no confidence 
at all'. 'Refuse to answer' or 'don’t know' were excluded from the analysis for each variable. 
 
8 I operationalize the four European sub-dimensions by closely following a similar conceptualization 
presented by Glencross and Trechsel (2011). 
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 • 'Europhile' attitudes towards the EU institutions. This sub-dimension is provided by the 
answers to the "trust the institutions of the European Union" question. For the 2004 data set 
this dimension was created as a su m of answers to two questions — 'trust in European 
Parliament' and 'trust in European Commission'. The scale for the answers ranges from (1) 
'no trust at all' to (10) 'complete trust'. I created a new variable of 'trust in EU institutions', 
as a su m of answers to two questions (with an alpha reliability coefficient of .91) and I 
rescaled it to become comparable with the 2009 survey question, from (1) to (5) 'complete 
trust'. In 2009, EU institutional trust was captured by the question: "indicate whether you 
agree or disagree with 'you trust the institutions of the EU'", with a range from (1) 'strongly 
agree' to (5) 'strongly disagree'. I reversed the coding for this item, to reflect the 2004 
values: (1) 'strongly disagree' and (5) 'strongly agree'. 
 
• Egocentric Europeanness — is captured by answers to the question "One’s country’s 
membership to the EU is a good thing", coded as a dummy variable (1) 'yes', and (0) 'bad' 
or 'neither'.  
 
• Europhile attitudes towards the political system are measured using the question — "how 
satisfied is one with the way EU democracy works": (1) 'very satisfied', (4) 'not at all 
satisfied'; 'don’t know' and 'refuse' are dropped from the analysis. However, this question in 
particular, proved to be very difficult for the new members, such that out of 7,700 
participants almost one third (2,559) answered 'don’t know' or 'refuse' in 2004 and only 
1,100 answered the same in 2009. These respondents were excluded from the analyses.  
 
This time, however, the first order sub-dimensions are moderately correlated in the pooled 
2004 data set, such that the 'national Europeanness' is positively correlated both with 
'egocentric Europeanness' and negatively correlated with Europhile attitudes towards the 
political system. Hence, evaluative perceptions of how the EU works and of possible economic 
gains are negatively correlated with more normative positions of trust in EU institutions and in 
EU membership. Coefficients in the pooled data set are .48 and .47, while for particular 
countries, Slovakia and the Czech Republic they go up to .64 and .61. In 2009, for the pooled 
data set, correlation coefficients do not go above .39, but are still high in the Czech Republic 
(.47).  
 
Operationalising the European Campaign 
Since I expect campaigns to matter, especially in the post-communist context where the public 
is essentially uninformed on the EU related issues, I capture the campaign environment with 
measures at the individual and country levels. At the individual level I created a sca le for 
European campaign exposure, using survey questions related to television exposure, newspaper 
readings on the election, friends and family discussions on EP elections and campaigns, public 
meeting attendance related to campaigns, and website searches for campaign information (see 
Appendix for questions used). The final scale ranges from (3) 'more campaign' to (15) 'not at 
all', with an alpha reliability coefficient of .64 (for the 2004 data) and .74 (for 2009) indicating 
that the measures have internal consistency. 
 
In addition to the measures created at the individual level, I add two contextual variables 
that vary across countries. Both are considered key in affecting electoral behavior at the EP 
elections: campaigning context and timing in the national electoral cycle.  
 
Country Level Predictors of Turnout 
Two country level predictors of turnout were defined: the visibility of the EU in national 
campaigns in the media and the timing of the election in the electoral cycle. The indicator of 
the European visibility in electoral campaigns was developed from the longitudinal cross-
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 national media study released in 20109, a data set built on three cross-national media studies 
carried out in 1999, 2004 and 2009. Such studies conducted a systematic coding of national 
television and newspapers in every EU member state and included a m easure of the EU 
visibility in the news. In the two data sets developed for this chapter, the EU visibility measure 
ranges from as l ow as 1 2 percent in Latvia up to 24 percent in Poland in 2004 and from 9 
percent in Estonia to 21 percent in Poland in 2009.  
 
The timing in the electoral cycle was measured as the distance in months from the previous 
national election. There is, however, not a lot of variation among the 7 countries. In 2004, most 
of the countries fall int the middle, with Slovenia having completed almost a full cycle; in 
2009, Slovenia was in an early position with elections held within a year after the national 
election. All the rest of the sample spans were around 2-3 years (between 22-33 months). 
Considering the limited sample and the lack of variability I included only timing measured in 
months elapsed since the last national legislative election, omitting the squared component of 
the cyclical pattern, which was not found to work for the post-communist cases in 2004 
(Schmitt, 2005) nor in 2009 (Schmitt, 2010).  
 
Control Variables 
Besides the preceding explanatory variables of interest, the following control variables were 
included in the analyses:  
 
• Gender: coded as a dummy variable, (1) male and (0) female. 
 
• Social class: coded as an  ordinal measure, (1) working class and (5) upper level class. 
'Refuse', 'other', and 'don't know' were dropped from the analyses.  
 
• Age: a quantitative variable coded in 2004 as 'age' (2009 minus year of birth) and for the 
2009 election as 'year of birth'.   
 
• Interest in politics: measured as an  ordinal variable with smaller values indicating 'very 
interested' (1) and larger values reflecting political apathy (4).  
 
• Party attachment: "do you feel yourself close, fairly close, or merely a sympathizer to the 
party": (1) 'very close' and (3) 'merely a sympathizer'. To avoid dropping too many 
observations, I recoded 'don’t know' and 'n/a' as 'no sympathizer' (4). As such, strength of 
party attachment becomes an ordinal variable, with a reversed coding: low scores meaning 
very strong attachments and high scores meaning no attachment.  
 
• Education: measured in age when full education was stopped10.  
 
All else being equal, I would anticipate that older men, middle-class partisan voters, who are 
interested in politics are more likely to participate at EP elections. This expectation conforms 
with the standard view in the voting behavior literature. 
 
Method  
As the dependent variable is dichotomous (vote participation in the EP elections), a series of 
logistic regressions have been estimated. For all analyses I use the pooled data sets rather than 
individual estimations for each country, mostly because I am interested in assessing an overall 
effect for the region of the national and European dimensions on individual behavior. Also, the 
9 Banducci, S., de Vreese, C., Semetko, H., Boomgarden, H., Luhiste, M., 2010. EES Longitudinal Media 
Study Data Advance Release Documentation, 15/10/2010. (www.piredeu.eu)  
10 The case of ‘still studying’ registered in the original data sets proved to be very problematic, as one 
cannot automatically assume that ‘still studying’ means higher, post-graduate education (about 5% of 
respondents in both data sets). And yet, I arbitrarily recoded these respondents as ‘most educated’.  
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 variability at the individual level is better estimated using the pooled data set rather than data 
sets at each country level. Considering the nested structure of the data, individuals within 
countries, and the two level indicators used in the analyses, individual and country levels, I 
estimate a random intercept multi-level structural model with two distinct levels for covariates. 
Such a model accommodates for the dependence of observations within countries and makes 
adjustments to both within and between parameter estimates (Snijders and Bosker 1999). 
 
logit (Pr (Voteij =1)) = β0j + β1Genderij + β2Classij + β3Ageij + β4Political Interestij + β5Party 
Attachmentij + β6Economic Evaluationij + β7National Democracyij + β8Government Partiesij + 
β9Governmental Approvalij + β10National Europeannessij + β11Europhile attitudes EU 
Institutionsij  + β12Egocentric Europeannessij + β13Europhile attitudes EU Democracyij + β14EU 
Campaignij, 
 
where i indexes individuals and j indexes countries. At the country level, I model the 
individual-level constant β0j as a function of European visibility in campaigns and timing: 
 
β0j = γ00 + γ01 Monthsj + γ02 EU Visibilityj+ u0j, 
 
where u0j are independent, identically distributed random errors. 
 
By specifying level 2 random effect u0j, I avoid imposing the assumption that the model 
accounts for all possible sources of contextual heterogeneity. For instance, given the small 
number of countries in the analyses, I prefer not to include additional country variables found 
significant in other analyses, such as financial benefits from the EU (Garry and Tilley 2010). 
However, the hierarchical model allows for such differences between countries not included in 
the model to be regarded as unexplained variability within the set of all countries (Snijders and 
Bosker 1999).  
 
 
Results 
 
I estimate five models for each election year, 2004 (Table 2) and 2009 ( Table 3). For each 
election time, I start with a first model only with control variables, to which I add, in a step-
wise regression fashion, national, domestic determinants (Model 2), European attitudinal 
effects (Model 3), campaigns’ heterogeneous effects captured at the individual level (Model 4) 
and finally, full model estimations that comprise all of the above and contextual sources of 
heterogeneity: timing and EU visibility in the media (Model 5).11 The motivation behind these 
partial estimations is to capture the additional effect of each dimension, national but especially 
European, previously theorized as having a substantial impact on EP turnout. In particular, I am 
interested in two aspects: first, the effects of the European and national attitudes as a whole, 
captured by R squared calculations12 when moving from one model to another; second, the 
behavior of national determinants when the European attitudinal effects are considered as well.  
 
What happens then with the two main dimensions, national and European? How much do 
they add to the explanations of why people vote at EP elections? First, based on t hese ten 
estimations, we observe that control variables perform only partially as expected. As such, 
strong partisan older female voters, interested in politics, with higher social status, are more 
11 All coefficients presented in Table 2 and Table 3 have been obtained with centering data for 
continuous and ordinal variables. It has been argued that centering is important for numerical stability, 
i.e. models will converge faster (Doug Baer, Multi-Level Models, ICPSR 2010). However, estimations 
without centering produce very similar results (not shown here, but can be provided upon request). 
12 I calculated the R squared as the variance of the linear predictor divided by the sum of the variance of 
the linear predictor, plus the level-two intercept variance, plus the level-one residual variance (Snijders 
and Bosker 1999, pp. 224-225). 
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 likely to participate in both the 2004 and 2009 EP elections. Education does not seem to have 
an effect, at least not in 2004, while in 2009 the variable has a minimal impact, but opposite in 
direction. This strange behavior might be explained in part by the coding procedure. To create a 
comparable variable across different educational systems, the survey question asked for 'years 
when full education stopped', with people 'still studying' coded as 'most educated'. A recoding 
of this variable or a different survey question is probably necessary to assess a more accurate 
impact of education on EP voting. We also notice that control variables explain a substantial 
percentage of the variance, .19 in both estimations. 
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 Table 2: A Multilevel Model of Participation in the 2004 European Parliament Elections 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 5 
 Particip. Participation Participation Participation Participation Directional  
  
log odds 
 (s.e.) 
log odds 
 (s.e.) 
log odds 
 (s.e.) 
log odds  
(s.e.) 
log odds 
 (s.e) Effects 
Interest in politics -0.62(.03)***  -0.59(.03)***  -0.57(.05)***  -0.34(.06)***  -0.34(.06)***  +***  
Gender -0.24(.05)***  -0.23(.05)***  -0.20(.08)***  -0.20(.08)**  -0.20(.07)**  -**  
Social class  0.20(.02)***  . 017(.03)***   0.15(.04)***   0.09(.04)**   0.09(.04)**  +**  
Age  0.02(.00)***   0.02(.00)***   0.02(.00)***   0.02(.00)***  0.02(.00)***  +***  
Education  0.00 (.00)  0.00 (.00) -0.00 (.00) -0 .00 (.00) -0.00 (.00) - 
Party Attachment -0.49(.03)***  -0.44(.04) ***  -0.42(.05)***  -0.36(.05)***  -0.36(.05)***  +***  
Economic evaluation  -0.13(.03)***  -0.06 (.04) -0.04 (.04) -0.04 (.04) + 
Satisfaction with democracy  -0.30(.04) ***  -0.28(.06)***  -0.32(.07)***  -0.32(.07)***  +***  
Governmental parties    0.02 (.09) -0.07 (.12) -0.08 (.13) -0.08 (.13) - 
Government approval   0.05 (.07) -0.08 (.09) -0.06 (.10) -0.06(.10) - 
National Europeanness   -0.19(.06)***  -0.18(.07)**  -0.19(.06)**  +**  
Europhile attitudes towards 
institutions   0.21(.00)***   0.19(.00)***  0.19(.00)***  +***  
Egocentric Europeanness   0.51(.10)***   0.52(.10)***  0.52(.10)***  +***  
Europhile attitudes towards the 
political system   0.25(.07)***   0.27(.07)***  0.27(.07)***  -***  
EP campaign    -0.29(.03)***  -0.28(.03)***  +*** 
Timing      0.00 (.04) + 
EU visibility     -0.06 (.09) - 
Random effects       
Variance component 0.37*** 0.36*** 0.39*** 0.34*** 0.30***  
R squared 0.19 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.30  
No of groups 7 7 7 7 7  
No of individuals  7,049 5,812  3,217  3,164  3,164  
Source: 2004 EES. ***p<0.001; **p<0.05; *p<0.1      
 
  
Table 3: A Multilevel Model of Participation in the 2009 European Parliament Elections 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 5_ 
  
log odds 
 (s.e.) 
log odds 
 (s.e.) 
log odds 
 (s.e.) 
log odds  
(s.e.) 
log odds 
 (s.e) Effects 
Interest in politics -.72(.03)***  -.68(.04)***  -.66*** (.05) -.39*** (.05) -.39*** (.05) +***  
Gender -.12(.05)**  -.13(.06)**  -.08 (.07) -.06 (.07) -.06 (.07) - 
Social class  .17(.03)***  . 16(.03)***   .12(.04)***   .08(.03)**   .08(.03)**  +**  
Age -.00(.00)***  -.00(.00)**  -.00(.00)**  -.00(.00)**  -.00(.00)**  +**  
Education -.00(.00)**  -.00(.00) ***  -.01(.00)**  -.01(.00)**  -.00(.00)**  -**  
Party Attachment -.54(.04)***  -.58 (.04)***  -.56(.05)***  -.49(.05)***  -.49(.05)***  +***  
Economic evaluation   .03 (.03)  .08(.04)**   .09(.04)**   .09(.04)**  -**  
Satisfaction with democracy  -.06 (.04)  .01 (.06)  .04 (.06) -.03 (.06) + 
Close to governmental parties  -.14 (.09) -.12 (.10) -.09(.10)**  -.09 (.10) - 
Government approval   .29(.07) ***   .17(.08)**  .18(.09)**   .16(.09)*  +*  
National Europeanness   -.22(.06)***  -.23(.06)***  -.24(.06)***  +***  
Europhile attitudes towards 
institutions   .22(.04)***   .19(.04)***   .19(.04)***  +***  
Egocentric Europeanness   .32(.08)***   .36(.09)***   .35(.09)***  +***  
Europhile attitudes towards the 
political system    .09 (.06) .09 (.06)  .08 (.06) - 
EP campaign    -.34(.02)***  -.34(.02)***  +***  
Timing     -.02(.26)***  -***  
EU visibility      .08(.02)***  +*** 
Random effects       
Variance component .45*** .50*** .53*** .47*** .18***  
R squared .19 .19 .21 .29 .33  
No of groups 7 7 7 7 7  
No of individuals  6,384  5,583  4,528  4,453  4,453  
Source: 2009 EES. ***p<0.001; **p<0.05; *p<0.1      
 
 
 When the second order national determinants (Model 2) are added to the equations, we 
notice only a minimal increase in the explained variance of EP voting, of .1 percent (2004) or 
less than .1 percent (2009). This minimal increase in R squared speaks to the minimal 
contribution of the second order thinking for turnout at EP elections in the post-communist 
region. In addition, we observe some variations from one EP election to another. In 2004, the 
most important national determinant is 'satisfaction with democracy', indicating that citizens 
satisfied with the way their national democracies work are more likely to vote. In 2009, on the 
background of the international economic crisis, the performance of national economies trigger 
EP participation the most. As such, people who consider the economy to be going badly are 
more likely to vote than people who think otherwise (Model 5 in 2009).  
 
The predicted probabilities of EP voting (Table 4) allow us to estimate the size of the 
national effects. In 2004 t here is a significant difference of 23 pe rcent in the probability of 
voting for citizens who are most satisfied with how national democracies work versus citizens 
who are most dissatisfied with national democracies. The rest of the national dimensions do not 
attain statistical significance. Attachment to governmental parties and governmental approval 
decrease the probability of EP voting by only 2 percent, while negative assessments of national 
economies increase the probability of EP voting by 4 pe rcent. In 2009, however, the most 
important national effect for EP electoral participation is the economy. The probability of EP 
voting is 6 percent higher for citizens who think the economy works badly when compared to 
the probability of voting for citizens who think the economy works well. Considering the 
overall international economic crisis that affected these new member states as well, it is not 
surprising that the economy is the most important national factor in 2009.  
 
When European attitudes and European evaluations are added to the model, we notice a 
substantial increase in the R squared for 2004, up by .5. It increases by .2 in 2009 (Model 3). 
Most importantly, all four sub-dimensions matter for EP electoral participation and matter more 
than national considerations in particular (Model 5). Moreover, we distinguish two types of 
European related issues that significantly boost turnout. First, positive evaluations of the EU 
matter. As hypothesized, participation in EP elections in the post-communist region is 
economically driven; voters confident that EU membership represents national economic gains 
and the promise of a better life are more likely to participate than voters who think otherwise. 
Also, voters who are positive about EU institutions and trust them are more likely to vote than 
voters who think otherwise. However, surprisingly, negative assessments of the EU matter as 
well. Euro-skeptic voters with respect to the functioning of EU democracy are more likely to 
vote than voters who think otherwise. Overall, these first order considerations, of assessing the 
EU ‘on its own terms’ (Clark and Rohrschneider 2009) definitely trump the second order 
national evaluations, when deciding to participate in EP elections. As such, the main argument 
of the chapter is confirmed: the European dimension matters for EP electoral participation and 
it matters more than national considerations do to EP participation. To some extent however, 
the importance of negative European attitudes comes as a su rprise. It might indicate that two 
types of voters participate in EP elections: euro-optimists who seek economic benefits from the 
EU and trust in EU institutions, and Euro-skeptics, who are not satisfied with how EU 
democracy works. 
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 Table 4: Predicted Probabilities in % (2004 and 2009 EP Elections) 
 
 
 
 2004 2009 
Variable 
2 std below mean  
Dummy at value 0 
2 std  above mean 
Dummy at value 1 
Absolute 
Change 
2 std below mean 
Dummy at value 0 
2 std  above mean 
Dummy at value 1 
Absolute 
Change 
       
Economic evaluation 55 51 4 66 73 6** 
Satisfaction with 
democracy 65 41 23*** 69 71 2 
Close to governmental 
parties 55 53 2 72 70 4 
Government approval 55  53 2  67  70 3 
       
National Europeanness 60 46 14** 77 62 15*** 
Europhile attitudes  
towards institutions 42 64 12*** 61 77 16*** 
Egocentric Europeanness 40 53 13*** 62 70 8*** 
Europhile attitudes  
towards the political 
system 44 63 19*** 67 72 5 
       
EP campaign measured at 
the individual level  76  29  47***  90  38  42*** 
 *** Indicates significant effects at .05 and .001 found in Model 5. 
  
 
 In a sense, this finding would corroborate previous aggregate level analyses which 
underscore the relative success of Euro-skeptic parties at EP elections when compared to such 
parties successes at national elections, a literature mostly developed for old member states. 
However, as I mentioned in the description of the data, this European governing item proved to 
be particularly problematic for EU citizens of post-communist countries. Asking them to assess 
how EU democracy works when they just joined the EU pushed one in three citizens to answer 
'don't know' or 'refuse' in 2004, in contrast to one in seven for all other European evaluations. In 
2009, however, after five years of membership, the proportion of responses to non-responses 
becomes similar to all other European items. It is in 2004 that negative evaluations matter, 
probably when only citizens with strong EU related opinions answered all EU related sub-
dimensions. In 2009, however, when the EU democracy evaluation is not as problematic as in 
2004, EU negative evaluations lose their significance as well. Hence, the relevance of EU 
negative attitudes might be interpreted as an artifact of a measurement problem rather than a 
clear indication of negative attitudes as highly significant.  
 
The relative small increase in R squared in 2009 when compared to the larger European 
effects in 2004 can have two interpretations. First, the European effect has a decreasing impact 
on EP voting, despite the fact that it is still important when compared to the national one. A 
different structure of the data, that is in panel format, would be necessary to definitively adopt 
this interpretation. It is also possible that the result reflects the measurement issue just 
mentioned: the problem post-communist EU citizens with less developed opinions face when 
answering questions about EU governing structures. In other words, the difficulty that the EU 
post-communist citizens had in answering this question in 2004 might trigger the larger effect 
for the EU dimension in 2004, when compared to 2009.  
 
A visual effect of the European dimension vs. the national assessment is provided in Figure 
1 and Figure 2. In these plots, larger slopes mean larger effects. Attitudes towards the EU exert 
highly significant effects on turnout, and the effects of the European arena are stronger than 
domestic considerations, which display mostly flatter slopes. As such, four of the hypotheses to 
be tested in this chapter are confirmed: European attitudes matter (H1a), 'positive attitudes 
towards the EU' increase turnout (H1b), national evaluations matter as well but their overall 
effect is less important when assessed against the effects of European attitudes (H3). European 
attitudes matter more than the national arena in both the 2004 and 2009 EP elections (H2).  
 
Finally, the last two models (Model 4 and Model 5) of campaign effects captured at both 
individual and contextual levels confirm the substantial effect of EP campaigns. As such, the 
more exposed to EP campaigns citizens are, to EU news in particular, the more likely they are 
to vote (H4). EU campaigns seem to be the most important mechanism in the region for 
increasing turnout; the explained variance increases by .5 in 2004 and by .8 in 2009, when EP 
campaign exposure at the individual level is added to the models. The substantial effect of EP 
campaigns' exposure is illustrated in Table 4. The difference in the probability of voting among 
citizens more exposed to EP campaigns versus less exposed electorates is about 40 percent, 
which is also the strongest impact of all determinants in the 2004 EP election and in the 2009 
EP election. In addition, in 2009, the contextual EU visibility in the national media significantly 
increases turnout.   
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Figure 1: Second Order Effects and the Probability of Voting in European Parliament 
Elections 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: European Attitudes and the Probability of Voting in European Parliament elections 
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 Discussion 
 
In 2004, eight post-communist countries participated at European Parliament elections for the 
first time. Yet, this 'return to Europe' translated into a low turnout. This is understandable and 
explainable however, if one considers the lower stakes of EP elections when compared to the 
first order national elections. Attaching the label 'second order', however, should not 
necessarily imply 'national, domestic affairs'. In the region, Europe matters, it matters as a n 
incentive for people to participate and it matters more than domestic concerns. Why is this 
case? I posit, first, that it is because of the lack of strong party commitments in the region and 
second, because of different stakes that the EU represents in the post-communist region. Given 
the high party and vote volatility in post-communist EU member states, Europe - as an issue - 
finds room to impact electoral behavior in a region where the EU represents expectations of 
economic affluence and of democratic norm entrenchment.  
 
In contrast to studies concerned with the relevance of the European arena for governmental 
parties' losses and different party choices, this study takes a step back and focuses on European 
attitudes and turnout. As such, this chapter shows that more positive evaluations of the EU 
institutions can boost turnout and definitely trump national determinants. However, this finding 
is not entirely surprising. As mixed evidence from recent research on revising 'the second order 
national election thesis' has pointed out, European attitudes matter for EP electoral behavior 
(Hobolt et al. 2008, Clark and Rohrschneider 2009, Hobolt and Witrock 2010, de Vries et al. 
2010) and they matter differently in Eastern and Western European contexts (Garry and Tilley 
2010, Tucker et al. 2002, Cichowski 2000).  
 
In addition to the finding that Euro-optimists are the main voters in EP elections in the post-
communist region, I underscore that EP voting is mostly economically driven: voters have a 
rationalized approach of the inter-dynamics they envision between their respective countries 
and the EU. In a nutshell, voters strongly believe that national economic benefits accrue from 
EU membership. Given the difficulties entailed by transitions to market economies, the sinuous 
enlargement process fueled sometimes with promises of material affluence via EU 
membership, and conditional on (mostly painful) social and economic reforms, the importance 
of EU economic calculations should not be a surprise. Voters attach a distinct meaning to their 
act of participating in elections that have been said to ‘have no purpose' (Wessels & Franklin 
2010) so that the EU policy making process is not evaluated in the strict sense of linkages 
between institutional attributes and policy outputs. The lack of these utilitarian approaches to 
the act of voting should not be viewed with suspicion, considering the relatively low levels of 
accurate understanding of how the EU operates. In the post-communist region, voting has a 
utility associated with it, but of a different kind to that found in Western Europe: the EU is the 
symbol of material affluence and, the association with the ‘West’ raises the hope that poorer 
member states will become more affluent (Cichowski 2000, Romanian interviews in 2009). In a 
sense, the relevance of economic utilitarian predictors for EP electoral participation 
corroborates previous studies on E U enlargements and support for EU integration of less 
affluent countries with short democratic experiences and almost no open trade with Europe, 
such as Spain, Portugal, and the Central and East European countries. In these states, public 
attitudes toward European integration were shaped by the prospects of higher living standards 
and of the EU as a mean of strengthening democracy and market related reforms (Cichowski 
2000).  
 
What will happen, however, if these high expectations of the EU are not fulfilled? Will the 
EU matter less? Will negative assessments of the EU matter more, as they seemed to in old 
Europe? After eight years of membership, the analyses above show that the European effect for 
the post-communist region is robust. Of course, this chapter looks at Eastern Europe as a whole 
and different analyses are necessary for disentangling the impact of European attitudes in 
particular countries.  
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 Finally, as previous studies on EU electoral voting behavior demonstrate, the EU as an issue 
matters more in Western Europe and in national elections. Hence, the larger effects observed 
here for the post-communist region might be observed in old Europe as well, considering the 
increase of the importance of the EU in national and international politics. Another possibility 
for future research would be to systematically compare national and European elections, since 
attitudes towards Europe play a role in national (first order) elections. Future research might 
also compare systematically between Central and Eastern Europe,on the one hand, and Western 
European countries on the other.  
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 Appendix 
 
Survey questions used in the analysis: 
Sources:  
European Election Study 2004. 2nd edition. Design, Data Description and Documentation. 
Hermann S., Matthew L., Adam, S., Braun. D 
van Egmond, M., Sapir, E.V., van der Brug, W., Hobolt, S. B, Franklin, M.N. 2010. EES 
2009 Voter Study Advance Release Notes. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam 
 
Socio-demographic controls 
‘To what extent would you say you are interested in politics? Very (1), somewhat, a little, or 
not at all (4)?’  
‘Do you feel yourself to be very close to this party, fairly close, or merely a sympathizer?’ very 
close (1), fairly close (2), merely a sympathizer (3) 
‘How old were you when you stopped full time education?’ (xy in years, 97 for 'still studying) 
‘Gender’ male (1), female (2) 
‘What year were you born?’ 
‘If you were to choose one of the five names for your social class, which would you say you 
belong to: the working class (1), the lower middle class, the middle class, the upper middle 
class, or the upper level class (5)?’ 
‘Would you say you live in a rural area or village (1), in a small or middle-sized town (2), or in 
a large town (3)?’  
 
Second order indicators 
‘What do you think of the economy? Compared to 12 months ago, do you think that the general 
economic situation is a lot better, a little better, stayed the same, a little worse, a lot worse? a lot 
better (1), a lot worse (5)’ 
‘On the whole how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in[c]? very satisfied (1), 
fairly satisfied (2), not very satisfied (3), not at all satisfied (4)’  
‘Do you approve or disapprove of the government's record to date? approve (1), disapprove (2), 
neither (3)’ (Variable recoded as (1) approve(0) disapprove) 
‘Do you consider yourself to be close to any particular party? If so, which party do you feel 
close to?’ 
 
European indicators 
In 2004: ‘Please tell me on a sco re of 1-10 how much you personally trust each of the 
institutions I read out. 1 means that you do not trust at all, and 10 means you have complete 
trust. Trust in European Parliament? Trust in European Commission?’ 
In 2009: Q41: Do you strongly agree (1), agree (2), neither agree nor disagree (3), 
disagree (4), strongly disagree (5)? You trust the institutions of the European Union.  
‘Generally speaking, do you think that [country's] membership of the European Union is a good 
thing, a bad thing, or neither good not bad? (good thing (1), bad thing (2), neither (3))’ 
‘All in all again, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied 
with the way democracy works in the European Union? very satisfied (1), fairly satisfied (2), 
not very satisfied (3), not at all satisfied (4)’ 
‘How much confidence do you have that decisions made by the European Union will be in the 
interest of [country]? (a great deal of confidence (1), a fair amount (2), not very much (3), no 
confidence at all (4).’ 
 
European campaign exposure 
‘How often did you watch a program about the election on television?’ often (1), never (3) 
‘How often did you read about the election in a newspaper?’ 
‘How often did you talk to friends or family about the election?’ 
‘How often did you attend a public meeting or rally about the election?’ 
‘How often did you look into a website concerned with the election?’ 
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European campaign at the country level 
Source:  
Banducci, S., de Vreese, C., Semetko, H.; Boomgarden, H., Luhiste, M., 2010. European 
Election Study Longitudinal Media Study Data Advance Release Documentation, 
15.10. 2010. (www.piredeu.eu) 
 
‘Primary topic of the story’ - the % of EU related topics per country, which comprise stories 
related to EU elections, EU politics/EU institutions/competences of the EU institutions, and EU 
integration/EU enlargement were obtained by cross-tabulations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
143
 References 
 
Anderson, C. & Reichert, M. S., 1995. Economic Benefits and Support for Membership in the 
EU: A Cross-National Analysis, Journal of Public Policy 15 (3), pp. 231-249. 
 
Banducci, S., de Vreese, C., Semetko, H., Boomgarden, H., Luhiste, M., 2010. European 
Election Study Longitudinal Media Study Data Advance Release Documentation, 
15.10. 2010. (www.piredeu.eu)  
 
Bernhard, M. & Karakoc, E., Moving West or Going South? Economic Transformation and 
Institutionalization in Post-Communist Party Systems”, paper presented at the 
Comparative Politics Colloquium, February 2010, Gainesville, FL.   
 
Bielasiak, J., 2002. The Institutionalization of Electoral and Party Systems in Postcommunist 
States, Comparative Politics 33, pp.189-210. 
 
Carrubba, C. & Timpone, R., 2005. Explaining Vote Switching Across First and Second Order 
Elections, Comparative Political Studies 38, pp. 260-281. 
 
Cichowski, R., 2000. Western Dreams, Eastern Realities: Support for the European Union in 
Central and Eastern Europe, Comparative Political Studies 33 (10), pp: 1243-1278. 
 
Clark, N. & Rohrschneider, R., 2009. Second-Order Elections versus First-Order Thinking: 
How Voters Perceive the Representation Process in a Multi-Layered System of 
Governance, Journal of European Integration 31(5), pp: 613-632.  
 
Craig, S., (ed). 2006. The Electoral Challenge. Theory Meets Practice, Washington, DC: CQ 
Press 
 
De Vreese, C. , Banducci, S.,  Semetko, H. and Boomgaarden, H., 2006.  
The News Coverage of the 2004 European Parliamentary Election Campaign in 25 Countries, 
European Union Politics 7, pp: 477- 504 
 
De Vries, C., van der Brug, W., van Egmond, M., and van der Eijk, C., 2010. Individual and 
contextual variation in EU issue voting: The role of political information, Electoral 
Studies, doi: 10.1016/j.electstud.2010.09.022 
 
Eijk, Van der C. & Franklin, M., 1996. Choosing Europe? The European Electorate and 
National Politics in the Face of Union, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press  
 
Ehin, P. & Solvak, M., 2010. Party voters gone astray: explaining independent candidate 
success in the 2009 European elections in Estonia, Paper prepared for the PIREDEU 
Final User Community Conference, Brussels, 18-19 November 2010  
 
Franklin, M., 2001. How structural factors cause turnout variations at European Parliament 
elections, European Union Politics 2(3), pp: 309-28 
 
Franklin, M., 2004. Voter turnout and t he dynamics of electoral competition in established 
democracies since 1945. New York: Cambridge University Press 
 
Franklin, M., 2007. Turning out of turning off? How the EP elections of 2004 shed light on 
turnout dynamics, in Connex Report Series No. 1: European Elections after Eastern 
Enlargement, available @ 
http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/projekte/typo3/site/index.php?id=597 
144
  
Franklin, M., Cees van der E., and Oppenhuis, E., 1996. The Institutional Context: Turnout in 
Choosing Europe? The European Electorate and N ational Politics in the Face of 
Union, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press  
 
Hillygus, S., 2005. Campaign Effects and the Dynamics if Turnout Intention in Election 2000, 
The Journal of Politics 67 (1), pp: 50-68. 
 
Hix, S. & Marsh, M., 2007. Punishment or Protest? Understanding European Parliament 
Elections, Journal of Politics 69(2), pp: 495-510 
 
Hobolt, S., Spoon, J, and Tilley, J., 2008. A Vote Against Europe? Explaining Defection at the 
1999 and 2004 European Parliament Elections, British Journal of Political Science 
39, pp: 93-115 
 
Hobolt, S.B & Wittrock, J., 2010. The Second-Order Election Model revisited: An 
Experimental Test of Vote Choices in European Parliament Elections, Electoral 
Studies, xxx: 1-12. 
 
Hug, S. 2001. Altering Party Systems. Strategic Behavior and the Emergence of new Political 
Parties in Western Democracies. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press  
 
Garry, J. & Tilley, J., 2010. Attitudes to European Integration: Investigating East-West 
Heterogeneity in Schmitt, H. (ed.), European Parliament Elections after Eastern 
Enlargement, New York: Routledge. 
 
Glencross, A.  & Trechsel, A., 2011. First and Second Order Referendums? Understanding the 
Votes on the Constitutional Treaty in Four EU Member States, West European 
Politics 34:4, pp. 755-772.  
 
Kitschelt, H., 1995. F ormation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies. 
Theoretical Explanations, Political Communication 1(4), pp: 447-472 
 
Koepke, J. R. & Ringe N., 2006. The Second-Order Election Model in an Enlarged Europe, 
European Union Politics 7 (3), pp: 321-346.  
 
Lipset, S. M & Rokkan, S., 1967. Cleavage Structures and Voter Alignments, in Lipset, S. M. 
& Rokkan, S. (eds) Party Systems and Voter Alignment: Cross-National 
Perspectives. New York: The Free Press 
 
Marsh, M., 1998. Testing the Second-Order Election Model after Four European Elections, 
British Journal of Political Science 28(4), pp: 591-607 
 
Marsh, M., 2007. Vote Switching in the European Parliament Elections: Evidence from June 
2004 in Connex Report Series No. 1: European Elections after Eastern Enlargement, 
available @ 
http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/projekte/typo3/site/index.php?id=597 
 
Norris, P., 1997. S econd-Order Elections Revisited, European Journal of Political Research 
31, pp: 109-114. 
 
Reif, K., & Schmitt, H., 1980. N ine Second-Order National Elections – A Conceptual 
Framework for the Analysis of European Elections Results, European Journal of 
Political Research 8(1), pp: 3-44. 
 
145
 Reif, K., 1984. National Electoral Cycles and European Elections, Electoral Studies 3(3), pp: 
244-255. 
 
Reif, K., 1997. Reflections: European Elections as Member State Second-Order Elections 
Revisited, European Journal of Political Research 31, pp: 115-124. 
 
Schmitt, H., 2005. The European Parliament Elections of June 2004: Still Second-Order?, West 
European Politic, 28(3), pp: 650-679. 
 
Schmitt H., Loveless M., Adam S., Braun D., 2009. European Election Study 2004. Design, 
Data Description and Documentation, 2nd Edition 
 
Schmitt, H. 2010, Introduction, in Schmitt, H (ed.), European Parliament Elections after 
Eastern Enlargement, New York: Routledge 
 
Schmitt, H. & Mannheimer, R., 1991. About Voting and Non-Voting in the European Elections 
of June 1989, European Journal of Political Research 19, pp: 31-54. 
 
Snijders, T.A., & Bosker, R. J., 1999. Multilevel Analysis. An Introduction to basic and 
advanced multilevel modeling, London: Sage Publications 
 
Toka, G., 2007. Information Effects on Vote Choices in European Elections in Connex Report 
Series No. 1: “European Elections after Eastern Enlargement”, Available @ 
http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/projekte/typo3/site/index.php?id=597 
 
Tavits, M., 2005. The Development of Stable Party Support: Electoral dynamics in post-
communist Europe, American Journal of Political Science 49(2), pp: 283-298 
 
Tavits, M. 2007. Party Systems in the Making: the Emergence and Success of New Parties in 
New Democracies, British Journal of Political Science (38), pp: 113-133 
 
Tavits, M. 2008. On the linkage between electoral volatility and party system instability in 
Central and Eastern Europe, European Journal of Political Research 47, pp: 537-555  
 
Tucker, J., Pacek, A., and Berinski, A., 2002. Transitional Winners and Losers: Attitudes 
Toward EU Membership in Post-Communist Countries, American Journal of 
Political Science, 46(3), pp: 557-571. 
 
Van Egmond, M., Sapir, E. V, van der Brug, W., Hobolt, S. B, Franklin, M. N. 2010. EES 2009 
Voter Study Advance Release Notes. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam 
 
Wessels, B. & Franklin, M., 2010. Turning Out or Turning Off: Do Mobilization and Attitudes 
Account for Turnout Differences between New and Established Member States at the 
2004 EP Elections?, in Schmitt, H. (ed.), European Parliament Elections after 
Eastern Enlargement, New York: Routledge 
 
Whitefield, S., 2002. P olitical Cleavages and Post-Communist Politics, Annual Review of 
Political Science 5, pp: 181-200 
 
 
146
Citizen Representation at the EU Level: Policy Congruence in 
the 2009 European Parliament Election1  
 
 
Alexia Katsanidou2 and Zoe Lefkofridi3 
 
 
Abstract 
Our analysis builds on the Selection Model of Representation and seeks to make a three-
fold contribution to the scholarly debate on citizen representation via the European 
Parliament (EP) electoral channel. Firstly, we pay close attention to the selection and 
sorting mechanisms in place to advance the argument that, because the EP representation 
channel operates by national- and EU-level parties, congruence should be achieved (and 
assessed) at multiple levels. We contend that differences of congruence exist across levels 
and that this discrepancy manifests itself in different dimensions of political conflict. 
Furthermore, we hypothesize that variation on the basic elements of the model (selection 
and sorting mechanisms) as well as variation in citizens’ knowledge about the EP election 
accounts for varied congruence differences across levels of representation. Secondly, 
operationalizing congruence as a “one-to-many” relationship, we utilize a novel measure 
(relative congruence) to investigate congruence at two levels (national and EU) and 
construct an indicator measuring difference between levels. Thirdly, we test our hypotheses 
against new data for 27 member states, collected by the EU Profiler and the 2009 European 
Election Study (PIREDEU). This data allows measuring policy congruence in both the 
classical left-right dimension and the EU dimension. We find varied degrees of congruence 
across levels, countries and EP party groups. We also find that congruence differences 
across levels of representation can be explained to some extent by phenomena nested in the 
individual, the national party, EP party group and country levels of analysis. Our results 
have implications for the study of political representation in the EP and the broader debate 
on the EU’s democratic deficit.  
 
 
Introduction  
 
Normatively, representatives should not be found at odds with the represented (Pitkin 1967). A 
research route towards assessing the quality of this relationship is the study of “policy 
congruence” (Wlezien and Soroka 2007). In the present chapter, we examine policy 
congruence in the 2009 European Parliament (EP) elections and locate our inquiry in 
the broader debate about political representation in the EP. At the outset, neither this 
particular institution nor the EU system in general fit extant models of representation 
(see Marsh and Norris 1997). However, normative models provide valuable guidelines 
and criteria based on w hich the quality of political representation in the EP can be 
assessed (Thomassen 1994). For this purpose, previous studies of the EP have made use 
of the APSA (1950) manual (Responsible Party Model) (Thomassen and Schmitt 1999, 
1997). Our analysis builds on t his research but takes a different normative starting 
point.  
 
1 This paper was presented at the PIREDEU Conference, Brussels 18-20 November, Panel Session III.2: 
Political Representation in the EU. We are grateful to Andreas Wüst for his constructive review. We 
acknowledge support by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF), the European Science Foundation (ESF) and 
the European University Institute (EUI). We appreciate useful comments on earlier versions by Juan 
Casado-Asensio, Ken Horvath and Sylvia Kritzinger. Our special thanks to Holger Döring for his 
invaluable help in the early stages of data analysis. All errors remain our own. 
2 Gesis-Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences, Cologne. Email: alexia.katsanidou@gesis.org 
3 Dept. of Methods in the Social Sciences, University of Vienna. Email: Zoe.Lefkofridi@univie.ac.at 
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We focus on the Selection Model of Representation (Mansbridge 2009) and make a three-
fold contribution to the scholarly debate. Firstly, we pay close attention to the selection and 
sorting mechanisms in place to argue that research should take seriously the particularities of 
the EP representational process. Precisely because the EP representation channel operates by 
national- and EU-level parties, congruence should be achieved (and assessed) at multiple 
levels. We suggest that differences of congruence exist across levels and that this discrepancy 
will manifest itself in different dimensions of political conflict. We discuss how variation in the 
basic elements of the model (selection and sorting mechanisms) as well as citizens’ knowledge 
about the election could affect such differences. Secondly, operationalizing congruence as a  
“one-to-many” relationship, we utilize a n ovel measure (relative congruence) advanced by 
Golder and Stramski (2010) to investigate congruence at two levels (national and EU). Based 
on relative congruence estimates, we construct an indicator of the difference between these 
levels of representation. Thirdly, we test our hypotheses against new data for 27 member states, 
collected by the EU Profiler and the 2009 E uropean Election Study (PIREDEU4). This data 
allows measuring policy congruence in both the classical left-right dimension and the EU 
dimension. Our data analysis reveals congruence differences across levels. The descriptive 
picture shows variation across countries, EP party groups and across dimensions of 
contestation. We then conduct regressions at different levels of analysis (i.e. individual, national 
party, EP party group and country), including variables that have been used generally in models 
of policy congruence. Our analysis throws new light on the quality of electoral democracy and 
representation in the EP, with implications for the broader debate on the EU’s democratic 
deficit.  
 
In what follows, we firstly flesh out our argument and hypotheses on congruence difference 
across levels and on variation of this difference across dimensions of conflict as well as voters, 
parties, and countries. Secondly, we deploy our methodological strategy. Thirdly, we report our 
results and in our fourth and concluding section we briefly discuss their relevance to (the study 
of) representation in the EP.  
 
 
Theorizing Congruence in European Parliament Multilevel Representation 
 
In the Selection Model of Representation, alignment between representatives and represented is 
primarily determined by the selecting and sorting mechanisms that are in place for this purpose 
(Mansbridge 2009). Approaching the representational relationship from a principal-agent 
perspective, voters are the principals choosing candidates as their agents. Agents sort 
themselves in organizations (political parties) that are promoting specific policy proposals. It is 
important for the principals (voters) to know what these are and the organizational label (e.g. 
party name) provides relevant cues. However, from the voter’s perspective, the achievement of 
such an alignment via the EP election is not business as usual. The difficulties they encounter 
are inherent in the architecture of the representation channel. Candidates for EP elections are 
recruited by national parties. The voice of the people thus gets articulated via party competition 
at the national level: each people within the EU selects a (fixed) number of representatives 
(according to member states’ population size). Yet, the EP is organized along party (as opposed 
to national) lines. So the elected candidates (national party members) re-sort themselves in EU-
level parties (EP party groups) to decide on legislation for the EU citizenry as a w hole. 
Therefore, in the case of the EP, both national political parties competing in elections and EP 
party groups legislating are (constitutionally) entrusted with the task of embodying the 
“channelment”5 between citizens and elites in the EU. In sum: every five years citizens of 
4 See official website: http://www.piredeu.eu/public/Data_Release.asp 
5 Sartori (1976: xxi) views parties as “the central intermediate and intermediary structure enabling 
“channelment” “expression” and “communication”  between society and government. Hence, an 
examination of ideological congruence between parties and their electors indirectly also contributes to 
148
national constituencies go to the polls to select among candidates sorted in national parties that, 
after the election re-sort themselves into EP party groups. Therefore, as a selection mechanism, 
the EP election should produce congruence at two levels: (a) between voter X and national 
party x (voted for by voter X) and (b) between voter X and the EP party group χ of which 
national party x be comes member. Under ideal circumstances, there should be no difference 
between the positions of EP party groups and that of their constituent members. However, this 
is (still) far from reality. In what follows, we elaborate on ou r expectations regarding 
congruence differences across levels of representation and variation in the manifestation of 
these differences across dimensions of contestation as well as voters, parties and countries.  
 
 
Research Hypotheses  
 
Previous analyses of representation in the EP, which studied voters’ congruence with either 
national parties or EP party groups, reveal variation across dimensions and issues of 
contestation, across countries and parties (e.g. Mattila and Raunio 2006; Kritzinger et al. 2010; 
Thomassen and Schmitt 1999). Moreover, research on EP party groups shows that they 
constitute a patchwork of - sometimes very - different fabrics (Mc Elroy and Benoit 2007). 
Synthesizing these findings, we suggest here that the alignment achieved between voter X and 
party x at the national level may “get lost in translation” when the national party x becomes a 
member of an EU-level party χ. Our major hypothesis postulates that congruence differences 
are likely to exist across levels of representation (Hypothesis 1). Given that the main elements 
of the model adopted here, selecting and sorting mechanisms, concern differences across 
countries and parties, we expect variation in congruence differences both among EU member 
states (Hypothesis 1a) and EP party groups (Hypothesis 1b).  
 
If congruence between represented and representatives differs across levels of 
representation, then it could better or worse at the supranational level of representation when 
compared to the national level. When EP party groups are formed after the European election, 
there are two possibilities: if the EP party group position is closer to that of the voter (compared 
to the position of the national party this voter supported), then the voter will “gain” in 
congruence as we move up the levels of representation. Yet, if the resulting EP party group 
position is further away from that of the voter (compared to preferred national party), the voter 
will “lose” in terms of congruence across levels. In essence, the congruence difference between 
national and EP levels will be either advantageous, or disadvantageous to the voter. This means 
that some voters may be better represented than others at the stage when their preferred national 
party gets incorporated into an EP party group. If congruence can differ in either direction 
across levels of representation, a secondary research question concerns the factors accounting 
for either of these outcomes. In what follows, we examine the potential effect of country and 
party-level variables used in previous works (e.g. Mattila and Raunio 2006) and additionally 
explore whether EU-level as w ell as individual-level variables play a r ole in congruence 
differences observed across levels.  
 
Firstly, a recurrent finding during thirty years of European electoral research is that EP 
elections are “second-order national elections” (Schmitt 2005; Reif and Schmitt 1980). They 
are haunted by the issues of another more prominent arena (e.g. the national election), they are 
notoriously low-turnout-events, in which large and incumbent parties lose and small and 
extreme parties win. Due to its second-order nature, the EP election is not necessarily fought 
over Europe or issues pertaining to EP competences (see also Mair 2007b; 2000; Lefkofridi and 
Kritzinger 2008). Research on political conflict, cleavages and national party competition vis-à-
our knowledge of how well parties perform with regard to these crucial functions attributed to them. The 
difference between the EU and national systems is that there are two structures to consider in the EP 
system.  
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vis European integration (e.g. Marks et al. 2006; Marks and Steenbergen 2004; 2002; Hooghe 
et al. 2002; Marks and Wilson 1999) suggests that national parties have incentives to 
underemphasize European issues and structure competition “along the more familiar and safer 
socio-economic cleavage” (Mattila and Raunio 2006: 428). So at the selection moment, more 
information is likely to be available to voters on left-right issues than on EU issues. Previous 
comparative analyses have shown that parties and voters achieve higher congruence in the 
classic left-right dimension of contestation than in the EU dimension, with national parties 
being more EU-supportive than voters (e.g. Mattila and Raunio 2006). Also, research on MEPs 
and EP party group behavior shows that “ideological variance from the EP party on left-right 
issues is a stronger predictor of MEP defection than ideological variance on European 
integration issues” (Hix 2002: 694). EP party group groups in the EP are, by and large, EU-
supportive, as they share a long-term “preference of increasing the power of the EP and the 
legitimacy of the EU system as a whole” (Kreppel and Hix 2003: 93). So we expect congruence 
differences across levels to vary across dimensions of contestation (Hypothesis 2) and 
hypothesize that congruence differences will be less pronounced in the left-right dimension 
(Hypothesis 2a). In addition, assuming that at the national level incongruence is predominant in 
the EU dimension, then at the EP level congruence will is most likely to deteriorate so that 
voters “lose” as we move up the levels (Hypothesis 2b).   
 
Secondly, we consider whether variation in congruence differences is due to varied timing of EP 
elections, timing of EU membership and institutions regulating selection, i.e. electoral rules. The 
timing of EP elections in relation to the national election matters: an EP election coinciding with a 
national election is more likely to be “second-order” than when the two elections are not held 
simultaneously (e.g. Oppenhuis et al. 1996). Concurrence of EP elections with important domestic 
electoral events suggests maximum prevalence of domestic lines of competition. This situation may 
exaggerate the divergence between congruence achieved at national and EP levels. We thus 
hypothesize that coincidence of domestic electoral events and EP election will bring about a greater 
difference between congruence achieved at national and EP levels (Hypothesis 3). Moreover, we 
hypothesize that voters in countries where the EP election is coinciding with national events will 
“lose” congruence as we move up the levels (Hypothesis 3a).  
 
What is more, the length of EU membership could play a role (see Goetz 2006; Mattila and 
Raunio 2006). Newer member states are less familiar with the EU system in general and the EP 
in particular. We thus hypothesize that older member states will exhibit congruence differences 
than newer ones (Hypothesis 4). We formulate a more specific hypothesis about the direction of 
the difference across levels, namely that voters in newer member states will “lose” congruence 
as we move up the levels (Hypothesis 4a).  
 
In addition, in various studies electoral systems have been theorized as i mportant 
determinants of democratic representation. Although the literature on congruence has explored 
the impact of majoritarian versus proportional electoral institutions on policy congruence (e.g., 
Huber and Powell 1994; Powell 2000, 2006; McDonald et al. 2004; McDonald and Budge 
2005; Blais and Bodet 2006) and has found no major differences, it remains unknown whether 
aspects other than proportionality are influential. In the case of EP elections , the typical 
dichotomy between majoritarian and proportional selection rules is absent: all countries use 
some form of proportional representation. However, the specific selection rules are not 
harmonized and variation among them matters in EP representation (Farrell and Scully 2007; 
Hix and Hagemann 2009). We know that differences between candidate-centric and party-
centric selection mechanisms affect legislative behavior of representatives (e.g. Jun and Hix 
2010). Also Farell and Scully (2007) show that open, candidate-based systems are associated 
with greater concern about constituency representation among elected politicians. Even though 
EP party groups display high degrees of cohesion when legislating (e.g. Hix et al. 2007), 
national-level selection mechanisms have been found to affect MEP behavior. According to 
(Hix 2004) party-centered electoral systems (such as closed-list proportional representation 
systems) and centralized candidate-selection rules result in MEPs beholden to national parties 
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(that fight elections and choose candidates). Based on these insights, we are interested in the 
effects of varied selection rules on congruence produced across levels at the very moment of 
selection. Candidate-centered systems give voters the chance to choose among specific 
candidates. This generates the incentive for individual candidates to deviate from the national 
party line during campaigns so as to remain as close as possible to their supporters. Assuming 
that candidate-national party congruence in party-centered systems is higher than in candidate-
centered systems, voters in the latter systems are more likely to experience congruence 
differences as we move up the levels of representation (Hypothesis 5). This is because when the 
various positions of EP party group members get aggregated to form a single EP party group 
position, voters of more “independent” MEPs will be in a disadvantageous position. It is easier 
for an internally cohesive party to pull the average EP party group position in its direction. 
Hence, voters in candidate-centered systems are more likely than those in party-centered 
systems to “lose” congruence as we move up the levels of representation (Hypothesis 5a).  
 
Thirdly, we consider the potential effect of party-level variables, namely party ideology and 
party size of national parties as well as EP party groups. According to previous works (Dalton 
1985; Mattila and Raunio 2006) ideological centrism/extremism matters for policy 
representation. Hence we hypothesize that supporters of national parties with clear ideological 
profiles on t he left and right of the ideological spectrum experience the least congruence 
difference across levels (Hypothesis 6). Party size is another typical suspect in analyses of EP 
elections, party competition, party policy positions and, consequently, policy congruence. In 
fact, specific research investigating party-voter congruence on the EU dimension based on 
voters’ perceptions of party positions (Mattila and Raunio 2006: 443) finds party size to affect 
degree of congruence, with small parties scoring better on congruence than large parties (at the 
national level). The rationale is that small parties are likely to exhibit higher ideological 
homogeneity than bigger parties with larger electorates (ibid.). However, we do not know 
whether party size has similar effects when we take into account both national and European 
levels. We know that EP party groups’ positions do not always equate the average constituent 
members’ positions (McElroy and Benoit 2007). If so, then party size may matter and the 
positions of the entire EP party group will be closer to those of its largest constituent parties. It 
should be mentioned here that the size of a national party delegation within an EP party group 
depends upon the number of seats allocated to its country of origin. We therefore hypothesize 
that supporters of large national member parties of an EP party group, are least likely to 
experience congruence differences across levels (Hypothesis 7). We underline that our 
hypothesis refers to differences in congruence across levels; it follows that, in case large parties 
are incongruent with their voters at the national level, this incongruence should be preserved. 
We add a corollary hypothesis, namely that voters of large national member parties of EP party 
groups are least likely to “lose” congruence as we move up the levels (Hypothesis 7a).  
 
Party size at the EP level can also be related to congruence differences across levels. Given 
important differences across EU member states in terms of preferences about the aims and 
outcomes of common policies (e.g. Hix and Goetz 2000), the more parties included in an EP 
party group, the larger the potential for intra-EP party group heterogeneity in terms of positions. 
Under conditions of group heterogeneity, chances are higher that there is greater deviation of 
national parties from the central tendency of their EP party group. Large EP party groups are 
composed of a higher number of constituent parties. We thus hypothesize that the higher the 
number of constituent member parties of an EP party group, the more likely it is for voters of 
these parties to experience congruence differences across levels (Hypothesis 8a). Furthermore, 
we hypothesize that voters represented by such EP party groups are more likely to “lose” 
congruence as we move up the levels of representation (Hypothesis 8b). The two largest EP 
party groups are the European People’s Party and the Socialists. So we should be able to see 
differences between voters of parties joining these two large EP party groups and voters of 
parties joining other Groups.  
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Finally, we know that voters’ political knowledge matters for electoral processes (e.g. 
Bartels 1996; Bennett 1996; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996) and for achievement of alignment 
in the selection model (Mansbridge 2009). Assuming that knowledge is dependent upon 
degrees of citizens’ interest and information availability, we expect that high political interest 
and political information for the EP election would matter for congruence differences. We thus 
hypothesize that voters whose knowledge about the EP election is poor will experience 
congruence difference across levels (Hypothesis 9). Moreover, voters that are highly informed 
about the upcoming EP election will consider sorting mechanisms at both levels of 
representation when making a choice. In other words, when selecting a national party informed 
voters will take into account information about the EP party group that the national party is 
likely to join. So we hypothesize that knowledgeable voters will “gain” congruence as we move 
up the levels (Hypothesis 9a).  
 
Studying citizen’s multilevel representation in the EP is obviously a complex phenomenon 
that requires the exploration of variation operating at different levels of analysis. In the next 
section, we elaborate on our methodological strategy for such an enterprise.  
 
 
Methodology  
 
Having adopted a selection model of representation, we only focus on ideological congruence 
produced via direct EP elections6. A major contribution of the original Miller and Stokes' 
(1963) selection model and its refinements (e.g. Page et al. 1984; Kuklinski and Elling 1977) 
was the conceptualization of the representational relationship as “dyadic”. Yet, due to the 
supranational nature of the EP institution and the second-order character of EP elections, 
congruence as a measure of representation is, evidently, not easy to operationalize: the dyads of 
interest differ between levels; they concern voters and national parties as well as voters and EP 
party groups, which are composed of national parties from different EU member states. To 
translate congruence into something both measurable and meaningful in the multinational EU 
setting, we use the differentiation of congruence measures put forward by Golder and Stramski 
(2010).  
 
Golder and Stramski (2010) develop measures for three types of dyadic relationships: (a) 
“one-to-one” encapsulating the relationship between a single citizen and her representative, (b) 
“many–to-one” referring to the relationship between the group of citizens that have voted for 
one representative or party and (c) “many-to-many” depicting the relationship between all 
citizens and all representatives or parties in one assembly. First, the “one-to-one” concept does 
not allow us to investigate the national aspect of the elections. It should be noted here that in 
Pitkin’s seminal linguistic analysis, a “political representative—at least the typical member of 
an elected legislature—has a co nstituency rather than a s ingle principal” (Pitkin 1967: 214). 
Second, measuring congruence as a “many-to-many relationship” is more appropriate for an 
investigation of the alignment between constituency and legislature. Hence, for the purposes of 
our analysis of congruence difference across levels, we utilize the “many-to-one” relationship.  
 
The “many-to-one” relationship is picturing congruence between one political party and the 
segment of the electorate that voted for it. This is a straight-forward relationship in a national 
context but more complex in the EP electoral setting. In order to operationalize congruence 
between voters and their representatives in the EP environment we need to go through the 
national party structures. In other words, the electoral system for the EP elections follows a 
national structure, where the national parties compete for the EP seats; it is only in the EP that 
6 Consistent with our theoretical framework, we focus here on the input of the EP representation channel. 
It should be noted, however, that congruence could also be evaluated as correspondence between citizen 
preferences and policy output.  
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the elected deputies join a EU-level party that is (in theory) unattached to national interests. 
Thus, even though the voters make a choice of a national party considering national issues they 
are finally represented by a E P party group on issues of EP jurisdiction. To capture this 
particularity in practice, we first measure congruence between voters and national parties and 
then move to combining national parties into their respective European parliament groups. This 
research design is based on the assumption that national parties are not ideologically identical 
with the Euro-party groups they join. Thus the clustering has to take place in a second stage.  
 
An additional problem for dealing with representation in a supranational assembly is that 
ideological positions on the left-right axis do not always mean the same thing for the whole 
(European) electorate (see Mair 2007a). For instance, what a British voter understands as 
“extreme left” might be what a Swedish voter would place around the centre left. Thus, we 
need to ensure that the measures are standardized across Europe. Therefore, among different 
measures of the “many-to-one” relationship, we chose the “relative citizen congruence” as a 
standardized measure of distance between citizens and parties (Golder and Stramski 2010: 93):  
 
 
 
where N is the number of citizens having supported party Pj and Ci is the ideal point of the ith 
citizen. Relative Citizen Congruence (RCC) is the distance between the ideological position of 
party Pj and Ci, in relation to the dispersion of the preferences of all citizens having supported 
the same party (whereby MC is the ideological position of the median supporter of Pj ).  
 
To measure policy congruence in the two main dimensions of contestation for the EP 
election we use the EES 2009 data to estimate the positions of voters and the EU Profiler data7 
to estimate the positions of national parties. The EU Profiler data provide a self-placement of 
the parties prior to the 2009 European election. Deriving party positions from a questionnaire 
on policy issues that parties themselves filled out is obviously a more accurate method to 
extract the position of political parties than relying on EES respondents’ perceived positions of 
parties. The data on the position of the voters are self-reported. The left-right dimension 
consists of a classic 0-10 scale (where 0 means “far left”). The EU dimension is a continuum 
ranging from the opinion that the European Unification has gone too far (0) to the opposite 
opinion that it should be pushed further (10). We recoded these data to an -2 to +2 scale to 
match the EU Profiler data that provide party positions on the corresponding issues. Perfect 
congruence between party and voters occurs when their positions are identical. The smaller the 
distance between voters’ and parties’ positions, the higher the congruence between them. Yet, 
what happens to policy congruence when we move up the representation ladder?  
 
After measuring congruence on t he national level, we proceed by combining the national 
parties into their respective Euro-party group based on the 2009 EP formation. Having used the 
self-reported EU profiler data for locating national parties along the two major dimensions of 
contestation, we need a similar source for the EP party group. Lacking the direct self-reported 
position, however, we need to rely on extrapolations that offer us an accurate measure of the EP 
party group positions. The findings by McElroy and Benoit (2010) show the position of the EP 
party group being very close to its median member party. They also find that national parties 
form EP party groups on the basis of policy congruence. Incongruence may be observed over 
7 Alexander Trechsel, "EU-Profiler: positioning of the parties in the European Elections", 
http://hdl.handle.net/TEST/10008 UNF:5:8GmnaMhk3vC0e58H3PmWDg== European University 
Institute V1 
 
RCC =1−
| Ci − MC |
i=1
n
∑
| Ci − Pj |
i=1
n
∑
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time due to national party policy fluctuations, which eventually may lead parties to switch EP 
party groups. Yet, we focus on the moment of re-sorting, namely right after the election, when 
the EP group is just formed. By locating our analysis at this moment in time, we can safely 
assume that conditions of highest intra-EP party group congruence exist. For this reason, we 
use the median member party of an EP party group as an estimate for that party group’s 
position and calculate the congruence between the party group and the voters of its national 
member parties utilizing the Golder and Stramski (2010) measure mentioned above.  
 
To measure the difference of congruence (hereafter termed “Congruence Difference”) 
produced at different levels, we subtract the congruence between voters and their national party 
from the congruence between voters and their EP party group. Negative values of Congruence 
Difference signify that the voter „loses“ as we move up the levels of representation, whereas 
positive values signify that the voter „gains“ as we move up the levels of representation. To 
illustrate, if:  
 
National level Congruence (C-NAT) =Voter Position (VP) - National Party position (NP) = 
0  & 
EU level Congruence (C-EU) = Voter Position (VP) - EU Party Position (EUP) = 1 
 then Congruence Difference (C-D) = (C-NAT) - (C-EU) =  0-1 = -1 (a) 
 
Similarly, if:   
(C-NAT)= VP-NP = 1  and (C-EU)= VP-EUP = 0, then (C-D)=  1-0 = +1 (b) 
 
Finally, congruence at both levels could be identical, i.e. equally low or high. Therefore, if, for 
instance:  
(C-NAT)= VP-NP = 1 and  (C-EU)= VP-EUP= 1, then (C-D)= 1-1= 0 (c) 
 
In this last example, there is no difference between levels. This constitutes the Null 
Hypothesis in our inquiry, i.e. that there is no c ongruence difference across levels of 
representation. To the best of our knowledge, the variable “congruence difference” has never 
been used as a dependent variable before. As there is no established path to follow in 
constructing regression models and choosing control variables, we use our hypotheses and a lot 
of common sense. 
 
We now turn to the operationalization of the country-level variables that we hypothesized as 
affecting congruence difference across levels. Firstly, like most comparative analyses, we use 
the 2004 enlargement wave as the cutting point to divide EU member states into “old” and 
“new”. Secondly, we look at the timing of elections. Our case-study is the 2009 European 
Parliament election. In most countries, it took place on S unday June 7, 2009. Because 
traditional polling days vary across countries (according to local custom), in some countries the 
election was held in the three preceding days8. Notably, in seven EU member-states, the EP 
election took place alongside other domestic electoral events: a general election in 
Luxembourg; local government elections in Latvia, parts of the United Kingdom and Germany, 
Italy, Malta, and Ireland (as well as two by-elections in Dublin South and Dublin Central); a 
regional election in Belgium; and a referendum on r eforming the royal succession law in 
Denmark. Hence, our case-study allows us to study the effect of timing, by comparing countries 
where the EP election is a stand-alone event to those where they coincide with local, regional 
and, most importantly, national elections or referenda.  
 
8 Thursday June 4, 2009: United Kingdom (including Gibraltar), Netherlands (including Aruba and the 
Netherlands Antilles); Friday June 5, 2009: Ireland, Czech Republic (day 1); Saturday June: 6, 2009 
Cyprus, France (for part of Outre-mer), Italy (day 1), Latvia, Malta, Slovakia, Czech Republic (day 2); 
Sunday June 7, 2009: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Greece, Hungary, Italy (day 2), Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Sweden.  
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Thirdly, four different electoral systems operate in the EP election, as each country-
constituency is allowed to choose a variant of proportional representation. These variations 
allow differences in how voters choose their candidate(s). Thus, we have: the preferential vote9, 
the closed list vote10, the mixed vote11 and the single transferable vote12. In practice, the 
differences among these PR systems translate in variations of voters’ range of choice. In many 
cases the voter has no control over the specific candidates that are elected.  
With regard to our party level variables, we divide them into national party variables and EP 
party group variables. The former include party ideology and party size at the national level. 
We measure ideological extremism based on party positions on the left-right scale mentioned 
earlier: we characterize as “Left” parties scoring below 0 and “Right” the parties scoring above 
0 in the -2 to +2 scale (where -2 is left and +2 is right). There is a significant number of parties 
that score 0, creating the centre ground of the left-right scale. Party size is measured as vote 
percentage won at the national level. The EP party group level variable of interest here is 
straightforward, i.e. the number of constituent member parties of an EP party group. We also 
construct a variable that includes the total number of seats gained by the EP Party group. To 
explore differences, we additionally construct a variable of national party membership in the 
Socialist or EPP party groups. 
 
To assess the role of individuals’ political knowledge in experiencing congruence 
differences across levels, we utilize the questionnaire items of the EES Voter Survey inquiring 
about frequency of: watching news in general, watching EP-election specific programs, reading 
EU-specific papers, talking about EP elections, attending EP-election related meetings, visiting 
a website on EP elections and visiting a vote-aid website for EP elections. Since we are 
studying policy congruence, we also test for individual left-right placement. We have not 
included this variable in our theoretical framework for reasons of endogeneity. However, we do 
include it in the data analysis to see how it performs, especially for the purpose of analyzing the 
EU dimension. We control for classic demographic variables used in electoral research, namely 
age, gender and religiosity. Last but not least, the case under study is the first pan-European 
election occurring during the financial crisis, which started in 2007. We thus include the voter’s 
evaluation of the economy as a relevant valence item to see whether being disappointed with 
the economic situation of a member state has an effect on congruence differences between the 
two levels of citizen representation.  
 
 
Data Description and Analysis  
 
The dependent variable in the present analysis is the difference of congruence achieved 
between voters and parties at the national and EP levels of representation; the range of this 
variable runs from -1 to +1. Due to reasons of space, we cannot report here the results for all 
parties in all EU 27 member states for two dimensions of contestation. We thus give an 
aggregate picture of our results. We look at each dimension of conflict separately, grouping the 
results for each dimension per country and per EP party group. Before organizing our results in 
such a w ay, we measured congruence at both levels as el aborated in the previous section. 
Observations at close to 0 would reflect no difference of congruence across levels. It should be 
borne in mind that negative values signify that voters “lose” as representation moves up a level 
whereas positive values signify that voters “gain” congruence when the parties they voted for 
joins an EP party group.  
 
9 Voters can modify the order of the candidates on the list according to their voting preference. 
10 Voters select a list that cannot be changed. 
11 Voters can choose different candidates from several lists. 
12 The voter indicates first choice, then second choice and so on. If the first candidate is not elected the 
vote is transferred to the second choice, etc. 
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With regard to the left-right dimension, a cursory look at our dependent variable shows that 
congruence at the national and EP level of representation is far from equal. Figure 1 displays 
the ranking of congruence differences among all EU member states, while Figure 2 shows the 
ranking of congruence differences among EP party groups. Both Figures exhibit large 
deviations from 0, thus lending support to the major proposition put forward here, namely that 
congruence differs across  levels  (Hypothesis 1).  Importantly,  variation  in  congruence  
differences  is  evident  both  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Congruence difference between national and EU parties. 
Left-right ideology by country. 
 
across countries and across EP party groups (Hypotheses H1a and H1b). A closer look at Figure 
1 shows that, voters in three countries (France, Italy and Slovakia)  stand  out  as  exhibiting  
greatest 
 “loss” of congruence in the left-right dimension when their national parties join EP party 
groups. In most countries, however, voters “gain” congruence as we move up the levels of 
representation. This is an interesting finding and further investigation is needed to understand 
the mechanism behind it.  
 
Figure 2 shows that supporters of national parties joining the Greens/European Free Alliance 
“lose” congruence more than supporters of parties joining other Groups. The biggest “loss” is 
for national voters of the Alliance of European National Movements, whose members are non-
aligned and poorly integrated, contrary to other EP party groups. Notably, voters of parties 
joining the European People Party experience almost no difference across levels. For voters of 
the rest of EP party groups the picture is largely positive, with voters having supported national 
parties that joined the Alliance of Liberals & Democrats of Europe gaining most in terms of 
congruence with their representatives in the left-right dimension. The finding about the “Non-
aligned” group is surprising, as those voters apparently “gain” congruence at the EP level 
despite the fact that they do not even constitute a proper EP party group.  
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Figure 2: Congruence difference between national and EU parties. 
Left-right ideology by EU Party Group. 
 
 
The next question to address is whether similar patterns of congruence differences exist 
among EU-level parties on the EU dimension. Figure 3 reports the results per country and 
Figure 4 the results per EP party group. Similarly to the left-right dimension, the analysis of the 
EU dimension reveals striking congruence differences as we move up the levels of 
representation, thus further supporting our major proposition (Hypothesis 1). When looking at 
country differences we see a completely different pattern on this dimension compared to the 
left-right one (Hypothesis 2). But when looking at EP party groups the patterns in the two 
dimensions of conflict are not that different. However, in the case of the EU dimension the EP 
party group that appears very “balanced” across levels is the Progressive Alliance of Socialists 
& Democrats. The voters of national parties joining this EP Party group experience only a 
slight difference across levels. 
 
In Figure 3 we see that in half of EU member states voters “lose” congruence on the EU 
dimension when their chosen national parties join EP party groups, with four new member 
states championing in terms of congruence “loss” across levels. The picture for voters in the 
other half of the EU shows the opposite phenomenon, with voters from five of the six founding 
member states (France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy and Germany) gaining congruence when 
representation moves from national to EP level.  
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Figure 3: Congruence difference between national and EU parties 
 
 
Figure 4 displays patterns of congruence differences among EP party groups in the same 
dimension. Here “losers” across levels constitute the supporters of national parties joining the 
European Conservatives, the Alliance of Liberals & Democrats for Europe and the European 
People’s Party. Voters supporting Euroskeptic national parties seem to score well in congruence 
with the EP party groups representing them. Supporters of the Group of the European United 
Left constitute the biggest “winners” of representation across levels, followed by the Alliance 
of European National Movements, the non-aligned and the Greens/European Free Alliance. 
 
In sum: it is clear that there is a difference between national and EP party congruence that 
varies both among countries and among EP party groups. The data analyzed here thus lend 
support to the basis of our argument (Hypothesis 1, 1a, 1b). Our analysis shows variation across 
dimensions of conflict (Hypothesis 2). Also, our data provide some evidence regarding 
differences across levels as being less pronounced on the left-right than on the EU dimension 
(Hypothesis 2a). According to the four figures presented here the congruence differences on the 
EU dimension are much more prominent than those on the left-right dimension. Finally, with 
regard to our hypothesis about voters’ “loss” of congruence across levels in the EU dimension 
(Hypothesis 2b) the picture is ambiguous: in fact, there is evidence both for deterioration and 
improvement of congruence. 
 
However, the EU dimension shows more EP party groups and more countries scoring below 
zero than in the left-right dimension. Having established the existence of congruence 
differences and their variation across dimensions, countries and EP party groups, in what 
follows we explore under which conditions an upward movement in the representative channel 
results in higher congruence between represented and their representatives.  
 
From the description of our dependent variable it is clear that explanations of the variation 
in the congruence difference take into account two different levels of analysis, countries and EP 
party groups. As these two levels are not nested in one another, we undertake our exploratory 
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analysis on the two levels of analysis separately. As in our descriptive results, the dependent 
variable is the difference between national party and EU party congruence. At this stage of the 
analysis, we want to find out under what circumstances going up a l evel of representation 
results in higher congruence between represented and representatives. In other words, we 
inquire about when individual voters are better represented by their national party or by the EP 
party group. However, to test our hypotheses we need to establish under what conditions this 
congruence difference reaches its minimum. So we consider the absolute congruence difference 
between national and EP Party level, which can be utilized in a regression analysis. Consistent 
with our theoretical framework, we divide our results into four levels of analysis in order to 
pinpoint the most influential variables and to test our hypotheses: individual level, national 
party level, EP party group level and country level. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Congruence difference between national and EU parties 
 
 
The Individual Level 
The focus of our individual level analysis is political knowledge, measured as interest in and 
information about the EP elections. We hypothesized that poor knowledge would bring a larger 
difference between national and EU levels (Hypothesis 9a), while gaining more information 
would improve congruence as we move to the EP party group level of representation 
(Hypothesis 9b). Our results show a very low explanatory value. However the effects should 
not be disregarded. As we see in Table 1 we find some statistically significant effects, which, 
however have limited magnitude. This implies that conventional explanations of congruence, 
based on which we selected our independent variables, do not help us explain the new variable 
presented here, namely congruence difference between levels of representation. In what 
follows, we discuss these findings in detail.  
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Table 1. Explaining Congruence and Congruence Difference by Individual Level Variables 
 
 
 
 
Left-Right 
National-EU 
Congruence                 
Left-Right 
Absolute 
Difference               
EU position 
National-EU 
Congruence            
EU position 
Absolute 
Difference  
Frequency of news watching  .002 (.001)  .002 (.002) -.001 (.001) -.002 (.001) 
Watch program on EU elections -.003 (.004) -.006 (.005)  .007 (.003)  .000 (.003) 
Read papers on EU elections  -.017* (.004) -.000 (.005) -.006 (.002) -.003 (.003) 
Talk about EU elections -.005 (.004) -.010 (.005)  .009* (.003) -.005 (.003) 
Attend a meeting on EU elections -.000 (.005) -.016 (.008)  .017* (.003)  .002 (.005) 
Visit a website on EU elections  .007 (.005) -009 (.006) -.004 (.003) -.001 (.004) 
Visited a vote aid website -.007 (.009) -.002 (.012) -.025* (.006) -.008 (.008) 
Individual left-right position  .030*(.002) -.023* (.009)  .006* (.001) -.006* (.002) 
Religiosity  .000 (.000) 
 
-.000 (.001) -.002* (.000) -.002* (.000) 
Economic valence -.008* (.002) 
 
-.004 (.003) -.004 (.002)  .006* (.002) 
Male  .006 (.005) 
 
-.007 (.006) -.008 (.004)  .005 (.004) 
Age .000 (.000) 
 
 .000 (.000) -.000 (.000) -.000 (.000) 
Constant .312* (.028) 
 
 .138* (-.037) . 185* (.02)  .029 (.026) 
Adj R sq  .024 
 
-.007  .008  .003 
N 12230 
 
12230 12230 12230 
One asterisk (*) means that the effect is significant in the p<0.01 level.  
 
 
Firstly, in the left-right dimension of competition we find that, the more often an individual 
talks about the EP elections with her peers and attends meetings about them the smaller the 
congruence difference between national and EU level of representation . These forms of 
informing oneself about EP elections seem to be the most active ones, and thus dominate over 
the more passive forms of information gathering. The influence of left-right self-placement has 
to be viewed with a grain of salt, considering the potential endogeneity problems it might bring 
with it. If its significance persists in the EU dimension, our skepticism about its significance 
will be reduced. Keeping this in mind, it appears that right wing individuals experience a lower 
congruence difference between the two levels of representation. Left-right self-placement is 
also significant for the direction of congruence change. Right wing individuals gain in 
congruence as we move up a level from national to EP level. Similarly, individuals who read 
more about the EU elections gain in congruence in the EU level. Though such a finding could 
suggest that they are more aware of the actual position of the EP party groups and use this 
information when selecting a party, the magnitude of effect does not allow us to draw such a 
bold conclusion. Finally, we find that individuals who, despite the financial crisis, have a 
positive outlook on t he national economy for the past five years, gain in congruence as w e 
move up the levels. 
 
Secondly, the EU dimension ranges from the opinion that the EU has gone too far to the 
opposite opinion that the EU has not gone far enough. On this dimension we find that the 
congruence difference between national and EP level of representation is minimized for more 
right wing individuals and individuals with higher levels of religiosity. Being positive about the 
economy also minimizes the congruence difference between levels. What we do not find is any 
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relevance of political knowledge. This only becomes relevant when we look at the direction of 
change across levels and have a cl early different effect than in the case of the left-right 
dimension. We find that the more the individual voter watches programs on the EP election, 
talks about it or attends a related meeting, the more congruent this individual is with her 
national party (rather than with the EP party group). Interestingly, reading about the EP election 
has the opposite effect. The more an individual voter reads news on the EP election, the more 
congruent she is with her respective EP party group (rather than with her national party). 
Similarly, we find that those who visited a vote aid website gain congruence as we move up the 
levels. This result is important, considering the increasing use of these websites. Individuals 
with higher religiosity and individuals with a pessimist view towards the economy appear more 
congruent with their national party on the EU dimension, i.e. losing congruence as we move up 
a level of representation.  
 
Overall, we find some divergence with regard to what affects congruence differences in each 
dimension of conflict. We also find a distinction between active and passive ways of gathering 
information on the EU elections, with reading news being the only exception. Reading news 
seems to allow individuals formulate a better judgment than watching it. Finally, while in the 
analysis of the left-right dimension being more informed leads to gaining congruence as we 
move up a l evel, this is not the case for the EU dimension (once again, except for reading 
news). 
 
The National Party Level 
Taking into account independent variables that concern national parties, we hypothesized that 
clarity of ideological profile of a national political party should lead to lower congruence 
differences across levels (Hypothesis 6). Also, that party size should influence policy 
congruence. 
 
In particular, voters of large national parties were least expected to experience congruence 
differences across levels (Hypothesis 7) and to lose congruence as we move up a level 
(Hypothesis 7a). Considering the low number of cases, the results we get are insignificant. The 
only statistically significant finding concerns the EU dimension, where we find that voters of 
smaller national parties experience less congruence differences across representation levels,  
while voters of larger parties (i.e. with more seats) experience congruence loss as we move to 
the EP level of representation. Hence, we can say that our hypothesis about party size functions 
quite differently across dimensions of political conflict. 
 
The European Parliament Party Group Level 
We hypothesized that voters of national parties, which join EP party groups encompassing a 
high number of parties should experience congruence differences across levels (Hypothesis 8a) 
and lose congruence as we move from the national to the EU level of representation 
(Hypothesis 8b). The results have minimal statistical significance, especially considering the 
low number of cases. In fact, for the left-right dimension we get no significant results. For the 
EU policy dimension, though it seems that voters of national parties, which join EP party 
groups with many members within their gulfs experience low congruence differences between 
the levels of representation, the magnitude of the effect is minimal. Although the number of 
constituent the members does not seem to matter, membership in the EPP or the Socialists, 
displays an effect with slightly higher magnitude. 
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Table 2. Explaining Congruence and Congruence Difference by National Party Level 
Variables 
 
 
 
     
Left-Right 
National-EU 
Congruence             
Left-Right 
Absolute 
Difference               
EU position 
National-EU 
Congruence             
EU position 
Absolute 
Difference              
Seats .001 (.002) 
 
.000 (.003) -.006* (.002) .000 (.002) 
Left party -.008 (.07) 
 
.15 (.09) .004 (.07) -.08 (.08) 
Right party -.012 (.08) 
 
.03 (.09) .01 (.07) -.128 (.081) 
Constant .259* (.07) 
 
-.01 (.09) .22 (.06) .11 (.078) 
Adj R sq -.02 
 
.006 .015 .01 
N 142 142 142 142 
One asterisk (*) means that the effect is significant in the p<0.01 level.  
 
 
 
Table 3. Explaining Congruence and Congruence Difference by European Parliament 
Party Group Level Variables 
 
 
 
 
Left-Right 
National-EU 
Congruence              
Left-Right 
Absolute 
Difference                  
EU position 
National-EU 
Congruence               
EU position 
Absolute 
Difference             
EP seats -.000 (.000) 
 
-.000 (.000) .000 (.000) -.000* (.000) 
Number of parties 
within EP Party group 
-.001 (.003) .003 (.007) -.006 (.004) .003 (.002) 
Joining the Socialists -.32 (.42) 
 
-.291 (.93) -.55 (.59) .83* (.274) 
Joining the EPP -.51 (.71) 
 
-.63 (1.57) .85 (1.01) 1.4* (.46) 
Constant .23 (.04) 
 
.009 (.093) .27 (.06) .062 (.02) 
Adj R sq -.65 
 
-.38 .02 .039 
N 9 9 9 9 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
One asterisk (*) means that the effect is significant in the p<0.01 level.  
 
 
The Country Level 
Finally, we look at the effect of country level variables. We hypothesized that the  simultaneous 
occurrence of domestic and EP elections would increase congruence differences (Hypothesis 3) 
and lead to voters’ loss of congruence when moving upwards in the representation channel 
(Hypothesis 3a). For new member states, we expected to find more congruence differences 
(Hypothesis 4) and loss of congruence across levels (Hypothesis 4a). Last but not least, we 
hypothesized candidate-centered systems as provoking more congruence differences 
(Hypothesis 5a), with voters losing as we move from national to EP level of representation 
(Hypothesis 5b). The effects we find are not significant, expect for the EU dimension, where 
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we find that being a citizen of a new member state is associated with  congruence difference 
between the two levels (in support of Hypothesis 4). Considering the low number of 
observations this is a very important finding.  
 
Table 4. Explaining Congruence and Congruence Difference by Country Level 
Variables 
 
 
 
                  
Left-Right 
National-EU 
Congruence 
Left-Right 
Absolute 
Difference 
EU position 
National-EU 
Congruence 
EU position 
Absolute 
Difference 
New member state -.029 (.04) 
 
-.030 (.04) -.000 (.02)    .059* (.018) 
Having choice over 
candidates 
 .030 (.08) -.010 (.07)  .032 (.04) -.057 (.032) 
Parallel election 
simultaneously 
 .005 (.077)   .010 (.07)  -.060 (.048)  .044 (.030) 
Constant  .269* (.02) 
 
    .105* (.026)    .150* (.017) -.031* (.011) 
Adj R sq     -.108 
 
    -.089     -.050      .290 
N 27 27 27 27 
One asterisk (*) means that the effect is significant in the p<0.01 level.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
The fact that the EU is composed of representative democracies tells us little about whether 
the EU is indeed a democratic and representative system. Hence, the need to study it 
more closely. Not surprisingly, many journalistic commentaries but also many riddles 
for normative and positive political theory in the last decades have been evolving 
around the EU’s legitimacy gap and its democratic and representation deficits. For the 
first time after almost half a century, the post-Lisbon institutional setting establishes the 
EP as a co-legislator in an important number of policy fields, while introducing citizen's 
policy initiative. We consider these to be important changes to the EU political system: 
they empower the European Parliament but at the same time, they make it possible for 
citizens to bypass parties and parliaments and organize an initiative requesting 
legislation. In a post-Lisbon world, then, those citizens who can manage to get an 
initiative registered and a transnational campaign started may circumvent the traditional 
channels of representation. This is the future.  
 
Our analysis of political representation remained in the present-and was based on the 
belief that the extent to which citizens will get their act together in the immediate future 
(despite burdensome bureaucratic procedures) depends upon how (badly/well) they are 
currently served by extant institutions. The EP election is a case in point: infamously 
low levels of turnout document that most citizens in Europe refrain from seeking 
representation via this Europe-wide election. This motivated us to look more closely at 
the selecting and sorting mechanisms in place for producing an alignment between the 
represented and their representatives in the EP. We argued that for those citizens who 
give it a  try, it is difficult to predict how their party choices at the national level 
translate into EU-level policy representation.  
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The argument advanced here is that the architecture of the EP representation’s 
channel may produce different degrees of policy congruence across levels. Yet, 
congruence differences between national and EP levels are not always negative for 
citizen representation in the EP: it is possible for some voters to experience 
deterioration and for others to experience improvement of policy congruence across 
levels. To explore conditions under which improvement is possible, we examined a 
snapshot of EP representation. Using a series of hypotheses about factors operating at 
different levels of analysis, we inquired about congruence differences experienced by 
voters in the entire Union. As expected, we observed congruence differences, which 
varied across countries, EP party groups, and across dimensions of political conflict. 
These findings shed new light on the debate about the deficits of the EP (and the EU as 
a system more generally). Though congruence differences do exist, the good news is 
that they mostly mean improvement of congruence at the upper level of representation. 
Our results on t he reasons behind this improvement are very tentative. Drawing on 
existing studies, we inquired about the effect of a series of variables on congruence 
differences and the direction of these differences (loss/gain). Given the extremely low 
R Squares concerning independent variables at all levels of analysis and the small 
magnitudes of their effects, the mechanisms behind the achievement of congruence 
through this two-level representation channel remain unknown. That said, we can state 
with certainty that, within the Union, there exists variation of policy congruence 
differences between national and EP levels. Hence, studies of the EP should attend to 
the conditions enhancing improvement/deterioration of policy congruence across levels 
of representation. Future research could investigate further into the relationship 
between these levels (e.g. nesting) and analyze the same data utilizing multilevel 
modeling and/or consider additional variables.   
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 Meaningful Choices? Voter Perceptions of Party Positions in 
European Elections.1 
 
 
Sylvia Kritzinger2 and Gail McElroy3 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Voting decision processes are complex. Over the years it has been variously asserted that voters 
choose one party or candidate over another on the basis of their group orientations (see 
Lazarsfeld et al. 1948), their emotional attachments to parties (see Campbell et al. 1960), their 
retrospective evaluations of incumbents’ performances (Fiorina 1981; Kramer 1971) or on the 
basis of party policies (Downs 1957).4 According to the latter, and by now dominant, proximity 
model, voters favor candidates that are close to them in policy space (usually reduced to one 
dimension). This conception of voting behavior has been incredibly influential in political 
science but “scholars have been hard pressed to demonstrate empirically that the perceived 
distance in policy space between a voter and a competing candidate is a key predictor of which 
candidate a voter will support” (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002: 20). The conditions for issue 
voting to take place are non-trivial, not only must voters have strong feelings about an issue, 
they must know their own position on the issue and they must also know the various competing 
parties' positions on the same matter. Furthermore, parties must actually offer distinct positions. 
Where parties convey inconsistent or ambiguous messages about their positions, it will be 
nearly impossible for voters to establish where parties are located in policy space (Bowler 
1990; Andeweg 1995).In this chapter, we examine one small aspect of the issue-voting puzzle, 
whether or not voters in European elections can identify, with any degree of accuracy, the 
location of parties on the principal axes of competition. Furthermore, we explore which types 
of parties voters can locate most easily and speculate as to why this is easier for some parties as 
for others.  
 
Collective agreement over the location of parties in policy space is generally viewed as a 
necessary (though far from sufficient) prerequisite for democratic representation (e.g. Dahlberg 
2009; Wessels and Schmitt 2009; Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2010).5 If even modest levels 
of political accountability (e.g. as advocated by the responsible party model) are to be achieved, 
voters and elites should share relatively similar perceptions of party positions. Where voters 
cannot locate parties in policy space, meaningful mandates for parties to fulfill cannot be 
realized. And while there has been considerable research on projection effects in voter 
placement of parties (Merill et al. 2001), there has been surprisingly little research on the 
overall levels of agreement amongst voters or on the factors that facilitate such agreement (for 
exceptions see Van der Brug 1998; Van der Brug et al. 2008; Dahlberg 2009; Weber 2007; 
Wessels and Schmitt 2009; Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2010). In this chapter, we are 
1 The research conducted for this study has been supported by the European Science Foundation (ESF) 
HumVib EUROCORES scheme, the Austrian Research Fund (FWF) (I150-G14) and the Irish Research 
Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences (IRCHSS). 
2 Department of Methods in the Social Sciences, University of Vienna. E-mail: 
sylvia.kritzinger@univie.ac.at 
3 Department of Political Science, Trinity College, Dublin. E-mail: mcelroy@tcd.ie 
4 Admittedly, this is an extremely parsimonious (even cartoonish) characterization of decades of voting 
behavior research and there are models not neatly encapsulated within these four overarching strands of 
research e.g. directional voting (MacDonald et al. 1991; Westholm 1997), strategic decision-making 
(Kedar 2005) and discounting models (Adams et al. 2005).  
5 And while perceptual agreement and perceptual accuracy are not the same, the former is needed if the 
latter is to be achieved. 
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 interested in exploring the extent to which voters agreed on party positions at the time of the 
last European election. We find that there are systematic differences in perceptual agreement 
across the member states and parties themselves. We find that voters in 15 established 
European democracies can agree more readily on the placement of parties when compared with 
EU member states with a post-communist legacy and that extreme parties, in particular those 
on the left, are easier to locate than more moderate parties.  
 
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows: first we outline our theoretical 
expectations regarding voters’ ability to place parties in European Parliament elections. 
Second, we present the measure of perceptual agreement and discuss the descriptive results. 
Next, we examine if there are systematic factors that can account for the variation in parties’ 
perceptual agreement scores. And finally we conclude with a brief discussion of potential 
problems and future avenues of research. 
 
 
Theoretical Expectations 
 
Even the most minimal definition of effective democratic representation requires some degree 
of congruence between citizens’ preferences and policy outputs (Dahl 1997). For this to be 
achieved, parties must offer a reasonably broad range of alternatives at election time (see 
Rohrschneider and Whitefield (forthcoming)). To quote Dalton, “the essence of the democratic 
market-place is that like-minded voters and parties will search out each other and ally forces” 
(1985: 279). The implicit assumption here, and in spatial theories of voting in general, is that 
voters can identify parties’ positions, compare them to their own positions and then choose the 
party closest to their ideal point. By extension, it follows that where voters do not possess a 
common understanding of where parties are located in the political space, many will fail to 
choose a party that represents their views.6 Under these circumstances voters’ decisions cannot 
be considered as meaningful choices. There should be an overarching collective agreement 
amongst voters on the placement of a given party (e.g. van der Eijk 2001; Converse 1964; 
1975). Even if everyone can place the Liberal party on t he Left-Right spectrum but they 
disagree fundamentally over this positioning, the full Downsian conception of issue voting 
cannot be said to be operational. So, even if we accept that voters are issue motivated, if they 
choose parties on the basis of fundamental misperceptions of parties’ positions in political 
space the end result will be ‘ineffective representation’. The literature on this topic is 
surprisingly sparse, as political scientists generally assume that voters are capable of this level 
of cognition, even allowing for the well-documented projection and assimilation effects.  
 
Our chapter scrutinizes the implicit assumption that voters can generally locate parties in 
policy space and examines in detail this small but crucial part of the democratic representation 
process. We ask whether or not voters can identify with any degree of accuracy the location of 
parties in European elections.7 The reasons for low or high perceptual agreement amongst 
citizens are undoubtedly, at the risk of understatement, complex: voter, party and structural 
factors will interact to affect the level of agreement. For instance, the less informed, the less 
educated, the less connected a voter is to a party, the less he or she is likely to be able to 
identify its position. Intra-voter differences are beyond the scope of this chapter rather we 
simply explore (1) the differences between the member states in terms of the ability of voters to 
agree on party locations and (2) the differences amongst parties themselves. 
 
Which Policies? 
The number of issues being addressed in any given political arena, even at a single point in 
time, is almost infinite and no v oter, let alone any survey instrument, would be capable of 
assessing each party position on each issue. However, the complexity of the political space 
6 Note this is not to claim that such agreements are necessarily a precise reflection of a party’s ‘true’ location. 
7 We do not explore in this chapter whether or not these perceptions are correct.  
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 leads voters to take shortcuts and cues into account when evaluating parties (see Popkin 1991). 
The standard practice is to treat the policy space as unidimensional (typically left-right), which 
not only makes the placement of parties more tractable but some even argue analytically 
preferable (Hinich and Munger 1997). Furthermore, research has shown that these general 
ideological motivations are strong factors in predicting vote choice and better predictors than 
specific policy positions (e.g. van der Eijk et al. 1999). 
 
We examine the placement of parties by survey respondents on two scales: the generic Left-
Right (LR) one and the more specific European Integration (EI) dimension. While the Left-
Right continuum is increasingly regarded as the main ideological dimension in the European 
political space (Tsebelis and Garrett 2000; Kreppel and Tsebelis 1999; McElroy and Benoit 
2007; Hix et al. 2007),8 some scholars have described the European policy space as consisting 
of two dimensions, a left-right dimension and an orthogonal dimension of EU integration 
versus national sovereignty (Hix and Lord 1997). Furthermore, considering the political space 
simply in terms of Left-Right can lead to distortions such as the classic problem of where to 
place a fiscally conservative but socially liberal party (see Kriesi et al. 2008; van der Brug and 
van Spanje 2009). Especially in the context of elections to the European Parliament the 
exclusive focus on the national-driven Left-Right ideological dimension may neglect an 
important dimension on which (at least some) parties compete. Party policy with regard to the 
very process of European integration itself may be one of the main factors on w hich issue 
motivated voters cast their vote. Certainly, the rise of Euro-skeptic parties such as the British 
United Kingdom Independence Party (the second largest vote getter in 2009) or the Austrian 
Freedom Party, suggest that this is a politicized dimension in some countries.  
 
Finally, and on a slightly different note, drawing from discussions on European Parliament 
elections as second order in nature (e.g. Reif and Schmitt 1980; Marsh 1998) and of bigger 
questions about the democratic deficit, the descriptive question of whether or not citizens have 
any idea about the positions of parties on European Integration seems relevant. Schmitt (1995) 
demonstrated that voters do not have much idea as to where parties stand on European issues – 
even though they were generally prepared to express opinions on the matter. We therefore 
consider European voters' ability to identify party positions on the EU integration dimension as 
important of itself and it is worth examining whether the situation has changed in the past 15 
years (since Schmitt’s analysis). Has the rise of Euro-skeptic parties, European political groups 
and the decline of the permissive consensus led to increased voter knowledge about party 
positions on EU integration?9  
  
Degrees of Collective Agreement  
In an ideal world, parties would have high collective agreement scores on both the Left-Right 
and EU dimensions and we have no strong theoretical expectations as to which dimension will 
generate higher scores. Consider for instance the Left-Right scale: on the one hand, the 
reductionism of parties’ positions to Left-Right is very common (e.g. in media coverage), so 
voters should be familiar with these cues. Previous research (Benoit and Laver 2006) has also 
found that this dimension represents well the national policy spaces. On the other, the meaning 
of Left-Right is contested and partially contradictory so we might expect some confusion on the 
part of voters. If we consider the placement of parties on the EU dimension, on the one hand it 
is far less publicized, even in European elections, but on t he other hand the meaning of this 
dimension is less contested.   
8 There is some disagreement over the issue with others arguing that geo-political pressures define the 
principal axis of competition (Hoffman 1966; Moravcsik 1998). 
9 In individual countries of the EU there are, of course, other salient dimensions on which parties 
compete, for instance attitudes to immigration have been found to be highly salient in Austria. 
Nonetheless, research has shown that LR is a good proxy for the overall policy space in most member 
states (Benoit and Laver 2006) and the more specific attitude to European Integration is relevant in 
European elections. Not to mention none of these issues are included in the EES! 
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More generally, competition in European elections takes place on two different continuums 
that do not  neatly coincide (Hooghe et al. 2004) and the political space is structured by 
different discourses. Following from this, we expect that voters’ collective agreement will vary 
from country to country and from party to party. All in all, we expect that voters are more 
likely to collectively identify the European integration position of Euro-skeptic parties or 
parties that only compete in European elections, while for mainstream, established national 
parties voters should show more likely common agreements on the Left-Right continuum. 10  
 
Collective Agreement and Party Characteristics 
While descriptive analyses of collective agreement scores will provide us with a first important 
overview of (1) voters’ ability to identify the nature of the European political space, and (2) 
some partial insights into the quality of ‘choice sets’ (Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2010), we 
are also interested in exploring analytically what influences the variation in agreements among 
political parties. Voters’ likelihood of expressing agreement on pa rty positions should be 
closely connected to the structure of the supply side, that is, the nature of party competition 
itself (see Wessels 2002; Wessels and Schmitt 2009). Where parties provide distinct cues, 
voters should be more likely to collectively agree on party positions. Where parties provide 
ambiguous signals, voters will have greater difficulty in positioning them. Wessels (2002) has 
shown that there is a connection between party level factors (for instance the effective numbers 
of parties) and voters’ ability to connect party and policy. On the other hand, Wessels and 
Schmitt (2006) find that the party level characteristics do not impact voters’ significantly on 
evaluations of party positions. In this area of research, where results are conflicting, we extend 
the analyses by the inclusion of a greater array of party level variables, such as the age of the 
party, party family, the party’s extremism and whether or not a party is an incumbent to see if 
we can identify the factors that makes it easier for voters to place some parties in policy space 
compared with others.  
 
We included information on Party Age as we anticipate that, all else equal, the older a party 
the more likely voters will be able to identify it with specific policies. Voters will be less likely 
to recognize new parties and place them in policy space. The information on party age was 
garnered from a contextual dataset provided by PIREDEU and reflects the age of a party in 
2009 (EES 2009b; Czesnik et al. 2010).  
 
H1: Older parties will have higher PA scores than younger parties, all else, equal.  
 
The party’s vote share in the most recent national election (prior to June 2009) is taken as an 
indicator of its Size. We anticipate that larger parties will be easier to place accurately, all else 
equal, as they will generally get the lion’s share of media coverage. However, we allow for the 
possibility that such parties attempt to appeal to broader audiences and as such may send less 
clear messages to voters – classic Kirchheimerian ‘catch-all’ parties (1966).11 The data was 
gathered from a v ariety of official national agencies and websites such as 
www.electionresources.org.12 
 
H2a: Party size affects perceptual agreement scores positively.  
 
10 For a definition of mainstream and niche party see Ezrow (2010) who defines mainstream parties as 
Social Democratic, Christian Democratic, Conservative and Liberal, and niche parties as parties on the 
extreme left, the extreme right or distinctly noncentrist (e.g. Communists, Right-wing, Nationalist, 
Green, Ethno-regionalist). 
11 Of course the effect of party size may be non-linear, with midsize parties faring worst.  
12 Where parties ran as a coalition of parties for the European elections, their joint size is recorded. 
Where parties only ran in the European elections, we listed their size from the European election itself 
rather than recording a zero.  
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 H2b: Party size affects perceptual agreement scores negatively. 
 
The variable Incumbency captures whether or not the party was an incumbent at the time of 
the election. We anticipate that incumbent parties are more difficult to place, all else equal, due 
to their inability to provide distinct programmatic party positions in their government 
functions.13 
 
H3: Incumbent parties, all else equal, will have lower PA scores. 
 
We also include a variable to capture the effects of Party Extremism as we anticipate that 
more extreme parties are easier to place, than those with more moderate views. To capture 
extremism we make use of two different measures. The first measure captures the Distance 
from the Mean on the dimension in question. We use recent expert surveys to identify the ‘real’ 
positions of political parties on each of the two dimensions in our study. 14 In addition, to the 
absolute distance we also use a directional measure of distance from the mean, to capture the 
possibility that the distance effects are not equal for right and left wing parties. Second, we also 
use a measure of Ideological Family to capture extremism. While party family is a crude 
summary measure of a party’s general orientation, it does have the advantage, unlike the expert 
scores, of being applicable to more parties in our database.  We lose over 20 percent of our 
cases with the expert survey based measure, as they have not been included in recent expert 
surveys.15 The identification of parties with particular party families is notoriously difficult but 
we make use of the information from the contextual dataset of PIREDEU, which draws heavily 
on country experts to code parties as Communist, Green, Liberal, Social Democrat, Christian 
Democrat, Green or Radical Right. We also added an additional variable to this measure to 
capture Euro-skeptic parties. While this variable overlaps heavily with the Radical Right 
category it is not identical. Parties such as the British UKIP or the Austrian HPM, while Euro-
skeptic, are not best described as radical right but do, nonetheless, offer a distinct European 
message.   
 
H4a: Parties with extreme views on the left and right of the political spectrum should have 
higher PA scores, all else equal.  
 
H4b: Euro-skeptic parties should have higher PA scores on the EU dimension.  
 
In the next sections, first we describe the results on the collective agreement scores using the 
measure perceptual agreement, and second, we present our results on the impact of party 
characteristics on collective agreements.  
 
 
Perceptual Agreements 
 
Data and Measure 
In the following analyses we use the newly released data from the European Parliament 
Election Study of 2009 (EES 2009; van Egmond et al. 2010) to examine whether or not there is 
agreement, among the electorates of Europe, on the placement of parties in policy space. This 
election study was conducted in the immediate aftermath of the elections of June 2009 in each 
13 This applies particularly to parties in coalition governments. However, we cannot explore this 
distinction in this chapter.   
14 Specifically, we take the absolute distance of a g iven party from the weighted mean placement. We 
used the Chapel-Hill expert survey conducted in 2006 to create this variable. This particular dataset 
covers a larger selection of parties competing in the 2009 election than alternatives such as the Benoit 
and Laver (2006) survey. 
15 Almost 40 percent of the parties competing are not covered by Benoit and Laver. 
173
 of the 27 member states of the European Union.16 In what follows, we draw on the two 
questions that ask respondents to place political parties on two dimensions: Left-Right and 
European Integration.  
 
1) For LR positions the question was worded as follows: 
 
In political matters people talk of “the left” and “the right”. About where would you 
place the following parties on this scale? Please indicate your views using any 
number on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means “left” and 10 means “right”.  
 
2) For European Integration the question reads as follows:  
 
Some say European unification should be pushed further. Others say it already has 
gone too far. About where would you place the following parties on this scale? Please 
indicate your views using a s cale from 0 to 10, where 0 means unification ‘has 
already gone too far’ and 10 means it ‘should be pushed further’. 
 
Using responses to these two questions we calculate perceptual agreement scores for each 
political party according to the measure devised by van der Eijk (2001). The advantage of this 
measure is that it takes into account the voters’ placement of parties on a given dimension in 
terms of both the skew of the voter dispersion and also the modality (unimodal, bimodal etc.) of 
the distribution.  
 
Measuring party positions has become something of a cottage industry in political science in 
recent years, such is the demand for point estimates. There are many different ways of deriving 
ideal points: expert surveys, roll call vote analysis, text analysis or manifesto coding. But the 
use of the mean or median placement of voters of a party (or subset of voters such as sel f-
identifying partisans) remains one of the most popular methods (see Macdonald et al. 1991). 
This is due, in part, to the ease of calculating these measures, their direct comparability with 
voters’ self-placement scores and also the availability of comparable cross national data. 
However, where the data is non-normally distributed, the use of such methods to produce party 
positions can be misleading and the choice of the mean or median can be critical. To illustrate 
this point, Figure 1 maps the density of respondent placement of the FPÖ (Austria) on the Left-
Right scale from the EES09. The distribution is heavily left (negatively) skewed and the mean 
placement of the party is 7.6, whilst the median placement is 9 and the modal response is 
actually 10. On an 11-point scale these differences in measurement of the party’s position are 
substantial and the choice of one over another can have far reaching effects in statistical and 
substantive analyses.17   
 
Furthermore, where data is not unimodal the use of means and medians can be deceptive. At 
the extreme, in a uniform distribution the median and mean are essentially meaningless, even 
though both measures are equivalent.18 A uniform distribution of party placement is perhaps 
better interpreted as indicating that voters have no idea where a  party  belongs on  a particular 
16 Circa 1.000 respondents were interviewed in each country. In the EU15 all surveys were conducted via 
Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) whilst in seven of the newer member states 
(Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) the 
sample was split between Face to Face Interviewing (70%) and the CATI method (30%). 
17 Such skewness also affects measures such as standard deviation.  
18 Where A and B represent the minimum and maximum value of the scale Mean/Median= (A + B)/2 in a 
uniform distribution. There is no mode in such cases.  
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Figure 1: Distribution of Preferences FPÖ (AT) on L-R 
 
dimension. For instance, Figure 2 m aps the distribution of voter placement of the PNT-CD 
(Romania), and while there is a slight peak around 0, the distribution approximates a uniform 
distribution far better than a unimodal one.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of Preferences PNT-CD (RO) on LR 
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 Figures 3 and 4 illustrate other common types of distribution encountered in the EES09 data. 
The mapping of the British National Party (BNP) on the LR scale suggests a bimodal 
distribution with peaks at the extremes of zero and ten and the mapping of the PDS-CC in 
Portugal is perhaps best described as tri-modal. In general, aggregate statistics like mean, 
median and standard deviations from the mean are not detailed enough when data is non-
symmetrically distributed. 
 
 
Figure 3: Distribution of Preferences BNP (UK) on L-R 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of Preferences PDS-CC (PT) on European Integration 
176
 The perceptual agreement (PA) measure used in this chapter overcomes several of these 
problems and ranges from a minimal value of -1 to a maximum value of +1. A score of -1 
indicates that half the respondents place a party at one extreme of a scale (0 in this instance) 
while the other half place them at the opposite extreme (10 in our data). In the figures discussed 
above, the BNP is an example of this type of distribution. Clearly respondents are uncertain as 
to whether this is an extreme left or right-wing party. A score of 0 suggests a uniform 
distribution along the scale while a score approaching 1 i ndicates that all respondents are in 
agreement as t o where to place the party. The PA score, thus, assesses the collective 
perceptions of voters, it evaluates to what degree they hold a common understanding of the 
party positions and overall policy space in a country (van der Eijk 2001).19 
 
A note on the issue of Don’t Know responses 
Before we commence our analysis of PA scores in the next section, we have a caveat regarding 
the rather high incidence of ‘Don’t Know’ (DK) responses in the EES09 on the two questions 
of interest. If we are truly interested in whether or not voters share a common perception of 
policy space, it is not merely an inconvenience if many respondents feel insufficiently informed 
to even attempt to place a party on either dimension. Figure 5 illustrates the alarmingly high 
occurrence of DK responses to both questions in some countries in the dataset.  
 
 
 
Figure 5: Mean Don’t Know Responses by Country and Issue 
 
We observe that in most Western European countries voters’ attempt to place the parties’ on 
the LR dimension, the mean DK response is less than 10 percent. Germany has the lowest rate 
of DK response for this dimension, the mean rate is less than 6 percent. However, in Central 
and Eastern Europe this is not the case. In countries such as Romania, upwards of 50 percent of 
19 The scores were calculated using an Excel based macro courtesy of Cees van der Eijk. 
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 respondents fail to place the parties.20 When examining European positions we see a more 
mixed picture across Europe: voters in general have greater difficulty expressing views on this 
dimension with very high DK rates witnessed even in founding member states such as Italy.  
 
In general, these results reflect poorly on the capacity of voters to place parties and suggest 
that we should treat perceptual agreement scores with some caution. In some instances, the PA 
score we derive exclude a majority of the sample (when one includes refusal to answer the 
question). Unfortunately, while the PA measure has many attractive features it cannot be 
weighted to include DK responses. Given that it is a common finding in psychological research 
that individuals believe they know more than they actually do (e.g. Allwood and Montgomery 
1987; Griffin and Tversky 1992; Nisbett and Ross 1980) these DK rates are particularly 
worrisome. Larger questions connected to issue voting cannot ignore this. If half of a country’s 
population (as represented by survey respondents) feels incapable of even placing a party on a 
major axis of competition, the idea of proximity voting is severely tested.  
 
Descriptive Analyses: Results 
With this (rather considerable) caveat in mind, we proceed to examine the collective agreement 
scores at the timing of the 2009 European election by contrasting established democracies with 
former communist countries. In the former category, we assume party systems to be established 
and to be well known to their citizens. Meanwhile, this might not be the case in younger party 
systems such as in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. Graph 1 examines thus 
the PA scores for parties in the EU15, Graph 2 adds the new member states, and includes thus 
scores of the EU27. As we can see from the Graph 1, most parties in the EU15 have PA scores 
above zero on both dimensions, though very few approach the figure of complete agreement of 
1. Recall that scores close to 0 suggest a uniform distribution of placement while figures 
approaching -1 suggest a bimodal distribution at the extremes of the scale. Interestingly, we can 
also observe that we do not observe major differences between the LR and the European 
Integration positioning. Eyeballing this graph suggests two preliminary findings: first voters do 
not hold strong collective agreements about parties’ positions, but second, this is, perhaps 
surprisingly, the case for both for the LR and European integration dimensions.  
 
Adding Central and Eastern European parties to the mix (Graph 2), we observe that the 
scatter plot is stretched towards lower (even negative) agreement scores both on the LR and the 
European continuum – indicating a more uniform distribution of party positions than in the 
EU15. Particularly, for the European continuum we observe very low and quite a few negative 
results. In the newer member states it appears, at least, that these two dimensions are not ones 
on which voters can easily agree about party positions confirming our initial assumption 
concerning the differences across EU member states. Combining these results with the high 
non-response rates in Central and Eastern Europe a troublesome picture concerning spatial 
voting models emerges.  
 
Locating parties’ positions may be connected with a high level of voter cognition and to 
examine this possibility we also conducted the analyses with the subset of the mostly highly 
educated respondents in the EU15.21 The PA scores do improve rather significantly with this 
sample (see Graph 3). Where the scores in Graph 1 (only EU15) mostly accumulated in the 
square between 0.5 on the LR and 0.5 on the European integration continuum, now most parties 
are above the 0.5 line on LR positions. On the European integration continuum we continue to 
see poor perceptual agreement scores, there are still many parties below the 0.5 threshold. 
 
20 And this holds across all parties in the system. 
21 We restricted this sample to all those respondents with a bachelor’s university education or higher. The 
percentage of respondents falling into category was rather low in some countries, less than 8 percent, and 
nowhere reached above 20 percent of the total. This is a very select sub-sample. 
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Graph 1: Perceptual Agreement Scores on the L-R and European Integration Continuum 
(EU15) 
 
In general, voters (at least voters with higher education) agree to a l arge extent where to 
position political parties in the old EU member states on the LR dimensions. The often claimed 
 
 
 
Graph 2: Perceptual Agreement Scores on the L-R and European Integration Continuum 
(EU27) 
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 ‘communication device’ of the LR dimensions seems to be reasonably effective for this set of 
voters.22 Nevertheless, there are still significant variations both within and between countries.  
 
 
 
Graph 3: Perceptual Agreement Scores on the LR and European Integration Continuum 
amongst higher educated respondents 
 
 
Calculating the mean of the perceptual agreement scores per country we obtain general party 
locations per country (see Graph 4). In the EU15, Greece, Spain, Belgium, Ireland and UK 
display low agreement scores on both continuums. Meanwhile, in countries such as Portugal, 
Italy and to a certain extent France, voters have a collective grip on parties’ positions on the LR 
continuum but not on the European Integration one. Voters in the other countries achieve 
medium collective identification on both continuums. In the newer member states meanwhile 
we observe Poland, Lithuania, Slovakia, Estonia and Slovenia located around 0.4 on bo th 
scales. While the Czech Republic and Cyprus do well on the LR continuum but less well on the 
European one. The remaining newer member states perform very poorly on both dimensions. In 
Romania even the mean of the PA scores on the European continuum is negative.  
 
When we compare the means of all voters with the mean of voters with higher education we 
observe – as Graph 3 already indicated – that the agreement scores rise substantially (see Graph 
5). In all countries the mean positions increase diagonally upwards into the right hand corner: 
agreement increases on both scales. The effect of education seems to be particularly notable in 
countries such as the UK, Belgium, Greece and the Netherlands where we find substantially 
higher agreement scores among those with a university degree. In countries such as Finland, 
Sweden and the Netherlands, higher educated voters display very high agreement scores on 
both continuums.  
 
22 These results echo the findings of Alvarez and Nagler (2004). 
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Graph 4: PA-Scores on the LR and European Integration Continuum (country means) 
 
 
 
 
Graph 5: PA-Scores on the LR and European Integration Continuum (country means all voters 
versus higher educated voters) 
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 For ease of presentation, Graphs 6 to 9 illustrate individual party differences in subsets of 
countries. For the first set of countries in Southern Europe (Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece) 
we observe the main differences  between  Spanish  and  Greek  parties  on  the  one  hand,  and 
Italian and Portuguese parties on the other hand. While the voters can place the latter parties 
rather well on the LR continuum, this is not the case for the former ones. Most surprisingly are 
the cases of the Greek PASOK and the Spanish PSOE (both traditional social-democratic 
parties); voters do not share common perceptions of their place on what would be generally 
taken as their most salient axis of competition. Unsurprisingly, parties are far less likely to be 
collectively identified on the European integration dimension with Berlusconi’s Popolo della 
Libertà (PDL) even achieving a negative value (likewise with the Portuguese Peoples’ Party). 
Exceptions are the Greek Communist party as well as the Spanish regional parties, which 
appear to convey their EU position quite strongly.  
 
 
Graph 6: PA-Scores LR and European Integration Continuum: Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece 
 
A rather different picture emerges in the Scandinavian countries where voters’ agreements on 
both continuums are, in general, rather high. Exceptions are the Swedish Sverigedemokraterna 
(SDEM) – a highly Euro-skeptic party. Voters have problems placing this party, like many other anti-
immigration parties, on the left/right dimension, but its position on European Integration is very clear. 
Oddly, the JuniBevægelsen (JB), a Danish Euro-skeptic party which only competed at the 
supranational level displays more agreement on the LR dimension than on European integration.23  
 
When examining the graph of the parties of ‘continental Europe’ (Graph 8), we find a positive 
linear distribution by country, with the Belgian parties faring worst in terms of PA scores on 
these two dimensions. The two continuums may simply not be relevant for Belgian voters. For 
the Netherlands we observe the opposite: positive agreement scores with parties collectively 
identified on both continuums. Particularly the main Dutch parties (PvdA, VVD, D66, CDA, 
Groen Links) do well. Meanwhile, in Germany the LR continuum is a useful device for 
collective identification, the European continuum to a lesser extent. Surprisingly, the 
23 The party disbanded after a disastrous Election performance in 2009. 
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 CDU/CSU is not particularly well identified on either of the two dimensions. In Austria we see 
a dispersed picture: while the two Euro-skeptic and right-wing parties FPÖ and BZÖ can be 
located easily on the European continuum (but oddly not Liste Hans Peter Martin, a  party  that 
only competes in the European elections), this is not the case for the Greens or the two 
mainstream parties SPÖ and ÖVP. The latter do however perform well on the LR continuum. 
 
 
Graph 7: PA-Scores LR and European Integration Continuum: Denmark, Sweden, Finland 
 
 
Graph 8: PA-Scores LR and European Integration Continuum: Austria, Germany, Belgium, the 
Netherlands 
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 Finally, let us turn to the UK, Ireland and France (Graph 9). Most noteworthy is the result 
for the British BNP: voters agree very highly on t heir European position but there is great 
disagreement as to where to locate the party on the LR continuum. In general, British voters 
can hardly agree on any party position. Both the Labour Party and the Conservatives score low 
on the European continuum but also on the LR continuum. Unsurprisingly, the French parties 
feature high collective agreement scores on the LR continuum perhaps due to the strong 
historical division on this dimension. The Front National meanwhile achieves a v ery high 
agreement score on the European continuum as well. Ireland presents low agreement scores on 
both continuums. This is not surprising considering the fact that the political distinction 
between Left and Right is of lower importance and thus perceptions might be more easily 
distorted. Though for the European continuum results are surprising (exception Libertas): in the 
aftermath of several EU referendums a collective agreement on parties’ positions might have 
been expected. 
 
 
Graph 9: PA-Scores LR and European Integration Continuum: UK, Ireland, France 
 
 
What conclusions can we draw from these preliminary analyses? First, the analysis suggests 
that data used to calculate any kind of voter-party distance needs to be evaluated carefully. 
High rates of non-response undermine the validity of using the data and raise questions about 
the extent of issue voting in some countries. Second, we can observe that voters’ collective 
agreement over parties’ positions varies significantly across countries and parties. While in 
most ‘Continental’ European and Scandinavian countries agreement scores on both continuums 
are rather high, this is simply not the case in the remaining countries (at least on these two 
dimensions). Furthermore, the evidence suggests that voters are better at agreeing on party’s 
positions on the LR continuum. This is particularly the case for extreme left parties (the 
inheritors of Communism) such as the Italian RC, the Swedish VP, the French LO/NPA and the 
German Linke. On the other hand, right-wing parties are more likely to be placed in a common 
position on the European dimension: the Austrian FPÖ and BZÖ, the British BNP, the Swedish 
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 Irish Labour Parties do not have high collective agreement scores. Third, the very low 
perceptual agreement scores for some parties indicate that, at a m inimum, Left-Right and 
European Integration do not appear to be the basis on which issue voting takes place. On the 
one hand, it may simply be the case that in some countries such as Belgium or Spain the 
decisive programmatic positions do not run along the LR and the EU continuums and we might 
find higher PA scores on alternative dimensions such as the regional or nationalist continuums 
(a question which can only be explored with national election data). On the other hand, certain 
parties may not convey clear issue positions to their voters and their voter base is not well 
captured by proximity voting models. A final conclusion focuses on the agreement scores of 
more educated voters, which in general tend to be much higher. This result suggests that where 
scholars are using voters’ responses on placement scales to extricate measures of party 
positions they should probably restrict the analysis to subsets of voters.24  
 
 
Party Characteristics 
 
In this final section of the chapter we explore, briefly, the differences in perceptual agreement 
scores across parties in the EU15.25 To analyze the influence of party related factors on our 
dependent variables (the actual PA score), we created a d ataset of a v ariety of party 
characteristics that might help explain why one party does better in terms of collective 
placement compared with another. 
 
We also include several control variables in our analyses. As discussed above, the high rates 
of DK responses are not captured in the PA measure and for knowledge questions this seems 
particularly relevant, we therefore control for the number of missing (DK) responses per party, 
per dimension, calling the variable Uncertainty. The problem with DKs is that responses both 
“reflect two systematic factors: knowledge and propensity to guess” (Mondak 2001: 225). We 
expect that high rates of DK responses indicate an element of guessing on the part of those who 
do place the party.  
 
Finally, it is well established that European elections are second order in nature and that 
campaign effects are generally much weaker than in national competitions. We thus control for 
the effect of national election campaigns on perceptual agreement scores (Weber 2007). Where 
campaigns are intense (as in national elections) voter information should increase and this 
should have a positive effect on voters’ ability to identify party positions. Hence the nearer the 
European Election is to the national election, the higher the expected PA score (all else equal). 
This effect should be particularly evident for the LR continuum. We a dopt Reif’s measure 
(1984) which expresses on a scale of 0-1 the time-span between an EP election and the 
preceding national election, controlling for the length of the legislative session in the member 
state. We also include the square of this term to capture any non-linear impacts, such that when 
a European election is held in the middle of a national election cycle, the effects should be 
weakest.26  
24 Admittedly, the subset of party supporters is sometimes used to extricate party positions, however, 
with party identification rates declining, the numbers willing to so identify is getting lower and lower. In 
the EES09 many parties had fewer than five respondents (and in some cases not a single one) willing to 
admit that they were close to Party X.  
25 The choice of the EU15 is partly motivated by data availability issues but also these countries, 
typically, have more institutionalized party systems, longer EU membership and far lower DK responses 
on the party placement scales. In future work we will extend the analysis to newer member states.  
26 It should be noted that this variable is not party specific but is rather country specific. Other potential 
structural variables that could be included in the model are the effective number of parties, overall 
polarization of the party system or the nature of the electoral system (see Wessels 2002). While we have 
gathered data on all these variables we omit them from the analysis as these all vary at the system level 
and we may be mistaking group level correlations for individual effects. Running a multi-level model 
may be one solution, however with a sample of only 15 countries (even 27) there are probably 
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 Results 
We ran three separate OLS models on each of the two dependent variables (LR agreement 
score and European agreement score).27 The first model considers mostly traditional party 
characteristics such as party age, party size, whether the party is in government or opposition 
and the extremism of the party as measured by the expert surveys. The second model replaces 
the expert survey extremism measure with the parties’ ideological families, and the final model 
takes into consideration the timing of the European election relative to the national electoral 
cycle.  
 
Table 1 presents the results of the 6 models. Overall there are few significant results; party 
characteristics (at least as measured here) do not greatly impact on agreement scores. The only 
consistently significant variable relates to the percentage of DK responses (Uncertainty), 
though this is hardly a surprising outcome: the greater the number of DK responses the lower 
the overall PA score. The first three columns of Table 1 report the results for the LR dimension. 
In model 1 the only significant variable of interest relates to directional distance from the party 
mean as measured by expert survey results. The further a party is to the left of the political 
spectrum the higher the agreement scores.28 Absolute distance from the weighted mean 
position, is however not significant. Model 2 replaces the expert survey measure of extremism 
with the ideological family variables but none of the variables reach standard significance 
levels with the exception of yet again the variable that captures extreme left parties 
(Communist). All in all, the first two models indicate that voters collectively agree on the 
location of communist parties. Our third model introduces the electoral cycle variable and the 
results are consistent with the findings of Weber (2007): the closer the European election is to 
national elections the higher the agreement scores for a party.  
 
Models 4-6 reproduce the same analysis for the European integration dimension. Here the 
results are slightly more interesting. In the first model for this dimension (model 4) we discover 
that some of the traditional party characteristics are now significant. As predicted, the older a 
party, the more likely are voters to agree on its location in political space. In addition, the size 
of a party is now significant, with smaller parties having higher PA scores. However, neither of 
the expert survey measures of extremism (absolute or directional) are significant. In model 5, 
which includes party family, the effects of party size and party age remain significant, and we 
find that membership in the Communist, Conservative and Green ideological families 
negatively impacts on PA scores for the European continuum. The electoral cycle does not 
however (Model 6) appear to have any significant influence, a result which is at odds with that 
of Weber who, somewhat surprisingly, found that agreement on this dimension was “highest at 
the midterm and lowest at election time in the member states” (2007: 523).  
 
Overall, our findings stemming from this basic OLS-regression are not particularly 
noteworthy and we are not particularly confident of their robustness. We can interpret the 
results as indicating that party characteristics are of minor explanatory power in the collective 
identification of party positions, though of course the measures utilized may also be crude and 
inappropriate proxies for the underlying causal hypotheses we wish to test. Nonetheless, the 
results do suggest that on the Left-Right dimension, voters seem to agree on the placement of 
extreme left parties. Secondly, on the European continuum smaller, older parties feature higher 
collective agreement scores.  
      
        
 
insufficient level 2 variables. Also the appropriateness of country as a level 2 variable is contested.  
27 The models are run using robust ordinary least squares regression (Huber-White transformation).  
28 Given the construction of this variable, positive scores on this dimension refer to parties to the left of 
the weighted mean, while negative ones measure parties to the right. The result holds if one also simply 
uses the actual placement of the party from the Left-Right Chapel Hill expert survey.  
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 Table 1: Effects of party characteristics on agreement scores (OLS-Regression) 
 LR (1) LR (2) LR (3) EUPA (4) EUPA (5) EUPA (6) 
Party Age 0.000321 0.000123 0.000494 0.00273** 0.00300*** 0.00278*** 
 (0.758) (0.910) (0.621) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Party Size -0.201 0.0206 -0.0823 -0.300** -0.230* -0.247* 
 (0.171) (0.905) (0.629) (0.003) (0.034) (0.016) 
       
Incumbent -0.0185 -0.00483 -0.000250 -0.0115 -0.0100 -0.0105 
 (0.583) (0.881) (0.994) (0.717) (0.755) (0.731) 
       
Abs. Dist -0.00639   0.000280   
 (0.603)   (0.976)   
       
Directional Dist. -0.0161**   -0.00817   
 (0.007)   (0.146)   
       
Uncertainty -0.607*** -0.554** -0.738*** -0.464*** -0.526*** -0.511*** 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       
Communist  0.159** 0.147**  -0.0991** -0.108*** 
  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.000) 
       
Euroskeptic  -0.111 -0.105  0.0419 0.0325 
  (0.065) (0.062)  (0.218) (0.330) 
       
Radical Right  -0.0481 -0.0694  -0.0174 -0.00779 
  (0.663) (0.518)  (0.755) (0.897) 
       
Liberal  0.0211 0.0177  -0.0581 -0.0627* 
  (0.675) (0.712)  (0.065) (0.044) 
       
Conservative  -0.0480 -0.0350  -0.123* -0.122** 
  (0.529) (0.607)  (0.011) (0.010) 
       
Christian Dem.  -0.0140 -0.0224  -0.0983 -0.0993 
  (0.813) (0.682)  (0.052) (0.057) 
       
Soc. Dem  -0.0595 -0.0610  -0.0504 -0.0517 
  (0.319) (0.298)  (0.320) (0.292) 
 
Green  0.0139 0.0119  -0.134** -0.142** 
  (0.789) (0.809)  (0.006) (0.003) 
       
Cycle   -0.789**   0.0545 
   (0.006)   (0.792) 
       
Cycle Squared   0.558*   0.0288 
   (0.021)   (0.866) 
       
Constant 0.565*** 0.500*** 0.764*** 0.389*** 0.463*** 0.427*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 95 123 123 97 123 123 
F 4.988 4.075 4.193 9.035 10.26 10.27 
p-values in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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 Conclusions 
 
Our initial analysis of voters’ collective location of European parties suggest that political 
scientists may be unduly optimistic in assuming that voters possess high levels of cognition 
with regard to parties’ positions at the time of European elections. Overall the results are pretty 
grim. This is particularly true for positions on the European Integration dimension. Not only are 
voters less likely to agree on party positions on this dimension, they are disinclined to even 
express an opinion about a party’s placement in many instances. Citizens do not appear to have 
cognitive orientations towards this element of party competition. It is beyond the scope of this 
chapter to reach any firm conclusion as to why this is the case, but we speculate that parties 
may not compete on this issue dimension in European elections, that European elections are 
second order in nature and that citizens are simply not engaged with the European project. 
 
The analyses presented in this chapter focus exclusively on characteristics of parties and 
party systems. In future work, we hope to explore the effect of individual voter characteristics 
on perceptions of party positions in European elections. Our aggregate analysis suggests that 
education has a powerful impact on respondents’ collective agreement on party location. This 
finding may be particularly significant for those who wish to extrapolate party positions from 
these survey responses. There also appears to be grounds for concern about priming affects 
(Krosnick 1991) with these scales items, the distribution of voter responses are quite extreme 
with greater use of the ends of the scale than typically found in national election surveys. 
Furthermore, we identified some quite extraordinary and counterintuitive mode effects in 
Eastern Europe that need to be explored in greater detail.  
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‘To them that hath…’.  
News Media and Knowledge Gaps1 
 
 
Pippa Norris2 
 
 
Synopsis 
Scholars continue to debate what citizens know about politics, whether ordinary people 
lack the capacity to make rational and informed choices in a d emocracy, and what 
voters learn from election campaigns. One common prism to understand these issues 
focuses upon the role of ‘knowledge gaps’, suggesting that any adult learning from the 
media will be strongly conditioned by prior levels of formal education. An alternative 
theory suggests that lifetime learning occurs, so that adult use of the news media has 
the capacity to shrink any information gaps arising from early schooling. Most studies 
have examined these issues among citizens living within one country, especially the 
U.S. Cross-national research is important, however, as the broader context of 
communication environments is also expected to shape political learning; with smaller 
knowledge gaps predicted in more cosmopolitan societies, where communications flow 
easily across and within national borders. 
 
This study therefore compares European citizens to investigate whether the size and 
distribution of any knowledge gaps are affected by the interaction of individual-level 
education and media use, and also by societal level processes of cosmopolitan 
communications. The study utilizes the European Parliament Election Study 2009 
survey, monitoring individual level news use and civic knowledge.3 Societies are 
classified by the cosmopolitan characteristics of media landscapes in European 
countries, using the Norris and Inglehart (2004) Cosmopolitan Communications Index. 
The conclusion considers the implications of the results for understanding processes of 
political learning within European societies. 
 
 
 
Persistent and substantial disparities in knowledge are important for understanding both the role 
of the mass media in social learning and also the role of citizens in a democracy. Enduring 
inequalities in citizens’ knowledge have been widely observed and these are central to many 
long-standing debates in the social sciences. This includes, for example, controversies 
concerning the rationality of economic decision-making in the market-place, the political 
capacity of citizens to cast informed ballots in a democracy, and the public’s awareness of 
information campaigns in studies of health care, communications, and marketing. 
 
Knowledge gaps are of long-standing concern in the political and social sciences for several 
reasons. Some minimal level of knowledge is widely regarded as necessary for informed 
choice, whether decisions about casting a ballot, buying a car, or taking out a mortgage. Yet 
survey research repeatedly demonstrates that even in long-established democracies, such as the 
United States, many citizens usually know little about many basic facts in political life (Delli 
1 Paper for Panel Session II.1: Political Knowledge and Information, PIREDEU User Community 
Conference, Brussels, 18-19 November 2010. 
2 McGuire Lecturer in Comparative Politics, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard 
University, MA 02138. Email: Pippa_Norris@Harvard.edu. Web: www.pippanorris.com. 
3 Data is derived from the EES (2009), European Parliament Election Study 2009, Voter Study, Advance 
Release, 7/4/2010, (www.piredeu.eu). Marcel H. van Egmond, Eliyahu V. Sapir, Wouter van der Brug, 
Sara B. Hobolt, Mark N. Franklin (2010) EES 2009 Voter Study Advance Release Notes. Amsterdam: 
University of Amsterdam 
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Carpini and Keeter 1996). Some scholars conclude that as a result, democracy does not work 
well (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964; Converse 1990). Others contend that citizens do 
not need extensive information to make reasoned decisions, especially if cognitive shortcuts 
can aid rational choices (Graber 2004). Encyclopaedic information may be redundant if citizens 
can get by with incomplete information (Lupia and McCubbins 1998). 
 
This issue may also be considered important for political behaviour, if substantial 
knowledge gaps reinforce other inequalities in civic participation. Following events in the news 
can be regarded, in itself, as a desirable form of civic literacy in a democracy, as well as being 
closely associated with more active forms of political participation. A cross-national study by 
Milner showed that a population's degree of civic literacy is the single best predictor of its level 
of political participation (Milner 2002; Milner and Gronlund 2006). Awareness about politics 
and public affairs is associated with internal political efficacy or a sense of competence, one of 
the strongest predictors of political activism (Verba et al. 1995; Lassen 2005; Palfrey and Poole 
1987). More knowledge about government programs has also been found to increase political 
trust (Cook et al. 2010). 
 
The issue of knowledge gaps is not simply of academic interest; disparities between 
information rich and information poor citizens have also aroused considerable concern among 
public policymakers. For example, civics has long been integrated into the school curriculum 
on the grounds that young people need to learn about public affairs, their rights and duties as 
citizens, and the way that they can become engaged in society. Studies have monitored 
substantial cross-national variations in civic knowledge among young people.4 More generally, 
lack of awareness about health campaigns, such as those concerning the risks of poor diet, 
smoking, or AIDS, have an especially severe impact on those groups most negatively affected 
by social changes, who also tend to be information poor (Hayward 1995). The contemporary 
policy debate has often framed the issue in terms of the access to newer information and 
communication technologies (ICTs), exemplified by the ‘digital divide’. Hence the EU has 
prioritized expanding digital access as part of its strategy for economic growth and 
employment.5 Yet in fact multiple disparities have long existed in civic awareness, as well as in 
access and use of traditional communication mediums, not simply access to digital ICTs. 
 
 
Theoretical Framework  
 
What explains inequalities in civic information and political awareness? Socialization theories 
provide the mainstream approach to understanding social learning processes. The literature has 
repeatedly demonstrated that two of the strongest predictors of civic knowledge among the 
adult population are formal educational qualifications, derived from schooling during early 
childhood and adolescence, and also news media consumption during later life. 
 
Education and Cognitive Skills 
Socialization accounts have long emphasized the learning process derived from formal 
schooling occurring during earliest childhood through adolescence (Sears 1975; Gimpel et al. 
2003; Grusec and Hastings eds. 2006). Formal education provides knowledge of civics, as well 
as broader insights into politics and society arising from the study of history, geography, social 
studies and related fields. Formal education is also predicted to deepen literacy, numeracy and 
the reservoir of cognitive, analytic and abstract reasoning skills; to provide prior contextual 
4 See, for example, the IEA Civic Education Study, which surveyed nationally representative samples 
consisting of 90,000 14-year-old students in 28 countries, and 50,000 17- to 19-year-old students in 16 
countries throughout 1999 and 2000. http://www.terpconnect.umd.edu/~jtpurta/ A further IEA survey 
conducted in 2009 among 30 nations has recently been completed. For an overview of the sub-field, see 
Sherrod et al. 2010. 
5 http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/eeurope/i2010/index_en.htm 
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knowledge which helps to make sense of additional new information; and to strengthen the 
existence of social networks which facilitate discussion and deliberative learning. Other 
important sources of early learning include the immediate family and peer-groups, as well as 
the local community, and religious institutions. Theories emphasize that socialization processes 
shape the ways in which children and adolescents acquire their enduring cultural attitudes, 
beliefs, and values and how they learn their role as citizens. Longitudinal panel surveys are the 
most effective research design to establish the formative experiences shaping childhood 
socialization processes; studies of the American public using this approach have established 
that distinctive generational differences can be attributed to certain experiences and events 
occurring during the formative life stages (Jennings 1996; Jennings et al. 2009). 
 
Lifetime Learning through the Mass Media 
In addition, adults are expected to learn during their lifetime from both direct experience and 
through information provided by processes of interpersonal, group, and mediated 
communications. The ‘virtuous circle’ thesis theorizes that habitual use of the news media, 
social learning, and civic engagement are complimentary and mutually-reinforcing interactive 
processes (Norris 2000; Norris 2001; de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2006; Stromback and 
Shehata 2010). This includes acquiring political information from the main channels of the 
traditional and newer media available within each country, as w ell as v ia cosmopolitan 
communications flowing from abroad. An extensive body of empirical work has examined the 
classic issue of whether individual consumption of news reinforces political knowledge and, if 
so, whether any such learning is conditioned by the type of media source (including learning 
from radio and television news and entertainment, as well as from tabloid and broadsheet 
newspapers, from internet websites and online social networks, and from interpersonal 
discussion) (Russell 1974; Stauffer et al. 1981; Robinson and Levy 1986; Mondak 1995; 
Martinelli and Chaffee 1995); the amount, duration and prominence of news coverage; the type 
and complexity of topics (such as awareness of local, domestic, or international issues); and the 
measure of knowledge (such as tests through closed or open-ended questions) employed in the 
research design (Chaffee and Schleuder 1986; Price and Zaller 1993). 
 
The Interaction of Education and the Media 
As well as the separate effects of both education and news media exposure on civic knowledge, 
the interaction of these factors is also expected to prove important. The theory of ‘knowledge 
gaps’ was first proposed by Phillip J. Tichenor and his colleagues in their 1970 article "Mass 
media flow and differential growth in knowledge" (Tichenor et al. 1970). The original thesis 
argued that schooling during the formative years shapes subsequent processes of lifetime 
learning. In particular, the most educated and highest status sectors of the population are 
thought to have the greatest capacity to acquire further useful information about people, 
processes and institutions during their adult lifetimes, including learning from the mass media, 
thereby reinforcing pre-existing inequalities between the information rich and information poor 
(see Figure 1, Model A). 
 
The knowledge gap thesis predicts that people with higher education (and thus higher SES) 
learn at a faster rate than those with lower education, a pattern attributed to differential 
communication skills, pre-existing knowledge, social networks, and access to the mass media. 
In particular, Tichenor et al theorized that any knowledge gaps were due to the skills and 
capacities developed by human capital. Those with higher levels of education are expected to 
prove more active when seeking further new information from the media (McLeod and Perse 
1994). The well-educated are therefore predicted to gradually become more informed about 
politics, society, and public affairs as they learn from the news media during their adult years. 
Those lacking formal educational qualifications are also expected to learn from the media 
during their lifetimes, but at a far slower rate, gradually dropping even further behind. Thus the 
knowledge gap between the well-educated and less educated is expected to widen during 
adulthood. 
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Figure 1: The ‘knowledge gap’ and ‘lifetime learning’ models 
 
The typical links between formal education, news media consumption, and patterns of 
knowledge in the United States can be illustrated by the results of surveys conducted by the 
Pew Research Center for The People and The Press. Pew has regularly monitored levels of 
awareness about political figures and current events in the news in the United States over many 
decades. Their battery of almost two-dozen questions seeks to monitor whether people can 
identify the correct name of some leaders (such as the President of Russia or the US Vice-
President), political issues featured in the news (such as which party currently controls the 
House of Representatives), and the position held by certain public figures (such as the 
Democratic Speaker of the House of Representatives 2008-10, Nancy Pelosi). Based on a  
comparison of American levels of political knowledge from 1989 t o 2007, the Pew study 
concluded that education is the single best predictor of knowledge: “Holding all other factors 
equal, levels of knowledge rise with each additional year of formal schooling. At the extremes, 
these educational differences are dramatic…. More than six-in-ten college graduates (63%) fall 
into the high knowledge group, compared with 20% of those with a high school education or 
less – among the largest disparities observed in the survey” (Pew Center 2007). Pew reports 
that Americans also learnt from the news – but the audiences for different media sources (such 
as cable or network television news) varied greatly in how much they know about what’s going 
on. These patterns can be seen as a consequence both of self-selection (the kinds of people who 
rely on each type of medium) and media effects (how much people learn from specific sources). 
 
An extensive literature has built upon the idea of the knowledge gap thesis originally 
proposed by Tichenor et al, generating more than a hundred studies in total (Gaziano 1997; 
Hwang and Jeong 2009). Research has expanded in scope and methodological sophistication 
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during the last forty years and several approaches have dominated the empirical literature. One 
uses panel survey data, with repeated surveys of the same subjects, to examine learning over 
time (Jennings 1996). This is an ideal research design but unfortunately the longitudinal data 
remains limited, with no available cross-national evidence. Experimental studies have also been 
used, examining the effects of learning from different news sources and stories (Sanders and 
Norris 2007). Another more common approach uses a cross-sectional sample of citizens to 
examine the learning effects of levels of issue coverage in the media, for example concerning 
awareness of economic and foreign policy issues. Hwang and Jeong’s (2009) recent meta-
analysis reviewed the accumulated body of scholarship and concluded that certain robust 
findings emerged from the knowledge gaps literature: 
 
(i) The size of any knowledge gaps were consistently related to formal 
educational  levels, as the original thesis predicted.  
 
(ii) Knowledge gaps were often, but not always, moderated by types and levels of 
media  news coverage, with the strength of any association conditioned by the 
type of media  sources and issue topics, as well as by the type of knowledge 
measures and the study  design. 
 
(iii) Nevertheless Hwang and Jeong emphasize that the substantive size of any 
knowledge  gains over time, or as the result of the degree of issue coverage, 
were usually modest. 
 
(iv) Lastly, empirical studies do not always consistently support the knowledge gap 
thesis;  some scholars have concluded that any knowledge gaps between the 
well and less  educated remain constant. 
 
(v) Among high and low media users, suggesting that the latter are capable of 
lifetime learning at a rate which is comparable to the former. 
 
In the light of these inconsistencies, the knowledge gap thesis has come under challenge 
from other theoretical approaches. In particular, the alternative life-time learning perspective 
developed by Mishler and Rose (2002) suggests that although those with formal schooling have 
a head-start at civics during their early adulthood, these differences do not persist over a 
lifetime, since people have the capacity to acquire new information from multiple sources, 
including from personal discussions, from social networks, and from the mass media. Mishler 
and Rose emphasize, in particular, that citizens living in countries which have experienced a 
major regime transition can be expected to have the capacity to learn new democratic processes 
and procedures. Thus attention to political news is expected to generate processes of adult 
learning, with a gradual closure of the ‘head start’ knowledge gap arising from formal 
schooling (see Figure 1, Model B). 
 
The Communications Environment 
The core propositions of the knowledge gap thesis therefore deserve reexamining against 
empirical evidence. What has received less attention in the research literature on knowledge 
gaps in the United States, however, is the context of the media system in each society and, in 
particular, the degree to which communications flow freely and easily within and across 
national borders. As Milner (2002) notes, with a few notable exceptions, most existing studies 
of political knowledge among representative samples of the adult population have been 
conducted within the United States. Any learning effects arising from  news, however, can be  
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Table 1: Media landscapes, Europe 
Nation 
Historical 
democratizatio
n Index 
1972_2008, 
100 pts (FH) 
Liberal 
Democracy 
scale 100 pts 
2008 (Freedom 
House) 
GDP per capita 
ppp 2006 (World 
bank 2007) 
Human 
development 
index 2005 
100-pt scale 
(UNDP 2007) 
Cosmopolitan
ism index 
(Norris and 
Inglehart 
2009) 
Press 
Freedom 
2005 
reversed 
(RWB) 
% of HH with 
TV, average 
2000-04, 
(World Bank) 
Cellular mobile 
telephone 
subscribers per 
100, 2005 
(ITU) 
Daily 
newspaper: 
number of 
titles, 2004 
(UNESCO 
2008) 
Daily 
newspaper 
circulation 
per 1000, 
2004 
(UNESCO) 
State owned, 
television by 
share; 
Djankov 
(2008) 
Austria 85 99 $26,110 0.948 4.73 98 93 99 17 311 0.78 
Belgium 84 99 $24,541 0.946 5.04 96 97 90 29 165 0.41 
Bulgaria 34 85 $2,256 0.824 0.37 90 93 81 58 79 0.75 
Cyprus 75 99 $22,699 0.903 2.85 95 98 95 8  0.23 
Czech Rep 43 99 $7,040 0.891 2.65 99 97 115 81 183 0.34 
Denmark 85 99 $32,548 0.949 5.60 100 97 101 35 353 0.80 
Estonia 40 99 $6,945 0.860 2.01 99 92 107 13 191 0.29 
Finland 78 99 $27,081 0.952 4.91 100 93 100 53 431 0.48 
France 80 99 $23,899 0.952 4.17 94 95 79 101 163 0.43 
Germany 80 99 $24,592 0.935 4.29 96 95 96 347 267 0.61 
Greece 70 92 $13,339 0.926 2.19 96 98 90   0.08 
Hungary 50 99 $6,126 0.874 2.35 98 96 92 34 217 0.20 
Ireland 84 99 $31,410 0.959 4.78 100 96 101 7 182 0.68 
Italy 80 92 $19,709 0.941 2.85 91 96 123 96 137 0.61 
Latvia 39 92 $5,683 0.855 1.23 98 86 81 23 154  
Lithuania 41 99 $5,247 0.862 1.27 96 97 128 14 108 0.23 
Luxembourg 84 99 $54,779 0.944 6.69  97 158 6 255  
Netherlands 85 99 $25,333 0.953 4.89 100 98 97 37 307 0.57 
Poland 49 99 $5,521 0.870 2.05 88 92 76 42 114 0.57 
Portugal 75 99 $11,124 0.897 3.04 95 99 109 27  0.38 
Romania 31 85 $2,443 0.813 0.04 84 92 62 163 70 0.37 
Slovak Rep 40 99 $5,126 0.863 1.89 99 90 84 13 126 0.35 
Slovenia 42 99 $12,047 0.917 2.20  97 88 5  0.54 
Spain 71 99 $16,177 0.949 3.29 67 99 95 151 144 0.43 
Sweden 85 99 $31,197 0.956 5.57 98 94 93 93 481 0.51 
UK 83 99 $27,582 0.946 4.67 95 98 109 109 290 0.60 
Total 64 94 $18,060 0.904 3.07 92 96 94 83 238 0.48 
Source: Pippa Norris. Cross-national Democracy Dataset June 2009, www.pippanorris.com 
 
expected to be conditioned by the broader communications landscape, where the U.S. media 
are not necessarily typical of other post-industrial societies, such as those with a stronger 
national newspaper industry and a public service tradition of broadcasting. The cross-national 
studies which have been published suggest that the United States may be ‘exceptional’ in levels 
of political knowledge, exemplified by low awareness of foreign affairs. Hence Bennett et al. 
(1996) compared knowledge of international affairs across five post-industrial societies and 
found that Americans displayed far less awareness than other comparable societies. Another 
study comparing Switzerland and the United States also found that knowledge of international 
affairs (and knowledge gaps) varied by the amount of international news coverage (Iyengar et 
al. 2009). Within Europe, as well, habitual viewership of either public service or commercial 
television broadcasting has also been found to influence levels of political knowledge (Norris 
and Holtz-Bacha 2001). 
 
We therefore need to monitor how far civic knowledge among citizens varies systematically 
across European nations and how far different individual-level educational qualifications and 
societal-level media landscapes may help to account for such variations (see for instance 
Curran et al. 2009; McCann and Chappell Lawson 2006; Holmberg 2009). The majority of 
studies of the knowledge gap have been conducted in the US, yet the media system in America 
and in European societies differ in some important regards; European television continues to 
have a far stronger public service tradition of broadcast journalism, alongside stricter regulation 
of campaign coverage, political expenditure, and political advertising (Kelly et al. 2004; 
Dragomir et al. eds. 2005; Bardoel and d’Haenens 2008). As Table 1 illustrates, media 
landscapes in Europe vary substantially on many dimensions, such as in historical and 
contemporary levels of democratization, per capita GDP and human development, as well as 
press freedom, access to media technologies, and the structure of broadcast television. 
European media systems also continue to differ significantly among member states, such as in 
Internet penetration rates, the degree of public service v. commercial broadcasters, and the 
structure of newspaper markets, providing a su itable context to test the potential impact of 
communication environments on knowledge gaps in post-industrial societies. 6 This includes 
important contrasts between long-standing West European democracies and EU member states 
which only experienced the transition to multiparty competitive elections and democratic states 
during the third wave era. These contextual features vary quite significantly across European 
countries and these factors are expected to influence knowledge gaps in the same way as they 
shape other aspects of political involvement and political equality (see for instance Gallego 
2010; Baek 2009). 
 
There have been a number of attempts to conceptualize contrasts in media systems, notably 
Mancini and Hallin developed an influential typology which has identified important contrasts 
across European countries, including in the development of a mass circulation press, the 
strength of the links between media and political parties, the development of professional 
journalism, and the extent of State intervention in the media system (Hallin and Mancini 2004). 
Unfortunately, their theoretical typology has proved difficult to operationalize and measure 
with any precision (Norris 2009). 
 
To provide an alternative way to conceptualize the contrasts, this study focuses upon t he 
idea of cosmopolitan communications. The concept of ‘cosmopolitan communications’ 
represents the degree of information flowing across and within national borders, including how 
far people interact today within a single global community, or whether these networks remain 
more localized and parochial.7 Cosmopolitan communications are understood to reflect the 
degree of openness towards ideas and information derived from divergent cultures, deepening 
6 Macro-level data about the regulation, structure and audience for the mass media are gathered from 
many database sources, including UNESCO, Euro-Stats, and the European Audiovisual Observatory. 
See, for example, http://www.obs.coe.int/db/index.html.en. 
7 For the idea of cosmopolitanism, see Hannerz 1990; Tomlinson 1999; Vertoves and Cohen eds. 2002. 
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awareness of other places and peoples, including their languages, habits, and customs. It is 
measured in any society, as discussed later, in terms of the degree of press freedom within any 
state, economic development (as a proxy determining levels of access to the mass media in 
each country), and external barriers to information flows (arising from the process of 
globalization). The core theory posits that life-time learning about civic affairs can be expected 
to be particularly strong under certain conditions; notably in cosmopolitan societies where all 
social sectors have widespread access to diverse news media channels and outlets, in 
democratic states with an independent press where citizens have many opportunities (and few 
constraints) to learn about public affairs from news and current affairs, and in countries where 
political information flows easily across national borders, without censorship or restrictions. 
Cosmopolitan communications are expected to be particularly important for learning about the 
workings of the European Union, as well as for deepening understanding of democratic 
processes and awareness of civic concerns at home. The term ‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘parochial’ is 
employed descriptively in this study, without implying any normative judgment about the 
preference for one or the other. The measure of cosmopolitan communications is described in 
more detail in the next section of the paper. 
 
Core Empirical Propositions 
To reexamine the knowledge gap thesis, the core propositions at the heart of this project 
therefore predict that: 
 
(1.1) Formal education will cause stronger levels of civic knowledge. 
(1.2) Exposure to the news media will cause stronger levels of civic knowledge; with 
the effects conditioned by the type of media. 
(1.3) A significant interaction effect will be evident in levels of civic knowledge, so 
that formal education in childhood and adolescence will reinforce the learning effects 
arising from exposure to the news media in adult life. 
(1.4) The strength of the interaction effect between education and media exposure will 
vary cross-nationally depending upon the degree of cosmopolitan communications 
within each society. In particular, we expect to establish that civic knowledge gaps 
between the well and less educated will be larger in societies with more parochial 
communications systems. 
 
 
Research Design 
Research testing these propositions requires classifying a diverse range of contemporary media 
landscapes in Europe as well as monitoring systematic cross-national survey data on media use 
and nationally-equivalent measures of civic knowledge. 
 
 
Cosmopolitan Communication Index 
This study draws upon a Cosmopolitanism index which is designed to measure the permeability 
of societies to inward information flows. The idea of cosmopolitan communications is 
operationalized here in terms of three closely-related dimensions. External barriers include the 
degree to which national borders are open or closed, whether imports of cultural goods and 
services are limited by tariffs, taxes, or domestic subsidies, and how far there are restrictions on 
the movement of people through international travel, tourism, and labor mobility. To compare 
how far countries are integrated into international networks, we draw upon the KOF 
Globalization Index. This provides comprehensive annual indicators of the degree of economic, 
social, and political globalization in 120 countries around the world since the early 1970s 
(Dreher et al. 2008). Limits on media freedom also restrict news and information within 
societies, including through the legal framework governing freedom of expression and 
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information (such as penalties for press offences); patterns of intimidation affecting journalists 
and the news media (such as imprisonment, deportation, or harassment of reporters); and the 
nature of state intervention in the media (such as state monopolies of broadcasting, political 
control over news, and the use of official censorship). The most isolationist regimes seek to 
control domestic public opinion through rigid censorship of any channels of external 
information, controlling state broadcasting and limiting access to foreign news. To measure the 
free flow of news and information internally within each society, we draw upon annual 
estimates of media freedom developed by Freedom House.8 Lastly, economic under-
development is also an important barrier to information; less affluent nations commonly lack 
modern communication infrastructures, such as an efficient telecommunication sector and a 
well-developed multi-channel broadcasting service, and large sectors of the population in these 
countries often do not have the resources or skills to access media technologies. To compare 
national-levels of media access, we monitor differences in economic development, measured by 
per capita GDP in purchasing power parity. Economic development is closely correlated with 
patterns of media access. 
 
In combination, these three factors are combined to develop the Cosmopolitanism index, 
described in Table 1, which is applied to compare and classify European societies. The results 
show considerable variance across EU member states, exemplified by the contrasts between a 
highly cosmopolitan society such as Luxembourg and a more parochial one, such as Bulgaria. 
 
 
Measuring Media Use 
The EES 2009 includes several items tapping frequency of campaign exposure to sources of 
election information (see Technical Appendix A). Respondents are asked how many days a 
week they generally followed the news (whether on TV, listening to the radio, or reading the 
press). They were also asked whether they often, sometimes, or never followed the news about 
the European election during the campaign (in the four weeks before polling day), whether on 
television, in a newspaper, or via a website, as well as whether they had talked with friends 
about the election, or attended a rally or public meeting about the election. The items on use of 
television news, newspapers and website election news were summed for analysis to construct 
a news media use scale. 
 
Some qualifications about the news media exposure measures should be highlighted. The 
metrics are focused on habitual use (‘how many days a week’), which is appropriate for 
watching evening news bulletins, but this is imprecise for monitoring the frequency of 
broadband online usage, which is often 24/7 for users. Some have also claimed that these sorts 
of traditional measures can be biased and include considerable  over-reporting,  particularly  
among  people  with  
8 For more methodological details and results, see Freedom House 2007. The IREX Media Sustainability 
Index provides another set of indicators (http://www.irex.org/resources/index.asp). The Media 
Sustainability Index benchmarks the conditions for independent media in a more limited range of 
countries across Europe, Eurasia, the Middle East, and North Africa. Unfortunately the IREX index does 
not contain sufficient number of cases worldwide to provide a further cross-check for this study. 
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Table 2: Campaign information sources, EES 2009 
% ‘sometimes’ or ‘often’... 
Watch election 
on TV 
Read elections 
news in newspaper 
Go to 
election 
website Discuss election 
Attend election 
meeting or rally 
Election news scale 
(TV, Newspapers, 
Website) 
Austria 86 86 24 85 7 59 
Germany 89 79 22 80 9 57 
Sweden 78 89 34 86 8 57 
Ireland 76 77 21 86 10 56 
Luxembourg 81 76 26 76 10 56 
Denmark 74 67 30 84 5 53 
The Netherlands 74 76 31 71 4 53 
Latvia 81 60 29 87 9 53 
Italy 75 63 25 80 21 53 
Belgium 70 59 31 70 20 52 
Finland 66 78 31 81 8 52 
Hungary 75 58 16 77 9 51 
Slovenia 75 63 19 75 7 50 
Malta 74 48 18 78 14 50 
United Kingdom 61 64 25 70 4 50 
Greece 69 45 22 84 13 49 
Estonia 71 66 16 79 6 49 
Cyprus 75 50 11 73 18 49 
Czech Republic 66 64 19 65 14 49 
Slovakia 72 58 14 66 10 48 
Poland 72 47 14 65 5 47 
Bulgaria 74 40 10 74 10 46 
France 55 53 15 69 5 46 
Spain 59 55 15 76 6 46 
Lithuania 69 52  9 71 5 45 
Romania 70 35  8 64 12 45 
Portugal 67 41 11 65 4 45 
Total 72 61 20 75 9 51 
 
Notes: Proportion reporting that they ‘often’ or ‘sometimes’ used any of these sources during the four weeks before the European elections. See Technical appendix. 
Source: EES 2009 
 
higher levels of education and political interest (Prior 2009). Respondents may not be able to 
recall the frequency of time spent on these activities and reporting may over or under-estimate 
exposure due to social desirability biases (Coromina and Saris 2009). The measure of 
frequency of exposure does not monitor attention to news or politics. The survey asks about use 
of some specific news outlets within each country, such as some of the major newspapers and 
mainstream television channels, but given the fragmentation of news outlets and markets, it is 
not possible to generalize from these questions to assess broader patterns of news exposure. 
Plausibly, some may not access any of the selected media, and yet they may still access news 
elsewhere on a regular basis, for example for young people using online sources. Problems of 
measurement also arise from the multiple platforms which are accessed and used today, 
generating complex experiences, habits, and exposure for users.  The EES questions are unable 
to distinguish between forms of online participation that are simply ‘translated’ from the offline 
environment, such as reading newspaper stories via the website, and those that are unique 
forms of two-way communications the internet, such as p olitical discussion in social media 
such as F acebook (Gibson et al. 2005). Moreover while the EES can identify more passive 
forms of information gathering (i.e. reading websites or receiving email contacts from 
candidates or party organizations) it does not monitor the more active, user-driven 
communications (such as blogging, Tweeting, or forwarding viral videos and news clips to 
friends and family). 
 
Given these important qualifications, the results in Table 2 show the contrasts among EU 
member states in use of campaign information sources. The variations confirm important 
differences within Europe, reflected in aggregate indices, such as the widespread readership of 
newspapers in Scandinavia compared with Mediterranean Europe (Norris 2000; Kelly et al. 
2004). Hence in the EES, readership of election news during the 2009 campaign was relatively 
low in Portugal, Bulgaria and Romania, whereas by contrast more than twice as many citizens 
reported reading election news in Austria, Sweden and Germany. Television news use proves 
more uniform, although again there are variations among EU states, for example with relatively 
little use in France and Finland compared with Germany and Latvia. Finally, the use of election 
websites also vary a lot within the European Union, reflecting broader aspects of the digital 
divide, with minimal use (less than one in ten) in Lithuania and Romania contrasted with 
almost one third of all citizens using these online resources in Sweden and the Netherlands. 
Similar contrasts can be observed in interpersonal forms of campaign communications, such as 
attendance at meetings of rallies (which remain most popular in Belgium and Italy) and, to a 
lesser extent, discussion of the election with friends and family. 
 
Measuring Political Knowledge 
There remains considerable debate in the research literature about the most appropriate way of 
conceptualizing and measuring political ‘knowledge’. Three main approaches can be identified. 
 
Civics test 
The most common approach has used simple true-false factual statements towards political 
knowledge, or the so-called “civics test” approach. As exemplified by Delli Carpini and Keeter 
(1993; 1996), this assumes that voters need to grasp the basic institutional arrangements in any 
regime (typified in American studies by being able to identify the name of the US Vice 
President or which party controls Congress), comprehensive and detailed information about the 
policy platforms of the main contenders for office; and familiarity with the fine-print of the 
government’s record. Similar items have been used in the EuroBarometer and in national 
election studies.9 One issue arising from this approach is that, even in long-established 
democracies and highly educated societies, the majority of citizens appear to fail these tests 
most of the time. Often the trivial is weighted equally with the important in knowledge scores, 
and no allowance is made for whether it makes any difference or whether there are any 
9 See, for example, the analysis of knowledge and campaign learning in the 1997 British Election Study 
(Norris et al. 1999). 
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consequences if citizens get the answers right or wrong. In some cases, ‘civic’ questions can be 
useful for practical judgments. But not all. The acid test is knowledge for what? To give a 
simple example, knowing exactly how many members sit in the national parliament is 
irrelevant to electoral choices.  B ut knowing the party or parties currently in government is 
essential to cast an informed ballot. Many civics items fall in between these categories, for 
example is it important to know the name of a minister with a specific portfolio to judge the 
quality of public services provided by that department? 
 
Relativist knowledge 
By contrast, the “relativist” approach acknowledges that people have a l imited reservoir of 
political information, but suggests that this can be sufficient for citizens (Zaller 1993). 
Relativists argue that cognitive short cuts, such as ideology or ‘schema’, like a h andy ready 
reckoner, reduce the time and effort required to make a reasoned choice about the performance 
of government with imperfect information. In this view, citizens are capable of making good 
low-information decisions because the costs of keeping fully informed are high, whereas the 
rewards for engaging in politics in contemporary democracies are low. Relativists lower the 
necessary information hurdles, producing a more realistic assessment so that most citizens get 
at least a passing grade. Yet one major difficulty with this approach is that the cognitive 
shortcuts that voters use to decide may be helpful in reducing the buzzing clutter of multiple 
messages, or they may be based on serious factual inaccuracies – or “false knowledge” – 
especially if the public is not paying close attention to complex political, economic, or social 
issues in European politics. 
 
Practical knowledge 
An alternative approach, associated with the work of Lupia and McCubbins, focuses on the 
importance of “practical knowledge” (Lupia 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998). In this view, 
people need useful knowledge – in domains that matter to them – to connect their preferences 
with their social, economic and political choices. This approach strikes a middle way on the 
assumption that citizens do not need to know everything about democratic governance, as if 
cramming for a school civics test. Nor do they need to rely upon ideological shortcuts, such as 
feelings of national pride or partisan loyalties, as such shortcuts may prove misleadingly dated 
or inaccurate. Instead the practical knowledge approach implies that for rational judgments, 
citizens need sufficient information in the social, economic and political spheres to connect 
their preferences rationally with their choices (Graber 1988; 1994). 
 
The EES 2009 adopted the ‘civics’ approach and presented respondents with a series of 
seven true/false factual statements about national and European politics (see Technical 
Appendix A). The items varied in the difficulty of the questions asked, generating a balanced 
scale displaying a normal distribution. Several considerations should be noted about the survey 
design. The questionnaire used closed-ended formats where respondents have to choose 
whether each statement was either true or false (Mondak 2001). This format may overestimate 
levels of political knowledge, as it facilitates random guesses. 
 
There are also some issues to consider about the treatment of the ‘Don’t Know’ (DK) 
answers. The most conventional way to construct civic knowledge indexes is through an 
additive measure of correct answers to factual knowledge questions, where 1 refers to a correct 
answer and 0 to an incorrect or DK response. However, evidence suggests that identically 
treating the options “incorrect” and “DK” can lead to ambiguous estimations of what people 
know about politics (Mondak and Creel 2001). While the option “DK” implies a l ack of 
information from citizens about political issues, the option “incorrect” implies a certain degree 
of misinformation or at least partial information, and therefore the “incorrect” answer might 
potentially represent a higher state of knowledge than the ‘DK’ answer. 
 
Lastly, beside format issues, the topics chosen for the different factual items are also 
important, as they affect the capacity of respondents to answer correctly the knowledge items in 
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surveys. The topic of the questions may refer to different dimensions of political knowledge, 
such as political leaders, political institutions, European or domestic politics, economic or 
foreign policy issues, and so on. 
 
The seven civic knowledge questions included in the EES 2009 are listed in Table 3. The 
three items concerning national politics were amended as suitable for comparable equivalence 
in each country, such as the name of the minister for education. Each answer was recoded into a 
binary variable as either factually correct (coded 1), or else zero (coded 0) for the incorrect 
answer or else ‘don’t know’. 
 
 
Table 3: Civic knowledge scale 
 True or 
false 
statement 
% 
Correct 
Q96. The British Secretary of State for Children, schools and families is Ed Balls. True 73.3 
Q92. Switzerland is a member of the EU False 64.2 
Q94. Every country in the EU elects the same number of representatives to the 
European Parliament. 
False 64.0 
Q95. Every six months, a d ifferent Member State becomes president of the 
Council of the European Union 
True 57.3 
Q98. There are 969 members of the British House of Commons False 53.3 
Q97. Individuals must be 25 or  older to stand as candidates in British general 
elections. 
False 41.0 
Q93. The European Union has 25 member states False 36.4 
Mean score out of 7  3.9 
Note: The UK version of the questionnaire. Both incorrect and ‘don’t know’ answers were categorized as 
incorrect. 
Source: EES (2009), European Parliament Election Study 2009, Voter Study, Advance Release, 7/4/2010, 
(www.piredeu.eu). 
 
As the distribution of correct answers shows, these items showed considerable discriminance 
by level of difficulty, with most inaccuracy concerning the number of EU member states and 
the highest proportion of correct answers identifying the national minister for education. The 
seven items were tested with principle component factor analysis and they formed a si ngle 
dimension.  R eliability statistics suggest that the items form a reasonably strong index 
(Cronbach Alpha = .67). The summary index showed a normal distribution, producing a mean 
score of 3.89 out of 7 points (Median 4.0, Variance 3.5, Std Dev. 1.87, Skew -0.281). None of 
the civics issues were given particular emphasis within the period of the EU election, so in this 
regard the civics items formed a w eak test of campaign learning. Nevertheless it might be 
expected that the month-long campaign for the European parliament would encourage some 
background learning about European Union institutions, procedures, and membership among 
the most attentive news media users, amplifying and reinforcing general knowledge of matters 
such as the rotating EU presidency and the number of member states. 
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Analysis and Results 
 
First we can examine the core propositions descriptively and then use the multilevel 
multivariate analysis models. The first proposition suggests that (1.1) Formal education will 
cause stronger levels of civic knowledge. The study monitoring individual-level educational 
attainment, based on a 14-point  ISCED internationally-standardized  scale concerning the 
highest level of education which the respondent had completed, ranging from 1 ( no 
qualifications and left school prior to age 11) up to 14 (doctorate). This was collapsed into a 
seven point scale, to increase the reliability with smaller national samples. Finally the scale was 
also categorized around the mean into high or low levels of education, for descriptive statistics. 
 
 
 
Source: EES (2009), European Parliament Election Study 2009, Voter Study, Advance Release, 7/4/2010, 
(www.piredeu.eu). 
Figure 2: Knowledge gaps by education and election news media scale 
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The key issue for the classic knowledge gap thesis, however, is how far early schooling 
during childhood and adolescence conditions lifelong learning processes and thus information 
about contemporary affairs acquired through the news media. The third core proposition 
predicts that (1.3) a significant interaction effect will be evident in levels of civic knowledge, so 
that formal education in childhood and adolescence will reinforce the learning effects arising 
from exposure to the news media in adult life. 
 
 
 
 
Source: EES (2009), European Parliament Election Study 2009, Voter Study, Advance Release, 7/4/2010, 
(www.piredeu.eu). 
Figure 3: Knowledge gaps by education and televisions news use 
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 Source: EES (2009), European Parliament Election Study 2009, Voter Study, Advance Release, 7/4/2010, 
(www.piredeu.eu). 
Figure 4: Knowledge gaps by education and newspaper use 
 
 
 
Source: EES (2009), European Parliament Election Study 2009, Voter Study, Advance Release, 
7/4/2010, (www.piredeu.eu). 
Figure 5: Knowledge gaps by education and internet use 
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 Source: EES (2009), European Parliament Election Study 2009, Voter Study, Advance Release, 7/4/2010, (www.piredeu.eu). 
Figure 6: Knowledge gaps by education and media use scale, by nation 
 
Table 4 demonstrates the descriptive interaction effects between formal educational 
qualifications, use of the election news media scale, and levels of civic knowledge. Figure 2 
illustrates the pattern visually. The use of elections news is clearly associated with greater civic 
knowledge. Most strikingly, however, instead of observing a widening knowledge gap between 
the well-educated and the less educated, the evidence demonstrates that use of the campaign 
news media gradually closes the knowledge gap. Hence there is a mean knowledge gap of .86 
among the low and high educational groups who rarely use the news media during the election. 
By contrast, the size of this knowledge gap among the low and high educational groups shrinks 
by about half among those most attentive to the election news media. In other words, the news 
media in Europe appear to have a positive effect by reducing lack of knowledge from formal 
schooling, a pattern consistent with the lifetime learning model and one contrary to the effects 
predicted by the traditional knowledge gap literature. 
 
One way to look at this pattern in more detail is to compare the size of knowledge gaps by 
use of different types of election news media; thus Figure 3 presents similar patterns for 
television news use while Figure 4 c ompares newspaper readership and Figure 5 looks at 
internet use.  The results demonstrate that the knowledge gap between the less and well-
educated shrinks consistently for each type of media, with particularly strong effects for 
television news. It may be that knowledge gaps which have been commonly observed in the 
context of the United States media environment are different to those found in Europe, given 
the stronger emphasis on European public service broadcasting. This explanation, which 
requires further evidence to confirm fully, is certainly consistent with Norris and Holtz-Bacha’s 
earlier finding that people learn more from public service than commercial television in Europe 
(Norris and Holtz-Bacha 2001). 
 
Table 4: Civic knowledge by education and media use 
Election news scale  
(TV, newspapers, websites)  
Low education 
_____________ 
High education 
_____________ 
Gap 
_____________ 
1. Lowest use of election news 2.85 3.71 0.86 
2. 3.26 4.08 0.82 
3. 3.74 4.40 0.66 
4. Moderate use of election news 4.10 4.62 0.51 
5. 4.33 4.77 0.44 
6 4.53 4.95 0.42 
7. Highest use of election news 4.31 5.01 0.69 
Total 3.60 4.41 0.81 
Note: Mean scores on the 7-point Civic Education index by educational category and use of 
election news 
Source: EES (2009), European Parliament Election Study 2009, Voter Study, Advance Release, 
7/4/2010, (www.piredeu.eu). 
 
In addition, the core relationship between knowledge gaps and both education and media use 
can be broken down by country, as illustrated in Figure 6. This replicates Figure 2 bu t the 
results are subdivided by EU member state. The visual patterns show that the knowledge gap 
between the well-educated and the less educated is evident in all countries, although it is 
smallest overall in Ireland, Austria and Sweden, while proving more substantial in Romania, 
Slovakia and Portugal. The closure of the knowledge gap between those with low and high 
educational attainment due to media use, however, is clearest in Romania and Bulgaria. 
 
Thus overall the descriptive results suggest that formal schooling leaves a strong imprint on 
adult knowledge about politics and civic affairs. Nevertheless far from the knowledge gap 
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between the well and the less educated expanding, use of the news media serves to close, 
although not eradicate, the differential. 
 
Multilevel models 
So far we have only observed the descriptive patterns, but these could be attributed to other 
individual and national level differences which are commonly associated with habitual use of 
the news media, such as those of sex, class and age. It is well-established that patterns of 
newspaper readership are usually greater among men rather than women, among the older 
populations and among middle-class sectors, although these relationships vary both over time 
and among societies, in part due to the nature of the media markets. Some similar social 
profiles are evident in distinguishing internet users, with a reversal of the age use, showing the 
familiar digital divides. Lastly television news viewership is usually less clearly defined by 
socioeconomic or demographic group, although it does tend to be higher among the older 
generation, who usually watch more television in general (See for example Norris 2000). 
Patterns of media use and civic knowledge are expected to vary substantially in the context of a 
wide range of European media environments at societal-level, based on their permeability to 
cosmopolitan communications. Given these considerations, multilevel regression is the most 
suitable technique for analysis. 
 
Model A in Table 5 presents the results of the multilevel regression models testing the 
effects of education, media use, and the interaction of both these factors controlling for the 
standard demographic and socioeconomic variables at individual levels. The results confirm, as 
observed earlier, that both campaign news use and educational qualifications are associated 
with greater civic knowledge, even after employing the standard social controls. Since the 
coefficients are standardized (Z-scores), they can be compared against each other. The effects 
of education are particularly marked, outweighing all the other demographic, socioeconomic 
and attitudinal factors. Nevertheless far from exacerbating the difference, the combined 
interaction of media use and education reduces the knowledge gap. This suggests that, as 
observed descriptively, the knowledge gap between the well-educated and less educated is 
greatest amongst those who pay little attention to the news media. Amongst the group paying 
more attention, the knowledge gap due to education closes. 
 
Model B in Table 5 then adds the effects of cosmopolitan communications at societal 
level, and the interaction of education, media use and cosmopolitan communications. The 
argument is that in information-rich societies, where there is widespread access to political 
news at home and abroad, these conditions are most likely to promote civic knowledge. The 
results of Model B show that the main effects remain largely constant, although the impact of 
both education and media use strengthen slightly. The interaction of education and media use 
continues to close knowledge inequalities. Moreover, knowledge is strengthened by living in a 
cosmopolitan society. And this type of society interacts with media use and education to reduce 
knowledge differentials. The results do not change the main coefficients but overall the higher 
degree of cosmopolitan communications in any society, the smaller the civic knowledge gaps. 
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Table 5: Multilevel regression models of civic knowledge 
 Model A Model B 
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL   
Demographic characteristics   
Age (years) .213*** .212*** 
 (.013) (.013) 
   
Gender (male=1) .332*** .332*** 
 (.012) (.012) 
   
Socioeconomic resources   
Occupational class 7-pt scale .264*** .260*** 
 (.014) (.014) 
   
Education 7-pt scale .410*** .468*** 
 (.025) (.043) 
Attitudes   
Political interest .329*** .327*** 
 (013) (.013) 
Media use   
Frequency of election news use .154*** .203*** 
 (.015) (.020) 
NATIONAL-LEVEL   
Cosmopolitan Communications Index  .229* 
   (.091) 
INTERACTION EFFECTS   
Education*Election news use -.153*** -.124*** 
 (.029) (.028) 
   
Education*Media use*Cosmopolitanism Index  -.169*** 
  (.044) 
   
Constant (intercept) 3.82 3.83 
Schwartz BIC 69,805 69,976 
N. respondents 18,448 18,432 
 
N. nations 
 
25 
 
25 
Note: All independent variables were standardized using mean centering (z-scores). Models present the 
results of the REML multilevel regression models including the beta coefficient, (the standard error 
below in parenthesis), and the significance. The civic knowledge scale is constructed from the items 
listed in Table 3. The campaign media use scale combined use of newspapers, TV news, and websites for 
election news. The Cosmopolitan Communications Index combines measure of media freedom, 
economic development, and globalization. P.*=.05 **=.01 ***=.001. See appendix A for details about 
the measurement, coding and construction of all variables. Significant coefficients are highlighted in 
bold.  
Source: EES (2009), European Parliament Election Study 2009, Voter Study, Advance Release, 7/4/2010, 
(www.piredeu.eu).  
 
 
This pattern is illustrated in the scatterplot in Figure 7, where  the  knowledge  gaps  (i.e.  
the deficit of civic knowledge) between the well-educated and the less educated prove greatest 
in countries such as Slovakia, Malta and Poland, which are more parochial, while the gap 
closes in more cosmopolitan societies such as Denmark, Sweden and Luxembourg. 
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Source: EES (2009), European Parliament Election Study 2009, Voter Study, Advance Release, 7/4/2010, 
(www.piredeu.eu). 
 
                          Figure 7: Knowledge gaps and cosmopolitan communications 
 
 
Conclusions and Implications 
 
Debate about what citizens learn about politics and public affairs has been a long-standing issue 
in the study of political science and voting behavior. Disputes continue about the extent of any 
campaign learning and the conditions which facilitate or hinder this process. Unfortunately 
many studies have been limited to only one country, with analysis at individual-level, so that 
any effects arising from the broader societal context of the communications environment cannot 
be examined. Yet the impact of the availability of information arising from multiple sources is a 
plausible condition for any inequalities between information rich and poor. 
 
The findings presented here illustrate some of the factors driving knowledge gaps, including 
the role of education, exposure to the news media, and living in an information rich 
cosmopolitan society. All of these factors prove important but at the same time much further 
research is needed to build upon t his foundation. In particular, the effect of this process is 
expected to be conditioned by several factors which have not yet been discussed. Hence the 
complexity and type of issues may well matter, in particular, knowledge gaps dividing the well-
educated and less educated can be expected to be larger concerning more complex and abstract 
issues, such as international affairs rather than domestic issues of the economy or social policy. 
The knowledge test used here concerns fairly narrow issues of civic awareness, so we are 
unable to compare different dimensions of knowledge, and it thus remains unclear whether 
similar effects would be evident using a practical or relativist notion of what constitutes 
relevant knowledge. The type of public or private broadcasting system may also matter for 
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learning processes, along with the content and amount of coverage of campaign news and 
public affairs more generally. More fine-grained approaches which match habitual exposure to 
specific channels and programs with levels of knowledge would facilitate this further analysis. 
Therefore this study has added a cross-national comparison to the standard single-nation 
approach of understanding knowledge gaps but there are many other dimensions which require 
analysis for a more comprehensive understanding of this phenomenon. 
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Technical appendix A 
Campaign news: “How often did you do any of the following during the four weeks before the 
European election? How often did you:” 
 
 Often Sometimes Never 
Q16. Watch a program about the election on television? 1 2 3 
Q17. Read about the election in a newspaper? 1 2 3 
Q18. Talk to friends or family about the election? 1 2 3 
Q19. Attend a public meeting or rally about the election? 1 2 3 
Q20. Look into a website concerned with the election? 1 2 3 
 
 
Civic Knowledge index 
Q92-Q98: Now some questions about the European Union and ___(your country). For these 
questions, I am going to read out some statements. For each one, could you please tell me 
whether you believe they are true or false? If you don’t know, just say so and we will skip to 
the next one. (UK version of the questionnaire) 
 
 True False REF DK 
Q92. Switzerland is a member of the EU 1 2* 7 8 
Q93. The European Union has 25 member states 1 2* 7 8 
Q94. Every country in the EU elects the same number of 
representatives to the European Parliament. 
1 2* 7 8 
Q95. Every six months, a different Member State becomes president 
of the Council of the European Union 
1* 2 7 8 
Q96. The British Secretary of State for Children, schools and 
families is Ed Balls. 
1* 2 7 8 
Q97. Individuals must be 25 or older to stand as candidates in 
British general elections. 
1 2* 7 8 
Q98. There are 969 members of the British House of Commons 1 2* 7 8 
Note (*) statements were recoded as the correct answers. 
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Introduction 
 
This chapter pursues three broad research questions. On the most general level, we are interested 
in the effectiveness of political parties in EU electoral politics.  We focus on two aspects of this 
question that are empirically accessible. The first concerns the ability of political parties to 
effectively communicate their issue positions and policy concerns to the citizenry. Do citizens 
perceive the electoral messages of political parties in such a way that they can decode them in 
terms of generalised policy positions, or ideologies? Many theories of issue voting assume 
exactly this: that voter perceptions of party positions reflect to some degree the policies and 
issue stands of these parties. Already in 1957 Anthony Downs highlighted the information costs 
that are involved here, and referred to ideology as a cost saving device. In EU politics, those 
generalised issue or ideological positions are related to the left-right and the independence-
integration dimension. We will analyse whether citizens are able to translate the electoral com-
munications of parties in terms of those generalised issue positions. By doing so, we will also 
explore the substantive meaning, or policy content, of these two dimensions. What exactly is it 
that defines whether a party is perceived to lean more to the left or to the right, or whether it is 
perceived to be closer to the independence or to the integration pole of the ideological spectrum?  
 
The second aspect of our general research question, which we will empirically assess, 
concerns the ability of political parties to govern the issue positions and policy preferences of 
their candidates. This is no less important than parties’ ability to communicate their messages 
to the voters. Candidates are the spokespersons of political parties in the electoral campaign 
“on the ground”. Parties therefore need to make sure that their local candidates are speaking in 
accord with the main party line. This chapter will establish how well they manage to do this.  
 
It is the argument of this chapter that these kinds of questions can be answered by referring to the 
issue emphases and policy positions that parties advocate in their manifestos. We will show that 
citizens’ perceptions of the location of political parties – on the left-right and the independence-
integration dimension – are to a considerable degree associated with the content of these parties’ 
election manifestos. Moreover, we will demonstrate that the positions of the candidates of political 
parties on these two dimensions can be understood as a reflection of the content of the election 
manifesto of their parties. Our general approach to address these questions will first identify the 
latent dimensions of parties’ programmatic issue and policy statements; second, predict on this basis 
citizens’ perceptions of political parties’ left-right and independence-integration positions as secured 
in the cross-sectional surveys of the European Election Study 2009; and third, use these same latent 
dimensions in political parties’ election manifestos to predict the self-locations of their candidates 
on the left-right and the independence-integration dimensions.  
 
The structure of the chapter is straightforward. We first review the available scholarship in 
this area and formulate three broad hypotheses that guide our data analysis. We proceed by 
discussing our data base and the design and the methodology of our analysis. This will be 
followed by the presentation of our empirical findings. A conclusion reviews the main findings 
and specifies some directions for further research.  
1 Universities of Manchester and Mannheim. Email: hschmitt@mzes.uni-mannheim.de 
2 Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB). Email: wessels@wzb.eu 
3 Methods and Data Institute, University of Nottingham. Email : cees.vandereijk@nottingham.ac.uk 
221
 Previous Research and Hypotheses 
 
The EU political space has been structured by two generalised policy dimensions. One is the 
well-known left–right dimension which expresses a host of salient issue conflicts in terms of 
one common denominator (e.g. Laponce 1981; van der Eijk and Schmitt 2010). The other 
dimension organises political preferences that range from national independence to European 
integration (e.g. Hix et al. 2007). These two dimensions used to be independent from one 
another so that a particular position on one dimension (say somewhere on the ‘left’) did not 
imply a particular position on the other (say near the ‘national independence’ pole; e.g. Schmitt 
and Thomassen 2009; van der Eijk and Franklin 2004). 
 
We argue that these two generalised policy dimensions serve as heuristics. Heuristics, under 
conditions of imperfect information, help citizens to take rational decisions (e.g. which party to 
vote for) that are still based on their own specific issue positions and policy preferences 
(Downs 1957; Sniderman, Brody & Tetlock 1991). This is why they are sometimes referred to 
as “super issues” which can serve as summary indicators of a broad range of diverse issue 
positions and policy concerns (Inglehart & Klingemann 1976).  
 
We believe that citizen perceptions of the issue emphasis and policy positions of political 
parties have their basis in the actual behaviour of parties. Of course, parties behave in different 
arenas: EU politics, national politics, and even sub-national politics. However, these 
distinctions become somewhat blurred by the very fact that the European Union is operating as 
a multi-level system of governance (Hooghe and Marks 2001), and party behaviour in one 
arena has its repercussions in other arenas. Our focus here is on parties’ public political 
pronouncements and, more in particular, on the contents of their election manifestos. As we 
focus on the EU political arena, we will deal with the manifestos that parties issued on the 
occasion of the 2009 European Parliament election. This is not to say that these Euromanifestos 
are important as direct sources of information for the citizenry at large. We know well that 
citizens normally do not  read election manifestos. Still, those manifestos are important 
indirectly as their main messages are spread via the media, the commentariat and the political 
behaviour of party elites which is itself – this is at least our assumption – to a large part 
informed by and based upon the political direction that has been commonly defined in the 
election manifesto of their party.  
 
Graph 1 illustrates our research design; the solid arrows in it are investigated in this paper. 
We distinguish three groups of actors in the EU electoral process – parties, candidates and 
voters.4 Parties send policy (and personnel) messages to the voters, and we are interested in 
knowing what these messages are about and whether they are well received by the voters. The 
reciprocal effect, namely that voters respond to these messages by abstaining from the election 
or by participating and choosing one of the competing parties, is a more traditional question of 
electoral research which will not, however, be addressed in the present chapter.  
 
Not only do parties send policy messages to voters; they also recruit candidates who engage 
in the campaign in order to gain the support of as many voters as possible and ultimately, 
parliamentary representation. We expect these candidates to form groups of like-minded men 
and women, much as Flinn and Wirt observed many years ago when studying local party 
leaders in Ohio (Flinn and Wirt 1965). The reason for this assumed like-mindedness is in the 
interest of political parties: they cannot afford to recruit candidates with vastly differing issue 
orientations and policy preferences as this would threaten party unity and damage a party’s 
prospects for electoral success.   
 
4 We concentrate on the most obvious here, and even among those we ignore one very significant actor – 
the media. These limitations are imposed by the constraints of a conference paper.  
222
  
                                           send policy (& personnel) messages  
 national
 national 
  political
 electorates 
 parties                     respond according to their 
                                         preferences & predispositions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
party 
candidates 
 
 
Graph 1: Three Groups of Actors in the EU Electoral Process 
 
 
Based upon this reasoning, we are interested here in the degree to which we can understand 
the issue positions and policy preferences of party candidates as a function of the content of 
their parties’ election manifestos. In other words: can we think of these party candidates as the 
agents of their principal, that is: the party for which they are campaigning? And of course, there 
are again important further questions related to the attitudes and behaviours of party candidates 
which we cannot address in this paper, like their campaign effort and its relation to electoral 
success, to name but one.  
 
Based upon the above, we test the following two hypotheses: 
 
H1: Citizens’ perceptions of political parties’ left-right and independence-integration 
positions are informed by the content of the Euromanifestos of the parties. 
 
H2: Candidates’ issue orientations and policy positions are determined by the content 
of the Euromanifestos of their parties. 
 
In addition, we expect that: 
 
H3: These relationships are context-specific. More in particular, we expect contextual 
variations both in the strength of the overall determination of left-right and indepen-
dence-integration perceptions of parties and in the relative importance of specific 
content dimensions in those predictions.  
 
This latter argument is particularly important with regard to the seven post-communist 
countries in our sample. While research on the meaning of left and right in post-communist 
countries is limited, there are some indications that it has been different and, at least in some 
instances, reversed in comparison with connotations that are customary in the Western world. 
“During perestroika the terms ‘left’ and ‘right’ were inverted: the ‘left’ came to denote the free 
market democrats and liberals, and the ‘right’ the devotees of socialism and the communist 
system” (Sakwa 1996: 44; see also Colton 1998; Whitefield & Evans 1998; Markowski 1997; 
Park 1993).  
 
Much the same argument about contextual variations holds for the dimension of national 
independence versus European integration. In Western Europe, EU orientations have 
recruit like-minded  
men and women 
     campaign for votes 
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 progressively become associated with a p erceived need to protect, or demarcate, national 
economies and cultures from the effects of globalisation in general and of European integration 
in particular (Kriesi et al. 2008). In Eastern Europe, the situation seems to be different. After 
the (forced) integration of Eastern European countries into the USSR and the Warsaw Bloc 
came to an end, national independence is obviously a highly valued goal in post-communist 
politics which is not easily sacrificed on the altar of European integration (e.g. Jahn 2008). In 
addition, political expectations that Eastern Europeans associate with the European Union are 
of a particular kind, as the support for EU policy competences is often associated with the 
expectation that the EU might help to improve the quality of national political and economic 
processes (Schmitt 2007).  
 
 
Data, Design and Methods 
 
The overwhelming majority of analyses based on manifesto content is interested in estimates of 
the left-right positions of political parties (see e.g. Budge et al. 2001; Laver 2001; Klingemann 
et al. 2007). This is not to say that these studies would agree on the best way to get there. Quite 
the contrary, the traditionalists – that is, the adherents of the expert coding school around 
Budge, Klingemann and others – are accused by a growing group of revisionists – around 
Laver, Benoit and others – that the MRG/CMP coding process lacks reliability and thus 
validity, and should therefore be replaced by computerized coding routines (e.g. Laver et al. 
2003; Benoit et al. 2009). We do not entirely follow the line of reasoning of these critics, not 
least because computerized content analysis itself is not without problems. On the other hand, 
the CMP approach of estimating left-right positions of political parties has more problems – 
and arguably more important ones – than the questionable reliability of its content codes. Most 
importantly, it c an hardly be justified that the left-right positions of political parties are 
determined with a time- and space-invariant instrument – the so-called RILE index – which 
specifies a priori how the content categories of the MRG/CMP coding scheme are indicative of 
left and right.  
 
The situation is not principally different regarding the independence-integration dimension. 
This dimension is obviously best covered in the Euromanifesto project which, however, 
accurately copied the strategy of content analysis from the MRG/CMP and now MARPOR 
project. Here as well, additive indices have been used to measure parties’ European integration 
policy which count the proportion of Euro-positive arguments in a Euromanifesto and subtract 
it from the proportion of Euro-negative arguments (e.g. Thomassen and Schmitt 2004; Wüst 
and Schmitt 2007; Schmitt and Thomassen 2009). While the independence-integration 
dimension is arguably less complex than the left-right dimension, this is still a somewhat 
“mechanical” approach with obvious limitations. 
 
In the following, we will proceed differently and confront the left-right and independence-
integration positions of political parties and their candidates with the issue emphasis and policy 
position of those parties as stated in their Euromanifestos. Parties’ positions on these 
dimensions are estimated from voter surveys, by way of citizens’ mean perception of those 
positions, while candidates’ positions are self-reported in the data from the PIREDEU 
candidate survey. We do this for all parties that contested the European Parliament election of 
2009 and for which (a) a party manifesto for the 2009 election could be identified and coded; 
(b) questions have been included in the post-electoral voter surveys asking for the position of 
the party on both dimensions; and (c) at least one candidate has been interviewed. 
 
The policy positions of parties are assumed to be reflected in their election programs, and 
more particularly in the coded form of the latter. These election programs have been subjected 
to systematic content analyses in the tradition of the MRG/CMP project. Coding categories are 
used to characterise each sentence (or in the case of complex sentences, each argument, or 
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 quasi-sentence). When aggregated into proportions these codes represent the emphasis that 
parties place on the issues associated with the respective codes.  
 
We will attempt to explain citizens’ perceptions of party positions and candidates self-
locations from the issues and policies that the parties emphasize in their Euromanifestos. In 
principle we could do so by using the party and candidate positions as dependent variables, and 
all the MRG/CMP content categories as independent variables. This has a number of 
disadvantages, however. First, the large number of independent variables that this would entail 
risks problems of estimation and interpretation owing to unavoidable multicollinearity. This is 
aggravated by the already mentioned reliability problems of the MRG/CMP data, which partly 
originate in the substantive overlap between categories (Mikhaylov et al. 2008; Benoit et al. 
2009; but see also Braun et al. 2009), and which would result in a considerable degree of 
capitalising on chance when using all categories as independent variables. Instead, we will rely 
on the latent structure underlying the manifest variables contained in the original coding 
categories, and use those latent dimensions in subsequent analysis as our predictors of 
perceived left-right and independence-integration positions of political parties and their 
candidates.5  
 
The latent structure of coded party manifestos can be analysed in a number of ways, the 
choice of which depends on assumptions about the character of the manifest and the latent 
variables, and about their relationships. If we assume the latent variables to be continuous, 
some kind of latent trait model is required, whereas latent class analysis is the relevant 
approach if we assume the latent structure to be categorical (nominal) in character.6 The 
manifest variables are in our analysis the substantive content categories of the manifesto coding 
scheme, which reflect for each party the proportion of arguments, relative to all coded 
arguments of a m anifesto, that belong to them. These variables are of an interval-character 
(albeit bounded by lower and upper limits of 0 and 1). Latent and manifest variables can be 
assumed to be linear, monotonous, or non-monotonous. In the first two instances we can use 
factor-analytic or cumulative IRT-models to investigate the latent structure. In the third 
instance ideal-point or vector-preference models are the most appropriate choice.  
 
We expect the latent variables to be dimensional in character, which would reflect that 
parties and manifestos can be distinguished in gradations of ‘lower’ versus ‘higher’ in 
substantive issue and policy terms. We also expect a monotonous (possibly close to linear) 
relationship to exist between the manifest and the latent variables, so that some form of factor 
analytic approach seems viable.  
 
Factor analyses have been used in the past to investigate the structure of manifesto data (e.g. 
Budge et al. 1987; Strøm and Leipart 1989; Cole 2005; Petry and Pennings 2006; Schmitt & 
van der Eijk 2009; van der Eijk and Schmitt 2010; Wessels and Schmitt 2010). While not 
5 Note that we utilised a version of the 2009 Euromanifesto data which differs in two important respects 
from the original data as they are made available from the PIREDEU website. One of the differences is 
that we ignore the level of government codes that are assigned to each argument. The second difference 
is that we inspected the distribution of each individual coding category and suppressed all categories that 
are used in less than 90 percent of all documents. These “suppressed”, or ignored, categories are typically 
those that have been newly included in 2009 as negative counterparts of originally positive categories (an 
example is the code “peace negative”). Negative counterparts were newly included in the 2009 coding 
routine in order to allow for a strictly hierarchical coding procedure (for details see Braun et al. 2009).   
6 In the case of latent traits, we arrive at a depiction of parties and their manifestos in terms of positions 
on one or several (latent) dimensions, each of which runs from ‘low’ to ‘high’. In the case of latent 
classes, the analysis will lead to a ch aracterisation of parties in terms of one or several nominal 
classifications, each of which distinguishes substantively different ‘types’ of manifestos (hence types of 
parties).  
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 unequivocally supported (van der Brug 1997)7, this technique has been shown repeatedly to be 
able to extract latent dimensions which structure the content codes of election manifestos. In 
this paper, we use a principal components extraction of the four main factors. We decided to 
restrict the number of dimensions to four on substantive grounds (no overlap between the 
factors) and by ignoring the widely used Eigenvalue ≥1 criterion, as was recently suggested by 
Costello and Osborne (2005).  
 
The voter perceptions of parties’ left-right and independence-integration positions are based 
on voter survey respondents’ answers to questions in which they were asked to locate the 
parties involved on a n 11-point rating scale. We u se the mean values of these responses, as 
available from the PIREDEU website, as a measure of party location.  
 
In contrast to our strategy to identify voter perceptions of party positions, we rely on self-
placements on identical left-right and independence-integration questions in the candidate 
survey to place these parties’ candidates. We also analyse more specific issue orientations of 
candidates and assess how these are informed by their party’s Euromanifesto. The respective 
issue questions are documented in Appendix 2.  
 
The final aspect of the design of the analysis concerns the question how to determine the 
effect of latent dimensions on the left-right and independence-integration positions of political 
parties and their candidates. More in particular, we face the problem that issue saliencies and 
problem agendas differ widely between the EU member countries in the West and the East of 
the Union, and we must expect the latent dimensions of manifesto content to vary accordingly. 
There are basically two strategies for dealing with this. One is the extraction of four common 
factors for all – Eastern and Western – parties, and a regression analysis concentrating on East-
West interactions of the main effects (i.e., the latent dimensions). The alternative strategy is to 
extract separate latent dimensions for Western and Eastern parties, and to run separate 
analyses for both classes of cases. We decided to choose the latter alternative for reasons of 
descriptive clarity even if the latent dimensions would not differ all that much.  
 
 
Excursus on the Dimensionality of the European Political Space 
 
Before we can do t hat, however, we need to take a brief look at the dimensionality of the 
European political space. The question we are pursuing here is whether positions on the left-
right dimension and the independence-integration dimension are indeed independent from one 
another. Would this not be the case, i.e. were these two dimensions more or less strongly 
correlated, our findings regarding the determinants of position taking on bo th dimensions 
would also be correlated. This would not invalidate our strategy of analysis, but we should of 
course know about it and take it into account when interpreting our findings.  
 
Existing research on this question points in the direction of independence. Hix cum suis 
(2007) identifies two orthogonal dimensions structuring the European political space. These 
two dimensions are characterised by left-right and independence-integration policies. Based on 
their analysis of roll-call votes in the European Parliament, they maintain that the left-right 
dimension is increasingly gaining weight and importance over the independence-integration 
dimension. Based on different empirical evidence – namely national voter perceptions of 
national party locations – this conclusion was supported by Schmitt and Thomassen (2009) for 
7 Van der Brug argues that MDS is a more appropriate manner to analyse the data. Although we do not 
disagree with his position in principle, we find that the larger number of variables contained in the 
coding scheme ameliorates the potential disadvantages of a factor analytic approach. Elsewhere we will 
elaborate in more detail under which circumstances different approaches lead to substantively different 
findings in the analysis design utilised here.  
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 the 2004 election of the European Parliament.8 When we replicate this analysis for the 2009 
election, we find hardly any difference to the situation in 2004 (Graph 2). With an R2 of “only” 
five percent, the locations of political parties on these two dimensions are still largely 
independent from one another. This is somewhat counter-intuitive on t he background of the 
recent Euro-sceptical upsurge of support for “populist new right” parties.  
 
 
 
 Source: European Voter Study 2009 (PIREDEU).  
 
Graph 2. Left vs. Right and Integration vs. Demarcation: 
The Two Dimensions Are Still —Almost— Orthogonal 
 
 
The Latent Structure of Party Manifestos 
 
As discussed earlier, we use factor analysis to describe the content of parties’ manifestos in a 
limited number of dimensions of core importance. Obviously, a large amount of original detail 
is lost by doing so, and whether or not this matters can only be assessed when using the 
resulting dimensions as independent variables to explain how parties are perceived by citizens, 
and how these latent content dimensions constrain the policy orientations of party candidates. 
 
In the analyses reported here we conducted separate latent structure analyses for the 
Euromanifestos of Western and Eastern European parties respectively.9 Table 1 reports the 
8 See van der Eijk and Franklin (2004) for additional empirical evidence supporting the independence 
claim.  
9 We did so somewhat reluctantly, as from a g eneralist perspective we would prefer to use a s ingle 
analysis for all manifestos. Such a p ooled analysis would allow a u nified regression analysis of all 
parties and all countries, in which interaction effects could be used to estimate differences in effects 
between countries or between kinds of parties. Actually, we did originally perform such an analysis, and 
it leads, by and large, to the same conclusions as we derive in this paper from separate analyses for the 
two groups of countries. Yet, we decided on separate analyses for two reasons. One relates to differences 
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 results from these factor analyses. In both instances, we extract the same number of factors, 
which capture somewhat less of the overall variance in the original 101 variables in the 
Western Euromanifestos.  
 
It is clear from the substantive meaning of the factors that the political agenda that parties 
address in their Euromanifestos is quite different in Western and Eastern Europe. The analysis 
of the 135 W estern platforms reveals as a first and most important factor what we call 
“xenophobic Euro-Scepticism” – a syndrome of issue concerns that comes close to the cultural 
dimension of the new structural cleavage between winners and losers of globalisation that 
Kriesi cum suis identify in their 2008 book. The second factor combines two aspects – one pol- 
 
 
Table 1. Meaning Dimensions in the Electoral Communication of Political Parties Competing 
in the 2009 European Parliament Elections  
(results from a factor analysis of Euromanifesto content categories)    
Note: see Appendix 1 for details. 
 
 
itical and one economic – of conservative or right-wing orientations: the emphasis on law and 
order and the military on the one hand, and on laissez-faire economics on the other. The third 
factor represents a more traditional emphasis on European integration, combining the demand 
in the structure of residuals from the analyses, which could, in principle be modelled with higher-order 
interactions, but at the cost of clarity of presentation. The second reason is more important, however. 
Interpreting the substantive meaning of the factors derived from a pooled analysis is less clear-cut than in 
the case of the separate analysis. Moreover, comparing the results from the separate analyses shows very 
clearly, and in a way that is not captured by the pooled analysis, the differences in the political agendas 
in both groups of countries. 
 
135 WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTIES (4 Factors, extracting 20,5 % of variance of the original 
categories) 
Substantive interpretation of factors: 
1. Xenophobic Euro-Scepticism 
2. [against] Law and Order and Free Enterprise 
3. Economic Europe 
4. Protectionism and CAP 
 
61 EASTERN EUROPEAN PARTIES (4 Factors, extracting 23,2 %  of variance of the original 
categories) 
Substantive interpretation of factors: 
1. Post-communist Nostalgia 
2. [Green] Alternative Libertarianism 
3. Market Economy 
4. Capitalist Independence 
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 for increasing EU competences with clear economic connotations – against labour and for the 
Single European Market. The final factor points in the direction of a protecttionist European 
Union which holds up the principles of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
 
Eastern European politics is confronted with different challenges which are to a large extent 
related to the political and economic transformations from communist states to liberal 
democracies and market economies. With this background, it does not really come as a surprise 
that our factor analysis of Eastern European Euromanifestos identifies as a first and most 
important factor the content of which we can describe as “post-communist nostalgia”. This 
dimension combines strong emphases against privatisation, for protectionism, and against 
decentralisation. There is an important negative reference to the military which might also be 
understood as reminiscent of the communist past. What follows is close to the first factor in the 
West: negative loadings for multiculturalism and immigration, negative references to Europe in 
general and positive loadings for law and order and the preservation of a national way of life. 
The second Eastern factor is about alternative libertarianism (which is lacking the “green” 
element that Marks et al. in 2006 described as the GAL end of the GAL-TAN dimension). 
Here, the emphasis is on gay and women’s rights, immigration and Turkey as an EU member, 
while Council competences, law and order, and the EU structural fund are looked at negatively. 
Third comes a laissez-faire economy factor with some Euro-sceptic implications (e.g. regarding 
the competences of the Commission). Fourth and finally, we extract a factor of “capitalist 
independence” which opposes the transfer of powers to the EU, protectionism, market 
regulation, and the welfare state, and favours the support of the elderly.  
 
These are the four substantial factors that we extract each from the coding categories of West 
and East European parties’ EP election platforms (Euromanifestos) for the election of June 2009. 
We move on i n order to establish whether those content dimensions are indeed helpful in our 
understanding of citizens’ perceptions of political parties’ placements on t he left-right and the 
independence-integration dimension, and whether they constrain the positioning of their candidates 
on those dimensions (as well as on a variety of more detailed issue positions).  
 
 
Manifesto Content and Public Perceptions of Party Positions 
 
As explained earlier, we are interested in the extent to which citizens are able to “translate” the 
content of the Euromanifestos of political parties into their perceptions of the left-right and 
independence-integration position of these parties, in other words: whether parties are indeed 
able to communicate via their manifestos policy concerns to the citizenry at large, as our first 
hypothesis proposes. In order to answer this question and to test this hypothesis, we use the 
factors reported in Table 1 as condensed summaries of those policy concerns. The perceived 
positions of political parties on the left-right and the independence-integration dimension are 
derived from the voter study of the 2009 European Election Study (PIREDEU), as discussed 
earlier. To assess the relationship between the two, we use OLS regressions. Table 2 reports the 
results of these regressions.  
 
The first panel of that table reports the results for Western European parties. The findings 
indicate that manifesto content related to “xenophobic Euro-Scepticism” contributes strongly to 
the perceptions of parties on both the left-right and the independence-integration dimension: it 
pulls parties to the right-hand pole of the left-right dimension and, even somewhat more 
forcefully, to the independence pole of the independence-integration dimension. Manifesto 
content that contributes to the “law and order and free enterprise” factor pulls a party to the 
right, and somewhat less significantly, to the Euro-positive or integrationist side. 
Euromanifesto arguments constituting the “Europe of the Economy” factor pull political parties 
both to the right and to the integrationist side. Finally, manifesto content that contributes to the 
“Protectionism & CAP” factor does not significantly contribute to left-right perceptions of 
parties, while it pulls parties modestly to the independence side. All in all, manifesto content as 
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 we identify it here accounts for 56 percent of the variance in citizens’ left-right perceptions of 
parties, and for 57 percent of the variance in their perceptions of parties’ independence-
integration positions. 
 
 
Table 2. Euromanifesto Content Dimensions Predict Voter Perceptions of Party Locations  
in the Two-Dimensional Policy Space of the EU (figures are betas and R-squares) 
 
Western EU Member Countries (n=135 parties) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eastern EU Member Countries (n=61 parties) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
               Sources: Voter Survey and Manifesto Study of the 2009 European Election Study (PIREDEU). 
 
 
Things are very different when we move on to Eastern European parties in the second panel 
of Table 2. Predictive success is much less impressive here with 28 percent explained variance 
in left-right perceptions and 23 percent explained variance in independence-integration 
perceptions. Political parties in post-communist politics are less stable, therefore perhaps less 
effective regarding their electoral communication efforts, and evidently much less clearly 
defined as far as their policy profile is concerned (see van der Eijk & Schmitt 2010 and Schmitt 
& Scheuer 2011 for similar results). This difference supports our third hypothesis which 
postulates that context does indeed matter.  
           Left           
-Right 
Independence 
-Integration 
Xenophobic Euro-Scepticism  .45 -.55 
Law & Order and Free Enterprise 
(negative) 
-.44 -.28 
Europe of the Economy (positive) .48 .41 
Protectionism and CAP (positive) -.11 (ns) -.24 
 
R-square 
 
.56 
 
.57 
 
           Left           
-Right 
Independence 
-Integration 
Post-Communist Nostalgia .22 (ns) -.21 (ns) 
[Green-] Alternative-Libertarian (GAL) -.28 .40 
Market Economy .37 .09 (ns) 
Capitalist 
Independence                                
.24 .15 (ns) 
 
R-square 
 
.28 
 
.23 
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 Left-right perceptions in the post-communist countries are most clearly shaped by manifesto 
content that contributes to the “market economy” factor (identifies rightist positions), 
“alternative libertarianism” (identifies leftist positions), and “capitalist independence” 
(identifies rightist positions). The most important manifesto content dimension for East 
European parties, “post-communist nostalgia”, contributes neither to left-right nor to 
independence-integration perceptions of party placements.  
 
The only significant predictor for the positions of East European parties on the inde-
pendence vs. integration dimension is manifesto content that contributes to the “alternative 
libertarianism” factor. 10  
 
 
Manifesto Content and the Policy Positions of Party Candidates  
 
Can the manifesto content of political parties indeed constrain the issue orientations and policy 
positions of their candidates, as our second hypothesis postulates? We test this by matching the 
four manifesto content factors of each of our parties to the survey responses of these parties’ 
candidates in order to use the former to predict the latter. Again, we use the OLS algorithm, 
with candidates’ issue orientations as d ependent variables and their party’s Euromanifesto 
content dimensions as independent variables. Table 3 reports the findings of those regressions, 
again separately for Western and Eastern European parties’ candidates.  
 
What we find is very striking. While predicting individual policy positions of party 
candidates rather than aggregate perceptions of party positions on our two generalised policy 
dimensions, we find almost identical results to those in Table 2. What differs is the predictive 
power of the four factors that summarise manifesto content. As one would have expected due to 
the change from the aggregate to the individual level of analysis, factors prove to be somewhat 
less powerful predictors of candidates’ policy positions in three out of four regressions (left-
right for Western candidates, and independence-integration for both Western and Eastern 
candidates), but proportions of explained variance are still substantial. Interestingly enough, 
manifesto content as represented by our four factor solution predicts the left-right positions of 
Eastern local party candidates better (R2=.36) than it predicts public perceptions of these 
parties’ left-right placements (R2=.28). This seems to suggest that the characteristic lack of 
predictive success for Eastern European parties does not originate primarily in a w eak 
definition of what left and right means to political elites in post-communist politics, but in the 
lack of public knowledge of parties’ policy positions. Candidates know the programs of their 
parties better than voters do which is probably why their content dimensions are more closely 
associated with the candidates' left-right self-positioning.  
 
  
10 A word of caution is required, however, when comparing significance between the top and bottom 
panel of Table 2. The number of Eastern European party manifestos is quite small (61) compared to 
Western Europe (135). The strength of the effects of the post-communist nostalgia factor in Eastern 
Europe is of the same order of magnitude as those of protectionism and CAP in Western Europe. The 
fact that these effects are not significant in Eastern Europe while they are significant in Western Europe 
is entirely attributable to the much smaller number of cases.  
231
 Table 3. Euromanifesto Content Dimensions Predict These Parties Candidates’ Locations in 
the Two-Dimensional Policy Space of the EU (figures are betas and R-squares). 
 
Western EU Member Countries (n=824 candidates) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eastern EU Member Countries (n=179/178 candidates) 
 
 
                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 ___________________________________________________________________ 
 Sources: Candidates Survey and Manifesto Study of the 2009 European Election Study (PIREDEU). 
 
 
We move on t o our final analytical step and test whether the content of political parties’ 
Euromanifestos does not only constrain generalised policy positions of candidates but also their 
more specific issue positions. Table 4 shows the result of these regressions. By and large, we 
still find substantial proportions of variance in West European candidate positions explained by 
their parties’ manifesto content, with an average of 35 percent and a maximum of 45 percent 
(for the issue of state ownership of major public services). However, explained variance is very 
modest for East European candidates with an average of 13 pe rcent and a maximum of 22 
percent (again for state ownership of major public services).  
 
 
           Left           
-Right 
Independence 
-Integration 
Xenophobic Euro-Scepticism  .46 -.51 
[against] Law & Order and Free 
Enterprise  
-.38 -.15 
Europe of the Economy .24 .30 
Protectionism and CAP -.21 .06 (ns) 
 
R-square 
 
.47 
 
.46 
 
           Left           
-Right 
Independence 
-Integration 
Post-Communist Nostalgia .11 (ns) -.30 
[Green] Alternative Libertarianism (GAL) -.15 .23 
Market Economy .43 .10 (ns) 
Capitalist Independence                                .36 -.04 (ns) 
 
R-square 
 
.36 
 
.15 
 
232
 Table 4. Euromanifesto Content Dimensions of Political Parties Predict Issue Orientations of 
These Parties Candidates (figures are % explained variance) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                      
                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Candidates Survey and Manifesto Study of the 2009 European Election Study 
(PIREDEU). See Appendix 2 for exact question wordings.  
 
 
Implications  
 
We can summarise the implications of our findings in a small number of propositions. First, 
how citizens perceive generalised policy positions of political parties is strongly related to the 
content of the party manifestos. That supports the assumption that parties’ policy messages as 
stated in their Euromanifestos are well received. However, this relationship is much stronger in 
Western European countries than in Eastern European ones, but in all these countries public 
perceptions are significantly shaped by the policy and issue positions of parties. This is a 
prerequisite for the ability of elections to impact the course of government policy in the 
direction desired by voters, or, in other words, for the democratic meaningfulness of elections. 
As this relationship is observed between data from two entirely different sources (manifestos 
on the one hand, and voter and candidate surveys on the other), it cannot be dismissed as an 
endogeneity artefact. Of course, this relation does not arise from citizens reading manifestos 
and reflecting upon them. Rather, it attests to the capacity of the ‘public sphere’ with its myriad 
of explicit and informal communications to transmit the core of parties’ positions about issues 
and policies.  
 
A second implication of our analyses is that parties effectively constrain the policy and issue 
orientations of their candidates. Parties select their candidates at least to some degree on 
ideological and policy grounds so that they can indeed be regarded as groups of like-minded 
 
Western Europe Eastern Europe 
immigrants must adapt 27,5 14,5 
women decide on abortion 43,6 8,0 
no politics intervention in economy 30,9 14,1 
harsher sentences for crime 34,6 20,1 
redistribution of wealth  21,8 3,9 
authority taught in schools 22,5 7,8 
EU referendums 28,6 10,7 
women cut down for family 40,0 16,5 
reduce immigration  23,4 14,8 
private enterprises solve problems 32,5 8,7 
prohibit same sex marriages 24,8 14,3 
major public services in state 
ownership 
44,6 21,6 
 
mean proportion of explained variance 
 
35,4 
 
12,8 
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 people. While the overall level of determination is somewhat weaker here, this seems to be 
more than balanced by the fact that we analyse individual level data rather than public 
perceptions of party positions in the aggregate. This finding, it seems to us, is particularly 
important in view of the party decline literature which suggests that candidates are becoming 
more important than their political parties as electoral cue givers (Schmitt forthcoming; Zittel 
& Gschwend 2008).  
 
A third implication of our findings is that positions on t he left-right dimension and the 
independence-integration dimension, while being independent from one another, can be 
understood by the same set of manifesto content dimensions. Xenophobic euro-scepticism, for 
example, contributes to the left-right perception of parties (by pulling parties to the right) as it 
contributes to the independence-integration perception (by pulling parties towards 
independence). The orthogonality of these dimensions is not necessarily immutable, but rather 
a reflection of the fact that, for the time being, factors contributing to both dimensions are 
balancing. This may change over time, however. It would be a dramatic development if this 
state of affairs would seriously change, i.e., if the independence-integration dimension would 
become strongly associated with the left-right dimension. This would drastically reduce room 
for package dealing, compromising and coalition formation in EU politics, and would possibly 
put the continued functioning of the European Union into question.  
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 Appendix 1. Factor Structures of the Manifesto Content Categories (Western and Eastern 
European Parties Separately). 
 
Table A1. Results of a factor analysis of the content categories of the 2009 Euromanifestos  
 
Western European parties only (n=135). Factor loadings >=.45 are documented.  
 
 xenophobic 
Eurosceptici
sm 
law & order and 
free 
enterprise[against] 
economic 
Europe 
[for] 
protecti
onism  
and 
CAP 
[for] 
Turkey EU member (-) .68    
immigration (-) .68    
Europe/EU in general (-) .68    
transfer of powers (-) .61    
nat way of life (+) .59    
EU enlargement (-) .56    
multi-culturalism (-) .53    
EP competences (-) .48    
labour groups (-) .46    
exec & admin efficiency 
(-) 
.46    
peace (+) -.45    
law & order (+)  -.65   
military (-)    .56   
incentives (+)  -.50   
productivity (+)  -.48   
free enterprise (-)    .48   
Europe/EU in general 
(+) 
  .59  
competences EC (+)   .48  
labour groups (+)   -.47  
single market (+)   .46  
protectionism (-)      -.69 
agric & farmers (-)      -.52 
human rights (+)      -.45 
variance of original  
indicators extracted (%) 
 
6.76 
 
4.85 
 
4.62 
 
4.29 
 
Source: Euromanifestos Data 2009 (PIREDEU). The original data set has been “cleaned” in such a 
way that content categories are analysed only if they are used in at least 10 percent of all documents 
that are included in the analysis. The content categories that fail meeting this criterion are mostly 
“artificial” negative counterparts that were included to allow a strictly hierarchical coding routine - 
an example would be the category “peace negative”. See Braun et al. (2009) for a documentation of 
the revised coding procedure for the 2009 study. Reported in the above table are the loadings of the 
orthogonally (=varimax) rotated component matrix. Oblique rotations were also run to ensure that 
the dimensions are actually orthogonal. 
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 Table A2. Results of a factor analysis of the content categories of the 2009 Euromanifestos. 
 
Eastern European parties only (n=61). Factor loadings >=.45 are documented.  
 post-communist 
nostalgia 
green-alternative- 
libertarian (GAL) 
market  
economy 
capitalist 
indepen-
dence 
privatisation (-) .90    
protectionism (+) .89    
decentralisation (-) .89    
military (-) .87    
multiculturalism (-) .86    
Europe/EU in general (-) .77    
immigration (-) .58    
law & order (+) .53    
nat way of life (+) .47    
homosexuals (+)  .84   
competences Council (-)  .66   
immigration (+)  .66   
law & order (-)  .65   
women (+)  .55   
corporatism (+)  .54   
Turkey EU member (+)  .53   
EU structural fund (-)  .50   
social justice (+)   -.73  
labour groups (+)   -.68  
free enterprise (-)   -.68  
competences EC (-)   -.52  
eco orthodoxy (-)   -.49  
transfer of powers (-)    .65 
protectionism (-)    .58 
market regulation (-)    .56 
elderly (+)    .53 
FSR (-)    .52 
welfare state (-)    .51 
 
Variance of original  
indicators extracted (%) 
 
6.66 
 
5.66 
 
5.49 
 
5.39 
 
Source: Euromanifestos Data 2009 (PIREDEU). The original data set has been “cleaned” in such a 
way that content categories are analysed only if they are used in at least 10 percent of all documents 
that are included in the analysis. The content categories that fail meeting this criterion are mostly 
“artificial” negative counterparts that were included to allow a strictly hierarchical coding routine - 
an example would be the category “peace negative”. See Braun et al. (2009) for a documentation of 
the revised coding procedure for the 2009 study. Reported in the above table are the loadings of the 
orthogonally (=varimax) rotated component matrix. Oblique rotations were also run to ensure that 
the dimensions are actually orthogonal. 
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 Appendix 2. Issue List Included in the Candidates Survey. 
 
 
(Answering categories: strongly agree, agree, neither/nor, disagree, strongly disagree) 
 
1. Immigrants should be required to adapt to the customs of[country] 
2. Private enterprise is the best way to solve [country’s] economic problems 
3. Same-sex marriages should be prohibited by law 
4. Major public services and industries ought to be in state ownership 
5. Women should be free to decide on matters of abortion 
6. Politics should abstain from intervening in the economy 
7. People who break the law should be given much harsher sentences than they are these 
days 
8. Income and wealth should be redistributed towards ordinary people 
9. Schools must teach children to obey authority 
10. EU treaty changes should be decided by referendum 
11. A woman should be prepared to cut down on her paid work for the sake of her family 
12. Immigration to [country] should be decreased significantly 
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The Nationalism-Postnationalism Axis and the Gradual 
Transformation of Ideological Space in Europe:  
Evidence from Party Discourse in Euromanifestos from Six 
European Countries.1 
 
 
Eftichia Teperoglou2 and Emmanouil Tsatsanis3 
 
 
Abstract 
This chapter investigates the thesis about the growing politicization of issues pertaining to 
European integration and/or globalization and the ensuing polarization dynamic within 
European political systems between supporters and foes of the latter processes, Our main 
research hypothesis is that even though European integration and globalization constitute 
multifaceted and diffuse processes, preferences of political actors on issues related to the 
challenges and opportunities of globalization will tend to manifest clear tendencies of 
consistent directionality across distinct economic, cultural and political domains. We test 
this hypothesis by examining Euromanifestos data from six European countries (Germany, 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy, Greece and Hungary) for a time frame of up to 
thirty years (for Germany and the United Kingdom), beginning with the first European 
elections in 1979. We apply multidimensional unfolding, which allows us to depict in a 
joint low-dimensional space the relative positions of both political parties and ideological 
categories. Our findings largely support the hypothesis that components of a nationalism-
postnationalism divide tend to transform the content of the traditional cultural-political 
dimension. 
 
 
Conceptual Framework 
 
The political science literature on the dimensionality of ideological space and political 
competition in contemporary democracies stretches back (at least) to the middle of the previous 
century with the median voter theorem (Black 1958) and its familiar assumption about the 
unidimensionality (e.g. left-right dimension) of ideological space.  However, cursory as well as 
more systematic observations of party coalition strategies or parties' policy preferences (e.g. 
Budge et al. 1987) suggested that assumptions about the unidimensionality of ideological space 
did not conform well with the realities observed in most political systems. As a result, the 
assumption of multidimensionality of ideological space has become a staple for most 
subsequent analyses. Such approaches have been also undoubtedly buoyed by Lipset and 
Rokkan's (1967) influential work on cleavages which, as is well known, identified four main 
societal conflicts that dominated political life in Western Europe during the last few centuries 
and, in turn, gave rise to political parties with particularistic policy agendas. There was an 
acknowledgment, however, that all of these conflicts (capital-labor, land-industry, church-state, 
center-periphery) correspond to just two overarching dimensions, an economic one and a 
cultural one. 
 
As the literature on cleavages investigates the links between demand-side and supply-side 
politics, it is no surprise that the identification of structural transformations in Western societies 
1 We would like to thank Ioannis Andreadis for his insights that helped us in the methodological design 
of the chapter. We also owe thanks to the panel discussant. Wouter van der Brug. for his comments and 
suggestions. 
2 Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES). University of Mannheim. Email 
Eftichia.Teperoglou@mzes.uni-mannheim.de  
3 Centre for Research and Studies in Sociology-ISCTE. Lisbon University Institute. Email 
emmanouil.tsatsanis@iscte.pt 
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has prompted new analyses of the major divisions in contemporary political systems. 
Technological changes, the reorganization of economic production and the increased 
significance of the ever-expanding middle class have supposedly dulled the classic capital-labor 
conflict. In addition, economic growth, increased affluence levels and the rapid expansion of 
education have created a secularizing dynamic and a purported generational value shift 
(Inglehart 1977). Hypotheses that new cleavages are gradually replacing older ones, or that 
simply traditional cleavages are in decline (e.g. Franklin et al. 1992), abound in the relevant 
literature. The new divisions might reflect divergence of interests within the middle class (e.g. 
Kriesi 1998) or the emergence of new value conflicts and divergence of interests within the 
middle class. There has been an array of labels intended to capture these new cleavages: left 
libertarianism vs. right authoritarianism (Kitschelt 1994), new left vs. new right (Flanagan 
1987; Flanagan and Lee 2003), materialist vs. postmaterialist (Inglehart 1977, 1990). These 
new conflicts are not supposed to have added any fundamentally new dimension of conflict into 
the political space but merely transformed the meaning of the two already existing ones (Kriesi 
et al. 2008b: 13). In other words, all cleavages, whether the old Rokkanean ones or the newer 
ones, essentially boil down to two dimensions of conflict: an economic conflict over 
distributional preferences, reflecting a divergence of objective material interests; and a cultural-
political conflict informed by fundamental value divides (e.g. religiosity vs. secularism). 
 
The latest structural transformations that are supposed to rearrange the configuration of 
national cleavage structures are associated with the process of globalization. The most 
important, perhaps, empirical investigation of this thesis has been carried out by Hanspeter 
Kriesi and other political scientists from the Universities of Zurich and Munich (Kriesi et al. 
2006, 2008a; Bornschier 2010). The assumption underlying this thesis is that as the impact of 
globalization in its various aspects (economic, cultural and political) can assume a diversity of 
forms for the different members of a national community, new disparities and new forms of 
conflict are created. Citizens will tend to perceive these differences in terms of 'winners' and 
'losers' of globalization and that the aspirations or grievances of these competing groups will be 
articulated by political parties (Kriesi et al. 2008b: 3). 
 
Following this line of reasoning, this chapter investigates the thesis about the growing 
politicization of issues pertaining to European integration and/or globalization and the ensuing 
polarization dynamic within European political systems between supporters and foes of the 
latter processes. Our main research hypothesis is that even though European integration and 
globalization constitute multifaceted and diffuse processes, preferences of political actors on 
issues related to the challenges and opportunities of globalization will tend to manifest clear 
tendencies of consistent directionality across distinct economic, cultural and political domains.  
In other words, we posit that there is a unidimensional underlying ideological axis which we 
call the nationalism-postnationalism axis that can be used to aggregate consonant 
predispositions in issues as seemingly disparate as the strengthening of EU institutions and 
perceived challenges to national sovereignty, attitudes towards immigrants and the perceived 
erosion of national identity, as well as market integration and trade liberalization. In addition, 
we expect that this dimension is aligned with the traditional cultural-political issue-dimension 
within the ideological space and that, as the effects of globalization are becoming increasingly 
felt by national populations around the world, they are gradually redefining the content of the 
cultural-political dimension. We hold the same expectation for the economic dimension of the 
nationalism-postnationalism axis and, for this reason, we have conceptualized and 
operationalized distinct categories for economic integration and economic liberalism, even 
though the two are often conceptually and operationally collapsed (as in the work by Kriesi et 
al. 2006, 2008a). We argue that the issue of economic integration is fundamentally a boundary 
issue, not unlike the cultural and political components of the globalization divide, and that 
orientations in favor or against stem from shared ideological predispositions on the broader 
question of community demarcation vs. integration.  
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We test this hypothesis by examining the programmatic commitments of political parties 
from six European countries (Germany, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy, Greece and 
Hungary) as expressed in their European election manifestos. We employ data from the 
Euromanifestos and PIREDEU project and the time frame of our study covers up to thirty years 
(for Germany and the United Kingdom), beginning with the first European elections in 1979. 
For our data analysis we apply a multidimensional unfolding technique, which allows us to 
depict in a joint low-dimensional space the relative positions of both political parties and 
ideological categories.   
 
In the following section we present in detail our research strategy and design, which 
provides an overview of the Euromanifestos data and focuses the discussion on the 
operationalization of our main ideological categories and the selected method of analysis.  Then 
we proceed with a discussion of the national context and country-specific hypotheses for each 
of the six countries of our sample, before moving on the presentation of our findings. 
 
 
Research Strategy and Design 
 
Our study focuses on four main objectives. The first and overarching one is to examine the 
structure of the ideological space of different party systems and, subsequently, the position of 
our globalization-related issues within this space. Another main objective is to measure the 
salience of the debate around these issues for each political party and to identify possible trends 
of growing politicization surrounding globalization. Moreover, we attempt to locate the exact 
position of all relevant political parties within the national ideological space by examining that 
proximity between political parties and particular issues. Finally, we attempt to offer more 
nuanced readings of contextual factors for each national political system in an attempt to 
anticipate findings that contradict our main expectations about the unidimensionality and/or 
alignment of the nationalism-postnationalism axis.   
 
Selection of Data 
Our analysis focuses exclusively on the supply-side of party competition. Undoubtedly, the 
demand-side of electoral competition, consisting of the policy preferences of the electorate, is a 
crucial component of the complete equation that captures major changes in the ideological 
space. A cross-national analysis with a longitudinal perspective that covers both sides of the 
equation would obviously be a tall order given the space limitations of this chapter and, for this 
reason, we have decided to focus our analysis exclusively on parties' policy positions. 
 
The first and most important step of our study design was to make an appropriate choice of 
data in order to estimate the policy positions of political actors, in accordance with our research 
questions and with the availability of data for the selected time frame. Over the past twenty-five 
years or so, different methodological attempts have been made to locate the positions of 
political actors in ideological/political spaces. Peter Mair has offered an overview of the main 
approaches on measuring political space, trying also to comment on their limitations and 
possibilities (2001: 10). Mair's review covers: a) the use of a priori judgements, the oldest 
approach to locating parties in a given policy space; b) secondary reading; c) perception of 
party positions expressed in mass surveys; d) elite studies; and, finally, the two most dominant 
approaches, e) the analysis of party programmes and manifestos and f) expert surveys (Mair 
2001). At this point, we could also include a recent approach on the measuring of the supply-
side of ideological space, the content analysis of articles in major daily newspapers based on 
human coding (Dolezal 2008a: 67-71), devised to examine a similar research question, namely 
the impact of the globalization-inspired ‘new cultural’ divide on the ideological/political space 
in Europe.  
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Τhe empirical investigation of our study rests on an analysis of party manifestos from 
European Parliament elections (hereafter: EP elections) taken from six different countries. 4 It 
should be noted that this constitutes an innovative aspect as our analysis is based on party 
programmes for second-order (EP) national elections, unlike previous studies that employ 
strictly "first-order" elections. We have used the database of the Euromanifesto project (EMP)5 
at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES) for the time period of 1979-
2004; for the Euromanifestos of 2009, the available database of the Manifesto Study 2009 of 
the PIREDEU project was analyzed.6   
 
The starting theoretical and analytical point for the content analysis of manifestos is that the 
(human) coding is based on the assumptions of the saliency theory of party competition 
(Robertson 1976, Budge et al. 1987; Klingemann et al. 1994). The theory posits that the relative 
policy position of parties can be determined by the emphasis they place on each issue, not 
necessarily on the articulation of an explicit position, which the theory assumes is more or less 
the same for all parties. Several critiques have been levelled against the MRG/CMP project 
over the years. Perhaps the most important are that manifestos have a soft-focus effect - 
meaning that parties avoid clear statements - and that voters tend to not read manifestos 
(Dolezal 2008a: 67). Nevertheless, there are many benefits from using manifesto data. Braun et 
al. (2010:5) emphasize inter alia that the party manifestos cover a wide range of themes, 
problems and political positions. Changes of issue emphases and policy positions of parties can 
be studied in a diachronic and cross-national perspective.  
 
Selection of Countries, Parties and Time-frame of the Study  
One of our goals was to select a sample of countries that reflect the diversity of socio-economic 
and cultural contexts in Europe. For this reason we have decided to select EU–member states 
from Western, Southern and Eastern Europe: Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands 
and the UK. This particular group of countries allows for variation in national levels of pro- and 
anti-European attitudes at the level of public opinion, level of economic development, as well 
as status of net beneficiary vs. net contributor within the European Union. 
 
 
4 In some countries parties do not distribute a proper Euromanifesto. In this case. the coders of each 
country were asked to find and code another ‘official’ election-related party document (e.g. press 
release). a manifesto of the party leader. an excerpt of the national manifesto - in case of concurrent 
national elections only. or (under justification) another document summarizes the statements of the 
party’s policy positions. For more details. see: The Euromanifestos Handbook 2009 (Euromanifestos 
Coding Scheme/ EMCS III). p. 4. 
5 The roots of the Euromanifesto Project (EMP) go back to the flagship study of party manifestos for 
national elections. the cross-national “Manifesto Research Group” (MRG)/ Comparative Manifestos 
Project” . The EMP started in 2000. when Prof. Hermann Schmitt (MZES) started to apply the 
MRG/CMP approach of analyzing party manifesto content to European Parliament elections. For more 
details go online at: http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/projekte/manifestos/. See also Wüst and Volkens 
(2003) and Braun et al. (2006). 
6 This is one of the components of the Collaborative Project on ‘Providing an Infrastructure for Research 
on Electoral Democracy in the European Union’ /PIREDEU. For more details go online at:  
http://www.piredeu.eu/ and Braun et al. (2010)  
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Table 1: EU and globalization-related scores (2007) 
Countries Net benefit per 
capita  
Pro-European 
Attitudes 
Globalization  
index 
Germany -1045 65% 84.16 
Greece 2238 55% 75.83 
Hungary  2384 37% 87.00 
Italy -778 39% 82.26 
Netherlands -1467 77% 91.90 
UK -937 39% 80.18 
Sources:  
(1) For the net benefit per capita, the data are taken from the “Open Europe briefing note: European 
Communities (Finance) Bill, 2007”, available at: http://www.openeurope.org.uk/research/budget07.pdf 
 (2) Pro-European Attitudes: the data present the positive evaluations of the EU- membership (“membership a 
good thing”). Eurobarometer 67, spring 2007 
(3) KOF Index of Globalization -2007 (ETH Zurich). The globalization index measures the economic, social 
and political dimensions of globalization. For more details see http://www.globalization-index.org/ 
 
 
At this point, it should also be mentioned that for the final selection of these countries we 
had to take into account the issue of data availability. As one of our aims is to study the 
transformation of ideological space over time, the first EP election of 1979 is the starting point 
for our analysis, until the 2009 EP election. Nevertheless, it was necessary to adjust this time 
frame for some cases. Only in Germany and the UK is there a consistent time-series of selected 
and coded Euromanifestos for (at least) all major parties from 1979 to 2009, which allowed the 
study of the basic structure of ideological space of the party system at a given time and which 
constitutes our threshold criterion for the inclusion of an election in our study. Based on this 
criterion, the final time-frame for each of the other countries is as follows: the Netherlands and 
Italy (1994-2009); Greece (1999-2009) and Hungary (2004-2009).  
 
Another central question of our study design concerns the selection of the parties. On one 
hand, the Euromanifestos project research team defined as relevant parties in the EU those that 
have been represented in the European Parliament at least once (Braun et al. 2010: 4-5). On the 
other hand, the criteria that have been used in the MRG/CMP projects are based on the 
argument that, in general, the relevance of parties is given both by their representation in the 
national parliament and on the blackmail potential of a party in a given party system (Sartori 
1976). For the purposes of our analysis, we decided to follow a middle-of-the-road approach. 
Our basic and most important criterion that we employ to designate a party as 'relevant' is 
representation in the European Parliament as a result of the specific election under 
consideration. Only for some elections, we have decided to follow a mixed criterion, which is 
to include in our analysis some parties that were not able to obtain a seat at EP, but their role in 
the immediately preceding national 'first-order' elections was decisive. For example, we have 
included the List Pim Fortuyn in Netherlands for the 2004 EP election, even though they failed 
to gain a seat in that electoral contest, but their performance in the 2002 parliamentary elections 
had been responsible for the description of that contest as the 'earthquake' election of the Dutch 
political system.  
 
Operationalization of Ideological Categories  
As is well known, the scores in the Euromanifestos dataset represent percentages of political 
arguments (quasi-sentences) related to particular issues within each manifesto. Because of 
differences in the length of the documents, the number of quasi-sentences in each category is 
standardized in order to make coded manifestos comparable.  We have selected only a subgroup 
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of categories for our analysis7, which are then regrouped into nine distinct categories that 
denote more abstract ideological orientations: economic liberalism, welfare state economy, 
fiscal conservatism, cultural liberalism, sociopolitical authoritarianism, environmentalism, 
economic integration, Euroscepticism, and nativism.  The particular issues and the broader 
ideological categories were selected in an attempt to satisfy two main criteria: a) ideological 
clarity, in terms of selecting categories of issues that correspond more clearly to the two main 
dimensions of political competition as identified in the beginning of the chapter (socio-
economic and cultural-political), plus the nationalism-postnationalism divide that constitutes 
the focus of our study; b) conceptual congruence, in terms of striking the best possible balance 
between more abstract ideological categories (e.g. economic liberalism) and concrete policy 
issues (e.g. privatization). We achieved the latter by selecting issues with detailed definitions 
(in the Euromanifestos codebook) that were unambiguously associated with one of our nine 
categories. Some issues were excluded due to the fact that components of their definitions had 
no direct relevance with our strictly defined ideological category, even in cases where the title 
of the issue-category at first appeared relevant. We decided, at this stage, against pursuing a 
more inductive approach by applying data reduction techniques on the entire group of available 
issue-categories in the Euromanifesto dataset for the construction of our ideological categories. 
Such an approach would have probably allowed us to employ additional issues from the dataset 
in our analysis and to quantitatively identify underlying factors, surely at the cost of greater 
conceptual stretching and lower content validity for our composite categories (cf. Ray 2007: 
12; Keman 2007: 78).  
 
As mentioned above, following our first criterion we have created categories that correspond 
to the two classic dimensions related to economic and cultural-political issues, plus the 
'globalization' dimension: a) economic liberalism, welfare state economy, and fiscal 
conservatism correspond to the economic dimension; b) cultural liberalism, sociopolitical 
authoritarianism, and environmentalism correspond to the (broadly defined) cultural-political 
dimension, which includes the 'new politics' dimension; and c) economic integration, 
Euroscepticism, nativism capture the economic, political and cultural dimension of our 
nationalism-postnationalism axis.   
 
The nine ideological categories are defined in such a way that they indicate clear 
directionality. More specifically, we have distinguished between positive and negative 
references for all the selected issues. It should be noted that a major benefit of using the dataset 
of the Euromanifestos project, in comparison to the MRG/CMP, is that the direction of parties’ 
statements is documented in most of its categories. Table 2 lists and describes in detail the nine 
ideological categories, including the particular issues that form the components of each 
category. The nine ideological categories are computed by summing up all the positive 
references and subtracting the negative ones.  We have applied this formula to all the relevant 
parties of each country and for each EP election.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 The original Euromanifesto Coding Scheme (EMCS) includes a range of policy domains: external 
relations. freedom and democracy. political system. economy. welfare and quality of life. fabric of 
society and social groups. They are further divided into several content categories and sub-categories. 
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Table 2: Ideological categories and issues 
Ideological 
categories/ 
Abbreviations 
Issues used for calculation of ideological category scores 
(positive minus negative quasi-sentences) 
 
 Positive Negative 
Environmentalism 
environment 
Environmental protection; anti-growth 
politics; steady state economy; 
ecologism; ‘Green Politics’ 
 
Any opposite mentions of positive  
Euroscepticism 
euscept 
 
 
 
 
 
Hostile references to Europe or the EU; 
no “deepening of Europe” necessary; a 
more integrated Europe and the transfer 
of power to EU is rejected; hostile 
reference to the European Parliament and 
its MEPs, the European Commission, the 
European Court of Justice and other EU 
institutions; required unanimity in the 
European Council  
 
 
Favourable references to Europe or 
the EU; “deepening of Europe” 
necessary; a more integrated Europe 
and the transfer of power to EU is 
supported; desirability of expanding 
the competences of EU institutions; 
positive reference to the European 
Parliament and its MEPs, the 
European Commission, the European 
Court of Justice and other EU 
institutions; required majority voting 
in the European Council 
(democratisation and more efficiency 
in decision making within EU) 
 
Cultural Liberalism  
cultlib 
Opposition to traditional moral values; 
support for divorce, abortion etc.; 
favorable mentions, support or assistance 
for homosexuals and women; any other 
mentions opposite of negative 
Favorable references to traditional 
moral values; prohibition, censorship 
and suppression of immorality 
stability of family; religion; negative 
references to homosexuals and 
women. 
 
Economic Integration  
econintgr 
 
Favorable references to or support for the 
Single European Market and the 
European Monetary Union; favorable 
reference to labor migration and support 
for the concept of free trade; support or 
accept national contributions to finance 
the EU or its policies; maintain or extend 
EU funds for structurally underdeveloped 
areas 
Negative references to or rejection of 
the Single European Market and the 
European Monetary Union; negative 
reference to labor migration and 
positive mentions to protect internal 
markets; national contributions to 
finance the EU or its policies are 
criticized or rejected; cutback or 
suspension of funds for structurally 
underdeveloped areas   
 
Economic Liberalism  
econlib 
 
Favourable references to free enterprise; 
need for wage and tax policies to induce 
enterprise, privatisation*; negative 
reference to: corporatism;  direct 
government control of economy; social 
ownership*; publicly-owned industry*; 
socialist property*; nationalization, 
market regulation, Marxist analysis  
 
Any opposite mentions of positive; 
positive references to: corporatism;  
direct government control of 
economy; social ownership*; 
publicly-owned industry*; socialist 
property*; nationalization, market 
regulation, Marxist analysis 
*: only for 2004 and 2009 Euromanifestos 
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Table 3: Ideological categories and issues (continued) 
Ideological 
categories/ 
Abbreviations         
Issues used for calculation of ideological category scores 
(positive minus negative quasi-sentences) 
 
 Positive Negative 
Fiscal conservatism 
fiscalcon 
 
 
Need for traditional economic orthodoxy; 
e.g. reduction of budget deficits, support 
for strong currency; positive references to 
the European Central Bank 
Keynesian demand management: 
demand-oriented economic policy; 
devoted to the reduction of 
depression and/or to increase private 
demand etc; any negative references 
to economic orthodoxy and the 
European Central Bank 
Nativism 
nativism 
 
 
Enforcement or encouragement of 
cultural integration; any appeals to 
patriotism and/or nationalism; need to 
reduce immigration; negative references 
to or no support for immigrants and 
foreigners 
Cultural diversity; communalism; 
preservation of autonomy of 
religious, linguistic heritages, against 
patriotism and/or nationalism; need 
to retain or increase immigration; 
positive references to and support for 
immigrants and foreigners 
 
Sociopolitical 
Authoritarianism 
authoritarian 
 
Enforcement of all laws; actions against 
crime; support and resources for police; 
fight against terrorism*; need to maintain 
or increase military expenditure; negative 
references to the importance of human 
and civil rights 
Against the enforcement of all laws 
and the fight against terrorism; 
favorable reference to decreasing 
military expenditures; disarmament ; 
favorable reference to importance of 
human and civil rights; freedom of 
speech; supportive refugee policies 
 
Welfare State 
Economy 
welfare 
 
Need to introduce, maintain or expand 
any social service or social security 
scheme; the concept of equality; fair 
treatment of all people and special 
protection for underprivileged; references 
to labor groups; specific measures for 
supporting the expansion of the welfare 
state (pensions, health care and nursing 
service, social housing, child care) 
Limiting expenditure on social 
services or social security; negative 
mentions  to equality and fair 
treatment, or proposal to cutback or 
suspend specific measures for 
supporting the expansion of the 
welfare state 
*: only for 2004 and 2009 Euromanifestos 
 
Method of Analysis 
We selected multidimensional unfolding (MDU) as our main method of analysis due to the 
appropriateness of the method when trying to represent the relative positioning of ideological 
categories and parties in a low-dimensional space. The capacity to locate political parties and 
specific ideological categories within a common space allows us to compare parties and party 
systems both cross-nationally and over time. Perhaps most importantly, the visualization of the 
structure of the ideological space and the place of parties within it produces easily interpretable 
findings. MDU can be seen as a special case of multidimensional scaling (MDS), where the 
within-sets proximities are missing (Borg and Groenen 2005: 293) - in our case proximities 
between parties and between ideological categories respectively. Instead, our data represent 
only between-sets proximities, that is proximities between parties and ideological categories. 
 
MDU is best applied when the data constitute preference scores (such as rank-orders of 
preference) of different individuals (or, in our case, political parties) for a set of choice objects 
(in our case, ideological categories) (Borg and Groenen 2005: 293). Therefore, based on the 
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scores that we obtained on each of our ideological categories for each party, we have ranked 
ideological-preferences for each of our parties in each separate election, in order to obtain the 
initial unweighted proximities between parties and ideological categories. In order to account 
not only for the similarities between pairs of objects (parties and ideological categories), but 
also for the salience of these relationships, we have used the measure of this salience (i.e. the 
frequency of the entire set of quasi-sentences used per ideological category by each political 
party) as a weight that adjusts the original proximity between party and ideological category. As 
a result, the distances on the joint space corresponding to salient relationships between parties 
and ideological categories will be more accurate than the less salient ones (cf. Dolezal 2008a: 
72). In addition, we employ the same frequencies to examine in separate tables salience trends 
for the three ideological categories that are associated with our nationalism-postnationalism 
axis. Even though all our unfolding solutions are completed for a two-dimensional space 
following our main hypotheses , we do not simply assume that the optimal dimensionality of 
the ideological space will be the same for every single election. We run each unfolding model 
for different numbers of dimensions and use badness-of-fit values (Kruskal's Stress-1) to gauge 
the optimal dimensionality of the unfolding model. 
 
 
Six European Party Systems in the Era of Globalization: National Contexts and Country-
Specific Hypotheses 
 
In this section we offer a discussion of the historical background, national context and country-
specific hypotheses for each of the six countries of our sample, before moving on the 
presentation of our findings. 
 
Germany 
In the relevant literature, the German party system is typically described as being historically 
dominated by two cleavages: class and religion (Urwin 1974; Dolezal 2008b).  Perhaps the 
only qualification that should be added is that the religious cleavage of Protestants vs. Catholics 
early on in the post-war period transformed into a religious-secular (or church-state in 
Rokkanean terms) cultural cleavage, with the CDU expanding its appeal to both religious 
Catholics and Protestants. Even though pre-1990 studies inevitably focus solely on West 
Germany, the structure of the German system did not really change after unification. The main 
legacy of unification has been the emergence of a national party of the post-communist left 
(PDS/Die Linke). However, the long lasting three-party format (SPD, CDU/CSU, FDP) had 
already come to an end with the advent of the Greens onto the political scene in the 1980s.    
 
The fact that the two traditional cleavages have tended to not overlap but to be orthogonal, 
means that polarization has never been an enduring feature of German political life. So long as 
the party system retained its three-party configuration, it constituted a classic case of a 
centripetal two-and-a-half party system, with the smaller FDP serving as coalition partner for 
both the larger SPD and CDU/CSU. This triangular arrangement was possible due to the 
convergence between FDP and CDU/CSU on 'bourgeois values' and between SPD and FDP on 
'socio-liberal values' (Pappi 1984). In terms of the ideological and political space, there was 
also the question of whether the emergence of the Green party was the harbinger of a 
fundamental shift in German politics, whereby a new value division would gradually replace 
older ones (Dalton 1984) or the new conflict would overlap and be absorbed by the traditional 
left-right cleavage (Pappi 1984). 
 
Moving on to the nationalism-postnationalism divide (in this case labeled 'demarcation-
integration' divide), most authors agree that the issues political integration at the European level 
did not prove to be a particularly polarizing issue for German political parties (Dolezal 2008b: 
213). On the other hand, reactions against EU enlargement and the European Monetary Union 
are issues that have gained traction with the German electorate in recent years (Busch and 
Knelangen 2004). However, none of the small parties that endorse 'hard' Eurosceptic positions 
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(such as the Republikaner) have been well rewarded at the polls. Of the relevant parties, 
PDS/Die Linke is perhaps the most consistently critical party of the 'neoliberal' character of 
European economic integration, without, however, rejecting the project of European 
unification. In contrast, immigration has emerged as a hot-button issue, with CDU and 
(especially) CSU becoming more attuned with the growing anti-immigration and culturally 
protectionist sentiments across the country. 
 
We expect the German system to be structured by two conflicts: the socio-economic one and 
a second one dominated by traditional cultural-political issues (sociopolitical authoritarianism 
and cultural liberalism). However, we expect the 'new politics' environment category to be 
increasingly signifying the cultural-political conflict after the growth of the Green party in the 
late 1980s. In relation to the nationalism-postnationalism axis, we hypothesize that cultural 
threats induced by globalization (reflected in our nativism category) will mainly contribute to 
the content of the vertical dimension, whereas Euroscepticism is not anticipated to be a 
polarizing category due to the overwhelmingly pro-European tendencies of the German party 
system as a whole.   
 
United Kingdom   
Open any textbook on British politics and in the opening paragraphs you will find, almost 
without exception, a similar introductory note. For the most part of the past century or so, 
British politics has been dominated by the class cleavage. With the extension of suffrage and 
the replacement of the Liberal party by the Labour party after the end of World War I as the 
main alternative to Conservative rule, the political system became, even more acutely, an 
institutional arena for the representation of socio-economic class interests. However, class is 
not the only durable feature of the British political system. The United Kingdom has always 
been a multi-ethnic state and, in more recent decades, with the advent of the Scottish and Welsh 
nationalist parties has acquired a more fully developed form of the center-periphery cleavage. 
Hoping to facilitate the comparative aspect of our analysis, we have decided to focus only on 
the national relevant parties. Due to the fact that the unit of analysis in this study is 'second-
order' elections, we have already included a greater number of parties (addition of Greens, 
UKIP and BNP) than what we would normally have, had we focused on national elections 
instead. The gradual tendency towards fragmentation and multipartyism for the once classical 
two-party system certainly appears more accelerated when focusing solely on EP elections. 
 
Undoubtedly, the past three decades has been an era of great transformation for the British 
party system. There has been a proliferation of parties (including the resurgence of the Liberals) 
and a steady decline for the combined percentages of the Conservative and Labour parties. 
After a near two-decade hegemonic period for the Conservative party that was marked by 
intense ideological polarization, the (New) Labour party moderated its image fashioning third-
way politics under Tony Blair, and managed to kick off its own successful run that terminated 
in 2009 for EP elections and in 2010 for national elections.  Going back to the 1980s, the 
British ideological space appeared to be quite straightforward, largely thanks to Margaret 
Thatcher's electorally triumphant neoliberal project. The Conservatives under Thatcher had 
launched a true ideological revolution, combining an extreme - for the time - economically 
liberal agenda with socially conservative rhetoric (cf. Kelly 2003: 255-257; Hall 1988). This 
innovation had not only polarized, but also simplified the structure of ideological space in 
Britain, with the broader left-right dimension signifying the entire British political universe.  
 
Even back then, however, one could detect the first few signs of a new set of issues that was 
gradually coming to the center of political discourse. As the process of European integration 
intensified in the mid-1980s and early 1990s, Europeanization-related issues started to compete 
with classic distributional issues in political interest terms.  European integration awakened 
deeply-held prejudices toward continental powers and politics and, in addition, influx rates of 
immigration increased once again after a three-decade hiatus in the 1990s (Kriesi and Frey 
2008b: 190), raising anxieties concerning the integrity of the British -social fabric and culture. 
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We expect that the British political system will be structured primarily by the socio-economic 
dimension, especially in the pre-1990s period.  Following the findings of Kriesi and Frey 
(2008b) we expect that a second dimension will be dominated by classic cultural-political 
categories (i.e. cultural liberalism vs. authoritarianism), only to be gradually replaced in the 
1990s by globalization-related issues, and especially the Euroscepticism category. The fact that 
we are working with Euromanifestos data (combined with the inclusion in our analysis of the 
Green party, UKIP and even BNP in 2009), lead us to expect a comparatively higher salience of 
the Euroscepticism and economic integration categories, as they are the two categories which 
include the EU-related issues. 
 
Netherlands 
In most studies of politics in the Netherlands some well-known distinct characteristics of Dutch 
society are highlighted. The most important of these is that “the Netherlands is a country of 
minorities” (Andeweg and Irwin 2005:19, Kriesi and Frey 2008a: 154). Up to the mid-1960s, 
the society was traditionally divided into four different subcultures that formed closed social 
groupings called "zuilen" (pillars). There were four main pillars, each corresponding to a major 
subculture in the country: the Catholics, the Calvinists, the Socialists, and the Liberals (with the 
latter belonging to the so-called 'general' pillar). This unique feature of organizational 
pillarization, the so-called 'verzuiling' (e.g. Andeweg and Irwin 2005:25) has been defined as 
"the degree of interlocking between cleavage- specific organizations active in the corporate 
channel and party organizations mobilizing for electoral action" (Rokkan 1990: 142). In purely 
political terms, a corollary feature is that Dutch space of political competition has been 
historically dominated by class and religious divides. The mutual isolation and divisions were 
held together by elite cooperation and a 'spirit of accommodation' among political elites, the so-
called model of 'consociational democracy' (Lijphart 1968).  
 
During the mid-1960s, Dutch society underwent a process of rapid depillarization. Even 
though it is beyond the scope of this chapter to analyze this process in detail, one could cite the 
impact of individualization and secularization that has been transforming politics in most 
advanced industrial democracies during the past few decades. The direct result of these twin 
processes is that voters' party preferences and structural positions are becoming increasingly 
independent from one another (Franklin et al. 1992). As the dominant cleavages were losing 
much of their acuity, depillarization inevitably contributed to the re-formulation of the Dutch 
political arena. The party system gradually acquired features of a more conventional type of 
multipartyism. There was a proliferation of secular parties - Democrats 66 (D66), Socialist 
Party (SP), Green Left (GL) - that complemented the traditional Labour Party (PdvA) and the 
liberal People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD). In contrast, there was a contraction 
of religious political forces. In 1980, the Catholic People's Party (KVP), and the two main 
Calvinist parties, Christian Historicals and the Anti-Revolutionary Party merged into the 
Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), in an attempt to address the challenge of an increasingly 
secularized polity. The national election of 2002 was another major turning point for Dutch 
politics. The unprecedented meteoric rise of populist politician Pim Fortuyn, and the electoral 
success of his party (LPF), coupled with his assassination only nine days before the polls, 
caused an earthquake in the Dutch party system (Kriesi and Frey 2008: 163). The sudden 
decline of LPF was balanced out by the rise of the Geert Wilders' Party for Freedom (PVV) in 
2005, signalling that the right-wing populist agenda of Euroscepticism and anti-immigrant 
positions is here to stay.  
 
The question that has repeatedly been examined in the relevant literature is to what extent 
the religious and class cleavages that structured Dutch political space have been replaced by 
new cleavages in its contemporary phase. Numerous studies reveal a wealth of different and 
often contradicting findings, in some cases perhaps reflecting not just different -temporal focus 
but also the effects of different methodological strategies. For example, some studies identify 
only two-dimensions of conflict: the socio-economic left-right, and a libertarian-cosmopolitan-
multicultural/authoritarian-nationalist-monocultural dimension that has succeeded the classic 
251
religious-secular conflict (Kriesi and Frey 2008a: 172; Pellikaan et al. 2003). Pennings and 
Keman (2003) also put forth a two-dimensional model, where the left–right dimension is 
complemented by a second dimension, the progressive–conservative axis.  Finally, a recent 
study focuses on the issues of immigration and post-materialism and even though they argue 
that both issues should not be underestimated, they conclude that they have not yet developed 
into cleavages and therefore it is not clear what type of cleavage, if any, has come to replace the 
old ones (Andeweg and Irwin 2005: 39-41).  
 
Our first expectation is that there will be an equal amount of dispersion of parties along both 
the economic and cultural-political axes. Furthermore, we expect that the cultural-political axis 
will be determined by 'older' categories in the elections of the 1990s, whereas nativism should 
emerge as the most important structuring category in the 2004 and the 2009 EP elections, which 
followed the 2002 election, a significant election that is usually credited with the 
transformation of ideological space in the Netherlands.  
 
Italy 
The fact that our analysis begins in 1994 means that we are dealing with a radically new party 
system. Even though the Italian party system is the newest of all six (even newer than in later 
democratizers Greece and Hungary), the new configuration quickly developed a bipolar 
structure which persists to this day.   
 
As is well known, the party system that collapsed was dominated by the Christian 
Democratic Party (DC). The Christian Democrats represented moderate conservatism and 
became the hegemonic force in post-war Italian politics due to two interrelated factors. The first 
was Italy’s electoral system of pure proportional representation that allowed even the smallest 
parties to be represented in parliament, resulting in the fragmentation of Italy’s political forces 
into too many parties. Most governments were therefore made up of weak and unstable inter-
party coalitions. The second related factor was that eligibility for inclusion in these government 
coalitions did not extend to the two extremes of the political competition space, the 'antisystem' 
communists (the second largest political force in Italy) and the 'neofascists' of the Italian Social 
Movement (MSI) to the right of DC. As a self-declared 'anti-communist and anti-fascist' force, 
as well as the largest party in any electoral contest until 1994, the DC was able to occupy the 
political center and dominate democratic politics by always serving as the major partner in 
successive coalition governments (Pappas 2001: 235). 
 
After forty years in government, the DC became the main cog in a machinery of systemic 
corruption. Following the Tangentopoli affair8, the DC fragmented into three main parties: the 
Italian People’s Party (PPI), which was under the leadership of Romano Prodi; the conservative 
Christian Democratic Center/United Christian Democrats (CCD/CDU); and the Christian 
Social Party (CS). The latter disappeared completely as it was quickly absorbed by the other 
parties. Subsequently, the PPI joined center-left coalitions, while the CCD/CDU sought 
collaborations with parties on the right. Finally, a smaller group within DC chose to move even 
farther to the right by forming a coalition with the MSI. The MSI seized the political 
opportunity of the dissolution of the DC and its own strong performance in the local elections 
of 1993 and rebaptized itself as the National Alliance (AN) under the leadership of the party’s 
secretary, Gianfranco Fini (Tsatsanis 2006: 125). The dissolution of DC, the formation of Forza 
Italia (FI) by Silvio Berlusconi, and the 'refoundation' of the Communist Party as the (more 
legitimate) Party of the Democratic Left (PDS) formed the main components for the creation of 
two coalition camps, led by FI and PDS respectively, that put an end to the one-party dominant 
system of the post-war era and inaugurated an era of multi-party bipolar politics.  
 
8 Tangentopoli (Italian for bribeville) was the name generally used to refer to the corruption based 
political system that ruled Italy until the mani pulite (clear hands) investigation delivered it a deadly 
blow in 1992. leading to the demise of the DC and of the Socialist Party (PSI). 
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Even though the post-war Italian party system was marked by a dual cleavage structure 
where class and religion predominated (Bellucci and Heath 2007: 5), partisan dealignment and 
organizational fluidity do not allow us to posit more specific hypotheses about the structure and 
content of contemporary ideological space in Italian politics. We retain our more general 
hypotheses about the two-dimensional structure of the ideological space (even though the 
continuing fragmentation of the party system is likely to elevate badness-of-fit values) and 
increasing significance of the ideological categories belonging to the nationalism-
postnationalism axis. Nevertheless, because of the existence of pre-electoral coalitions based on 
a bipolar left-right configuration, one should expect some degree of polarization along the 
economic axis. In addition, the presence of AN (before its dissolution into PdL) and, especially, 
of LN are expected to increase polarization along the cultural-political axis.    
 
Greece 
Even though the party system of Greece is relatively new, created after the return to democracy 
in 1974, memories of the political divisions of the pre-authoritarian period continued to 
condition the understanding of Greek politics and to shape political identities long after regime 
transition. It has been argued that Greek political space has been characterized by a three-
pronged (left-center-right) unidimensional structure and a single cleavage, with its exact point 
of division along the single axis shifting according to the historical juncture (Moschonas 1994). 
The post-German occupation civil war created a schism between communists vs. 
anticommunists that replaced the dominant interwar division of republicans vs. royalists (or 
Venizelists vs. Anti-Venizelists), thus shifting the line of separation towards the left end of the 
left-right axis. The protracted monopolization and abuse of political power by conservative 
political forces eventually shifted the line of separation back toward the right end of the 
political spectrum through the emergence of a right-antiright cleavage in the 1960s, with the 
antiright bloc encompassing both forces of the left and of the political center (Moschonas 1994: 
167-170).   
 
Despite the apparent straightforward intelligibility of the unidimensional left-right space, it 
should be noted that in the case of Greece the content of this dimension never quite 
corresponded to its classic definition and understanding. Even though political divisions in 
Greece forged resilient identities, they never amounted to full cleavages - in the strict sense - 
due to the exceptionally weak structural anchoring of both political identities and voting 
choices. The absence of a sizeable industrial working class due to late industrialization, coupled 
with the post-war regime of quasi-authoritarianism meant that the left-right axis was primarily 
understood in terms of a conflict over socio-political values and not as outright class conflict 
(Tsatsanis 2009: 39). Most of the parties that appeared after the end of the colonels' regime in 
1974 were new but with clearly discernible ties to pre-authoritarian political life. After the first 
two elections of the post-authoritarian period in the 1970s, which were characterized by a 
relatively high degree of fluidity, the Greek party system was dominated once again by three 
blocs (left-center left-center right) (Lyrintzis 2005: 244) but started to develop even stronger 
majoritarian tendencies. The shift of the ideological equilibrium to the left of the spectrum, that 
lasted at least until the 1990s, can be attributed to a relative radicalization of the Greek 
electorate generated by the seven-year experience of right-wing authoritarianism. In the 1980s 
there was a swift move towards two-partyism, with the party of the center-left (PASOK) and 
the party of the center-right (New Democracy) regularly capturing over 80 percent of the vote 
in parliamentary elections. The third bloc, consisting of a united or (more commonly) 
fragmented communist left continued to struggle, with an electoral strength that hovered 
around 10 percent of the vote and seats in parliament, a tendency that persists to this day. 
 
Our national specific hypotheses in the case of Greece relate first to the dimensionality of 
the Greek party system. Recasting the received wisdom of previous studies and following the 
findings of Tsatsanis (2009), we hypothesize that Greek political space is two-dimensional, not 
unidimensional, albeit with the cultural-political dimension being of much greater importance 
than the economic one. In other words, polarization along the cultural axis is expected to be 
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significantly more acute than polarization along the economic axis. The comparatively extreme 
leftward tendencies in economic issues for all political parties as well as voters have also been 
documented in previous studies (Tsatsanis 2006, 2009), and lead us to hypothesize close 
proximity between all parties and the issue of welfare, with the latter emerging more like a 
valence issue. Once again, our hypothesis about globalization-related issues does not deviate 
from our more general hypothesis; following the findings of Teperoglou et al. (2010), we 
expect them to be aligned with and to be gradually replacing more traditional cultural-political 
issues, especially after the emergence onto the Greek political scene of right-wing populist 
LAOS during the last decade.      
 
Hungary 
As in most post-communist democracies, the political landscape in Hungary was very fluid in 
the first years of the 1990s. The parties that dominated the first parliamentary elections of the 
post-communist era in 1990 were the conservative Democratic Forum (MDF) and the liberal 
Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), two parties that were quickly relegated to the status of 
junior coalition partners following subsequent elections. Since the late 1990s, there has been an 
apparent move towards the consolidation of a more classic two-and-a-half party system, with 
the center-left Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and the center-right Alliance of Young 
Democrats (Fidesz) assuming their place as the two major parties in Hungarian politics.   
 
However, tendencies of bipolarism were perhaps evident since the beginning of the post-
transition years. Since the first elections, there has been a, more or less, steady alternation in 
government between right-wing and socialist-liberal coalitions (Fowler 2002: 800). This 
alignment of political forces in terms of left and right does not mean that political competition 
in Hungary reflects primarily a divide over economic policy or a deep-seated class conflict. A 
quick look at the composition of the opposed camps can be quite instructive about the nature of 
the dominant cleavage that structures political space in the country. The fact that the liberal 
SZDSZ is the default coalition partner of the socialists, not of Fidesz or any other right-wing 
party, is probably testament to the reality that the decisive element that has been conditioning 
coalition formation thus far is proximity of parties on cultural issues, not convergence of their 
economic agendas.  
 
The economic liberalization policies carried through by the communist regime before its 
downfall blunted the issue of economic reform. The MZSP, as the communist successor party, 
could claim a credible commitment to economic reform, making it less attractive for other 
political parties to focus their appeal primarily on economic issues (Kitschelt et al. 1999: 234). 
In the search of more politically lucrative divisions, politicians in new parties chose to adopt 
culturally conservative, populist and often xenophobic positions, contrasting their agendas to 
the cosmopolitan and libertarian positions of other parties. Fidesz led this populist turn in the 
early to mid-1990s, which has been credited to a large extent for its later electoral success 
(Enyedi 2006: 179). The split in the MDF and the creation of the right-wing populist Hungarian 
Justice and Life Party (MIEP) in 1993, as well as the emergence and subsequent success of the 
ultra-nationalist Movement for a Better Hungary (JOBBIK) in 2003, conform to the broader 
hypothesis that polarization in Hungarian politics is gradually becoming more acute when it 
comes to identity and value issues. 
 
Our hypotheses concerning the case of Hungary do not deviate from our more general 
hypotheses. We expect that globalization-related issues will tend to be aligned with the standard 
cultural dimension. Furthermore, following the findings of Kitschelt and his coauthors (1999), 
we expect that differentiation along the economic dimension will be comparatively low, 
whereas greater polarization will tend to be observed along the cultural-political dimension. 
This tendency is expected to be even stronger in the 2009 election due to the introduction of 
JOBBIK in European elections.  
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Findings 
 
In this section we discuss our findings for each country by observing the main configurations of 
political parties and ideological categories per election as they appear on our unfolding models. 
For presentation purposes, we have rotated the two-dimensional plots in a way that the 
economic axis is arranged horizontally, always running from left to right (welfare state 
economy to economic liberalism). Following the presentational strategy employed by Kriesi et 
al. (2006, 2008a), we have drawn an additional vertical axis on each plot based on our visual 
representation of the second dimension structuring the ideological space. The categories 
forming the cultural-political axis can change from one election to the next, and so does the 
degree of integration between the two axes. At this point, we should once again point out that 
the distances between parties and ideological categories represent relative distances. In other 
words, we can only say that a party adopts culturally liberal positions only if it is located very 
close to that category, not necessarily because it is located in the upper end of the configuration 
(cf. Dolezal 2008a: 73). Again, we begin our discussion with Germany and the United 
Kingdom, the only two countries for which our analysis begins with the first EP election of 
1979.  
 
Germany (1979-2009) 
The dimensionality of the ideological space and political competition in Germany generally 
conforms to our nationally-specific hypotheses. The first important finding is that we observe a 
two-dimensional space of conflict. Raw stress values significantly drop from a single to a two-
dimensional solution to below 0.2 in every single case, with the exception of 1984, where the 
stress value is low even in the one-dimensional solution. The economic dimension, which 
corresponds to the traditional class cleavage, clearly constitutes a structuring dimension in 
Germany. In fact, in the election of 1984, the economic dimension appears to be the only 
important one. Our exceptional case is in accordance with previous analyses (e.g. Klingenmann 
1999), which posit that the left-right divide is the only prominent one in the German political 
competition. However, it should be noted that in the EP elections of 2009, 1989, and 1979, 
there are clear leftward tendencies for most parties, with welfare state economy strongly 
appearing as a valence category. 
 
The second dimension of political conflict is composed by the traditional cultural-political 
ideological categories of our study (sociopolitical authoritarianism vs. cultural liberalism) in 
several cases (see Figures 1a, 1c, 1e), a finding that is in line with our expectations concerning 
the importance of the religious-secular cleavage in Germany. However, the traditional cultural-
political categories are far from being the only ones that structure the second dimension of 
German ideological space. Environmental protection and anti-growth politics emerged in the 
1990s (following also the growth of the Green party) as an important structuring category of 
the second dimension, and by 2009 one could say that the environment has been transformed 
into a valence issue.  
 
The EP election of 1989 (which is also the only year in which the Republikaner party is 
included in our analysis) also led to the emergence of nativism as a polarizing category. Taking 
into account the fact that this ideological category corresponds largely to the issue of 
immigration, we can deduce that nativism became in Germany an important dimension with the 
rise of refugees and asylum-seekers in the early 1990s. In relation to the nationalism-
postnationalism axis, nativism is the only category that often contributes to the content of the 
cultural-political dimension (with the partial exception of economic integration in 1979 
and1999). As discussed in the country discussion above, none of the -German relevant parties 
of our study have endorsed 'hard' Eurosceptic positions (with the exception of the REP in 
1989). The political aspects of integration have never been a polarizing issue for German 
parties; Euroscepticism in German party politics is mainly expressed by individual politicians 
and is not translated into party policies (Busch and Knelangen 2004: 89).  
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A final set of findings relates to the movements of parties across time. The SPD maintains 
economically leftist positions and often culturally libertarian positions but since the entry of 
PDS/Die Linke into the political system, it tends to move closer to the center of the economic 
axis. In regard to the position of the FDP, our findings are totally in line with the position that 
by the mid-1990s the party give up its libertarian position and presented itself as closer to 
economic liberalism (Dolezal 2008b: 231). Both parties of the Union have rather stable 
positions close to authoritarianism and nativism (although CSU is rather closer than CDU). 
However, the most impressive transformation is probably the shift toward economic liberalism 
and the abandonment of pro-welfare positions for CDU after the 1989 EP election; until then, 
the positions of the party on the economic axis had been close or even to the left of SPD.   
 
 
 
Kruskal's Stress 1: 0.13 
 
Figure 1a: Germany 2009 
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Kruskal's Stress 1: 0.14 
 
Figure 1b: Germany 2004 
 
Kruskal's Stress 1: 0.16 
 
Figure 1c: Germany 1999 
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Kruskal's Stress 1: 0.15 
 
Figure 1d: Germany 1994 
 
Kruskal's Stress 1: 0.17 
 
Figure 1e: Germany 1989 
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Kruskal's Stress 1: 0.13 
 
 
Figure 1f: Germany 1984 
 
 
 
 
 
Kruskal's Stress 1: 0.07 
 
Figure 1g: Germany 1979 
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 ideological categories 
 
 
 
welfare=welfare state economy; econlib=economic liberalism; 
fiscalcon= fiscal conservatism; environment=environmentalism; 
cultlib=cultural liberalism; authoritarian=political authoritarianism; 
nativism= nativism; econintgr=economic integration; 
euscept=euroscepticism 
 political parties 
 
SPD=Social Democratic Party; FDP=Free Democrats; CDU=Christian 
Democratic Union; CSU=Christian Social Union; REP=Republicans; 
PDS=Party of Democratic Socialism  
 
 
 
United Kingdom (1979-2009) 
The EP election of 2009 reveals a party system clearly structured by two dimensions: the 
economic dimension, with Labour at the left end and the Conservatives and UKIP at the right 
end. The content of the second dimension conforms rather perfectly with our main hypothesis: 
it is dominated by the issues of economic integration (on the one end) and nativism and 
Euroscepticism (on the other). The inclusion of UKIP and BNP, which are comfortably located 
at the 'nationalism' end of the axis, certainly contributes to this alignment. The Liberal party 
emerges as the most 'postnational' party in this election, as in every single election since 1999. 
Overall, in relation to Germany, the content of the second dimension is much more determined 
by our globalization-related categories, and especially Euroscepticism and economic 
integration, but with nativism also strongly entering the picture, especially with the advent of 
the BNP in the last elections. This is no surprise given the well-known Eurosceptic tendencies 
of many political parties in Britain. The transformation of the content of the cultural-political 
dimension is accelerated in the 1990s, a fact also reflected in changes in the salience of the 
globalization debate in the post-Maastricht period (see Figure 7). 
 
The results of our analysis are in line with the findings of Kriesi and Frey (2008b) in relation 
to the structuring of the second dimension by integration-demarcation issues.  However, we 
have not discovered a 'slow transformation' of the cultural-political axis, with globalization-
related categories replacing the more traditional cultural liberalism-authoritarianism axis 
(Kriesi and Frey 2008b: 204). Instead, we find that the party system in the elections of 1979 
and 1984 can be best described as unidimensional, with the single economic axis accounting 
for almost all variance (the raw stress value for a one-dimensional solution for 1979 is 0.04 and 
for 1984 is 0.17).  
 
The movement of parties conforms to the widespread views about the changes in the 
orientations of the Labour and Conservative parties, especially in regard to issues related to 
Europe (see Rosamond 2003). Like many leftist parties, the Labour party initially adopted 
Eurosceptic anti-integration positions, only to become a pro-integration political force along 
with the Liberal party. In contrast, the Conservatives, which traditional contain both pro-
European and Eurosceptic factions within their party, initially adopted more pro-European 
stances, only to shift to Euroscepticism in the late Thatcherite period (cf. Spiering 2004:131).    
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Kruskal's Stress 1: 0.20 
 
Figure 2a: UK 2009 
 
 
 
Kruskal's Stress 1: 0.30 
 
Figure 2b: UK 2004 
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Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.22 
 
Figure 2c: UK 1999 
 
 
Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.18 
 
Figure 2d: UK 1994 
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Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.13 
 
Figure 2e: UK 1989 
 
Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.10 
 
Figure 2f: UK 1984 
 
 
 
263
 
Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.01 
Figure 2g: UK 1979 
 
 
 ideological categories 
 
 
 
welfare=welfare state economy; econlib=economic liberalism; 
fiscalcon= fiscal conservatism; environment=environmentalism; 
cultlib=cultural liberalism; authoritarian=political authoritarianism; 
nativism= nativism; econintgr=economic integration; 
euscept=euroscepticism 
 political parties 
 
1979 manifesto not available for Liberals; LDP=Liberal Democrats; 
UKIP=UK Independence Party; BNP=British National Party 
 
Netherlands (1994-2009) 
The unfolding models for the four EP elections in the Netherlands reveal considerable 
confirmation of our main research hypotheses. In all the four EP elections, we observe a clear 
two-dimensional space of conflict. Raw stress values drop significantly when moving from a 
single to a two-dimensional solution to below 0.2 in all cases. The first striking result that 
emerges for the configuration of parties and issues in all elections, save the 1999 election, is 
that there seems to be very little differentiation in the positioning of parties along the economic 
dimension. Welfare state economy and environmentalism emerge as valence issues with the 
occasional exception of the VVD and CDA (as well as the two right-wing populist parties, LPF 
and PVV in 2004 and 2009 respectively), which are not as close to welfare state economy in 
most cases but never clearly adopt economically liberal positions either. The 1999 EP election 
is the only one where there appears to be greater dispersion of parties along the economic 
dimension, and the only time where a party (CDA) can be seen as adopting a liberal economic 
agenda. In addition, the consistent proximity between environmentalism and welfare state 
economy suggests, contrary to our expectations, that there is an overlap between the economic 
and the 'new politics' dimensions.   
 
Going back to 1994, the configuration that emerges partially contradicts the findings of previous 
studies (Kriesi and Frey 2008a: 176; Van der Brug 1999:161) concerning the ideological heterogeneity 
of the 'purple coalition' (PvdA, VVD, D66). The analysis of the Euromanifestos data (in contrast to the 
analysis of references in the press and voter perceptions in the other studies) depict the three parties 
located extremely close to each other in the specific election, combining pro-welfare, pro-
environment, pro-integration and culturally liberal positions.  
Labour 
Conservatives environment 
euscept 
econintgr 
nativism 
cultlib 
econlib welfare 
authoritarian 
fiscalcon 
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The second main trend is related to the content of the second dimension. As in the case of 
the United Kingdom, the categories of the nationalism-postnationalism axis appear to 
contribute greatly, if not determine, this vector of ideological space. The main difference with 
the UK is that identity and immigration issues (captured by our nativism category) appear to 
typically provide the 'lower' end of the second axis instead of Euroscepticism. The 'upper' end 
of the second vector corresponds, in most cases, to cultural liberalism and economic 
integration, reflecting the mixture of 'old' and 'new' issues of the cultural-political axis and 
confirming, once again, our hypothesis about the latent variable that structures orientation on 
the issue of economic integration. In the last EP elections of 2009, the second dimension is 
structured exclusively by all three of the 'globalization' categories. We cannot confirm the 
finding of a previous study (Kriesi and Frey 2008a: 172) that the globalization categories have 
transformed the meaning of the cultural-political dimension because our data stretch back only 
as far as 1994. However, if we assume that the ideological space had a two-dimensional 
structure even before the 1990s, such a transformation would seem to be a likely development. 
The picture that emerges concerning the location of parties on this vector is much easier to 
interpret than positions along the economic axis. There is an integrationist and culturally liberal 
bloc consisting of PvdA, D66, Green Left and, to a lesser extent, VVD, contrasted with the left 
Euroscepticism of the Socialist Party and the right Euroscepticism of List Pim Fortuyn (2004) 
and PVV (2009). The position of the Christian Democratic parties (CDA and CU/SGP) appears 
to vary according to the content of the cultural-political dimension.  When the content of the 
dimension is structured by the ideological categories that contain issues related to economic 
and political integration (Euroscepticism and economic integration) as in 2009 and (partially) in 
1999, the two parties generally tend to belong to the integrationist camp. Conversely, when the 
dimension is structured by identity and values issues (nativism, cultural liberalism, 
sociopolitical authoritarianism) as in 1994 and 2004. the two parties are positioned closer to the 
nationalist/authoritarian end of the spectrum.     
 
 
 
 
Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.16 
 
Figure 3a: Netherlands 2009 
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Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.15 
 
Figure 3b: Netherlands 2004 
 
Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.18 
 
Figure 3c: Netherlands 1999 
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Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.13 
 
Figure 3d: Netherlands 1994 
 
 
 ideological categories 
 
 
 
welfare=welfare state economy; econlib=economic liberalism; 
fiscalcon= fiscal conservatism; environment=environmentalism; 
cultlib=cultural liberalism; authoritarian=political authoritarianism; 
nativism= nativism; econintgr=economic integration; 
euscept=euroscepticism 
 
 political parties 
 
PvdA=Labour Party; CDA=Christian Democratic Appeal; 
D66=Democrats 66; SP=Socialist Party; CU=Christian Union; 
SGP=Reformed Political Party; VVD=People's Party for Freedom and 
Democracy; GL=Green Left; PVV=Party for Freedom; LPF=List Pim 
Fortuyn; RPF=Reformatory Political Federation; GPV= Reformed 
Political League; EuroTrans=Europe Transparent 
 
 
 
 
 
Italy (1994-2009) 
The first thing that should be noted about the unfolding models of the Italian elections is that 
they render acceptable fits for all two-dimensional solutions (raw stress values around or below 
0.20), which means that the ideological space in Italy retained a basically dual structure. In 
1994, in the EP election that was conducted only a few months after the first national election 
of the restructured party system, what emerges is a picture of relative moderation along all 
relevant vectors. In the economic dimension there is some differentiation, with Lega Nord (LN) 
adopting the most rightward position, whereas Alleanza Nazionale (AN) and the Partito 
Populare Italiano (PPI) adopting economically leftist stances. The new Forza Italia (FI) and the 
Partito Democratico della Sinistra (PDS) emerge as centrist parties that blend pro-welfare with 
economically liberal positions.  Similarly, all parties adopt relatively pro-integration positions, 
with the exceptions of AN, which comes closer to the authoritarian and nativism categories and 
the only outlier, Rifondazione Comunista (RC), which positions itself as the only Eurosceptic 
party. 
 
High levels of organizational fluidity in the following elections make the task of trend 
detection extremely difficult. In the 1999 and 2004 elections we have the appearance of new 
parties the autonomous existence of which was short-lived; most of them were absorbed into 
new parties or coalitions in subsequent elections (e.g. Democrats, FLI/PRI, UD, EUR). 
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Following our criterion of inclusion which is securing representation in the European 
Parliament in the election under consideration, combined with the availability of stand-alone 
coded Euromanifestos, forced us to include a large number of parties in our analysis that often 
appear only once. Moderation in economic issues continues to be the rule in subsequent 
elections (see Figures 4a, 4b, 4c), however, some interesting observations can be singled out. FI 
makes a noteworthy shift towards economic liberalism in 1999 and 2004, but moves back into a 
more moderate position in the 2009 EP election after its merger with AN into the Popolo della 
Libertà (PdL). The PDS (in 2004 examined only as part of the Ulivo coalition due to the 
unavailability of separate manifestos, and in 2009 competing as Partito Democratico (PD), 
following its merger with La Margherita) oscillates between centrist and leftist economic 
positions, reflecting its many changes in leadership and programmatic identity. 
 
In comparison with the previous countries, the configuration of the cultural-political axis is 
less straightforward and stable. Cultural liberalism and sociopolitical authoritarianism often 
contribute to the signification of this dimension, reflecting the classic cultural divide (religious-
secular cleavage). The paradox is that sociopolitical authoritarianism is often aligned not only 
with nativism (which is expected) but also with economic integration. This creates a situation 
where the main party of the center-left appears to adopt simultaneously pro-integration and 
authoritarian positions (see PDS/PD in 1999 and 2009). This inverse alignment in the cultural-
political axis can be also observed in Greece, the only other Southern European country under 
consideration in this study. 
 
 
 
Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.13 
 
Figure 4a: Italy 2009 
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Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.21 
 
Figure 4b: Italy 2004 
 
 (positive minus negative quasi-sentences) 
Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.21 
 
Figure 4c: Italy 1999 
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Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.20 
 
Figure 4d: Italy 1994 
 
 ideological categories 
 
 
 
welfare=welfare state economy; econlib=economic liberalism; 
fiscalcon= fiscal conservatism; environment=environmentalism; 
cultlib=cultural liberalism; authoritarian=political authoritarianism; 
nativism= nativism; econintgr=economic integration; 
euscept=euroscepticism 
 
 political parties 
 
PdL=The People for Freedom; PD=Democratic Party; IdV=Italy of 
Values; LN=Lega Nord; UDC=Union of Christian and Centre 
Democrats; SVP=South Tyrolean People's Party; FI=Forza Italia; 
UD,EUR=Union of Democrats for Europe; PPI-Popular Party; 
AN=National Alliance; RC=Communist Refoundation; PdCI=Party of 
Italian Communists; PRI=Italian Republican Party; FLI=Future and 
Freedom; PDS=Democratic Party of the Left 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Greece (1999-2009) 
In the EP elections of 2004 and 2009 there is a peculiar alignment of authoritarianism and pro-
integration positions, a fact that reflects the major conservative party’s (New Democracy-ND) 
steady proximity to both ideological categories. In fact, New Democracy is the only party that 
is very close to the authoritarian category in every election, due to the fact that law and order, 
together with defense, are consistently high on the party's priority list. The main representative 
of Euroscepticism in Greece remains the Communist Party (KKE), the only unreformed 
communist party left in Europe which still embraces hardline antisystemic rhetoric and 
continues to embrace Stalinist symbolism. The proximity between nativism and 
Euroscepticism, and their contribution to the content of the cultural-political axis in 1999 and 
2004 conforms to our main hypothesis about the directionality of the 'globalization' categories 
and, in the case of Greece, can be explained by two factors. The first is that KKE has moved 
towards culturally protectionist and anti-immigration positions since the early 1990s, reflecting 
a more general strategic choice to rely upon a more explicitly national-populist agenda. The 
second factor has been the advent of right-wing populist LAOS onto the political scene, which 
has increased the relevance of its flagship issues: immigration and protection of the national 
culture (the issues corresponding to our nativism category). 
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Our hypothesis concerning the leftward tendencies of the Greek party system on the 
economic dimension are partially confirmed. In most elections welfare state economy emerges 
as a valence issue for all parties, with the exception of ND in 1999, which espouses very 
liberal, economically, positions and LAOS in 2009, which becomes an outlier party in 
economic policy terms. Otherwise, the location of parties on the economic dimension are more 
or less as expected. Another important observation related to the alignment between our 'new 
politics' category (environmentalism) and welfare state economy, meaning that, as in the 
Netherlands, the 'new politics' and the economic dimension overlap simplifying the ideological 
space. Thus, as reflected in the low raw stress scores (0.15 for 1999 and 2004, 0.17 for 2009). 
Greece might have developed a more complicated structure than the unidimensional one that 
had been identified in past decades (see discussion above), but probably one does not need to 
go beyond two dimensions to capture the complexity of contemporary Greek politics. 
 
 
 
Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.17 
 
Figure 5a: Greece 2009 
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Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.15 
 
Figure 5b: Greece 2004 
 
 
 
Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.15 
 
Figure 5c: Greece 1999 
 
 ideological categories 
 
 
 
welfare=welfare state economy; econlib=economic liberalism; 
fiscalcon= fiscal conservatism; environment=environmentalism; 
cultlib=cultural liberalism; authoritarian=political authoritarianism; 
nativism= nativism; econintgr=economic integration; 
euscept=euroscepticism 
 political parties 
 
PASOK=Panhellenic Socialist Movement; ND=New Democracy; 
SYRIZA=Radical Left Coalition; SYN=Left Coalition; 
KKE=Communist Party; LAOS=Popular Orthodox Rally;  
DIKKI=Democratic Social Movement 
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Hungary (2004-2009) 
As a new member of the European Union, Hungary had the opportunity to participate only in 
two EP elections since its accession in 2004. Obviously, the study of only two elections in a 
time frame of five years does not allow us to identify any meaningful trends in a party system 
that is, any way you look at it, very new. 
 
In both configurations, the raw stress scores are very low (0.04 for 2004 and 0.12 for 2009), 
allowing us to conclude that there is a clear two-dimensional conflict. From the representation 
of the Hungarian relevant parties and the ideological categories of our study into the common 
political space, we observe that our hypotheses concerning the case of Hungary do not deviate 
from our more general hypotheses. The first and most important conclusion is that the 
globalization-related issues tend to be uniformly aligned with the cultural-political dimension, 
with the exception of Euroscepticism in the 2004 EP election.  Furthermore, our country-
specific hypothesis concerning the different levels of dispersion along the two axes appear to be 
fully confirmed for both elections. In 2009, all four parties are concentrated on the left end of 
the economic axis, with all parties exhibiting similar rejection of economic liberalism. This 
picture is somewhat different from 2004, when there was a clearer differentiation between the 
parties, with the socialists (MZSP) and the conservative Democratic Forum (MDF) adopting 
more welfare-friendly positions and Fidesz and SZDSZ adopting more liberal economic 
agendas. For MDF and Fidesz at least the observation that positions on cultural issues are more 
important than convergence on economic agendas is confirmed; the unexpectedly 
nationalist/authoritarian position of the MZSP on the cultural-political axis does not allow the 
same observation to be confirmed by our data for socialist-liberal alliance of MZSP-SZDSZ. 
Finally our last country-specific hypothesis concerning the expected increase in polarization 
through the entry of JOBBIK in 2009 is partially confirmed: JOBBIK as expected occupies a 
position close to the Eurosceptic end of the axis but other than that we see a near complete 
coincidence of the positions of the two major parties MZSP and Fidesz. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.12 
 
Figure 6a: Hungary 2009 
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Kruskal's Stress-1: 0.04 
 
Figure 6b: Hungary 2004 
 
 
 ideological categories 
 
 
 
welfare=welfare state economy; econlib=economic liberalism; 
fiscalcon= fiscal conservatism; environment=environmentalism; 
cultlib=cultural liberalism; authoritarian=political authoritarianism; 
nativism= nativism; econintgr=economic integration; 
euscept=euroscepticism 
 political parties 
 
MSZP=Socialist Party; FIDESZ=Alliance of Young Democrats; 
MDF=Hungarian Democratic Forum; JOBBIK=Movement for a Better 
Hungary; SZDSZ=Alliance of Free Democrats 
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Figure 7: The Salience of the Globalization Debate in Six Countries 
(Salience of globalization-related issues: % of total) 
 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
In this chapter, we have tried to investigate the thesis that orientations of political actors on the 
economic, cultural and political aspects of globalization and Europeanization tend to be 
expressed in the form of ideological preferences along a common underlying dimension. We 
have named this dimension the 'nationalism-postnationalism axis', while others have developed 
akin conceptualizations which, in reality, constitute similar polarities under different headings: 
the globalization-antiglobalization, demarcation-integration, or cosmopolitanism-communitian-
ism divide In addition, we have posited that this divide will tend to be embedded in the classic 
ideological space, structured by the two broadly conceived traditional conflicts: an economic 
conflict over distributional preferences, reflecting the historical class cleavage; and a cultural-
political conflict informed by different value divides (religiosity vs. secularism, cultural 
liberalism vs. conservatism, political authoritiarianism vs. libertarianism, etc.). We 
hypothesized that the nature of this globalization-inspired nationalism-postnationalism divide 
will lead to a specific route of embedment into national ideological spaces: the different 
components of the nationalism-postnationalism divide will tend to transform the content of the 
traditional cultural-political dimension. 
 
Our six-country analysis produced some interesting results. To begin with, in all six countries 
our general expectation concerning the dual structure of ideological space was largely 
confirmed with a few minor exceptions. Furthermore, our transformation hypothesis was a 
much better fit for the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Hungary. In the other three 
countries, while there are some signs that the globalization debate informs to varying extents 
the structure of the ideological space in some elections, we cannot conclude with similar 
confidence that the nationalism-postnationalism divide is supplanting more traditional concerns 
related to the cultural-political dimension. However, we could say that the location within the 
ideological space of the three categories that we associate with the nationalism-postnationalism 
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divide (nativism, economic integration, Euroscepticism) exhibit tendencies towards unidimen-
sionality in all six countries. Even the nominally economic category of the axis (i.e. economic 
integration) election after election cross-nationally was located in an orthogonal position to the 
classic distributional categories (i.e. welfare state economy vs. economic liberalism). 
 
On the other hand, our measurement of the salience of the globalization debate in each country 
and per EP election, did not reveal any clear trends concerning the level of importance of the 
debate. Of course, our limited time frame was perhaps not suitable from the beginning for such 
comparisons. In Germany and the UK, for which our time frame spans three decades, we 
cannot discern any sustained trend. However, a modest trend does exist in both countries when 
comparing the average level of salience between the pre-Maastricht and post-Maastricht period. 
In our other countries the time frame was 15 years or less, which obviously do not allow us to 
talk about any long-term trends. For example, the observation that salience levels have been 
dropping from their late 1990s highs in the two South European countries of our analysis is 
noteworthy, but should not lead one to assume that the globalization debate is on the track of 
losing its polarizing edge. After all, the current national debt crisis that has impacted Southern 
Europe and the rest of the continent can serve as another reminder of how an increasing number 
of issues that enter the national political agenda are framed in terms of global politics.   
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Do European Attitudes Matter for Explaining Participation 
in European Parliament Elections?  
 
 
Mariano Torcal1 
 
 
European citizens tend to vote much less in the European elections than in national elections 
(Rose 2004; Flickinger and Studlar 2007). This anomaly is not explained by traditional models 
of electoral participation. It has to be related to the nature of these supra-elections. What 
explains the fact that the individual probability of voting in this kind of election is always lower 
than voting in national ones? It is evident from previous studies that voting in national elections 
is the best predictor of individual turnout in European elections (Franklin 2001). Thus, after 
discounting the traditional factors that explain general turnout in national elections in the 
European countries, there are two remaining reasons for citizens’ decisions to go to the polls in 
the European elections: the individual marginal utility of voting for a pro-European party or an 
anti-European party and the benefit of expressing support as a European citizen for the 
European project.2 How much do citizens take into consideration these two factors when they 
are about to decide whether or not to go to the polls in the European Parliament (EP) elections? 
So far, the responses in the literature have been very inconclusive, although the dominant view 
until recently was that European issues do not matter when it comes to this type of election, the 
results of which depend instead only on na tional issues. This argument has been supported 
mostly by the second-order election literature, which essentially has defended, among other 
things, the argument that these elections are mostly about issues that have to do with domestic 
politics, which is the main electoral arena, and therefore citizens decide whether or not to vote, 
and how to vote, depending upon national matters. Therefore, if citizens decide to stay home 
instead of casting their vote, it is assumed that this is a lack of interest or perceived 
consequences at either of the two electoral levels: national or European (Reif and Schmitt 1980; 
Eijk and Franklin 1996; Schmitt 2005; Schmitt and Eijk 2007; Hix and Marsh 2011; Hobolt et 
al., 2008; Hobolt and Wittrock 2011). In other words, if we discount the effect of national 
electoral politics, nothing remains with which we can explain citizens’ behaviour in European 
elections. So, what then explains cross-national and individual differences after taking into 
account the effect of national elections and national politics? The objective of the present 
chapter is to explain these differences using exclusively European factors. 
 
Recently, there have been growing indications that European issues are becoming more 
important in these types of elections. For instance, the study by Blondel, Sinnott and Svensson 
(1997) suggests that abstention specific to European elections is strongly related to the 
electorate’s assessment of the work of the European institutions, while a study by Carrubba and 
Timpone (2005) attributes explanatory value to preferences regarding EU policies in explaining 
vote-switching in European elections. Hix and Marsh (2007) also consider that the vote for 
Green and Eurosceptic parties is related to specific factors to do with European integration; and 
more recently they have argued that EU policy concerns are becoming more relevant to support 
pro-European parties (Hix and Marsh 2011). Similarly, Egmond (2007) holds that party 
positions for or against the EU have increasing influence in this type of election when it comes 
to choosing certain parties. Finally, Flickinger and Studlar (2007) shows the importance of 
European factors when it comes to explaining cross-national differences in turnout in the 2004 
European elections. So, were European issues more present in the 2009 elections? If this is the 
1 Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona. Email: mariano.torcal@upf.edu 
2 According to the rational-spatial literature on turnout, there could be two individual factors that help to 
explain the individual probability to vote: the individual marginal utility of supporting the party that 
might benefit our interest (i.e., the expected party differential), and the sense of citizenship duty (Downs 
1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1968; Niemi 1976; Blais 2000). 
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case, how did the presence of Europe in these European elections increase the probability of 
voters going to the polls in May 2009? 
 
Answering this last question is not easy. It is true that the prevalence of Europe may be 
changing as a result of the increasing visibility of the consequences of the process of European 
integration, such as the introduction of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the Euro. It 
may be also certain that there has been a process of increasing contestation of Europe in the 
national arena in many countries which has made this a central issue not only in European 
elections, but also in national elections (Franklin, Marsh and McLaren 1994; Gabel and Palmer 
1995; Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996; Anderson and Reichert 1996; Anderson 1998; Gabel 
1998a and 1998b; Hooghe and Marks, 2008; Schuck, Xezonakis, Elenbass, Banducci and 
Vreese 2011). Greater prominence of this conflict among the elites and during the election 
campaign could lead to “Europe” becoming more prominent in the public sphere and in the 
media (Vreese, Lauf and Peter 2007; Hix and Marsh 2011; Gibler and Wüst 2011). But 
precisely, because the politicization of Europe depends so much on national factors, we cannot 
expect the presence of Europe in the elections to be a u niform process across all European 
countries, as it is mostly  assumed and tested (for exceptions see Peter 2007; Eijk and Franklin 
2007; Flickinger and Studlar 2007). For example, it can be argued that the extent of the 
influence of support for the EU on voter turnout in this type of elections would depend on the 
presence of a national debate and conflict over the EU. Thus, a country whose public opinion 
was extremely divided over the issue of the European construction process could produce 
electoral benefits for Eurosceptics by making it easier to mobilise political opposition in these 
terms and resulting in higher levels of participation. On the other hand, the government of a 
country in which public opinion is very pro-Europe might adopt a pro-European stance that 
would benefit it, encountering hardly any resistance from its political opponents, making both 
sets of party positions indistinguishable from each other and thereby favouring a low voter 
turnout. Therefore, national matters might disrupt the presence of Europe in their respective 
national arenas, having a distinctive effect when it comes to explaining the individual decisions 
of going to the polls, but those are national matters about “Europe”, not exclusively national 
issues. 
  
However, it is difficult to imagine how Europeans can think of “European issues” when they 
go to the polls on such occasions. This is first, because there is a lack of attention from political 
parties and the media to European matters during the campaigns for these elections (Vreese, 
Lauf and Peter 2007); second, because the knowledge citizens have about the EU is very scant 
(Janssen 1991); and finally, because these elections have their own specificity due to the 
presence of an underdeveloped polity (Citrin and Sides, 2004), and therefore they do not give 
rise (even indirectly) to the election of an executive or a European Parliament (EP) that controls 
this executive (Eijk and Franklin 1996). Nevertheless, there might be an alternative way to 
estimate the presence of “European issues” for these supra-national elections. We also know 
that when citizens have to vote on issues about which they lack information or do not already 
have a formed opinion, they tend to refer back to very basic attitudes that help them to do this 
and attain greater political awareness (Zaller, 1992: 20-23). Taking this fact into consideration, 
in this paper I will argue that when citizens want to form opinions and take decisions about 
whether or not to vote in the European elections, they resort to two basic attitudes of support 
for or rejection of the EU that serve as informational shortcuts: affective or diffuse support; and 
instrumental or specific support (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970; Wilgden and Feld 1976). But 
the influence of these attitudes, as I said above, is not going to be uniform across countries, but 
conditional on t he level of the EU debate present in the respective national arenas. More 
concretely, it will be shown here that whereas the effect of the general affective or diffuse 
support to the EU is small and uniform across Europe, the effect of instrumental calculations 
becomes very relevant in countries where there is a more conspicuous presence of the inter-
party debate on t he EU at the national level. In such countries, these instrumental attitudes 
towards the EU have a greater effect when it comes to supporting a particular party (i.e., 
expected party differential about the EU is higher), substantially increasing the likelihood of 
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going to the polls. In national political contexts in which the EU has low inter-party 
differences, besides the weak and general effect of the affective or diffuse support, there is 
however, nothing favouring the effect of Europe when it comes to the electoral results, and 
thus, besides the weak and general effect of EU diffuse support, the participation might only 
depend on what is going on in the principal national arena (issues, incumbent effect, current 
electoral cycle and so on), reinforcing the second-order nature of the EP elections.  
 
 
The “D and B” Terms of Electoral Turnout in the European Elections 
  
Ever since the classic study by Downs (1957) and all the subsequent literature it has produced, 
we have known that the two most important elements for explaining individual electoral 
turnout of citizens are the marginal benefit they expect to obtain by voting for one candidate 
over another (the B term in the equation is just the expected party differential that voters expect 
to obtain for choosing one party instead of another) and the cost of actually casting their vote 
(the C term). B. The problem is that the benefit B of voting for one candidate or party instead of 
another is conditioned by the low value of P, i.e., the probability that an individual vote will 
have a decisive influence on the final result (as there are millions of voters). Therefore, as P is 
so low, the product P*B is always tiny and so the value of C, i.e., the cost of voting will always 
be higher than the product P*B, which means that the most rational course of action is not to 
vote. Nevertheless, most citizens in all the democratic political systems do vote. This 
contradiction between the logical deduction and the empirical evidence is what is known as 
“the voting paradox”. 
 
The best known way of attempting to solve this paradox is by including in the equation a D 
term representing the consuming satisfaction and/or the obligation of complying with the 
citizen's duty to vote (Riker and Ordeshook 1968; Niemi 1976). This duty may refer to the 
particular group to which the person belongs or to the whole community (Aldrich 1993), but 
ultimately the action of voting depends fundamentally on the individual value of D. The other 
alternative is considering other ways to estimate the value of B. This latest term might be more 
than just a pure individual utilitarian calculation, becoming an absolute instrumental motivation 
that can only be satisfied by the consumption value of expressing support for the most preferred 
option. This will also make B non-conditioned by the always low value of P. This way, we also 
shift the interest of explaining turnout from just cost and pure instrumental calculations to the 
resources and motivational cues that may not only lower transaction and information cost, but 
add an additional value to the simple act of voting, resolving the paradox that the rational 
choice model was not able to resolve by its own parameters.3 I adopt this theoretical approach, 
including the D term in the equation and making B non-conditioned by the low value of P.  
 
However, in the case of the European elections, the content and value of B and D are 
different after discounting the general effect of B and D for national elections. The “B European 
term” (BEU) will be the “consumption satisfaction of expressing support to a pro-European or 
anti-European party”; whereas, the “D European term” (DEU) shall only estimate the 
“consumption European duty benefit”; i.e., the satisfaction or duty to participate in this 
particular type of election (DEU). The values of BEU and DEU for European elections are not only 
different in nature but even more important, in so far as that is possible, than general B and D 
for national elections since the relative value of PEU is more reduced from what P is in national 
3 These responses are not completely satisfactory for the rational-choice paradigm and in some ways 
make the argument tautological (Barry 1978; Green and Shapiro 1994), but they at least serve to pose an 
interesting question by raising the issue of the role that general individual attitudes could have in 
overcoming the assumption of the importance of certain instrumental individual calculations in 
explaining electoral behaviour. Additionally, they represent a co nvergence of the individual resource 
model, the psychological involvement model and the mobilization model with the rational-choice one to 
explain turnout. For this argument see (Blais 2000: 12-14). 
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elections. The value of PEU is even smaller in this type of election, since, although the size of 
the electoral constituencies for the European elections is bigger (as, in most cases, the whole 
country is the electoral district), the total number of electors per district is much higher and, 
therefore, the value of the individual vote (i.e., the PEU value) diminishes. Additionally, we are 
talking about elections in which each person is called upon to vote together with 500 million 
other Europeans.  
 
If this is the case, the BEU term might become even more important when it comes to explain 
participation in the EP elections, but only if there are distinctive positions of the parties when it 
comes to valuing the EU and its policies, something that is not uniform across all the EU 
countries. If this pro- and anti-European distinctiveness among parties is not present to the 
public eye (so the expected party differential for the EU is zero), BEU will not have any effect 
on choosing party preferences and consequently on whether to decide to vote or not (Downs 
1957, 44) in European elections. The “consumption benefit” from expressing party support will 
be gone or substituted by national instrumental calculations related with the principal national 
arena (this is the basic argument of the second-order literature). But, also when BEU, the EU 
instrumental benefit consumption of expressing party preferences, is absent, the decision as to 
whether to cast a vote or not will depend much more, if not entirely, on the value of DEU or the 
European citizen duty/satisfaction of going to vote. In this context also, BEU will be “only” a 
function primarily of issues related to domestic politics (i.e, B), with the main electoral area 
playing a m ajor part and the status of these elections as se cond-order elections becoming 
enhanced. Therefore, the effect of BEU and DEU on going to the polls will depend on the 
visibility of party position differences on “Europe” in the national political arena and national 
public opinions. In a context in which Europe and the different party positions on Europe are 
strongly present in the political sphere, the value of BEU will be clearer and, of course, it will 
have more variation. As I already said, in this context, this will mean that electoral turnout for 
the European elections will not depend so much, or uniquely, on DEU, and, therefore, citizens 
will not only go to vote because they manifestly support or oppose the EU or the European 
integration process, but also, it will depend on the instrumental benefits that citizens expect to 
obtain from supporting clearly pro- or anti-European parties.  
 
Finally, the effect of DEU should be similar for all the countries regardless of the level of 
politicization of the EU in national politics, since this kind of diffuse support should be immune 
to daily politics forming the “safety net” of support (Easton 1965) and consequently, having the 
same effect on turnout across countries and their respective levels of EU trust and EU inter-
party politicization.  
 
 
Measurement of BEU and DEU and Operational Hypotheses 
 
As I said, turnout in European elections will depend on t he “consumption European duty 
benefit” itself, that is, DEU which must be very distinctive from the general D value, which 
applies to all elections and all citizens, and it should be measured by the general or diffuse 
support given to the EU integration process in general which is distinctive from the potential 
effect of the general consumption benefit of participating in elections in general. It should also 
be somehow independent for the level of instrumental or conditional support to the EU. The 
question I will use to measure this affective or diffuse support for the EU will be the following: 
“Generally speaking, do you think that membership of the European Union is a good thing, 
neither or bad thing?” This is a most frequent indicator used to measure diffuse support for the 
EU in the literature4 and it has been tested to explain turnout in European elections in other 
preceding studies (for instance Flickinger and Studlar 2007).  
 
4 For a most recent discussion of this literature see Sander, Toka, Belluci and Torcal (2011). 
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Estimating the value of BEU is not easy either. This is because, as has already been said (Eijk 
and Franklin 1996), these elections do not  give rise (even indirectly) to the election of an 
executive or an EP that controls this executive, leaving the value of BEU almost empty (since 
there is not a clear connection between party support and individual benefits coming from the 
adopted policies by those parties). Furthermore, there is a lack of attention from political parties 
and the media to Europe during the campaigns for these elections (Vreese, Lauf and Peter 
2007), and, as perhaps as a consequence of the former, citizens’ knowledge about the EU and 
its policies is very scant (Janssen 1991). Finally, citizens are, to a l arge extent, unaware of 
which tiers of government are responsible for different areas of public policies, adding more 
confusion to the conscious level of accountability that rational voting requires (Sander, Toka, 
Belluci and Torcal 2011).   
 
Therefore, for these types of elections, BEU can only be estimated by a general sociotropic 
measure of the consumption satisfaction of expressing instrumental party pro-European or anti-
European preferences. This is because, as I said before, European voters are most likely to fall 
back on basic attitudes of instrumental support for the EU to give BEU a value that it is 
independent from the B value of national elections. In particular, I propose to measure the 
value of BEU with an attitude that measures the sociotropic instrumental support given to the EU 
(whether belonging to the EU is beneficial to the country: “How much confidence do you have 
that the decisions made by the EU will be in the interest of your country?”5). In this connection, 
EU instrumental support may become a basic factor in calculating the individual absolute value 
of BEU and therefore in determining party preferences. This is a basic attitude in shaping most 
attitudes toward the evaluation of the EU, its institutions and its policies (Sanders et al. 2011), 
and, as it has been shown by preceding works, is based on cost-benefit analysis of either 
objective economic and social benefits (whether for individuals or groups) or of subjective 
perceptions of those benefits (Dalton and Eichenberg 1998; Anderson and Kaltenthaler 1996; 
Gabel and Palmer 1995; Gabel 1998a and 1998b; Christin 2005). Yet others consider that this 
indicator of instrumental support is related to the economic and social winners and losers in 
each country as a result of given EU policies (Gabel and Palmer 1995; Anderson and Reichert 
1996; Gabel 1998a and 1998b; Hooghe and Marks 2005). Additionally, some trends have been 
observed in the last years, detecting the rising importance of these subjective instrumental 
calculations, cued by national politics, when it comes to making an overall appraisal of EU 
integration, signaling the end of the so-called “permissive consensus” times of European 
integration to the new “constraining dissensus” times (Hooghe and Marks 2008). 
 
Additionally, the current increasing “constraining dissensus” is also producing several 
consequences with regard to these two types of support: their relationship is getting weaker 
over time; both types of support tend to have different behavior over time and from country to 
country; and, finally, they tend to have different relationships with other indicators of European 
citizenship (Sander, Toka, Belluci and Torcal 2011; Torcal, Muñoz and Bonet 2011). In the 
current data set, the correlation between these indicators is 0.38, although it varies from country 
to country, from a low 0.12 in Belgium to a high 0.51 in the Czech Republic.  
 
Therefore, we have two operational hypotheses: 
 
I) The effect of diffuse support on turnout should be uniform across countries 
regardless of the level of EU party conflict. 
 
II) A) In contexts in which there is little difference between the parties with regard 
to the EU and its policies, EU affective or diffuse support measured by general 
support to the EU, will be the only relevant factor in explaining individual 
turnout; 
 
5 For a similar approach to operationalize B to explain turnout probability in elections see Blais (2000). 
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B) but instrumental sociotropic support for the EU will hardly have any 
influence on the choice of which party to vote for and therefore it will not have 
any effect on explaining individual turnout. 
 
III) A) In contexts in which there are bigger differences between the parties in 
regard to the EU and its policies, EU instrumental sociotropic support will have 
a bigger influence on explaining individual turnout as it will also be influential 
for the choice of which party to vote for; 
 
B) and, thus, the effect of affective or diffuse to the EU will remain  significant 
but it will be secondary in explaining individual turnout.  
 
 
A Preliminary Analysis of the Data 
 
A preliminary analysis of the 2009 European Electoral Study (EES) data set allows us to 
confirm, in empirical terms, the aforementioned hypotheses. In order to do it, I have first 
created a party system distinctiveness index on the EU by country using the Chapel Hill Expert 
Survey Series6. This index of Party Score Distinctiveness has been calculated according to the 
following formula: 
 
 
This index produces a score that ranges from 0 to 1. The value 0 represents that all parties 
occupy the same position on the EU; and value 1 is when all parties occupy the most opposing 
positions on the EU. 
Country indices are presented in Table 1. I display in Tables 2 and 3 the distributions of 
these two attitudes, affective and instrumental support to the EU, clustering all the EU countries 
in two different groups according to the overall average of this index (below and above 
average).7 As we can see, the distribution of these two variables is the same in the two groups 
of countries and is therefore independent of the degree of national party system EU 
distinctiveness. We can also observe that diffuse support for the EU is always higher than the 
degree of instrumental support, regardless of the interparty positions discrepancies, confirming 
hypothesis I. Therefore, the degree of EU distinctiveness of the party positions does not affect 
the degree of diffuse or instrumental support for the EU. However, the same cannot be said for 
abstentions in the European elections and preferences for pro-European parties. Table 4 shows 
that turnout is ten percentage points higher in countries where there is a big contrast between 
the parties’ election platforms. Furthermore, Table 5 shows that the level of support for anti-
Europe parties is much higher where the differences between the party positions are much 
bigger, which confirms the importance of these distinctive elite positions in affecting the level 
of electoral conflict that may be present in national public opinion (Brug and Eijk 2007). 
   
 
6 This index of Party Score Distinctiveness has been calculated from overall EU opinion (Q1) from 
Chapel Hill Survey 2006 (see file 2006_ChapelHillSurvey_means.sav) 
7 The countries with higher distinctiveness are Poland, France, Greece, UK, Czech Republic, Italy, 
Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and Belgium. Lower distinctiveness includes Bulgaria, Slovakia, Ireland, 
Portugal, Slovenia, Estonia, Finland, Romania, Germany, Spain, Hungary, Latvia, and Lithuania.  
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Table 1: Index of EU Party System Distinctiveness by Country, 2006. 
                              
Country Index 
Score 
Poland 0.610697 
France 0.561081 
Greece 0.552425 
Austria 0.542936  
United Kingdom         0.531625 
Czech Republic 0.528346 
Italy       0.527127 
Netherlands 0.497564 
Denmark 0.497258 
Sweden 0.455472 
Belgium 0.428881 
Bulgaria              0.386071 
Slovakia           0.367032 
Ireland              0.362102 
Portugal 0.353811 
Slovenia 0.332651 
Estonia 0.317675 
Finland 0.303116 
Romania 0.280857 
Germany 0.279925 
Spain 0.256405 
Hungary            0.255506 
Latvia              0.204913 
Lithuania            0.147775 
      _______________________________ 
 
 
 
Table 2: EU Diffuse Support in Europe by Levels of EU Political Party Distinctiveness, 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
Countries with 
LOW EU Party  
System 
Distinctiveness 
Countries with 
HIGH EU Party  
System 
Distinctiveness 
 
 
Generally speaking, do you think 
that membership of the European 
Union is a…? 
 
Good thing 
 
63.46 
 
64.72 
Neither 
 
27.64 
 
23.34 
A bad thing 
 
8.90 
 
11.94 
Source: PIREDEU data set on the 2009 EP Elections. 
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Table 3: Instrumental Support in Europe by Levels of EU Political Party Distinctiveness, 2009 
______________________________________________________________________ 
  Countries with 
LOW EU Party  
System 
Distinctiveness 
Countries with 
HIGH EU Party  
System 
Distinctiveness 
 
 
How much confidence do 
you have that decisions 
made by the European 
Union will be in the interest 
of (country)? 
A great deal  
 
6.29 
 
4.71 
 
A fair amount 
 
38.36 
 
40.73 
 
Not very much 
 
44.73 
 
42.87 
 
No confidence 
 
10.63 
 
11.69 
 
Source: PIREDEU data set on the 2009 EP Elections. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Turnout in the European Elections by Levels of EU Political Party Distinctiveness, 2009 
 
 
 
Countries with  
LOW EU Party 
System  
Distinctiveness 
Countries with  
HIGH EU Party 
System  
Distinctiveness 
Voted 
 
65.33 
 
73.44 
 
Abstention 
 
34.67 
 
26.56 
 
Source: PIREDEU data set on the 2009 EP Elections. 
 
 
 
Table 5: Pro-European Party vote in the European Elections by Levels of EU Political Party 
Distinctiveness, 2009 
 
 Countries with  
LOW EU Party 
System  
Distinctiveness 
Countries with  
HIGH EU Party 
System  
Distinctiveness 
 
Anti-Europe 
 
3.58 
 
28.13 
 
Neutral 
 
7.49 
 
5.26 
 
Pro-Europe 
 
88.94 
 
66.61 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: PIREDEU data set on the 2009 EP Elections. 
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Table 6: Relationship between Turnout in European Elections and Diffuse Support to the EU, 2009 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Good thing Neither Bad thing 
 
LOW EU Party System 
Distinctiveness 
 
Voted 
71.87 55.15 55.61 
  
Abstention 28.13 44.85 44.39 
 
HIGH EU Party System 
Distinctiveness 
 
Voted 79.25 62.17 66.90 
 
Abstention 20.75 37.83 33.10 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: PIREDEU data set on the 2009 EP Elections. 
 
However, the important aspect of the argument is to show the nature of the relation between 
these attitudes and electoral behaviour depending on whether or not the party positions in 
regard to Europe are clearly different. Table 6 shows the relation between individual abstention 
rates and diffuse or affective support for the EU according to the degree of differentiation of the 
party positions. As can be seen in Table 6, the support for the EU variable correlates somewhat 
with individual abstention, but this relationship is the same regardless of the level of EU 
differentiation between parties.  
 
This pattern of relations changes substantially when voting for parties against or in favour of 
the EU is studied. As can be seen in Table 7, the relationship between instrumental support for 
the EU and preferences for pro- and anti-European parties is very high in countries where a 
high degree of differentiation between party positions exists, whereas this relation is almost 
non-existent where the degree of such differentiation is low. 
 
Table 7: Relationship between Pro-European Party Vote and Instrumental Support to the EU, 2009 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________ 
 
LOW EU Party 
System 
Distinctiveness 
 A great 
deal 
Fair 
amount 
Not very 
much 
No 
confidence 
 
Anti-European vote 3.25 2.52 4.52 6.00 
 
Neutral vote 3.25 6.03 9.25 11.27 
 
Pro-European vote 93.49 91.45 86.23 82.73 
 
 
 
HIGH EU Party 
System 
Distinctiveness 
 
 
Anti-European vote 17.41 17.19 35.51 58.96 
 
Neutral vote 9.22 5.47 4.94 3.02 
 
Pro-European vote 73.38 77.33 59.55 38.01 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: PIREDEU data set on the 2009 EP Elections. 
 
This approach using comparative data confirms the initial theoretical hypotheses and shows 
the different roles attitudes of diffuse and instrumental support for the EU can play in different 
national contexts, where the presence of the EU debate is higher as a co nsequence of the 
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existence of distinctive party positions. Affective support may have an impact, although not 
very strong, on increasing turnout in all countries, but what may increase turnout substantially 
are the sociotropic instrumental calculations (BEU) when the different party positions are more 
conspicuous and visible to the average citizen, increasing the consuming satisfaction of 
supporting pro- or anti-European parties. 
 
 
Testing Further the Hypotheses 
 
1. The influence of EU affective or diffuse support 
To further confirm these findings, I have estimated two logistic regression models having 
individual turnout as the dependent variables but including EU affective or diffuse support as 
the independent variable, but for both groups of countries: those with low and high EU political 
party system distinctiveness. In the model, I have included turnout in national elections as a 
controlling variable, since I want to estimate the effects on these variables for the levels of 
turnout in European elections and not general turnout. The inclusion of the latter variable will 
take away the effects that are related with the general model of turnout in each country, and 
therefore will take into account the general effect of D and other variables affecting national 
turnout.8 In other words, I want to estimate the weight of the DEU sense of European duty only 
for the European elections, not for the whole D sense of duty. In order to maintain the 
parsimony of the model, I have not included in it the usual socio-demographic suspects in the 
literature in explaining individual turnout. These variables are also important predictors of 
participation in national elections and their effects are already included in the effect of the 
participation in national elections (although as I will discuss later, results do not vary with the 
inclusion of these variables). I have included, however, in the model the original left-right scale 
and also the quadratic transformation of the left-right scale given the curvilinear relationship 
detected between EU party competition and ideology (Aspinwall 2002; Ray 2003a and 2003b; 
Eijk and Franklin 2004; Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2004). Finally, I have added an indicator 
of EU political knowledge to control the potential effect that this variable might have on the 
level of EU political awareness and its effects on electoral behavior (Vries, Brug, Egmond and 
Eijk 2011). To make the interpretation of the results easier, I have transformed all the 
independent variables to have the same range from 1 to -1. 
 
The results confirm the theoretical expectations: the impact of affective or diffuse support to 
the EU is not high but it is significant, although it seems to be almost the same regardless of the 
levels of EU party system distinctiveness (the probabilities of voting are almost the same in 
both models). As expected, the best predictor of voting in the European elections is voting in 
national elections (Franklin, 2001). Additionally, ideological positions matter. Leftists citizens 
tend to vote more, although the hypothesis that individuals at extreme positions on the scale 
tend to vote more is also valid, as we can see with the quadratic term of the equation (marginal 
effects in both models are 0.15 and 0.16 respectively and they are statistically significant)9, 
confirming previous findings (Aspinwall 2002; Ray 2003a and 2003b). 
 
 
  
8 This model could contain some endogeneity for the inclusion of this variable, but the model was 
estimated with instrumental variables and the results were exactly the same. Additionally, I have 
estimated the same model without the inclusion of the variable and the parameters seems to be robust 
and significance test stable. 
9 I have computed these predictive probabilities of the marginal effects of the quadratic term by the  
following formula when the rest of the variables are at their means: 
2
31 // RightLeftRightLeftx
y ββ +=
∂
∂
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Table 8 contains the result of the estimation of the logistic model with robust standard. 
 
Table 8: Predictors of European Elections Turnout by levels of EU Political Party 
Distinctiveness, 2009 
 
 B prob.** 
 
Low EU Party 
System 
Distinctiveness 
 
Participation in National 
Elections 
1.86* 
(0.069) 
 
0.43 
EU Diffuse support 
0.36* 
 (0.033) 
 
0.15 
Political knowledge 
0.34* 
(0.036) 
 
0.14 
 
Left-Right self-placement 
-0.55* 
(0.132) 
 
-0.23 
Left-Right self-placement 
squared 
0.74* 
 (0.122) 
 
Intercept 
-0.83 * 
(0.081) 
 
Pseudo R square 0.09 
 
N 10,856 
 
 
High EU Party 
System 
Distinctiveness 
 
Participation in National 
Elections 
2.03* 
 (0.086) 
 
0.46 
EU Diffuse support 
0.34* 
 (0.034) 
 
0.13 
Political knowledge 
0.43* 
 (0.042) 
 
0.18 
Left-Right self-placement 
-0.94* 
(0.153) 
 
-0.33 
Left-Right self-placement 
squared 
0.92* 
 (0.144) 
 
Intercept 
-0.64* 
 (0.099) 
 
Pseudo R square 0.09 
 
N 9,891 
 
Source: PIREDEU data set on the 2009 EP Elections. 
*Significant at p<0.00 ** First Probability differences when rest of variables at fixed at their 
means. 
 
The effect of support for the EU is not high but it is significant, although it seems to be 
almost the same regardless of the levels of EU party system distinctiveness (the probabilities of 
voting are almost the same in both models). As expected, the best predictor of voting in the 
European elections is voting in national elections (Franklin, 2001). Additionally, ideological 
positions matter. Leftists citizens tend to vote more, although the hypothesis that individuals at 
extreme positions on the scale tend to vote more is also valid, as we can see with the quadratic 
term of the equation (marginal effects in both models are 0.15 and 0.16 respectively and they 
are statistically significant)10, confirming previous findings (Aspinwall 2002; Ray 2003a and 
10 I have computed these predictive probabilities of the marginal effects of the quadratic term by the  
following formula when the rest of the variables are at their means: 
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2003b; Eijk and Franklin 2004; Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2004). These results also seem very 
robust if we include more variables in the model such as the demographic ones and other short-
term variables such as the evaluation of the economic situation and more.11 
 
To further test the hypothesis, I have estimated the same model, but added an interaction 
between EU affective support and the level of EU party system distinctiveness to assess the 
conditional effect of affective support in different national context. In order to better interpret 
the results of the interaction terms, I have transformed the EU affective support into a dummy 
variable.12 The results of this model in Table  9  confirm  the  results  obtained  previously, but,  
 
Table 9: Logistic Predictors for Turnout in European Elections, 2009 (robust standard errors) 
 
Dependent variable: 
Participation in the 2009 
European Elections. 
Coeff. 
 
Intercept 0.97*  
(0.092) 
 
Participation in National 
Elections 
1.95*  
(0.053) 
 
EU Diffuse support 0.40  
(0.112) 
 
Political knowledge 0.40*  
(0.027) 
 
Left-right self-placement -0.71*  
(0.100) 
 
Left-right self-placement 
squared 
0.79*  
(0.093) 
 
EU Party System 
Distinctiveness 
0.16  
(0.203) 
 
EU Diffuse support * EU Party 
System Distinctiveness 
 
0.35  
(0.269) 
  
Pseudo R squared 0.09 
N 21,139 
_____________________________________ 
*Significant at p<0.00 
 
what it is more relevant is that it shows that the probability of voting when the level of 
distinctiveness is zero is very low, especially for the median levels of support (information not 
2
31 // RightLeftRightLeftx
y ββ +=
∂
∂
 
11 Results are not shown, but can be obtained from the author on request. 
12 I have transformed the categories “a bad thing” and “neither” into 0, and a “good thing” into 1.  
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displayed).13 Additionally, the aggregate variable EU party system distinctiveness has no effect 
on turnout and the coefficient for the interactive term is non-significant. Finally, the mean of 
the conditional probability of voting when there is no support and inter-party distinctiveness 
increases only 0.096 when there is total support to the EU and it is not statistically significant.14 
The data is confirmed in Figure 1, which represents the average marginal effects of EU diffuse 
support for inter-party distinctiveness (and its confidence interval with a 9 5 percent of 
confidence). This figure shows that the marginal effects are small (see the slope), and not statis- 
tically significant since the slope does not go out of the range of the confidence intervals at any 
point. 
 
Figure 1: Differential Effect of EU Support on Indivdiual Turnout as Party Distinctiveness 
Changes. 
 
13 The statistical interpretation of the coefficient of one of the terms of the interaction is the effect of the 
original term when the other term is zero (Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006, 65), which in this case have 
a substantive meaning, since 0 it means the absence of party system distinctiveness on the EU issue 
positions. 
14 I have computed these predictive probabilities of the marginal effects by the following formula 
when the rest of the variables are at their means: 
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The replication of this model in a Two Level Hierarchical Logistic Model confirms the 
above results and the coefficient of the cross-level interaction remains non-significant (results 
are not displayed due  to  limited  space).  This  result  is  logical  if  we  observe  the  graphical 
distribution of the random slope for EU diffuse support. The variance component of this slope 
is small with 0.163 and is not statistically significant, and additionally, as we can see in Figure 
2, which contains the 24 national slopes of this coefficient, the cross-national variation of the 
slopes is small and does not respond to the level of EU party system distinctiveness. 
These results confirm hypothesis I and some additional things. First, it shows that diffuse 
support of the DEU term is important to predict participation in these elections, once 
participation by national factors is controlled. Secondly, this effect is uniform regardless of the 
level of the discussion and public distinctiveness of the EU conflict in each country. So, diffuse 
support to the EU does not only seem to be immune to the level of the EU conflict at the 
national level given the nature of this support, but its effects on turnout seem also to be 
uniform, regardless of the level of the “nationalization of the EU conflict”, showing the 
distinctive nature and consistent consequences of this type of support. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Country Slopes for EU Diffuse Support and Participation in the 2009 European  
Elections. 
 
2. The influence of EU instrumental support 
To estimate the effect of EU sociotropic instrumental support on turnout I will take two steps. 
Firstly, I will see the effect of this variable on party preferences, and secondly I will look at the 
effect of this same interaction between EU instrumental support and EU party system 
distinctiveness on individual EP turnout. 
 
a) First step: estimating the effect on party preferences 
In order to estimate the effect of instrumental support on party preference, I have estimated a 
multinomial regression model for the three voting options (since this variable has three values: 
pro-, neutral and anti-Europe voting), but again for two different set of countries: low and high 
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EU party system distinctiveness countries. This dependent variable is constructed from 
declared individual vote in the last election and by clustering the different parties for which 
they vote  into pro-, neutral or anti-European, according to their location on the 2006 Chapel 
Hill Expert Survey data set. The independent variables are the same from the preceding turnout 
model, but with participation in national elections removed, since we are now estimating party 
preferences and adding other additional variables that might influence individual voting 
preference for this type of elections: economic situation of the EU, and the sociodemographic 
variables such as age, education and religiosity.    
 
Table 10a: Predictors of Pro-EU Party Vote by Levels of EU Political Party System 
Distinctiveness, 2009. 
REFERENCE CATEGORY: Pro-European vote. Coeff. First Prob 
Diff 
Low EU  
Party 
System 
Distinctiv
eness 
 
 
 
 
Anti-
Europe 
Intercept -2.79* (0.291) 
 
EU Instrumental support -0.65* (0.159) 
 
-0.04*** 
Political knowledge -0.09 (0.129)  
Economy 0.37** (0.190)  
Left-Right self-placement -0.43 (0.290)  
 
Left-Right self-placement 
squared -0.07 (0.407) 
 
Religion -0.05 (0.133)  
Education years 1.49* (0.463)  
Age -0.19 (0.204)  
Neutral 
Intercept  -3.70* (0.296)  
EU Instrumental support -0.63* (0.116) 
 
-0.07*** 
Political knowledge 0.08 (0.095)  
Economy 0.04 (0.126)  
Left-Right self-placement 0.30 (0.314)  
 
Left-Right self-placement 
squared -1.11* (0.334) 
 
Religion -0.12 (0.098)  
Education years -1.36* (0.490)  
Age -0.47 (0.148)  
 Pseudo R square 0.042  
   
N 4975  
 
 
The results of the estimation can be observed in Tables 10a and 10b. In these tables we can 
confirm the effect of these attitudes of EU instrumental support upon voting preferences is 
much stronger in countries with high levels of EU party distinctiveness, as we can observe in 
the significance of the coefficients and the estimated probability presented in the same table.  
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Table 10b: Predictors of Pro-EU Party Vote by Levels of EU Political Party System 
Distinctiveness, 2009 (cont.). 
 
REFERENCE CATEGORY: Pro-European vote. Coeff. First Prob 
Diff 
High EU 
Party 
System 
Distinctiv
eness 
 
Anti-
Europe 
 
Intercept -1.08 (0.134)*  
EU Instrumental support -1.31 (0.075)* 
 
-0.47*** 
Political knowledge -0.08 (0.063)  
Economy  0.18 (0.179)**  
Left-Right self-placement -0.81 (0.198)*  
 
Left-Right self-placement 
squared  1.13 (0.189)* 
 
Religion 0.01 (0.057)  
Education years  -0.88 (0.224)*  
Age -0.16 (0.095)  
Neutral 
 
Intercept -3.28 (0.345)* 
 
EU Instrumental support -0.19 (0.151) 
 
-0.01*** 
Political knowledge -0.40 (0.121)*  
Economy -0.60 (0.132)*  
Left-Right self-placement   0.37 (0.573)  
 
Left-Right self-placement  
squared  0.89 (0.453)** 
 
Religion  0.72 (0.123)*  
Education years -1.94 (0.560)*  
Age -0.85 (0.182)*  
 Pseudo R square  0.09  
N 4689  
Source: PIREDEU data set on the 2009 EP Elections. 
*Significant at p<0.00 
 ** Significant at p<0.05 
*** First Probability differences when rest of variables at fixed at their means. 
 
 
The probability of voting for an anti-European party instead of a pro-European party in the 
context of high EU party system distinctiveness’ decreased by an average of 0.47 when the 
citizen thinks that the membership of the country to the EU has been beneficial for his/her 
country. The model is especially relevant when we want to predict the probability of anti-
European versus pro-European. Additionally, in general, the results show that the traditional 
variables that explain party preferences work much better in a context of party distinctiveness. 
The only exception is the ideological variable when it is not transformed in a quadratic form, 
showing once more, how the European conflict is a cross-cutting cleavage with the traditional 
left-right conflict in those countries where the conflict among parties emerges in significant and 
visible ways. 
296
 
Table 11: Logistic Predictors for Pro-Europe vote in EP elections 2009 
 
 Log Coeff 
 
Intercept 
 
4.38*  
(0.168) 
 
EU Instrumental support 0.41**  
(0.222) 
 
Political knowledge 0.134*  
(0.047) 
 
Economy -0.06 
 (0.056) 
 
Left-right self-placement 0.55*  
(0.153) 
 
Left-right self-placement 
squared 
-0.69* 
(0.140) 
 
Religion 0.037  
(0.046) 
 
Education 0.59  
(0.199) 
 
Age 0.29*  
(0.071) 
 
EU System Party 
Distinctiveness 
-7.97* 
(0.311) 
 
EU Instrumental support*  
EU Party System 
Distinctiveness 
1.20*  
(0.473) 
 
  
Pseudo R Square 0.13 
  
N 9,914 
                                                 ____________________________________ 
Source: PIREDEU data set on the 2009 EP Elections. 
*Significant at p<0.00 ** Significant at p<0.05 
 
To test the effect of the sociotropic instrumental variables in the context of party 
distinctiveness, I have grouped the dependent variables for the sake of simplicity into two 
categories, not voting (neutral and voting non-European parties) or voting for pro-Europe 
parties. The preceding results from the multinomial regression show the plausibility of this 
grouping. I have estimated a logistic regression with robust standard errors with the same 
model presented in Table 10, but have added the interactive term for EU instrumental support 
and the level of party system distinctiveness. Also, in order to make the interpretation of the 
interaction easier, I have transformed the EU instrumental support into a dummy variable.15 
15 I have transformed the categories “no confidence” and “not very much” into 0, and the categories “a 
great deal” and “fair amount” into 1. 
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The results, displayed in Table 11, show first that EU party system distinctiveness has a cl ear 
negative impact on pro-EU support; i.e., the greater the level of EU distinctiveness, the greater the 
probability that people will vote for an anti-EU party. Additionally, the interactive term 
(instrumental support and EU party system distinctiveness) is statistically significant and goes in 
the expected direction (higher when the party system distinctiveness is greater). We can better 
observe the conditional effect of instrumental support on E P voting depending on t he level of 
party system distinctiveness with the analysis of marginal effects of this variable displayed in 
Figure 3. Not only is the slope important but also significant (since the slope increment goes out 
of the bounds of the confidence interval)  (see  Brambor, Clark and  Golder, 2006).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Differential Effect of EU Instrumental Support on ProEU vote as Party 
Distinctiveness Changes 
 
 
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
D
iff
er
en
tia
l E
ffe
ct
 o
f E
U
 In
st
ru
m
en
ta
l S
up
po
rt
Min (0.15)0.20 0.25 0.30 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60Max (0.65)
EU Party Distinctiveness
 
Dependent Variable: Anti/Pro EU vote
 
298
These results confirm hypothesis II. The replication of this model in a Two Level Hierarchical 
Logistic Model (results are not displayed) does not add any additional information, and the 
coefficient of the cross-level interaction remains significant. Again, this result should be 
expected if we observe the graphical distribution of the random slope for EU instrumental 
support. The variance component of this slope is 0.719 and it is statistically significant, and as 
we can see in Figure 4, which contains the 24 na tional slopes of this coefficient, the cross-
national variation of the slopes is important and it seems to depend on the level of EU party 
system distinctiveness: the impact of this support seems to be conditioned by the level of EU 
inter-party positions. Before I finish this part, I want to make clear that this preceding model 
does not propose any causality in the process, but just the interactive nature of the relationship 
between voting to specific pro- or anti-European parties and EU instrumental support in the 
context of EU inter-party differentiation. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Country Slopes for EU Instrumental Support and Vote for Anti/Pro EU Parties in the 
2009 Eropean Elections 
 
 b)   Second step: estimating the effect on party preferences 
The final step to test hypotheses I to III is estimating the effect of individual turnout of EU 
diffuse support and EU instrumental support conditioned by the contextual (country level) of 
EU party system distinctiveness.16 In this case I propose to estimate a multilevel model with 
two cross-level interactions to test if the level of EU party system distinctiveness could explain 
the random effect of the slopes of the two attitudes of EU support (EU instrumental and EU 
affective or diffuse support). The model I propose to estimate is the following:   
 
16 The right way to estimate this model is using the predicted value of the dependent variable of the 
preceding model that estimates the probability of voting a Pro- or Anti-EU party as the independent 
variable of individual turnout. The problem, then, will be that in this case all the individuals included in 
the estimation would have declared that they had participated in the election. 
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Prob(EPVOTEij=1|βj) = ϕij 
    log[ϕij/(1 - ϕij)] = ηij 
    ηij = γ00 + γ01* EU Party System DISTINCTIVENESSj + β1j*(TURNOUT NAT. ELECTIONSij) 
+ β2j*(EU DIFUSSE SUPij) + β3j*(EU INSTRUMENTAL SUPij) + β4j*(EU KNOWLEDGEij) + 
β5j*(LEFT_RIGHTij) + β6j*(LEFT RIGHT SQUAREij) + γ21*(EU Party System 
DISTINCTIVENESSj *DIFUSSE1ij ) + γ31*(EU Party System DISTINCTIVENESSj 
*INSTRUMEij ) + u0j 
 
 
Table 12: Logistic Multilevel Model for European Elections Turnout, 2009 
Fixed effects at individual level 
 
Log Coeff. 
 
Participation in National Elections 1.72 (0.060)* 
Political knowledge 0.43 (0.044)* 
Left-right self-placement -0.73 (0.145)* 
Left-right self-placement squared 0.84 (0.156)* 
 
Random effects at individual level 
 
EU Diffuse support (γ20)  0.20 (0.039)* 
EU Instrumental support (γ30) 0.41 (0.044)* 
Country-level intercept ( γ 00)   1.27 (0.113) * 
 
Aggregate level variables 
 
EU party System Distinctiveness (γ01) -0.54 (0.939)  
 
Cross level interactions 
 
EU Diffuse Support * EU party System  
Distinctiveness (γ21) 
0.24 (0.335)  
 
EU Instrumental Support * EU party 
System Distinctiveness (γ31) 
   0.57 (0.325)** 
 
  
N  20,615 
Source: PIREDEU data set on the 2009 EP Elections. 
*Significant at p<0.00 
** Significant at p<0.05 
 
 
Table 12 contains the results of the estimation of this multilevel model. The most important 
finding is that EU Party System Distinctiveness (the cross level interaction between EU 
instrumental support and EU party system distinctiveness) is significant and it goes in the right 
direction (γ31=0.41); in other words, EU system distinctiveness (a country level variable) is able 
to explain the country differences that exist in the relation between EU instrumental support 
and EP individual turnout. Therefore, the effect of BEU on turnout is conditioned by the relative 
presence of the EU conflict in the political arena and its interaction with the selection of a pro- 
or an anti-EU party. However, this is not the case for EU affective support, as we can see for 
the significance of the parameter (γ21=0.24). The lack of significance of this parameter means 
that the influence of the DEU on EP turnout is constant regardless of the EU party system 
distinctiveness at the national level, which once more confirms hypothesis I.  
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Conclusion 
 
As we have seen, attitudes of EU support might have a clear effect on EP turnout, but depend 
on the level of EU inter-party conflict in the national arena. The effect of EU affective support 
in explaining individual turnout is small on average and uniform across countries regardless of 
the politicization of Europe in the national arenas, something that it is expected given the nature 
of this support. But in countries where the level of EU party distinctiveness is low, it is the only 
attitude contributing to increased individual turnout. So, in countries where this type of diffuse 
support is low and the level of EU party distinctiveness is also very low, participation in this 
type of elections should also be low. However, the picture is very different when it comes to 
the effect of EU sociotropic instrumental support. This kind of support was still relatively 
important on average for the European elections of 2009, but its effect was highly conditioned 
by the level of EU party system distinctiveness at the national level. The effect of this type of 
EU instrumental support on voting preferences is very weak in countries with low levels of 
distinctiveness, but it is much higher when parties hold very different positions on EU integ-
ration. Therefore, this is an important aspect in explaining individual turnout in the latter 
countries.  
 
This is not a denial of the importance of national politics in European elections. On the 
contrary, EU national polarization or the Europeanization of national politics is a distinctive 
national political feature, and its impact is driving the electoral and political conflicts crafted by 
the main national political parties. What make the European elections second-order elections 
are the different positions of the national parties on EU issues. No EU inter-party conflict 
means that electoral participation depends only on t he levels of EU support, and voting 
preferences are merely a reflection of what is going on in the main political arena. However, 
greater levels of EU inter-party conflict augments the individual consumption benefit of 
participating in the European elections, and, consequently, increasing the level of participation 
in these elections, although it might also signify an increased anti-EU vote. 
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Abstract 
Scholarly literature on post-communist countries of East Central Europe points to 
differences in how voting behaviour is structured in those countries in comparison with 
more established democracies of Western Europe. This chapter shows that, in addition, 
considerable variance exists in the impact of values on party preferences across East and 
West. However, those differences can be explained by a g eneral pattern characterising 
voter behaviour. We theorize and empirically prove that the variance in the effects of 
values across countries is caused by the varying degree to which voters’ attitudes are 
structured by left/right. In countries where it is less clear for voters what left/right stands 
for and where they can locate their attitudes in terms of left/right, the effect of values is 
stronger. In turn, in countries where voters know better how their attitudes relate to the 
major dimension of competition, the effect of values is weaker. Our findings explain why 
in post-communist democracies the effect of left/right on party preferences is weaker, 
while the effects of values are stronger than in Western European countries. This 
proposition is empirically substantiated in a two-step analysis using the European Election 
Study 2009. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Scholars of comparative electoral behaviour have been increasingly interested in cross-country 
differences in the extent of structural voting, ideological voting and issue voting. Several of 
these studies focus on the differences in the determinants of party support between established 
democracies in Western Europe and formerly communist countries in East Central Europe. 
Those studies, which treat established and consolidating democracies as rather homogenous 
blocks of countries, show that in the latter the effect of social class and left/right distance is 
weaker (De Graaf et al. 1994; Van der Brug et al. 2008), while the effects of religion and EU 
issue voting is stronger than in established democracies (De Vries and Tillman 2010). 
However, those studies do not account for variance within country groups. This approach 
downplays different paths of development that those countries have undergone (Kitschelt 1999) 
and disguises differences among them. This chapter takes a broader view on the variation 
between European countries by examining differences in the effects of values on party support 
and outlining factors which explain those cross-country differences. 
 
The focus of this chapter lies on the demand-side factors that determine the extent to which 
values affect party preferences. We believe that the crucial variable responsible for the 
differences in the effects of values on party support across countries is the extent to which 
voters’ value stances are structured by left/right. From the extant literature we can devise two 
opposing hypotheses on the impact of values on party preferences. The first line of reasoning is 
that if party political conflicts are not structured by left/right, it is difficult for voters to know 
where parties stand on these conflict dimensions (Van der Brug et al. 2008). When voters do 
1 This study was conducted as part of the Marie Curie Initial Training Network in Electoral Democracy 
(ELECDEM). 
2 Corresponding author. Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research (AISSR),  
University of Amsterdam. Email: a.walczak@uva.nl 
3 Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research (AISSR), University of Amsterdam. Email: 
w.vanderbrug@uva.nl  
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 not know where parties stand on specific value dimensions, they may have difficulty relating 
their own value stances to their position on left/right. Subsequently, it is unlikely that voters 
will take these values into consideration when forming their party preferences as they will not 
know how those values relate to the major dimension of political competition. The effect of 
values on party support is then expected to increase when issues and voters’ attitudes towards 
those issues are more strongly associated with left/right. However, research on policy voting 
has also shown that there is a trade-off between the effect of left/right and the effect of issues 
on party support (Bellucci 1994; Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996). When voting is strongly 
structured by left/right distance, there is less room for issues to have an effect, and vice versa. 
The same reasoning could hold for values which are associated with those issues. This leads us 
to the prediction that there is more room for party support to be structured by values when 
voters’ value stances are to a lesser extent structured by left/right.  
 
This chapter tests those opposing predictions. Based on our aggregate analysis we 
empirically prove that in countries where voters’ stances on values are to a considerable extent 
structured by left/right, voters use the left/right considerations to convey their preferences. 
Thus, the effect of values on party preferences is weaker in those countries. In turn, in countries 
where voters’ positioning on values is to a weaker extent structured by left/right, voters take 
direct recourse to values. Here, the effect of values on party preferences is stronger. Not only 
do these findings contribute to our general understanding of the way voters arrive at their party 
choice, but also the results of our chapter help us understand the differences between party 
support in consolidating democracies in East Central Europe and established democracies of 
Western Europe. In Western democracies, voters know better what the left/right means in 
practical policy terms and how their attitudes relate to the major dimension of competition as 
more stable party systems have provided them with enough clarity on where they stand on the 
left/right dimension. Thus, voters are able to convey their attitudes at the ballot box through 
direct recourse to left/right. In less stable democracies of East Central Europe, in turn, it is less 
clear for voters what left/right stands for and where they can locate their attitudes in the more 
abstract terms which dominate political competition. As a result, the left/right cognitive 
shortcut proves to be less useful for voters in their decision about which party to choose and 
values play a more important role.  
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section we discuss the relevant literature and 
derive expectations on the cross-country differences in the impact of values on pa rty 
preferences. We test those expectations in a two-step analysis based on a research design 
proposed by Van der Eijk and Franklin (1996). For this purpose, we employ the European 
Election Study 2009. S ubsequently, we present our findings and we conclude by discussing 
their implications for comparative research on party preferences in the European Union.    
 
 
Theoretical Expectations 
 
Values, Left/Right and Party Preferences 
Many previous studies have shown that across various European systems the behaviour of 
parties and voters alike has been structured largely by the left-right dimension, which until the 
1990s remained the dominant ideological dimension (Fuchs and Klingemann 1990; 
Klingemann et al. 1994; Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996; Hix 1999). Not all substantive 
differences between parties and among voters, however, are captured by their positions on the 
left/right dimension. In elections not all issues can play a role because it is unrealistic to assume 
that there will be a party with which one fully agrees on all possible substantive issues. In the 
words of Sartori (1976), “when the citizen speaks, he may have many things to say, but when he 
is coerced into casting a (…) vote, he may well have to (…) vote for the party (…) perceived as 
closest on the left-right spectrum (…)”. Electoral research from the 1980s and 1990s confirms 
that voters reached their electoral decision by considering which party was the closest to them 
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 on the left/right dimension (Granberg and Holmberg 1988; Oppenhuis 1995; Van der Eijk and 
Franklin 1996; Schmitt 2001; Van der Brug et al. 2008).  
 
The left/right dimension constitutes an ‘ideological super-issue’ (Pierce 1999), which 
summarises diverse policy issues in the domestic arena (Marks and Steenbergen 2002). 
However, the meaning of the left/right dimension is not fixed, but may vary across countries 
and over time (Gabel and Huber 2000). Similarly, the degree to which issues are structured by 
the left/right dimension may vary. This applies both to issues structured by left/right at the level 
of political parties as well as at the level of voters. Given the heterogeneity of issues 
dominating political discussions in countries of the European Union, we may encounter 
differences across countries with respect to which issues have been assimilated by the left/right 
dimension. Furthermore, the degree to which those issues have been assimilated by left/right 
may vary across countries. Similarly, values associated with those issues may be to a varying 
extent structured by left/right. The above implies that the left/right as a cognitive shortcut may 
take a different meaning in various countries as it structures various issues, and related values, 
to a varying extent across countries.   
 
Recent research points to a gradual decline of left/right in its capacity to structure behaviour 
of parties and voters in Western Europe. An important development is that the largest parties 
have converged on the left/right dimension (Pennings and Keman 2003; Green and Hobolt 
2008). As the Third Wave social democrats have accepted the basic principles of free market 
capitalism, the larger political parties have become less distinct in left/right terms. If the 
differences between parties on the left/right dimension have become smaller, the left/right 
ideology proves to be a less useful cue for voters on which to base their electoral choices. As it 
has been referred to above, the meaning of left/right goes beyond the socio-economic policies. 
New issues, such as en vironmentalism and immigration have, to a large extent become 
integrated in the left/right dimension, at least at the party level. However, some of those issues 
are at the level of voters almost uncorrelated with the left/right. Recent research shows that 
voters’ attitudes towards immigration are very weakly structured by the major dimension of 
competition (Van der Brug and Van Spanje 2009). Thus, if voters want to influence 
immigration policies by their vote, they cannot take recourse to their left/right position in their 
party choice. The combination of these two developments –  parties converging on the left/right 
dimension and new issues not being structured by left/right –− leads to the prediction that the 
left/right ideology will lose its capacity to structure voting behaviour. Subsequently, other 
considerations, such as v oters’ value orientations towards political issues may play a more 
substantive role in structuring party preferences (Rose and McAllister 1986). Owing to the facts 
that new conflict dimensions may arise, which are not clearly structured by left/right and that 
choices of voters at the ballot box may be increasingly influenced by other considerations than 
left/right, it is pertinent to look at the effects of values on party preferences. As we may expect 
considerable variance with regard to which values are important for electorates in each of the 
European countries as well as how values relate to the main dimension of competition in those 
countries, we systematically compare the effects of values on party preferences across all 
countries of the European Union.    
 
Values are cognitive structures of knowledge and beliefs guiding peoples’ attitudes towards 
political issues (Campbell et al. 1960; Johnston Conover and Feldman 1983; Fuchs and 
Klingemann 1990). They are regarded as the ultimate underpinnings of political behaviour as 
they condition the formation of attitudes and preferences on a range of issues (Feldman 2003). 
Values are considered stable long-term determinants of party preferences (Feldman 2003), in 
contradistinction to voters’ opinions and preferences on concrete issues which may be 
ambivalent and inconsistent (Converse 1964; Meffert et al. 2004, Steenbergen and Brewer 
2004). Values are more encompassing than specific issues and are also more deep-rooted. They 
are expected to constrain attitudes towards more specific issues. In our analysis, we use the 
term ‘value schema’ rather than ‘value dimension’, both employed in political behaviour 
literature. The reason is that various items that measure respondents’ attitudes on issues in a 
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 specific policy domain are too weakly related to speak of ‘dimensions’. The term ‘schema’ has 
been used in social psychology to describe cognitive structures which organise attitudes and 
political beliefs in a bipolar spatial metaphor (Johnston Conover and Feldman 1984; Fuchs and 
Klingemann 1990). In this chapter, we look at four value schemas – socio-economic, 
libertarian-authoritarian, EU integration and immigration – which have dominated the literature 
on party choice and attitude formation.  
 
The first value schema we employ here refers to socio-economic issues and encompasses the 
traditional division of attitudes towards the free market and the role of the state in the economy. 
On the one hand, we find approval of state involvement in the economy and a more just 
distribution of income and wealth in society, while on the other we find support for a free 
market economy and the economic freedom of individuals without state control (Downs 1957; 
Lipset et al. 1954). The second value schema, labelled libertarian-authoritarian, encompasses 
attitudes on the position of individuals in the society, namely greater societal and personal 
freedoms, including equality of women and rights for sexual minorities, greater citizen 
participation in democratic structures as well as lifestyle issues. This is contrasted here with 
attitudes including restriction of personal freedoms of minorities, respect for authority and 
discipline, emphasis on economic and physical security such as a t ough stance on crime and 
support for a stronger army (Inglehart 1977; Flanagan 1987; Flanagan and Lee 2003; Dalton 
1984; Flanagan 1987; Hooghe et al. 2002; Knutsen 2006). A further value schema used in this 
study refers to attitudes towards European integration and immigration (Hix 1999; Kriesi et al. 
2006, 2008). Those attitudes seem to have restructured the traditional socio-cultural dimension 
in Western Europe and overshadowed the questions of lifestyle and public order in their 
importance for party preferences (Kriesi et al. 2008; Bornschier 2010). Although Kriesi et al. 
(2008) assert that the socio-cultural schema has been restructured by attitudes towards 
immigration and EU integration, we consider attitudes towards both issues separately from the 
traditional socio-cultural value schema as they are clearly distinctive to the materialist vs. post-
materialist considerations. Furthermore, we look at the impact of attitudes towards EU 
integration and immigration on party preferences separately, as there are reasons to expect that 
in consolidating democracies voter attitudes towards EU integration are independent from 
considerations regarding immigration.  
 
What Explains Country Differences? 
Which factors explain cross-country differences in the effects of values on party preferences? 
We argue that the crucial variable is the extent to which voters’ attitudes are structured by 
left/right. Where party systems have been less stable, voters will have more difficulty linking 
their attitudes and value stances to their positions on left/right. In other words, it will be less 
clear for them where their own attitudes can be located in terms of higher order concepts which 
dominate political competition and what the left/right effectively stands for in terms of practical 
policy. Thus, voters’ stances on value schemas will be weakly correlated with their positions in 
left/right terms. In turn, when party systems are more established, and positions of political 
parties on i ssues and left/right have been more stable, thus allowing voters to undergo a 
learning process with respect to party positioning, voters will be more capable of relating their 
stances on v alues to their position on left/right. They will know better what the left/right 
dimension signifies in terms of practical policy and where their attitudes can be placed on the 
more abstract continuum used in political competition. Thus, in more stable democratic systems 
voters’ value stances will be to a higher extent correlated with their position on left/right. It is 
the extent to which voters’ positions on v alues are structured by left/right which will be 
responsible for the differences in the effects of value schemas on party preferences.  
 
As we know that voters evaluate political alternatives in higher order concepts such as 
left/right (Downs 1957; Conover and Feldman 1984; Granberg and Holmberg 1988; Van der 
Brug 1997), we believe that this shortcut fulfils its function when voters know what left/right 
stands for and how to place their own attitudes in terms of left/right. We could expect, on the 
one hand, that in countries where voters are to a lesser extent capable of linking their attitudes 
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 to left/right, the less clear it will be for voters what left/right stands for and where their own 
attitudes can be located in terms of this more abstract dimension which dominates political 
competition. We could expect here that in those countries we will observe a weaker effect of 
values on party preferences. In turn, in countries where voters are more capable of linking the 
attitudes they hold to their position on left/right, the more clarity they will have about what the 
left/right shortcut stands for and where exactly their attitudes fit in terms of an abstract 
dimension of competition. Those considerations lead us to the first of our two opposing 
expectations.  
 
Hypothesis 1: There will be a positive relationship between the degree to which voters’ 
stances on values are structured by left/right and the impact of values on party 
preferences. 
 
On the other hand, we could expect that in countries where voters are more capable of 
linking their values to their position on left/right, voters will more often use the cognitive 
shortcut as they know better what this shortcut means in practical policy terms. Their attitudes 
and stances on values will be transmitted through the usage of left/right. In this case, a direct 
recourse to values will be unnecessary as voters can convey their attitudes through voting 
according to their left/right position. However, in countries where voters are less capable of 
linking their stances on values to left/right, the cognitive shortcut will prove less useful for 
voters as they will not be able to convey their attitudes effectively through the simple recourse 
to their left/right stance. Here, the direct considerations such as v alues will play a more 
important role for party support. This reasoning leads us to the following expectation. 
 
Hypothesis 2: There will be a negative relationship between the degree to which voters’ 
stances on values are structured by left/right and the impact of values on party 
preferences.  
 
We also take into account other factors which may explain why the effects of values on 
party preferences are higher in some countries than in others. We t reat them here as control 
variables to test our main hypotheses on the relationship between the degree to which attitudes 
are structured by left/right on the one hand and party preferences on the other. One of those 
factors is the agreement among voters with regard to where political parties in their country 
stand on left/right. This structural agreement denotes the degree to which voters share the same 
perceptions of where parties are located on the left/right scale in the political system (Van der 
Eijk 2001). We expect that the higher the agreement among voters on where parties stand on 
left/right, the more clarity voters have regarding where parties stand on left/right. Van der Eijk 
and Franklin (1996) have shown that the effect of left/right on party preferences is positively 
related to the degree to which voters agree upon where political parties stand on the left/right 
political spectrum. In line with previous argumentation, our expectations here can be twofold. 
On the one hand, we expect that the clearer it is for voters where political parties stand on 
left/right, the easier it will be for them to know where parties stand on issues and which values 
they associate with them. Therefore, we hypothesise as follows. 
 
Hypothesis 3: There will be a positive relationship between the degree of structural 
agreement among voters and the impact of values on party preferences.  
 
On the other hand, we could expect that if it is clear for voters in a p arty system where 
parties stand on left/right, voters will use the left/right considerations more extensively. As 
voters are able to convey their attitudes through recourse to left/right, the effect of values will 
be weaker. This reasoning leads us to the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 4: There will be a n egative relationship between the degree of structural 
agreement among voters and the impact of values on party preferences. 
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 Furthermore, we account for two other factors that may affect the impact of values on party 
preferences. The first one is voter polarisation. We know from the existing literature that the 
more political parties are polarized on a dimension of competition, such as left/right, the 
stronger is the effect of voters’ positions on this dimension, in this case their left/right 
positions, on p arty preferences (Van der Eijk et al. 2005; Ensley 2007; Lachat 2008). In a 
similar vein, we expect that the more voters are polarised in terms of their stances on value 
schemas, the stronger the effect of those values on party preferences will be (Knutsen and 
Kumlin 2005). Last, but not least, the differences in the effects of value schemas across 
countries may be attributed to the extent to which voters of those countries consider particular 
issues as important or problematic for their country. In order to capture the differences in the 
significance of problems among European electorates, we account for voter perceptions 
regarding the most important problem facing the country. We expect that the more an issue is 
considered as the most important problem facing the country of respondents, the higher the 
effect of values associated with this issue on party preferences will be.  
 
The East-West Divide? 
Over the past two decades, much research has focused on the differences in patterns of party 
preferences between consolidating democracies in East Central Europe and more established 
democracies in Western Europe. Various studies have pointed to historical legacies of 
authoritarian rule under the communist regimes as an explanation for differences of how party 
support is structured across East and West. In consolidating democracies the party systems are 
less stable than in established democracies. In the former, political parties have repeatedly 
adapted their policies and ideological profiles in the face of changing opportunities for political 
mobilisation. The political systems have been more fluid, as parties have been appearing, 
changing their names, coalescing with other parties or vanishing from the political scene 
(Cirtautas 1994; Wesolowski 1996). Consequently, it has been more difficult for voters to 
establish how political parties differ in terms of policies they advocate as party stances have 
been blurred on some, mostly economic, issues (Markowski 1997). This lack of clarity has been 
partly caused by strategic considerations of left-wing parties that aimed to shake off their 
communist image by a dopting extensive market policies, thus precluding the possibility of 
voters distinguishing political parties on the economic left/right dimension (Tavits and Letki 
2009). In addition, the frequent changes in the supply of parties and the movement of elites 
between political parties in the early stages of party system development have led to confusion 
among voters with regard to which policies political parties advocate, contributing to increased 
voter volatility (Tavits 2008). The shifts in the policies formulated by political parties in new 
democracies have been partly induced by the requirements of accession to the European Union 
(Vachudova and Hooghe 2009). Those changes in identity and location of political parties have 
undermined the learning process that voters in new democracies have been undergoing. Unlike 
in Western democracies, where voters live in stable political systems with the same parties 
competing mostly from the same location on the left/right spectrum (Oppenhuis 1995; Van der 
Eijk and Franklin 1996; Van der Brug 1997), voters in post-communist democracies have 
experienced a fluid party system where the learning process with regard to where parties stand 
on left/right and what is their stance on i ssues has been much more difficult. Even if party 
systems have been slowly stabilising (Kitschelt et al. 1999), voters have been experiencing 
more stable positions of parties only in the last couple of years, which does not allow for a 
thorough learning process.  
 
Twenty years after the fall of communism, voters from both established and consolidating 
democracies are guided by similar considerations while choosing a political party at the ballot 
box. Still, differences remain with regard to which determinants of party support play a more 
important role in structuring party preferences in the new and established democracies of the 
European Union. Research has shown so far that the consolidating democracies see somewhat 
stronger effects of religion, satisfaction with democracy and age, and somewhat weaker effects 
of social class, government approval and strategic considerations than more established 
democracies (Van der Brug et al. 2008). Considerations regarding EU integration play, a bigger 
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 role among East Central European voters than among voters in Western Europe (De Vries and 
Tillman 2010). The major difference, however, in the determinants of party preferences is the 
significantly lower effect of left/right on party preferences in the consolidating democracies. It 
seems that in the new democracies voters use the left/right considerations in their decisions to 
support a p olitical party to a l esser extent than their counterparts in the West. In turn, no 
systematic research has been conducted so far with regard to the effects of values across 
established and consolidating democracies. Owing to the different paths of development of 
Western European and East Central European countries, we expect to find differences in the 
effects of values on pa rty support between both groups. We argue that whatever differences 
will be found between East and West will be explained by the contextual variables outlined in 
the previous section. Now, we turn to a brief methodological discussion, after which we 
proceed with the presentation of our results. 
 
 
Operationalization, Data and Methods  
 
This chapter explores and explains differences in the effects of values and left/right across 
countries of the European Union. For this purpose, we employ a two-step analysis based on a 
research design proposed by Van der Eijk and Franklin (1996). We use the European Election 
Study 2009 (EES 2009) which is a representative study of the electorates of all EU countries. 
Our analysis involves 28 political systems as B elgium is treated as two separate political 
systems (Flanders and Wallonia).4 The total sample size amounts to 27,369 respondents, where 
the majority of country databases contain exactly 1,000 respondents. 
 
The method proposed by Van der Eijk and Franklin (1996) allows us to systematically 
compare voter preferences for political parties across countries of the European Union. 
Methodologies such as multinominal or conditional logit, which are frequently employed to 
analyse party choice, do not lend themselves to answer the research questions of this study. In 
such approaches, the outcome variable (party choice) is a nominal variable, which differs from 
country to country as it consists of a country-specific set of choices. As long as we do not want 
to redefine the outcome variable to a dichotomy, we would have to carry out separate country 
studies without straightforward means of comparing the results across countries. In order to 
overcome this restraint, we create a stacked data matrix with propensities to vote for political 
parties as the outcome variable (Tillie 1995; Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996; Van der Eijk 
2002; Van der Eijk et al. 2006). The outcome variable is the observed strength of support that a 
respondent assigns to all political parties in her party system. In each country, voters are asked 
how likely it is (on an 11-point scale) that they will ever vote for a list of political parties in 
their country. Those propensities to vote for political parties can be regarded as preferences, 
because voters generally decide to vote for a p arty they most prefer. An advantage of this 
method is that vote propensities are comparable across countries as the electoral support of 
voters to political parties is measured on an identical scale. Even though the question on vote 
propensities is framed with reference to each particular party, the resulting party preference 
variable no longer refers to a sp ecific party, but to parties in general. This enables us to 
consider the effects of explanatory variables on propensities to vote for all political parties 
across Europe. 
 
In the first step of the analysis, we create a stacked data matrix for each of the political 
systems under study. The stacked data matrix is derived from a survey data matrix, in which the 
unit of analysis is transformed from the respondent to the respondent*party combination. The 
respondent appears here as many times as t here are parties for which vote propensities were 
measured. The level of analysis is effectively changed from the individual level to the 
4 Belgium is effectively a two-system country as it is not possible for voters in the Flemish region to cast 
a ballot for Wallonian parties and vice versa. For this reason, Flanders and Wallonia are treated 
separately. 
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 individual*party level. In the first step, we measure the effects of value schemas, controlled by 
a number of variables, on party preferences for each political system under study. The variables 
of interest are socio-economic, libertarian-authoritarian value schemas as well as E U 
integration and immigration schemas. We co ntrol for left/right distance, age, gender, social 
class, education, religion, approval of the government, satisfaction with democracy, 
retrospective and prospective economic evaluation and party size. As the outcome variable 
reflects preferences of voters for all political parties, we need to transform the explanatory 
variables so that they reflect the relation between a respondent and a political party. This can be 
done by setting the explanatory variable in relation to the outcome variable through employing 
a distance measure or the y-hat procedure, both of which will be explained below.  
 
In order to operationalize the value schemas, we employ a number of questions from the 
EES 2009. For the socio-economic schema, we use questions on whether private enterprise is 
the best way to solve a country’s economic problems, whether major public services and 
industries should be in state ownership, whether politics should abstain from intervening in the 
economy as well as whether income and wealth should be redistributed towards ordinary 
people. For the libertarian-authoritarian schema, questions are used on whether same-sex 
marriages should be prohibited by law, whether women should be free to decide on matters of 
abortion, whether women should be prepared to cut down on their paid work for the sake of 
their family, whether people who break the law should be given much harsher sentences than 
they are these days as well as whether schools must teach children to obey authority. 
Furthermore, we use questions on i mmigration – whether immigrants should be required to 
adapt to customs of the receiving country and whether immigration in the country of 
respondents should be decreased significantly. We also employ questions on EU integration, in 
particular whether EU membership of the country is regarded as a good or bad thing and which 
stance respondents have on EU unification and EU enlargement. Responses to each set of 
questions are on the same valence i.e. they have been re-coded on the same scale so that low 
scores indicate left-wing attitudes and high scores indicate right-wing attitudes.5  
The value schemas represent very broad concepts which do not need a p riori to reflect a 
single dimension, although recent literature on pa rty choice postulates the presence of clear 
socio-economic, libertarian-authoritarian (Kitschelt 1995) and integration-demarcation (Kriesi 
et al. 2006, 2008) dimensions in Western Europe. In order to analyse the dimensionality of the 
schemas and explore whether each set of items can be combined in a single scale both in each 
country under study, confirmatory factor analysis with varimax rotation and non-parametric 
Mokken scaling have been used.6 All employed techniques show that those dimensions can be 
found in some countries of the EU, but not in others.7 This does not allow us for the creation of 
separate scales which would be comparable for all countries. Therefore, we use the items 
relating to value schemas as separate items in a y-hat procedure. Here, we predict the outcome 
variable for each party separately on the basis of a s imple regression analysis using the vote 
propensities for this party as the outcome variable and the items chosen to represent each value 
schema as p redictors. These regressions per party yield one predicted score (y-hat) for each 
respondent for each value schema. After these y-hats are computed for each party separately, 
5 For the socio-economic schema, low scores reflect attitudes approving of state control of the economy, 
while high scores point to attitudes encompassing laissez-faire market economy and retrenchment of the 
state. For the libertarian-authoritarian schema, low scores indicate acceptance of same-sex marriages, 
women’s right to decide on abortion and her occupation as well as less emphasis on law and order in the 
society, while high scores indicate the opposite. For EU integration and immigration, low scores indicate 
favourable attitudes to further EU integration and immigration, while high scores point to opposition to 
closer EU integration and little tolerance towards immigrants. Here, we employ the logic of Kriesi et al. 
(2006, 2008), who attribute left-wing attitudes to greater support towards EU integration and immigration 
and right-wing attitudes to opposition to both.  
6 Those techniques have been employed on each country separately to explore whether comparable value 
scales emerge. 
7 Due to space limitations the results of the confirmatory factor analysis and Mokken scaling are not 
included in this chapter. They are available upon request from the authors. 
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 they are saved and used as an explanatory variable. They represent linear transformations of the 
original independent variables, which are centred on their means in order to remove country-
specific differences from the analysis. Such transformed y-hats are added to the stacked data 
matrix as they are comparable across parties and countries.  
 
Most of the control variables have been constructed using the y-hat procedure as well. The 
relevant literature on party choice teaches us that we should control for age, social class, 
education (Swyngedouw et al. 1998), gender (Gidengil et al. 2005), religion, approval of 
government and satisfaction with democracy (Van der Eijk et al. 1999), retrospective and 
prospective evaluation of the economic situation in the country of respondents (Lewis-Beck 
1988) and party size (Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996). Furthermore, we control for left/right 
distance in the first stage of analysis. Those variables, except for the left/right distance, are 
created using the inductive procedure where either a numerical independent variable or a set of 
dummy variables are regressed on propensities to vote for political parties in the political 
system. Age is created by regressing age of voters on propensity to vote for political parties. 
Gender uses a dummy for male/female in the same procedure. Social class is created with a 
subjective measure of self-assessed belonging to a particular class location. Education is 
represented by respondents’ self-placement according to various levels of education specific for 
each country. Religion is a composite variable of religious denomination, church attendance 
and level of religiosity. Approval of government uses a dummy representing the level of 
satisfaction with the incumbent government, while satisfaction with democracy is created with 
questions on satisfaction with democracy in the country of the respondent in particular and in 
the EU in general. The retrospective and prospective economic evaluation variables are 
constructed with questions on how voters assess the country’s economy in the last year and 
how the country’s economy will develop in the coming year respectively. For the left/right 
distance, we use the questions asking respondents to indicate how they would place themselves 
on an 11-point left/right scale as well as to indicate where they perceive the political parties on 
the same scale. This variable is transformed in the distance variable by subtracting the voter’s 
own position from the position of each party on the left/right scale. The absolute value of this 
variable has been included in the stacked data matrix.8 If voters prefer parties close to them in 
terms of left/right distance, then the resulting measure should exert a negative effect on vote 
propensities i.e. the smaller the distance between voter and party, the greater the preference for 
the party. In addition to the individual-level variables, we add party size as a party-level control 
variable. Measured in parliamentary seats, party size is meant to represent a strategic 
consideration which voters may take into account while casting a vote at the ballot box. When 
two or more parties are nearly equally attractive for some voters, then those voters tend to vote 
for the largest of these parties because it has the best chance of achieving its policy goals.  
 
After having included the value schemas and control variables into the stacked data matrices 
of 28 political systems, we performed a linear regression, using the Huber-White-Sandwich 
estimate of variance to account for the dependency among observations pertaining to the same 
respondent (Rogers 1993; Williams 2002). From each stacked data matrix we stored the 
coefficients for the socio-economic, libertarian-authoritarian, EU integration and immigration 
value schemas in a separate database. The number of observations in this database equals the 
number of the analysed political systems, namely 28. This database will be used in the second 
step of the analysis, in which we aim to explain the differences in the effects of value schemas 
on party preferences across countries. Here, we again use linear regression with White’s 
heteroscedastic consistent standard errors (Lewis and Linzer 2005). The explanatory variables 
that we include in the second step of the analysis are measures of correlation between voters’ 
left-right self-placement and their position on the value schemas, left/right system agreement, 
voter polarisation on the value schemas as well as a variable that identifies the most important 
8 If the respondent did not answer the question on the position of any particular party, we replaced 
the missing value with the national sample mean of the perceived party position. In this way, we lost 
only respondents who failed to place themselves in the left/right terms.     
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 problem facing the country. In order to operationalise the correlation variables, we take 
recourse to the question on v oters’ self-placement on the left/right scale and responses to 
questions which have been used to construct the value schemas, as explained above. The 
positioning of voters on a value schema has been created by adding up and averaging voters’ 
responses on the schema of interest. The correlation variables thus yield a single correlation for 
each value schema in each party system. In order to operationalise the left/right system 
agreement we use a question where respondents were asked to place each political party on the 
left/right scale ranging from 0 t o 10. This measure of perceptions of left/right positions of 
political parties has been weighted using the proportion of valid votes obtained in the national 
parliamentary elections preceding the elections to the European Parliament in 2009 (Van der 
Eijk 2001). The polarisation of voters on value schemas is measured by the standard deviation 
in the positions of voters on the value schemas in each party system under study. Furthermore, 
we analysed voter responses to the question regarding the most important problem facing their 
country. Countries where at least 5 per cent of voters see issues related to the value schemas 
under study as the most important problem were indicated with 1, while others with 0.  
 
The choice of the two-step analysis has been dictated by two considerations. Firstly, we aim 
to capture and explain the differences in the effects of value schemas across all countries of the 
European Union. Dividing the countries under study into categories would not reflect the 
differences among them. Secondly, our variables of interest – value schemas – cannot be 
interacted with the explanatory variables in the stacked data matrix as they have been 
transformed in the course of the y-hat procedure. This restriction precludes us from including 
covariates in a stacked data matrix or using hierarchical modelling, where y-hat variables 
would be interacted. Now, we turn to the findings of the two-step model. 
 
 
Findings 
 
Table 1 presents the results of the second step analysis, in which we explain the variation in the 
effects of the socio-economic schema (model 1), libertarian-authoritarian-schema (model 2), 
immigration (model 3) and EU integration (model 4) across the 28 pol itical systems under 
study. The first part of each model shows the effects of left/right system agreement and 
correlations between voters’ left/right self-placement and their stances on value schemas, voter 
polarization on relevant issues and a measure of the most important problem facing the country. 
The second part of each model shows bivariate regressions of the correlation variables on value 
schemas. 
 
Table 1 shows that there is a n egative relationship between the degree to which voters’ 
stances on values are correlated with left/right and the impact of values on party preferences. 
This relationship holds for the socio-economic, libertarian-authoritarian and immigration value 
schemas, while it does not explain the variation in the effect of EU integration. The effects of 
the correlation variables between left/right self-placement and the libertarian-authoritarian 
schema as well as the correlation between left/right self-placement and immigration, controlled 
by structural agreement, voter polarization and the most important problem variable, are strong 
and highly significant (-.66 and -.85 respectively). The effect of the correlation between 
left/right self-placement and socio-economic schema fails to reach statistical significance once 
we add left/right system agreement to the model. However, its effect points in the negative 
direction (-.19) and shows high statistical significance in the bivariate regression (-.33). The 
bivariate regressions show strong significant effects of the correlation variables for the socio-
economic, libertarian-authoritarian schemas and immigration (-.33, -.80 and -.72 respectively). 
Moreover, models 1, 2 a nd 3 show that our explanatory variables account for a considerable 
amount in the variation of the effects of value schemas (R² of .57 for socio-economic, .56 for 
libertarian-authoritarian and .33 f or immigration schema). The R² in bivariate regressions 
shows that the correlation variables explain the lion’s share of the variance we are interested in 
(.16, .46 and .27 respectively).  
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Table 1: Factors explaining variation in the effects of value schemas on party 
preferences. 
 
Model 1 
Socio-economic 
schema 
Model 2 
Libertarian-
authoritarian schema 
Model 3 
Immigration 
Model 4 
EU Integration 
LR system 
agreement 
-.12 
(.12) 
 
LR system 
agreement 
-.37** 
(.16) 
LR system 
agreement 
-.30 
(.31) 
LR system 
agreement 
-.57** 
(.25) 
Correlation 
LR self-
placement 
& SocEcon 
-.19 
(.21) 
Correlation 
LR self-
placement 
& LibAuth 
-.66*** 
(.21) 
Correlation 
LR self-
placement 
& Immig 
-.85*** 
(.26) 
Correlation 
LR self-
placement & 
EUInt 
.24 
(.39) 
Voter 
polarization 
on SocEcon 
(sd) 
.01 
(.28) 
Voter 
polarization 
on LibAuth 
(sd) 
-.12 
(.25) 
Voter 
polarization 
on Immig 
(sd) 
-.01 
(.17) 
Voter 
polarization 
on EUInt (sd) 
-.32 
(.47) 
Economy 
as the most 
important 
problem 
.12*** 
(.03) 
LibAuth 
issues as 
the most 
important 
problem 
-.03 
(.06) 
Immig as 
the most 
important 
problem 
.07* 
(.03) 
EUInt as the 
most 
important 
problem 
- 
 R²: .57  R²: .56  R²: .33  R²: .23 
Bivariate Regressions 
Correlation 
LR self-
placement 
& SocEcon 
-.33** 
(.14) 
Correlation 
LR self-
placement 
& LibAuth 
-.80*** 
(.16) 
Correlation 
LR self-
placement 
& Immig 
-.72*** 
(.24) 
Correlation 
LR self-
placement & 
EUInt 
.1 
(.33) 
 R²: .16 
 
 R²: .46 
 
 R²: .27 
 
 R²: .003 
 
Notes: *** significant at p < 0.01 ** significant at p < 0.05 * significant at p < 0.1 (one-tailed); cell 
entries represent regression coefficients obtained in a second step analysis in a linear regression using 
White’s heteroscedastic consistent standard errors     
 
 
Model 4 shows that the negative relationship between the correlation variable of voters’ 
stances on EU integration and their left/right positioning and the impact of EU integration on 
party preferences does not hold, unlike for other value schemas. This may not be surprising as 
EU integration represents a relatively complex policy issue. As De Vries (2007, 2010) points 
out, EU integration as a complex issue which is relatively new to national politics, will impact 
party choice if political parties provide cues for voters on this issue. How the effect of EU 
integration on party choice varies across countries, can be mostly explained by the degree to 
which parties link their EU position to their positioning on the major dimension of competition 
i.e. left/right. Our analysis provides indirect support to those findings. As it is shown in Graph 
3, the degree to which voters stances on EU integration are correlated with their positioning on 
left/right has been very low, with very little variance across countries. The correlations range 
here from .01 (France) to .22 (Sweden), with a high effect of EU integration on party 
preferences in Malta (.4). However, countries vary to a large extent with regard to how EU 
integration affects party preferences, as it is depicted by the spread of the effects on the y-axis. 
This variance cannot be explained by the demand-side variables which have been included in 
this study.9 The results presented in model 4 s how that those demand-side explanatory 
9 The variable EU integration as the most important problem has been omitted as in no EU country any 
problem related to EU integration has been mentioned at the level of 5 per cent of the responses. The 
reason might be that the European Election Study 2009 was conducted in the period of economic crisis in 
Europe, when socio-economic concerns overshadowed any other potential problems. 
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 variables can to a very limited extent explain variation in the effects of EU integration on party 
preferences (R² of .23). The correlation variable per se barely explains any variation, as R² in 
the bivariate regression amounts to .003. This leads us to conclude that the variance in the 
effect of EU integration across countries cannot be explained by differences in the electorates 
per se, but might be induced by differences in the supply side among those countries. In order 
to explain this variation, we need to look at the supply side in every country, which remains an 
avenue for further research. Any attempt to do so here would go beyond the scope of this 
chapter.   
 
Graphs 1-4 visualize the effects of the correlation variables on the corresponding impact of 
value schemas on party preferences in the 28 political systems under study. Graphs 1, 2 and 3 
show that the higher the correlation between voters’ stances on the socio-economic, libertarian-
authoritarian and immigration schema is, the lower the effect of this value schema is on party 
preferences. In Graph 4 we see that the relationship between the correlation variable and the 
impact of EU integration on party preferences does not hold. Here, the variance in the effect of 
EU integration on party support cannot be explained by demand-side variables. Those results 
provide support for our Hypothesis 2, according to which we were supposed to observe a 
negative relationship between the degree to which voters’ stances on values are structured by 
left/right and the impact of those values on party preferences across countries (however, this 
does not apply to EU integration).   
 
Furthermore, Table 1 shows that structural agreement relates negatively to the effects of 
value schemas on party preferences, which supports our Hypothesis 4. It turns out that the more 
voters agree about where parties in their political system stand on left/right, the weaker will be 
the effect of values on party preferences. This effect is strong and significant for the libertarian-
authoritarian schema and EU integration (-.37 and -.57 respectively), while it fails to reach 
statistical significance for the socio-economic and immigration value schemas (-.12 and -.30 
respectively). Polarization of voters, in turn, does not have a consistent effect on the value 
schemas. Contrary to what has been expected, polarization has a negative effect on the impact 
of value schemas on party preferences, with the socio-economic value schema as an exception. 
However, those effects are not significant. Finally, if voters consider some issues as the most 
important problem facing their country, the effect of values related to those issues increases. 
This effect is significant for the socio-economic and immigration value schemas (.12 and .07 
respectively), while it has a negative effect and fails to reach statistical significance for the 
libertarian-authoritarian schema (-.03).       
 
The general pattern of the negative relationship between the correlation variables and the 
effects of socio-economic, libertarian-authoritarian and immigration value schemas on pa rty 
preferences captures differences in those effects between established and consolidating 
democracies. In Graph 1 we see that most East Central European countries are characterized by 
a low degree to which voters’ attitudes on socio-economic values are structured by left/right 
and a high impact of this value schema on party preferences. In turn, in most of the established 
democracies voters’ stances on the socio-economic schema are to a higher extent structured by 
their position on left/right. Here, the effect of the socio-economic value schema on party 
preferences is weaker. The graph reveals that there are two groups of consolidating 
democracies – Poland, Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia where the impact of the socio-economic 
value schema on party preferences is low and Romania, Latvia and Lithuania where socio-
economic considerations exercise a stronger effect on party preferences. The former countries 
are those that have not been substantially affected by the economic crisis of 2009, while the 
latter group represents East Central European countries which suffered under the economic 
meltdown. In order to account for this difference and fully capture the effect of the correlation 
variable, we introduced as a control variable voters’ perception about the most important 
problem facing their country. After controlling for this and a range of other variables, as 
depicted by Table 1, the analysis still reveals a negative effect of the correlation variable on the 
magnitude of the socio-economic schema on party preferences. 
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Note: Graphs 1-4 show the effects of correlation variables on the impact of value schemas on party preferences. The coefficients for value schemas for 28 political systems, 
which have been obtained in the 2nd stage analysis, are depicted with 95% confidence interval
 
 In Graph 2 we see that in most consolidating democracies the correlation between voters’ 
stances on the libertarian-authoritarian schema and left/right is low, while the effect of the 
value schema on party preferences is high. In most of the established democracies, in turn, the 
correlation is relatively high, while the effect of the libertarian-authoritarian schema remains 
moderate. The same pattern can be found in Graph 3, which shows the effects of the correlation 
variable of voters’ left-right self-placement and immigration on the impact of the immigration 
schema on party preferences across countries. In most of the consolidating democracies, voters’ 
stances on immigration are to a weak extent correlated to their left/right position, but the effects 
of immigration on party preferences are considerably high. In most established democracies, 
the correlation is higher and the effect of immigration is lower.  
 
   Table 2: Effects of left/right and value schemas on party preferences across regions. 
 
 Established democracies 
Western Europe 
(model A) 
Consolidating democracies 
East-Central Europe 
(model B) 
B SE Beta b SE Beta 
Left/right distance -.38 .005 -.29* -.28 .008 -.23* 
Socio-economic schema .39 .013 .1* .49 .026 .11* 
Libertarian-authoritarian 
schema 
.38 .015 .1* .43 .026 .11* 
Immigration .24 .018 .051* .32 .038 .053* 
EU Integration .37 .02 .07* .44 .035 .08* 
Age .21 .035 .02* .53 .047 .06* 
Gender .54 .060 .03* .93 .11 .05* 
Social Class .40 .025 .06* .33 .054 .05* 
Education .27 .033 .03* .26 .052 .03* 
Religion .48 .018 .1* .54 .024 .14* 
Government Approval .31 .015 .09* .44 .025 .12* 
Satisfaction with Democracy .28 .022 .05* .30 .037 .05* 
Retrospective economic 
evaluation 
.28 .027 .04* .29 .048 .04* 
Prospective economic 
evaluation 
.18 .028 .03* .24 .041 .04* 
Party size .009 .0001 .18* .02 .0003 .15* 
_cons       
       
R²-adjusted .32 .29 
Number of observations 73 969 30 959 
Notes: * significant at p < 0.01 (one-tailed); cell entries present regression coefficients obtained in a 
robust regression on a stacked data matrix containing established democracies of Western Europe, 
including Cyprus and Malta (model A) and consolidating democracies of East-Central Europe (model B)  
 
 
The results show that in most of the consolidating democracies of East Central Europe the 
effects of values on party preferences are stronger, while in most of the established democracies 
of Western Europe the effects of values are weaker. In order to visualise those differences 
between country groups, Table 2 presents the effects of left/right and value schemas, controlled 
by a r ange of explanatory variables, on vote propensities. Model A shows the effects in 
established democracies of Western Europe, including Cyprus and Malta, while model B shows 
the effects in consolidating democracies of East Central Europe. We explain 32 per cent of the 
variance among established democracies and 29 per cent among consolidating democracies. 
The comparison of standardized coefficients reveals that the effect of left/right distance is 
slightly weaker in East Central European countries than in Western European countries, which 
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 confirms previous findings by Van der Brug et al. (2008). However, the effects of the value 
schemas seem to be slightly stronger in consolidating democracies.10 The opposite pattern can 
be observed in Western Europe. Here, the effect of left/right on party preferences is stronger, 
while the effects of values are weaker.11  
 
The results of our analysis show that there are considerable differences across EU countries 
in the effects of socio-economic, libertarian-authoritarian and immigration value schemas on 
party preferences. Those differences can be explained by the degree to which voters’ value 
stances are structured by their position on left/right. The analysis also shows that there are 
differences in the effects of values on party support across Western European and East Central 
European countries. In newer democracies the effects of values on party preferences are 
stronger than in established democracies, while the effect of left/right on party support is 
weaker. In the established democracies, in turn, the effects of values on party support are 
weaker, while the effect of left/right is stronger. However, significant heterogeneity within 
country groups remains, pointing to the fact that there is a general explanation for the variance 
in the effects of values across countries rather than only an East-West specific one. This general 
explanation related to how voters’ values stances are structured by left/right captures the 
differences between consolidating and established democracies in the effects of values on party 
support.   
 
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
 
This study proposes and empirically substantiates an explanation for the differences in the 
effects of values on party preferences across countries of the European Union. In countries 
where voters can better link their attitudes to the abstract dimension of competition i.e. 
left/right, the impact of values on party preferences is smaller. Voters to a lesser extent refer to 
their value stances in their decisions at the ballot box as they can convey their preferences 
through direct recourse to left/right. In those countries voters know better what the left/right 
stands for and how their attitudes can be described in the abstract terms of left/right 
competition. In turn, in countries where voters can to a lesser extent relate their attitudes to 
their stance on left/right, the observed impact of values on p arty support is stronger. Here, 
voters take direct recourse to values in their decisions about which party to choose as the 
left/right does not fulfil its purpose as a cognitive shortcut. In those countries, voters have 
difficulty in establishing where their attitudes can be located in the left/right continuum as well 
as what the left/right means in terms of practical policy. Those findings provide us with an 
explanation for the differences in the effects of values on pa rty preferences between 
consolidating democracies of East Central Europe and established democracies of Western 
Europe. The aggregate analysis shows that in consolidating democracies voters’ stances on the 
socio-economic, libertarian-authoritarian and immigration value schema are to a weaker extent 
correlated with their position on l eft/right than in established democracies. The impact of 
values on party preferences is stronger in the newer democracies, while the effect of left/right is 
weaker. In the established democracies, in turn, the effect of left/right on party support is 
stronger, while the effects of values are weaker. 
 
The contribution of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, the findings teach us about a general 
mechanism of how voters arrive at their electoral decision at the ballot box. The aggregate 
10 As the value schemas have been created using the y-hat procedure, they have similar distributional 
characteristics. Thus, we use standardized regression coefficients (beta) to meaningfully compare the 
effects of value schemas across the datasets. 
11 The comparison of betas allows for a substantive interpretation of differences across country groups. 
An insertion of a d ummy for East Central European countries in a co mbined data matrix would not 
provide us with any meaningful comparison of both country groups. The reason is that our variables of 
interest - the value schemas - have been created through the y-hat procedure. 
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 analysis shows that there are differences across countries with regard to how voters’ attitudes 
are structured by left/right. Those structural differences, which may result from varying degrees 
of stability of party systems, provide us with an explanation of why we observe strong effects 
of values on party support in some countries and weaker effects in others. This chapter focuses 
on a w ide spectrum of values, encompassing values concerning economic issues, personal 
freedoms, tolerance of minorities as well as questions related to lifestyle, immigration and 
integration in the European Union. The analyses show that these issues exert different effects 
on party preferences in the different member states. These country differences can be explained 
largely by the extent to which the issue is structured by left/right. This is true for all issues, 
except those related to EU integration. Voters’ attitudes on EU integration are not structured by 
voters’ positions on the left/right dimension. The differences in the effects of EU integration on 
party preferences across countries must be attributable to other factors, possibly induced by the 
supply side in the political systems. Secondly, this study contributes to our understanding of the 
differences in the patterns of party support across East Central European and Western European 
democracies. Our explanation for the variance in the effects of values across those country 
groups directly relates to the latest findings that point to the lower effect of left/right on party 
support in the new democracies (Van der Brug et al. 2008). It stresses the fact that the lower 
effect of left/right in newer democracies is associated with the higher effects of values on party 
support in those countries. However, our analysis goes beyond this regional comparison by 
showing that neither Western Europe nor Central Eastern Europe are monoliths; rather, there 
are considerable differences in the impact of values within both country groups.   
 
Our findings have two important limitations that may constitute an avenue for further 
research. Firstly, our explanation of the differences in the effects of values on party preferences 
across countries reaches its limits at values related to EU integration. The characteristics of the 
electorates which we explored in this study do not account for the variance in the effects of EU 
integration on pa rty preferences across countries and regions. This finding points to other 
possible explanations which focus on the supply-side factors that may influence party 
preferences. An interesting angle for pursuing further research into the differences in the effects 
of EU integration on party preferences across countries offers the issue linkage perspective (De 
Vries 2007, 2010), where EU issue voting is explained by the degree to which political parties 
relate EU issues to the major dimension of competition. As there is a considerable variation in 
the impact of values related to EU integration on party preferences across countries, it may 
prove worthwhile to explore how party system characteristics of the newer and established 
democracies condition the way in which EU integration affects party preferences. Secondly, 
our analysis takes an aggregate-level perspective by examining how voters’ stances on values 
are structured by left/right in the electorate as a whole. In a further step, we could extend our 
findings into the differences in the effects of values and left/right on party support by looking at 
how individual-level characteristics such as p olitical knowledge mediate those effects. 
Notwithstanding these avenues for further research, our findings offer a theoretical and 
empirical contribution to our understanding of the determinants guiding voters’ decisions at the 
ballot box. 
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Abstract 
Systems of multilevel governance can blur lines of responsibility and leave voters 
uncertain about which level of government is responsible for policy outcomes. Democratic 
accountability requires that citizens can assign responsibility for policy outcomes, yet 
multilevel structures of government only serve to complicate this task. This chapter 
examines the extent to which Europeans are able to navigate the complex and ever-
changing divisions of responsibility between their national governments and the 
supranational European Union. Specifically, we compare citizen and expert responsibility 
attributions to evaluate if and how voters can correctly assign responsibility to the 
European Union. We argue that the key determinant of citizen competence is the extent to 
which they are motivated and able to seek information about EU policy-making. Using 
multilevel modeling to analyze survey and media data from 27 EU member states, we 
demonstrate that politically sophisticated voters and those that do not have strong EU 
attitudes are better able to allocate responsibility correctly. At the contextual level, highly 
politicized environments result in more correct allocations of responsibility, with a 
conditioning effect on individuals with strong EU attitudes.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
In general, it is irrational to be politically well-informed because the low returns from 
data simply do not justify their cost in time and other scarce resources.  
Downs (1957: 259) 
 
Anthony Downs proposed that it is rational for most citizens to remain ignorant about political 
affairs due to the low marginal benefits of acquiring relevant political information, and the lack 
of political knowledge among citizens is well-documented (see e.g. Converse 1964; Delli 
Carpini and Keeter 1991). Indeed, the level of citizen ignorance about politics has led some 
scholars to suggest that ‘the low level of political knowledge and the absence of ideological 
reasoning have lent credence to the charge that popular control of the government is illusory’ 
(Iyengar 1987: 816). Citizens living in systems of multi-level governance, such as the European 
Union (EU), face an even greater challenge when it comes to holding their representatives to 
account, since they have the additional task of differentiating between national and federal 
responsibility. Yet, if popular control is to be more than an illusion, then it is crucial that 
citizens have at least a basic understanding of the different levels of government responsibilities 
and are able to assess their performance. Unfortunately, it is not this straightforward in the EU 
given the overlapping and ever-changing structures of governance. This raises the question of 
1 This project was funded by the UK’s Economic Social and Research Council (RES-062-23-1622), EU’s 
7th Framework Programme project, PIREDEU ("Providing an Infrastructure for Research on Electoral 
Democracy in the European Union") and the EU’s Marie Curie Initial Training Network, ELECDEM: 
Training Network in Electoral Democracy. We would like to thank the participants at the PIREDEU 
Final User Community Conference 2010 in Brussels for helpful feedback on a previous version of this 
paper. We would also like to thank Susan Banducci and James Tilley for their help with design of the 
expert survey and the 117 expert colleagues for taking time to participate in the survey. 
2 Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford.  
Email: traci.wilson@politics.ox.ac.uk; sara.hobolt@politics.ox.ac.uk. 
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whether European citizens are able to correctly differentiate responsibility between levels of 
national and supranational government. More fundamentally, it begs the question of why 
citizens would be motivated to seek out the relevant information that would enable them 
allocate responsibility correctly.  
 
This chapter examines individual attributions of responsibility to the European Union. To be 
able to assess the extent to which citizens allocate responsibility ‘correctly’, we compare citizen 
evaluations to expert judgments. We propose a theoretical framework that highlights the key 
factors at both the individual level and contextual level that motivate individuals to seek 
information about policy-making in the EU and thus enable them to distinguish between the 
responsibilities of different levels of government. This chapter utilizes the ability-motivation-
opportunity triad (Luskin 1990; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996) as a starting point to 
understanding when and how citizens correctly allocate responsibility.  S pecifically, we 
theorize that learning about governmental responsibility will depend on three key factors: at the 
individual level information processing will be influenced by ability and motivation, while 
opportunity is defined by the amount of information available in the context. In addition, we 
contribute to the existing literature with important distinctions at both the individual and 
contextual level. First, we demonstrate that motivation can serve to either improve or worsen 
correct responsibility judgments depending on the type of motivation. Second, different 
political contexts provide varying opportunities for learning, with more information available in 
some contexts compared to others. Third, we show that motivations do not affect all citizens 
equally; the political context has a conditioning effect on individual motivations. Finally, this 
study is distinctive in that it relies on three unique datasets: a survey of citizens in all 27 EU 
member states, a study of the media contexts, and a survey of experts in EU policy making. The 
opportunity to assess twenty-seven different national contexts provides a rich source of 
comparative data that has not been exploited in single-country studies of federal governments. 
 
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, we review the literature and present our theoretical 
model of attributions of responsibility in multilevel government systems, motivated 
information processing, and the role of political context. Next, we provide a descriptive 
summary of citizen and expert responsibility attributions to national governments and the 
European Union. A set of multilevel models test the hypotheses about the individual and 
country-level factors associated with correctly allocating responsibility to the European Union. 
Finally, we review the findings and provide suggestions for future research.   
 
 
 
Attributing Responsibility in Multilevel Government Systems 
 
For a number of reasons, multiple levels of government make it more difficult for individuals to 
correctly assign responsibility. The institutional arrangement is complex and responsibilities 
overlap on different levels. Individuals may not have the cognitive resources or motivation to 
learn about the division of responsibilities, or perhaps the information is not available or not 
salient in the context. Since policy responsibility is often not clearly divided but rather shared 
between different levels, individuals may not know which government is more responsible for a 
particular outcome (Arceneaux 2006; Cutler 2004, 2008; Johns 2010; León 2010). In addition, 
politicians do not have incentives to make the system more clear. Complexity allows them to 
claim credit for successful policies and engage in blame shifting for undesirable outcomes. 
 
Recent developments in the economic voting literature have demonstrated the importance of 
attribution of responsibility as a moderator of voting behavior. According to the classic reward-
punishment model, individuals vote for the incumbent when the economy is good, and for the 
opponent when times are bad (Key 1966; Fiorina 1981). However, this model has been shown 
not to work in all contexts, so scholars have shifted their attention to issues of governmental 
responsibility for policy performance. An influential article by Powell and Whitten (1993) 
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demonstrated that elections in countries where responsibility is most easily focused on a single 
government party are more likely to follow the reward-punishment model. Other studies also 
using cross-national data have supported the more general claim that economic voting is less 
prevalent when governments are weak and divided (e.g. minority and coalition governments) 
and legislatures are strong (e.g. strong committees and bicameral opposition) (Anderson 2000; 
Hellwig and Samuels 2008; Nadeau et al. 2002; Whitten and Palmer 1999). Most of these 
aggregate-level studies have focused on ‘horizontal’ institutional structures, such as coalition 
and divided government, and they have not directly examined voters’ views of who is 
responsible. 
 
Recently more attention has turned to the ‘vertical’ institutional structures of federal 
government, mainly in the context of the federal systems of Canada and the US (Anderson 
2000; Arceneaux 2006; Gomez and Wilson 2003; Cutler 2004, 2008; Johns 2010). These 
studies suggest that multiple levels of government make it challenging for voters to assign 
responsibility for policy outcomes as they find it difficult to know which level of government is 
responsible. Collectively, this work has sought to understand if 1) citizens attribute different 
levels of responsibility to different levels of government; 2) these attributions are correct; and 
3) voters cast their ballot based on these perceptions of responsibility and assignment of credit 
or blame. Yet, the studies provide mixed evidence about the extent to which citizens are able to 
make distinctions between the responsibilities of different levels of government. Some studies 
suggest that elected representatives are held accountable for performance at their level of 
governance (Atkeson and Partin 1995), whereas others suggest that citizens have difficulty 
distinguishing between different levels of government and do not differentiate responsibility 
(Cutler 2008) and that even when they are able to correctly distinguish it is unclear if this 
translates into greater accountability (Arceneaux 2006; Cutler 2004).  
 
This work thus leaves open the question of the degree to which citizens are able to correctly 
assign responsibility to different levels of government in a multilevel system, and more 
importantly what makes them able to do so. But before examining the role of motivating 
factors, we first need to address the issue of what we mean by “responsibility” and “correct” 
responsibility assignments. In the context of multilevel government, “responsibility” has been 
considered in various ways: functional responsibility, causal responsibility, or credit/blame for 
outcomes (see Hart 1968 for a discussion on the types of responsibility). Functional 
responsibility refers to the role and tasks for which the government is responsible, in other 
words, the areas over which it has policy-making duties. For example, the European Union has 
functional responsibility for monetary policy in the Eurozone. Causal responsibility refers to 
the influence an actor had on bringing about a specific outcome; did the actor cause an event or 
outcome.   
 
Perceptions of causal responsibility can lead to attributions of credit for positive outcomes 
and blame for negative results. In this chapter, we limit our analysis to the concept of role, or 
functional responsibility by analyzing if and how individuals understand the amount 
responsibility the EU has for various policy areas. We do not assess here individual perceptions 
of EU influence, success, or failure.   
 
So how do w e know when citizens are making “correct” attributions of responsibility, 
especially in light of the above discussion that multilevel government systems are complex and 
that frequently responsibilities overlap between different levels? One solution is to review 
literature on the policy-making process and determine the “correct” answer. However, a better 
method is to obtain an expert consensus through a survey of European Union scholars. If we 
assume that EU experts are the most knowledgeable group about the European Union’s role, 
than averaging across expert evaluations provides a baseline judgment of EU responsibility. By 
comparing individual evaluations of responsibility to expert judgments, we can determine how 
close citizens are to making a “co rrect” allocation of responsibility.  We can then assess the 
individual-level and contextual-level factors that are associated with more correct responsibility 
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attributions. The next section presents our theoretical propositions about when and why 
individuals are capable of reaching attribution judgments of expert quality. 
 
 
Ability and Motivation: Information Processing 
  
There is no doubt that it is difficult for individuals to attribute responsibility in federal or 
multilevel government systems. Even some experts in our study found it difficult to assign 
responsibility to the national and European levels of government across various policy areas. 
As discussed above, previous work has shown that sometimes citizens are able to differentiate 
governmental responsibility at various levels, and other times they are not able to. However, 
this prior work lacks a theory to explain when and why individuals are motivated and able to 
attribute responsibility in systems of multilevel governance. It is widely accepted that political 
knowledge is a function of ability, motivation, and opportunity (Luskin 1990; Delli Carpini and 
Keeter 1996; Gordon and Segura 1997). Building upon this triad, we theorize that ability and 
motivation to seek information about the complex institutional structures of the European 
Union depends on an individual’s cognitive ability and individual predispositions towards the 
EU. We argue that individuals with high levels of political sophistication have the cognitive 
ability to seek out and process complex information relating to European Union responsibility. 
In addition, extreme attitudes (both positive and negative) towards European integration may 
motivate individuals to gather information about the EU, but their strong predispositions result 
in biased information processing, making these individuals less likely to correctly allocate 
responsibility. Finally, the information context plays a critical role by providing individuals 
with the opportunity to acquire information. Without the availability of information, even 
highly able and motivated citizens may not have the opportunity to learn about the EU’s 
responsibilities. Furthermore, the political context itself can serve as a motivating factor which 
influences information seeking and processing. We argue that cognitive ability facilitates, while 
individual predispositions motivate information processing about the EU’s responsibilities. In 
turn, this increased processing of EU-related information will affect the level of knowledge 
about the European Union’s policy responsibilities dependent upon individual predispositions 
and the information context. 
 
Individuals vary considerably in their ability and motivation to understand political 
information.  Some individuals have a higher cognitive ability, which manifests itself in higher 
levels of political sophistication. These citizens will have the cognitive capacity which 
facilitates the consumption and processing of complex information. Indeed, high knowledge 
citizens are better able to understand institutional complexity and divided lines of 
responsibility. Highly sophisticated voters are more capable of recognizing that responsibility is 
divided among multiple levels and of making diffuse responsibility attributions, whereas low 
sophisticates generally focus on one political actor (Cutler 2004; Gomez and  Wilson 2003, 
2008). High sophisticates are also more competent in processing political information and news 
stories, and in converting this information into stored knowledge (Zaller 1991).  Moreover, an 
individual’s level of general political knowledge is a reliable predictor of news story recall, 
implying that there is a g eneral audience receptive to news stories (Price and Zaller 1993). 
Some individuals are generally interested in and more knowledgeable about a variety of 
political topics. In addition, highly informed citizens are more likely to perceive objective facts 
(Blais et al. 2010). As political sophisticates are better able to understand complex government 
structures, divided responsibility, and have the cognitive ability to process political news, we 
expect high political sophisticates to also be more knowledgeable about the European Union’s 
responsibility. This brings us to our first hypothesis: 
 
H1: Political sophisticates will make more correct responsibility assignments. 
 
Even if we do e xpect individuals with higher levels of political sophistication to more 
correctly allocate responsibility, it is generally costly and thus irrational for most citizens to be 
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politically informed (Downs 1957). Indeed, we would not expect all individuals, even those of 
equal cognitive ability, to be equally knowledgeable about the European Union’s 
responsibilities; there must be an additional motivating factor. While individual cognitive 
ability and political sophistication facilitate information processing, political predispositions 
may motivate information processing. Political predispositions are: 
  
stable, individual-level traits that regulate the acceptance or non-acceptance of the political 
communications the person receives. Because the totality of the communications that one 
accepts determines one’s opinions… predispositions are the critical intervening variable 
between the communications people encounter in the mass media, on the one side, and their 
statements of political preferences, on the other. (Zaller 1991: 22)  
 
Attitudes towards the European Union represent a political predisposition that can motivate 
individuals to seek out information about the EU’s responsibilities.  However, being motivated 
to seek out information does not guarantee that the information will be processed in a neutral 
manner: judgments may be affect-driven and distorted by systematic biases (Redlawsk 2002). 
Individuals are prone to interpret political items through a partisan bias (Campbell et al. 1960; 
Bartels 2002), which is a type of in-group attribution bias. A “group-serving attribution bias” 
refers to the tendency of in-group members to attribute positive actions committed by their own 
group to positive in-group qualities and negative actions by the favored group to external 
causes (Hewstone 1989; Pettigrew 1979; Fiske and Taylor 2007). While citizens may have 
factual information, “partisan-motivated interpretations can intercede between even accurate 
factual beliefs and policy opinions” (Gaines et al. 2007: 972). 
 
Strong support for or opposition to European integration, as a political predisposition, can be 
viewed as a type of partisanship or group membership. Research has shown that attitudes 
towards the EU are to a large extent shaped by identity concerns (McLaren 2006; Hooghe and 
Marks 2005, 2009). In other words, the ‘nation’ versus ‘Europe’ may be regarded as a salient 
in-group/out-group division in this context. Studies have shown that people who have more 
exclusive national identities are less likely to be in favor of EU integration (Carey 2002; 
Hooghe and Marks 2005; McLaren 2006). If the relative attachment to the European Union 
serves as a salient in-group, we would expect that feelings about the EU will affect 
responsibility judgments in a similar manner to partisanship. Predispositions can lead to biased 
information processing through group-serving biases, whereby individuals view their own 
group more favorably (Taylor and Fiske 1991), and through the use of heuristics. Partisanship 
is a much-used heuristic in political decision-making and information processing (Rahn 1993, 
Bartels 2000). An individual’s partisan predispositions affect his perceptions of the economy 
(Evans and Anderson 2006, Evans and Pickup 2010, Gerber and Huber 2010) and attributions 
of responsibility (Tilley and Hobolt 2011, Rudolph 2003, 2006), with citizens tending to see 
their own group in a positive light and blame problems on the out-group. Furthermore, while 
individuals are able to make responsibility judgments in a “reasoned manner”, they are more 
often prone to a partisan bias (Rudolph 2003: 210).   
 
In summary, while we expect that individuals with strong EU attitudes will be motivated to 
acquire EU-related information, we also expect that they are more likely to select information 
that is in line with their partisan beliefs and to process new information in a way that conforms 
to their predispositions. Therefore, when questioned about the EU’s responsibility, the answers 
given by Europhiles and Euroskeptics are more likely to be biased and consequently less 
accurate. Individuals without strong predispositions for or against the European Union, whom 
we refer to as “centrists”, are more likely to process information in a non-biased way and thus 
better able to allocate responsibility.   
 
H2: Individuals with strong attitudes about European integration are less able 
to correctly assign responsibility compared to centrists. 
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Opportunity: Contextual Information and the Politicization of European Integration 
 
Moving away from determinants at the individual level, we now turn to the role of the 
information context. Citizens do not acquire information in a vacuum; they are affected by the 
type of information available in the contextual environment and the saliency of a given issue. 
The political context can motivate, provide information, and help even low informed citizens to 
gain knowledge (Kuklinski et al. 2001). Previous studies have shown that the knowledge gap 
between low and high sophisticates can shrink when more information is provided in the 
political context (Nicholson 2003; Iyengar et al. 2010; Jerit and Barabas 2006). What type of 
political environment provides the opportunity to acquire information about complex structures 
of governance and motivates citizens to pay attention to this information? 
 
We argue that the politicization of the European issue plays an important role in determining 
not only the availability of information but also the salience of the issue to individual citizens. 
Recent work on political behavior in Europe has argued that the issue of European integration 
is becoming increasingly politicized as we are witnessing public contention over European 
matters in referendums, party competition and media reporting (de Vreese 2003; Tillman 2004; 
de Vries 2007; Kriesi et al. 2008; Hobolt 2009; Hooghe and Marks 2009). EU politicization 
refers to the increasing contentiousness of decision making in the process of European 
integration (Schmitter 1969). Hooghe and Marks posit that this politicization has changed both 
the content and the process of decision making in the EU (2009, 8).  Importantly, however, the 
level of politicization of European issues varies considerably across countries. We know from 
studies of vote choice in referendums and elections that arena-specific voting - so-called “EU 
issue voting” - is more pronounced when the European issue is politicized in the domestic 
sphere (Tillman 2004; de Vries 2007; Hobolt 2009). Equally, we would expect that the level of 
politicization of the European Union in a country affects the acquisition of information about 
the European Union’s responsibilities by increasing the amount of information available about 
the EU and making it a salient issue to more citizens. In turn, the increased salience and 
available information provides an opportunity for all citizens to acquire information about EU 
responsibilities. 
 
It is important to note that a lack of politicization in the field of EU studies has been 
associated with elite (and media) consensus in favor of European integration, and generally 
little public debate.  Consequently, politicization mostly implies that actors more critical of the 
EU are given a v oice, creating debate and increasing the amount of negativity surrounding 
European integration. For this study, we envision two key indicators of politicization: the 
negativity of media coverage of the European Union and perceived party polarization on the 
EU issue. Learning can occur in negative contexts through two mechanisms: by the increased 
availability and attention to information, and by increasing its salience.  Negativity makes 
issues salient: studies have uncovered a negativity bias whereby negative information stands 
out above positive information (Rozin and Royzman 2001). One reason for this is that negative 
stories are more likely to capture an individual’s attention through physiological arousal. 
Negative arousal in particular is associated with retaining more information (Reeves et al. 1991, 
Lang et al. 1996). As individuals pay the most attention to negative stories, we expect that the 
EU is most salient in countries with more negative coverage of EU news or where parties are 
perceived as polarized along the EU dimension. Individuals in negative media contexts have 
more opportunity to learn about the European Union either directly through the news stories 
since individuals pay more attention to and retain more negative news information, or by an 
increased motivation to acquire additional information about the EU resulting from the 
increased salience of European issues. 
 
Negative coverage in the media is not the only way to make an issue relevant to citizens. We 
would expect the EU to be salient in contexts where parties are polarized on the European 
integration dimension. Issue salience to the public increases when political parties are polarized 
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on that domain (Milazzo et. al 2010). When political parties move towards the center on a 
particular issue, it makes the issue less salient to voters. Therefore in contexts where there is 
little party polarization on the issue of European integration, the EU will not be a salient matter 
and there will be less information available than in highly polarized contexts. In summary, 
previous work has shown that individuals in negative and/or politicized contexts have more 
opportunity to learn from the information-rich environment and are motivated to do so because 
of the perceived relevance of the topic. We theorize that in contexts where the European Union 
is highly politicized through the media or party polarization, there will be more information 
available to citizens and they will pay more attention due to the saliency of the topic.   
 
H3: The more negative the media tone is on stories about the European Union, 
the more correctly individuals will attribute responsibility. 
 
H4: Individuals in contexts where parties are polarized along the European 
dimension will more correctly allocate responsibility. 
 
 
Conditioning Effect of the Politicized Context  
 
As just discussed, increased saliency in the political environment can motivate and provide an 
opportunity for individuals to pay more attention and acquire more information compared to 
individuals in low-salience contexts. However, the cues provided by increased politicization do 
not motivate everyone similarly, but rather provide incentives for specific groups to acquire 
knowledge. The political context and group identification can separately increase the salience 
of an issue, but they can also interact for greater salience among certain groups in specific 
contexts (Hutchings 2001, 2003). In addition, in-group attitudes motivate individuals to 
dedicate more information processing and complex reasoning when information is, on the 
surface, negative towards the in-group (Schaller 1992). Along these lines, we expect that in 
contexts where the European dimension is highly politicized, this will motivate EU supporters 
to seek out additional information.    
 
In the context of negative information about the EU, we theorize that information processing 
by EU supporters may be influenced by various motivations and consumption goals, including 
(dis)confirmation biases and accuracy goals. When an individual is confronted with 
information contrary to his beliefs, such as a Europhile in an environment highly politicized 
along the European dimension, he may be motivated to argue against or discount the 
information so that his beliefs are not disconfirmed.  This disconfirmation bias is particularly 
strong for the politically sophisticated and those with strong prior attitudes (Taber and Lodge 
2006; Taber et al. 2009). Similarly, a confirmation bias occurs when, given a choice, people 
will preferentially seek out information that is non-threatening to their beliefs or congruent with 
their pre-existing attitudes. Therefore we would expect EU supporters to not only discount 
information that is contrary to their beliefs, but also to be prone to a confirmation bias whereby 
they seek out additional information that supports their pro-EU attitudes. In contrast, we would 
not expect that negative environments motivate Euroskeptics to seek out additional 
information, as the context is already congruent with their predisposed beliefs. 
 
Individuals who engage in an effortful search for information with the goal of forming 
accurate impressions are much more likely to report correct information or impressions than 
individuals who do not  have an accuracy goal (Huang and Price 2001, B iesanz and Human 
2010). When individuals undertake reasoning driven by accuracy goals, they spend more time 
and effort in evaluating the information and are much less reliant on several types of bias and 
heuristic shortcuts (cf. Kunda 1990). Therefore, we argue that in a highly politicized context, 
Europhiles will be motivated more by accuracy goals and therefore make more correct 
attributions of responsibility. More generally, individuals in political contexts that are contrary 
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to their partisan predispositions will be more motivated to acquire information and better able 
to make accurate judgments.   
 
As discussed above, we envision two different politicized contexts that would potentially 
moderate EU attitudes: negative media tone and party polarization. This leads to our final 
hypothesis, which examines the interaction between context and political predispositions: 
 
H5a: EU supporters are better able to assign responsibility in contexts where 
the EU dimension is highly politicized compared with EU supporters in less 
politicized contexts. 
 
H5b: Euroskeptics are better able to assign responsibility in contexts where the 
EU dimension is not highly politicized compared with Euroskeptics in more 
politicized contexts. 
 
 
Descriptive Summary of the Data 
 
To test our hypotheses of responsibility attributions, we rely on three separate datasets: the 
2009 European Election Study Voter Survey (EES 2009; van Egmond et al. 2009) which 
included a module of responsibility questions (Hobolt et al. 2009), the EES Media Study 
(Schuck et al. 2010) and a survey of experts on EU policy making conducted by the authors. 
The voter survey was fielded during the four weeks immediately following the June 2009 
European Parliament elections, with randomly-drawn samples of at least 1,000 respondents in 
each of the EU’s 27 Member States. The Media Study includes content analysis of news stories 
from two broadsheets and one tabloid as well as the main evening news broadcasts from each 
EU country. In total, 52,009 television and newspaper stories were coded. Finally, to ascertain 
“correct” evaluations of European Union responsibility, we designed a survey of experts on 
European policy making. One hundred seventy-five potential expert respondents were sent a 
link to complete the survey online in February 2010 and the survey included the same 
responsibility questions as in the voter survey. We succeeded in obtaining at least two expert 
respondents per EU Member State and a total of 117 individuals responded (67 percent 
response rate). The goal was not to obtain a perfect distribution across countries, in particular 
since EU experts are not represented equally throughout the Member States, but rather to have 
enough variation to be able to average the responses to obtain an “expert evaluation” of 
European Union policy responsibility.3  
 
The question modules on a ttributions of responsibility in both voter and expert surveys 
probed respondents for their responsibility judgments in five policy areas. The questions were 
worded as: 
 
How responsible is the (country) government for economic conditions in (country)?  
Please indicate your views using any number on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 
“no responsibility” and 10 means “full responsibility.” 
 
And what about the European Union, how responsible is the EU for economic 
conditions in (country)? 
 
These questions are repeated, substituting the following policy areas: 
• standard of health care 
• levels of immigration 
• setting interest rates 
3 For the question on interest rates, experts were separated into two groups – Eurozone and non-Eurozone 
–before taking the expert average. 
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• dealing with climate change 
 
A possible critique is that these questions do not specify which institution within the 
European Union – European Parliament, Commission, Central Bank, etc. is responsible. 
However, most citizens tend not distinguish between the myriad of European institutions (Karp 
et al. 2003) so it should not pose a problem when measuring citizen perceptions of EU 
responsibility.   
 
Table 1 provides a summary of expert and citizen attributions of functional responsibility to 
their national governments and the European Union across five policy areas. Table 1 gives the 
mean and standard deviation for each group, and citizens are further divided into three groups 
based on their level of political sophistication, as well as Eurozone/non-Eurozone for the 
interest rate questions.4 T-tests show the difference between experts and citizens are statistically 
significant at the 99% level. On average, citizens attribute higher levels of responsibility to both 
the European Union (EU) and their national governments (NG) than do experts in all areas 
except two: Eurozone citizens attribute less responsibility than the experts do to the EU for 
interest rates, and citizens attribute less responsibility than the experts do to the national 
government for health care. However, the difference in NG health care evaluations is small, and 
both citizens and experts give the overall highest score to the NG government for health care.   
 
To be able to assess the extent to which citizens assign responsibility correctly, we compare 
the scores given by individuals in our voter survey with the scores of experts. Before 
proceeding to the multivariate analysis, let us first examine how political sophistication 
facilitates correct responsibility attributions. As shown in Table 1, when dividing the 
respondents by political sophistication, there is more variation between sophistication groups in 
some policy areas than others, and it is clear that low sophisticates had more difficulty 
allocating responsibility to the European Union than they did to their national governments. 
Looking first at attributions to the national government, there is little difference between 
sophistication groups in attributions of responsibility for the economy, immigration, and 
climate change, and many of these differences are not statistically significant.  Interestingly, the 
largest discrepancies between high and low sophisticates, each more than 1 point difference, are 
in the cases where lines of responsibility between the EU and national government are most 
clear: interest rates and health care. Low sophisticates over-attribute responsibility to their 
national governments in these areas. This supports the theory that high political sophisticates 
are better able to understand division of responsibility in complex governance systems. 
In addition, the standard deviations in each issue area are smallest for the experts and largest 
for the low sophisticates.5 These standard deviations show that while there is some variation in 
expert opinion, there is much less disagreement among experts than there is among citizens. To 
verify that the citizen and expert mean scores are significantly different, Figure 1 shows the 
mean scores with 95% confidence intervals.6   
4 Political sophistication is a summated scale created from the political knowledge questions (q92-98).  
Alpha score of .67.  While no measure is perfect, factual true/false questions are the best measure of 
political knowledge (Zaller 1992).  For the descriptive tables, we divided political sophistication into 3 
groups: bottom 25% for low sophisticates; middle 50% for medium sophisticates, and top 25% for high 
sophisticates. 
5 With the exception of interest rates, although this could be due to experts and high sophisticates 
thinking about the role of central banks that is external to the government responsibility. 
6 The confidence intervals were derived analytically from the data. In addition, we separately obtained 
the 95% confidence intervals by bootstrapping, which does not require any assumptions about the 
distributional properties of the data. With three different methods of confidence intervals: normal, 
percentile, and BCa, the results were nearly identical (± .01) to the analytically derived confidence 
intervals.   
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Table 1: Comparing expert and citizen attributions of responsibility 
 Experts  All Citizens  
High 
Sophisticates  
Medium 
Sophisticates  
Low 
Sophisticates 
Issue  Mean   (SD)   Mean (SD)  Mean (SD)  Mean (SD)  Mean (SD) 
NG - Economy 
            
5.88  
  
(1.84)  7.19 (2.72)  7.09 (2.51)  7.23 (2.68)  7.19 (3.00) 
EU - Economy 
            
4.48  
  
(1.86)   5.70 (2.70)   5.36 (2.54)   5.68 (2.68)   6.10 (2.84) 
NG - Health Care 
            
8.13  
  
(1.77)  7.80 (2.70)  8.03 (2.40)  7.81 (2.68)  7.57 (2.98) 
EU - Health Care 
            
2.28  
  
(1.96)   4.72 (3.00)   4.03 (2.82)   4.71 (2.97)   5.47 (3.09) 
NG - Immigration 
            
6.69  
  
(2.09)  7.23 (2.81)  7.16 (2.64)  7.23 (2.79)  7.31 (3.01) 
EU - Immigration 
            
4.18  
  
(2.28)   6.00 (3.03)   5.71 (2.93)   5.98 (3.03)   6.34 (3.10) 
NG Interest Rates - Non Eurozone 
            
4.53  
  
(3.35)  6.80 (3.22)  6.26 (3.31)  6.82 (3.17)  7.19 (3.18) 
EU Interest Rates - Non Eurozone 
            
3.04  
  
(3.32)   5.26 (3.26)   4.61 (3.15)   5.28 (3.22)   5.81 (3.33) 
NG Interest Rates - Eurozone 
            
2.38  
  
(2.55)  5.96 (3.08)  5.19 (3.25)  6.05 (2.97)  6.70 (2.94) 
EU Interest Rates - Eurozone 
            
7.95  
  
(2.10)   6.29 (2.88)   6.34 (3.00)   6.25 (2.83)   6.33 (2.86) 
NG - Climate Change 
            
5.83  
  
(2.16)  6.25 (3.10)  6.32 (2.93)  6.27 (3.08)  6.12 (3.32) 
EU - Climate Change 
            
5.50  
  
(2.12)   6.22 (3.03)   6.29 (2.86)   6.23 (3.01)   6.10 (3.24) 
 
n 117   27069   6103   14416   6550  
               
 
  
 
Figure 1: Mean expert and citizen attributions of responsibility to the European Union 
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Even though expert standard deviations are much smaller than the citizen standard 
deviations, the confidence intervals are much larger for the experts. These larger confidence 
intervals for the expert evaluations are primarily a function of a smaller sample size (~115 
experts compared to 27,000 citizens). Importantly, in no issue area do the confidence intervals 
overlap between citizen and expert means. In some policy areas they do overlap between 
sophistication groupings, which suggests that political sophistication does not play an equally 
important role across policy areas. It is perhaps not surprising that citizens at all levels of 
sophistication attribute similar responsibility to the EU for climate change. Being a cross-
national issue that is frequently discussed at the European level, it would seem that the EU 
should be responsible. However, the EU does not have much formal power in this area, so it is 
a difficult policy for citizens to distinguish. We also see no difference between sophistication 
groupings in the Eurozone for interest rates. Overall, from examining these graphs we can be 
confident that there is a difference in how experts and the average citizen perceive European 
Union responsibility, and that political sophistication brings individuals closer to expert 
evaluations. 
 
When examining attributions of responsibility to the European Union, we see the number of 
low sophisticates responding to the question declines considerably. In the low sophisticates 
group, up to 10 percent fewer people responded to each responsibility question compared to the 
high sophisticates group. Low political sophisticates are much more likely to respond they 
“don’t know” rather than assign a responsibility score. This indicates the possibility of 
overestimating the low sophisticates’ accuracy; that if all low sophisticates had answered 
questions about EU responsibility, they may have been even farther from the expert evaluation. 
In addition, low sophisticates were much more likely to refuse to answer questions about EU 
responsibility but were willing to answer the national government questions in the same policy 
area. This indicates that low sophisticates feel more comfortable assigning responsibility to 
their national governments than to the European Union. This is another example of low 
sophisticates being less knowledgeable about the European Union, and is further evidence that 
political sophistication facilitates attributions of responsibility in multilevel government 
systems.   
 
While the high sophisticates are nearly always closer to the expert mean score than the 
medium or low sophisticates, it is clear that citizens of all sophistication levels had a m ore 
difficult time assigning responsibility to the European Union than to their national 
governments. Differences across sophistication groups are much smaller when attributing 
responsibility to their national governments.   
 
Overall, citizens are more familiar and comfortable with the role of their national 
governments and are better able to correctly assign responsibility at the national level. This 
raises the important question of why some people are better able to attribute responsibility to 
the EU than others. Therefore, the empirical analysis will focus only on assignment of 
responsibility to the EU and not to the national government. We turn now to the multivariate 
analysis of the individual-level and contextual-level factors to test our hypotheses about the role 
of ability, motivation, and politicization in correctly allocating responsibility to the European 
Union. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
The goal of this empirical study is to compare citizen and expert attributions of responsibility to 
the EU to examine the individual-level characteristics and contextual factors that help citizens 
correctly allocate responsibility. The outcome variable is a measure of how close a citizen’s 
assignment of responsibility is to the expert evaluation. To create our outcome variable, 
closeness to the expert evaluation, we first calculated the mean expert attribution of 
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responsibility for each issue area.7 Next, we subtracted an individual’s attribution of 
responsibility from the expert mean and took the absolute value to find the distance from expert 
evaluation. Finally, we averaged across the five policy areas to create the outcome variable of 
closeness to expert evaluation.8 Similar to how a multi-item scale can correct for measurement 
error, by using the average across all policy areas, we obtain a m ore accurate picture of 
individuals’ general understanding of EU responsibility. 
 
The individual-level models estimate the importance of cognitive ability and partisan 
motivations in making correct responsibility judgments. To test the hypotheses that cognitive 
ability facilitates correct responsibility attributions, political knowledge (described above) is 
included as an explanatory variable. We also theorized that predispositions towards the 
European Union would motivate individuals to preferentially seek information in line with their 
EU attitudes, resulting in biased information processing and less accurate allocations of 
responsibility among individuals with strong pro- or anti-EU sentiment. EU attitudes is a 
standardized scale, with positive values being most supportive of the European Union.9 All 
individual level variables were grand-mean centered. 
 
In the interactive models, the linear variable EU attitudes is divided into three categories: 
Euroskeptics (bottom 25%), Centrists (middle 50%) and EU Supporters (top 25%). The 
Euroskeptics and EU supporters are the individuals with the most consistent, strong attitudes.  
Centrists is a more diverse group, and could include people who are ambivalent about the EU, 
who either have no strong opinion or who have a combination of positive and negative views of 
European integration. For this research, the heterogeneity of the Centrists group is not a 
concern as the theoretical focus is on individuals who identify strong EU attitudes.   
 
To test our hypotheses on the direct and conditioning effects of politicization, two 
contextual-level variables will be included in separate models. The first, negative media tone, is 
a measure of the tone of news stories about EU-related topics in television broadcasts and 
newspapers.10 The variable has been reversed so that higher values correspond to a m ore 
negative tone on EU issues. While negative media tone is a content analysis of news stories 
from only the two weeks leading up to the EP elections, it should provide an accurate picture of 
the media context as these two weeks would be a salient time for European-related news stories 
across the 27 Member States. Second, party polarization is a measure of the political party 
system on the issue of European integration. It uses the voters’ placement of the parties in the 
EES voter survey and is calculated as the standard deviation of the mean party positions in each 
political system.11 Finally, to test the moderating effects politicization, we include interaction 
terms of EU attitudes and our two politicization measures. 
 
7 While there was less variation in the experts’ attributions of responsibility than the citizens’ attributions, 
the experts were not in complete agreement. To ensure the robustness of the findings, we also calculated 
the dependent variable using the lower and upper bounds of the expert confidence interval as the mean 
expert score. The substantive conclusions did not change in either case. 
8 We also ran models separately on each policy area with the same substantive conclusions. For space 
and presentation considerations, they are not presented here but are available from the authors upon 
request.   
9 EU attitudes is a standardized item scale created from four equally weighted questions: q79, q80, q83, 
and q81; alpha score of .71. Please see appendix for question wording. These items were chosen for the 
scale of EU attitudes as they were highly correlated with each other and meet the monotone homogeneity 
assumption in item-rest tests. In addition, we model it as a one-dimensional construct, as we found strong 
unidimensionality in the responses. Furthermore Euroskepticism is normally modeled unidimensionally 
in the literature (see e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2005). 
10This is a measure from coding how news stories evaluated the European Union, European Parliament, 
and potential enlargement: negative, rather negative, balanced/mixed, rather positive, positive.     
11 Our findings are robust when we instead use the range of the parties’ positions in each system with the 
EES data. 
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Multilevel models will be used to analyze both the individual-level and contextual-level 
variation in closeness to expert evaluations. A multilevel, or hierarchical, model allows for 
estimating the variance between individuals as well as the variance between countries to 
specifically correct for the clustered nature of the data. In addition, multilevel modeling is 
necessary for hierarchical data such as cross-national surveys to obtain correct standard errors 
(Snijders and Bosker 1999). A benefit of cross-national studies is that variation at the 
contextual, or country, level is analyzed to help explain why similar individuals in different 
countries may have different outcomes. At the individual level we have over 25,000 
observations and therefore it poses no problem to include multiple individual-level predictor 
variables. However, at the country level we have just 28 observations which limits the degrees 
of freedom available and restricts the number of country-level independent variables that can be 
tested. We will therefore run separate models with different contextual effects to check the 
robustness of our politicization theory. A final model with both contextual variables will be 
assessed, bearing in mind the limitations due to the small number of second-level units. 
 
 
Results 
 
To test our hypotheses, we estimate three sets of models. Each model includes the same 
individual-level variables but different country-level variables to test the robustness of 
politicization as a predictor of accurate responsibility judgments. The results are shown in Table 
2. Recall that all variables were grand mean centered, so the intercept can be interpreted as the 
effect for the average respondent. The coefficients are then an indication of increasing or 
decreasing from the average. 
 
At the individual level, we proposed that cognitive abilities would facilitate while EU 
attitudes would motivate information acquisition and processing. For the sake of parsimony and 
clarity of effects, our models presented include only two individual-level variables. However, a 
model with the full battery of controls is available in the appendix.12 First, we theorized that 
citizens with high levels of political knowledge are generally more aware of and able to process 
political topics and would therefore make attributions closer to expert evaluations. We find this 
hypothesis is supported: political knowledge is strongly associated with correct responsibility 
attributions.13 This finding is not surprising, but it could not be assumed. Citizens usually have 
limited knowledge about the European Union governance, so it is important to confirm that 
political sophistication facilitates correct attributions of responsibility. 
For the second individual-level covariate, we examine how political predispositions 
motivate information processing. We theorized that while EU supporters and Euroskeptics may 
be motivated to learn about the European Union and are more receptive to information about it, 
they select and process the information in a biased way. Therefore, they will make 
responsibility judgments that are less accurate. On the other hand, individuals with ambivalent 
attitudes towards the EU are much less likely to suffer from a partisan bias and therefore are 
better able to acquire factual content about the European Union.  This hypothesis was strongly 
supported: both Euroskeptics and EU supporters make less accurate responsibility judgments 
than do the “centrists”. This is demonstrated in Figure 2 below, which plots the fitted values of 
the dependent variable, holding all other covariates at their mean
12 Note that the full model including educational attainment and other socioeconomic indicators as 
control variables does not change the strength or significance of our main findings presented here. While 
educational attainment is relevant to responsibility formations, we did not include education in the 
presented model for concerns about possible collinearity. The full model specification is available in 
Appendix 3. 
13 The knowledge items from the survey included questions about the EU and national governments. In 
models testing the EU and national items separately, both EU and national government knowledge had a 
strong and significant positive association with correct responsibility attributions.   
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Table 2: Multilevel model of closeness to expert evaluation 
   
 Model 1a   Model 1b  Model 2a  Model 2b  Model 3a  Model 3b  
  Coef. SE     Coef. SE   Coef. SE   Coef. SE   Coef. SE   Coef. SE   
Intercept -2.72 (0.05) **  -2.73 (0.05) ** -2.71 (0.05) ** -2.72 (0.05) ** -2.71 (0.05) ** -2.73 (0.05) ** 
                    
Knowledge 0.09 (0.00) **  0.09 (0.00) ** 0.09 (0.00) ** 0.09 (0.00) ** 0.09 (0.00) ** 0.09 (0.00) ** 
EU Attitudes 0.06 (0.01) **     0.06 (0.01) **    0.06 (0.01) **    
EU Attitudes^2 -0.20 (0.01) **     -0.20 (0.01) **    -0.20 (0.01) **    
                    
Euroskeptics     -0.27 (0.01) **    -0.28 (0.02) **    -0.28 (0.02) ** 
EU Supporters     -0.10 (0.01) **    -0.11 (0.02) **    -0.10 (0.02) ** 
(Base = Centrists)                    
                    
Negative Media Tone 0.22 (0.08) *  0.20 (0.09) *       0.18 (0.08) * 0.18 (0.08) * 
Media Tone*Skeptics     -0.04 (0.03)           -0.07 (0.03) * 
Media Tone*Supporters     0.06 (0.03) *          0.06 (0.03) * 
                    
Party Polarization        0.33 (0.13) * 0.28 (0.12) * 0.28 (0.12) * 0.24 (0.12) - 
Party Polar*Skeptics           0.11 (0.04) **    0.14 (0.05) * 
Party Polar*Supporters           0.05 (0.05)     0.04 (0.05)  
                    
                    
Number of individuals 
2622
    26228   
2622
   26228   26228   26228   
Number of contexts 28    28   28   28   28   28   
                    
Between-Country Variance 0.07 (0.27)     0.07 (0.27)   0.07 (0.27)   0.07 (0.27)   0.06 (0.25)   0.06 (0.25)   
-p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01                    
Source: European Election Study 2009 and Expert Survey 2010              
 
     
Figure 2: Fitted values of EU attitudes on responsibility allocations 
 
At the country-level, we proposed that politicization creates an opportunity for citizens to 
learn from the information-rich environment, resulting in more correct assignments of 
responsibility across levels of government. In contexts where the EU is highly politicized, the 
European issue becomes more salient and more accessible for people to learn about it. We 
tested this theory with two different contextual-level variables: negative media tone and party 
polarization. First, we find support for the direct effects of negativity in the media, shown in 
Model 1a. The EU is more salient to individuals in countries where the news stories about the 
EU are primarily negative, and they are able to make more accurate responsibility judgments. 
To test the interactive effects, we categorize EU attitudes by dividing it into three discrete 
groups: Euroskeptics (bottom 25%), Centrists (middle 50%) and EU Supporters (top 25%). 
Negative media tone significantly moderates the effect of EU attitudes, as d emonstrated in 
Model 1b.  Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of this interaction effect.  
The figures compare Euroskeptics (Figure 3a) and EU Supporters (Figure 3b) with the 
baseline Centrist category at different levels of negative media tone. Recall that higher values 
represent more negativity in the media. The lines show a sam ple of the 28 media contexts, 
including the most negative context (top line) and most positive context (bottom line). These 
graphs show that the media tone moderates the effect of EU attitudes in contexts that are 
contrary to an individual’s partisan dispositions.  This is most clear for EU supporters: in the 
most negative media environment, they make much more accurate attributions than do EU 
supporters in positive environments. This is evidenced by the nearly flat line in figure 3b: there 
is no discernible difference between the attributions of EU supporters and Centrists in the most 
negative media contexts. However, the bottom line is quite steep: Europhiles in positive 
environments do not face any cognitive dissonance: the  positive  context  is  in  line  with  their 
partisan predispositions, and therefore they are not motivated to seek out unbiased information.  
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       Figure 3a: Negative media tone moderates EU attitudes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Figure 3b: Negative media tone moderates EU attitudes 
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For both graphs, the flatter the line, the less difference there is between those with strong 
attitudes and centrists. In other words, we see that individuals with strong EU attitudes are 
motivated by contexts that are contrary to their partisan predispositions. This supports our 
theoretical expectation that when confronted with an environment that is contrary to an 
individual’s beliefs, individuals will be motivated by accuracy goals to seek out information 
which results in improved attributions of responsibility. In contexts that do not  threaten their 
beliefs, partisan biases are more likely, resulting in less accurate attributions.Our second 
politicization variable was party polarization. As shown above in Table 2, Model 2a, there are 
strong direct effects of party polarization on a ccurate responsibility judgments. We find the 
same effects as those with negative media tone on EU issues: individuals living in countries 
where political parties are polarized on the European integration dimension make more 
accurate responsibility evaluations. While the interaction between party polarization and EU 
attitudes was highly significant, the magnitude is quite small. When graphed, the interaction is 
nearly indiscernible. Therefore, we focus on the importance of strong direct effects of party 
polarization in increasing correct allocations of responsibility. The politicization indicators, 
media tone and party polarization, both support the theory that increased politicization creates 
an environment where individuals have access to information and improves correct attributions 
of responsibility.   
Finally, we test a model with both contextual-level politicization indicators to see i f the 
effects of one are perhaps controlled for by the other (Model 3). When including both negative 
media tone and party polarization, the magnitude of both decreases slightly, but they retain their 
statistical and substantive significance. This suggests that while both predictors are measures of 
politicization and have similar effects on correct attributions of responsibility, they are tapping 
into slightly different processes. This is further supported by their low correlation (.16). The 
lack of association between politicization variables could help explain why there is a significant 
interactive effect with negative media tone and EU attitudes but not with party polarization, and 
lends further support to the claim that politicization, in various forms, increases the amount of 
information available in the context. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Citizens generally are uninformed about political affairs and are lacking in political knowledge. 
It is especially difficult for them to understand allocations of responsibility in complex 
institutional structures. Indeed, some scholars have argued that it is irrational for voters to 
spend the necessary time and energy to become well-informed. Yet it is crucial for democratic 
accountability that citizens have at least a basic understanding of governmental responsibility. 
To that end, this chapter sought to discover whether European citizens can correctly allocate 
responsibility to the national government and European Union. In addition, if becoming 
informed is costly, what motivates citizens to seek out information?   
 
We proposed a theory that builds upon the ability-motivation-opportunity structure and took 
into account individual and contextual factors. At the individual level, we posited that cognitive 
ability facilitates the acquisition and consumption of information. Moreover, while support or 
opposition to European integration may motivate individuals to acquire information, it also 
promotes biased information processing which leads to less accurate responsibility judgments. 
At the contextual level, we theorized that politicization on the European issue would provide an 
information-rich context where citizens can learn about the EU. The increased salience of the 
EU and opportunity to easily acquire information motivates individuals and improves their 
understanding of EU responsibility. Finally, we expected the political environment to moderate 
the effect of individual EU attitudes on the accuracy of attribution judgments: those with strong 
opinions about the EU would be more likely to engage in unbiased information processing 
when confronted with a politicized environment in opposition to their partisan beliefs. 
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The empirical study provided support for this theoretical model. First, high political 
sophisticates are more likely to correctly allocate responsibility than are low knowledge 
citizens. Second, individuals with strong EU attitudes engage in more biased information 
processing as they selectively acquire information to support their predispositions, compared to 
EU centrists. This results in Euroskeptics’ and EU supporters’ attributions of responsibility 
being farther away from the expert evaluations.  
 
At the contextual level, politicization of the European issue motivates individuals to seek 
additional information. We demonstrated the robustness of this finding by showing that two 
different types of politicization resulted in more correct responsibility attributions: negative 
media tone on EU stories and party polarization on European integration. In contexts where the 
EU is politicized, it becomes a salient topic for citizens. There was a direct effect of negative 
media tone and party polarization on more accurate responsibility judgments. We also found a 
strong conditioning effect of politicization, with negative media tone moderating individual EU 
attitudes. When individuals are located in highly-politicized environments that are contrary to 
their beliefs, they are motivated to seek out more information and are able to make better 
responsibility attributions. Contrary to what might be expected, highly politicized contexts lead 
to improved understanding of European Union functions. One might imagine that a Europhile 
from a pro-Europe country would be the most knowledgeable about the EU, but it is actually 
the citizens living in politicized environments that are motivated to acquire additional 
information.   
 
These findings have important implications for our understanding of what facilitates and 
motivates individuals to learn about complex political matters. While cognitive ability is 
important, it is only one factor that facilitates political learning; motivation and opportunity are 
also crucial. Individual interest or perceived group membership, as well as an information-rich 
context, make the issue salient and motivate individuals to seek out information. However 
partisan biases influence information processing, which prevents many individuals with strong 
attitudes from making complex allocations of responsibility that approach expert evaluations. 
Future studies could more closely explore the link between attitudes/biases and individual 
ability to understand complex political institutions, as well as the different moderating effects 
of various politicized contexts. 
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Appendix  1: Question Wording from EES Voter Survey 
 
Political Knowledge 
Q92.    Switzerland is a member of the EU 
Q93.    The European Union has 25 member states 
Q94.    Every country in the EU elects the same number of representatives to the European 
Parliament. 
Q95.    Every six months, a different Member State becomes president of the Council of the 
European Union 
Q96.    The [Country] Minister of Education {or appropriate national title} is [Insert Name].  
Q97.    Individuals must be 25 or older to stand as candidates in [Country] general elections. 
Q98.    There are [actual number + 50%] members of the [Country] parliament. 
 
EU Attitudes 
Q79.    Generally speaking, do you think that [Country's] membership of the European Union 
is a good thing, bad thing, or neither good nor bad? 
Q80.    Some say European Unification should be pushed further.  Others say it already has 
gone too far.  What is your opinion?  Please indicate your views using a scale from 0 to 
10, where 0 means unification ‘has already gone too far’ and 10 means it ‘should be 
pushed further’.  What number on this scale best describes your position? 
Q83.    In general, do you think that enlargement of the European Union would be a good 
thing, bad thing, or neither good nor bad? 
Q91.    How much confidence do you have that decisions made by the European Union will be 
in the interest of (country)? A great deal of confidence, a fair amount, not very much, or 
no confidence at all. 
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Appendix 2: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
 
Variable n Mean SD Min Max 
      
Individual-Level Variables      
Closeness to Expert Evaluation 26236 -2.82 1.25 -7.95 -0.05 
      
Grand-Mean Centered (used in models)      
Political Knowledge 27069 0.00 1.87 -3.90 3.10 
EU Attitudes 27056 0.00 0.73 -2.30 1.44 
      
Original Scale      
Political Knowledge 27069 3.90 1.87 0 7 
EU Attitudes 27056 -0.01 0.73 -2.30 1.44 
      
Contextual-Level Variables      
Negative Tone 28 0.16 0.59 -1.36 1.26 
EU Party Polarization - Standard Deviation 28 1.12 0.40 0.42 1.97 
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Appendix 3: Hierarchical Model 
Table A3.1: Model with standard control variables 
 
Direct Effects 
Only   
Interaction 
Effects  
  Coef. SE         Coef.   SE   
Intercept -2.72 (0.05) **  -2.72 (0.05) ** 
        
Knowledge 0.07 (0.00) **  0.07 (0.00) ** 
EU Attitudes 0.04 (0.01) **     
EU Attitudes^2 -0.20 (0.01) **     
        
Euroskeptics     -0.24 (0.02) ** 
EU Supporters     -0.11 (0.02) ** 
(Base = Centrists)        
        
Control Variables        
Education 0.06 (0.00) **  0.06 (0.00) ** 
Age -0.002 (0.00) **  -0.002 (0.00) ** 
Female -0.07 (0.02) **  -0.07 (0.02) ** 
Social Class (Base = Routine non-manual) 
Upper Service 0.07 (0.02) **  0.07 (0.02) **  
Lower Service 0.05 (0.03)   0.05 (0.03)   
Petty Bourgeois -0.00 (0.03)   -0.01 (0.03)   
Skilled -0.10 (0.02) **  -0.10 (0.02) **  
Non-Skilled -0.11 (0.02) **  -0.11 (0.02) **  
Still in Education 0.02 (0.03)   0.03 (0.04)   
Other 0.01 (0.02)   0.02 (0.03)   
        
Negative Media Tone 0.17 (0.08) *  0.16 (0.09) - 
Media Tone*Skeptics     -0.06 (0.03) - 
Media Tone*Supporters     0.06 (0.03) - 
        
Party Polarization 0.27 (0.12) *  0.23 (0.12) - 
Party Polar*Skeptics     0.14 (0.05) * 
Party Polar*Supporters     0.02 (0.05)  
        
Number of individuals 26228    26228   
Number of contexts 28    28   
        
Between-Country Variance 0.06 (0.24)     0.06 (0.24)   
-p<.1 *p<.05 **p<.01        
Source: European Election Study 2009 and Expert Survey 2010  
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